nmhra claim in New Mexico

2013Moreover, even if the same facts give rise to different remedies, this is not a sufficient basis for ignoring that the Legislature has provided for the right to bring a NMHRA claim “de novo.” And, as recognized in Chandler, the statutory right to bring a NMHRA claim “de novo” encompasses more than merely reviewing the administrative determinations made by the employee agency. {34} Defendants ask us to consider University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788 (1986) as a basis for distinguishing Alexander and Chandler.

2013Moreover, even if the same facts give rise to different remedies, this is not a sufficient basis for ignoring that the Legislature has provided for the right to bring a NMHRA claim “de novo.” And, as recognized in Chandler, the statutory right to bring a NMHRA claim “de novo” encompasses more than merely reviewing the administrative determinations made by the employee agency. {34} Defendants ask us to consider University of Tennessee v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788 (1986) as a basis for distinguishing Alexander and Chandler.

2016But 12 “[pro se] pleadings, however inar[t]fully expressed, must tell a story from which, 13 looking to substance rather than form, the essential elements prerequisite to the 14 granting of the relief sought can be found or reasonably inferred.” Birdo v. Rodriguez, 15 1972-NMSC-062 , ¶ 6, 84 N.M. 207 , 501 P.2d 195 .

2016But 12 “[pro se] pleadings, however inar[t]fully expressed, must tell a story from which, 13 looking to substance rather than form, the essential elements prerequisite to the 14 granting of the relief sought can be found or reasonably inferred.” Birdo v. Rodriguez, 15 1972-NMSC-062 , ¶ 6, 84 N.M. 207 , 501 P.2d 195 .

2024We further proposed to reject Plaintiff’s suggestion that her ignorance of the relevant procedure, the difficulty she experienced finding counsel to represent her, and her medical condition should supply grounds for equitable tolling. [Unnumbered DS 4] See Trujillo v. Serrano, 1994-NMSC- 024, ¶¶ 15-19, 117 N.M. 273 , 871 P.2d 369 (providing that only the most unusual circumstances beyond the control of the parties will warrant overlooking procedural defects, and explaining that litigants “should not rely on the court’s munificence when filing notices of appeal [because i]t is incumbent upon th

2024We further proposed to reject Plaintiff’s suggestion that her ignorance of the relevant procedure, the difficulty she experienced finding counsel to represent her, and her medical condition should supply grounds for equitable tolling. [Unnumbered DS 4] See Trujillo v. Serrano, 1994-NMSC- 024, ¶¶ 15-19, 117 N.M. 273 , 871 P.2d 369 (providing that only the most unusual circumstances beyond the control of the parties will warrant overlooking procedural defects, and explaining that litigants “should not rely on the court’s munificence when filing notices of appeal [because i]t is incumbent upon th

2024We further proposed to reject Plaintiff’s suggestion that her ignorance of the relevant procedure, the difficulty she experienced finding counsel to represent her, and her medical condition should supply grounds for equitable tolling. [Unnumbered DS 4] See Trujillo v. Serrano, 1994-NMSC- 024, ¶¶ 15-19, 117 N.M. 273 , 871 P.2d 369 (providing that only the most unusual circumstances beyond the control of the parties will warrant overlooking procedural defects, and explaining that litigants “should not rely on the court’s munificence when filing notices of appeal [because i]t is incumbent upon th

2024We further proposed to reject Plaintiff’s suggestion that her ignorance of the relevant procedure, the difficulty she experienced finding counsel to represent her, and her medical condition should supply grounds for equitable tolling. [Unnumbered DS 4] See Trujillo v. Serrano, 1994-NMSC- 024, ¶¶ 15-19, 117 N.M. 273 , 871 P.2d 369 (providing that only the most unusual circumstances beyond the control of the parties will warrant overlooking procedural defects, and explaining that litigants “should not rely on the court’s munificence when filing notices of appeal [because i]t is incumbent upon th

2016On appeal, the employees argued that “a violation of the NMHRA is a violation of public policy actionable under Vigil." Rist, 2013-NMCA-109, ¶ 23 .

2014Corp., 2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 15 , 137 N.M. 339 , 110 P.3d 1076 (“We will not review unclear arguments, or guess at what [aparty’s] arguments might be.”). 2 Defendants maintain that Defendant Brogdon was no longer employed by the Tribe when Plaintiff was discharged. 3 Plaintiff appears to agree that her NMHRA claim does not apply to Defendant Lujan on the basis that he is not subject to state law. 4 Wc note that the defendants in Rodriguez argued that even though the defendants were named as individuals, the suit was really against the tribe, 82 P.3d at 265 , and that, unlike here, the court permitt

2014Corp., 2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 15 , 137 N.M. 339 , 110 P.3d 1076 (“We will not review unclear arguments, or guess at what [aparty’s] arguments might be.”). 2 Defendants maintain that Defendant Brogdon was no longer employed by the Tribe when Plaintiff was discharged. 3 Plaintiff appears to agree that her NMHRA claim does not apply to Defendant Lujan on the basis that he is not subject to state law. 4 Wc note that the defendants in Rodriguez argued that even though the defendants were named as individuals, the suit was really against the tribe, 82 P.3d at 265 , and that, unlike here, the court permitt

2014Corp., 2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 15 , 137 N.M. 339 , 110 P.3d 1076 (“We will not review unclear arguments, or guess at what [aparty’s] arguments might be.”). 2 Defendants maintain that Defendant Brogdon was no longer employed by the Tribe when Plaintiff was discharged. 3 Plaintiff appears to agree that her NMHRA claim does not apply to Defendant Lujan on the basis that he is not subject to state law. 4 Wc note that the defendants in Rodriguez argued that even though the defendants were named as individuals, the suit was really against the tribe, 82 P.3d at 265 , and that, unlike here, the court permitt

2014Corp., 2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 15 , 137 N.M. 339 , 110 P.3d 1076 (“We will not review unclear arguments, or guess at what [aparty’s] arguments might be.”). 2 Defendants maintain that Defendant Brogdon was no longer employed by the Tribe when Plaintiff was discharged. 3 Plaintiff appears to agree that her NMHRA claim does not apply to Defendant Lujan on the basis that he is not subject to state law. 4 Wc note that the defendants in Rodriguez argued that even though the defendants were named as individuals, the suit was really against the tribe, 82 P.3d at 265 , and that, unlike here, the court permitt

2013Plaintiffs failed to set forth a claim of retaliatory discharge. {23} Plaintiffs argue that a violation of the NMHRA is a violation of public policy actionable under Vigil v. Arzola, 1983-NMCA-082 , 102 N.M. 682 , 699 P.2d 613 , rev’d on other grounds, 1984-NMSC-090 , 101 N.M. 687 , 687 P.2d 1038 .

2013Plaintiffs failed to set forth a claim of retaliatory discharge. {23} Plaintiffs argue that a violation of the NMHRA is a violation of public policy actionable under Vigil v. Arzola, 1983-NMCA-082 , 102 N.M. 682 , 699 P.2d 613 , rev’d on other grounds, 1984-NMSC-090 , 101 N.M. 687 , 687 P.2d 1038 .

2013Plaintiffs failed to set forth a claim of retaliatory discharge. {23} Plaintiffs argue that a violation of the NMHRA is a violation of public policy actionable under Vigil v. Arzola, 1983-NMCA-082 , 102 N.M. 682 , 699 P.2d 613 , rev’d on other grounds, 1984-NMSC-090 , 101 N.M. 687 , 687 P.2d 1038 .

2013Plaintiffs failed to set forth a claim of retaliatory discharge. {23} Plaintiffs argue that a violation of the NMHRA is a violation of public policy actionable under Vigil v. Arzola, 1983-NMCA-082 , 102 N.M. 682 , 699 P.2d 613 , rev’d on other grounds, 1984-NMSC-090 , 101 N.M. 687 , 687 P.2d 1038 .

2013However, for discharge to be actionable as a violation of public policy, the public policy in question cannot be a general one, but rather the plaintiff “must identify a specific expression of public policy which the discharge violated[.]” Maxwell v. Ross Hyden Motors, Inc., 1986-NMCA-061 , ¶ 20, 104 N.M. 470 , 722 P.2d 1192 ; see also Vigil, 1983-NMCA-082 , ¶ 35 (“A general allegation that the discharge contravened public policy is insufficient; to state a cause of action for retaliatory or abusive discharge the employee must identify a specific expression of public policy.”).

2013However, for discharge to be actionable as a violation of public policy, the public policy in question cannot be a general one, but rather the plaintiff “must identify a specific expression of public policy which the discharge violated[.]” Maxwell v. Ross Hyden Motors, Inc., 1986-NMCA-061 , ¶ 20, 104 N.M. 470 , 722 P.2d 1192 ; see also Vigil, 1983-NMCA-082 , ¶ 35 (“A general allegation that the discharge contravened public policy is insufficient; to state a cause of action for retaliatory or abusive discharge the employee must identify a specific expression of public policy.”).

1999Schs., 86 N.M. 748, 750 , 527 P.2d 789, 791 (1974); cf. Sabella, 1996-NMSC-014 , ¶¶ 12-13, 121 N.M. 596 , 915 P.2d 901 (allowing a person to maintain her NMHRA claim in district court based on the fact that she had requested and received an order of nondetermination from the Division).

1999Schs., 86 N.M. 748, 750 , 527 P.2d 789, 791 (1974); cf. Sabella, 1996-NMSC-014 , ¶¶ 12-13, 121 N.M. 596 , 915 P.2d 901 (allowing a person to maintain her NMHRA claim in district court based on the fact that she had requested and received an order of nondetermination from the Division).