authorization requirement in New York

2013Where, as here, the prosecutor presented charges and the grand jury failed to vote to either dismiss them or indict the defendant, a situation arose “in which the court, and not the prosecutor, should have decided whether re-presentation to a second grand jury was appropriate” (People v Credle, 17 NY3d 556, 561-562 [2011]; People v Wilkins, 68 NY2d 269, 273-274 [1986]).

2013Where, as here, the prosecutor presented charges and the grand jury failed to vote to either dismiss them or indict the defendant, a situation arose “in which the court, and not the prosecutor, should have decided whether re-presentation to a second grand jury was appropriate” (People v Credle, 17 NY3d 556, 561-562 [2011]; People v Wilkins, 68 NY2d 269, 273-274 [1986]).

2013Where, as here, the prosecutor presented charges and the grand jury failed to vote to either dismiss them or indict the defendant, a situation arose “in which the court, and not the prosecutor, should have decided whether re-presentation to a second grand jury was appropriate” (People v Credle, 17 NY3d 556, 561-562 [2011]; People v Wilkins, 68 NY2d 269, 273-274 [1986]).

2013Where, as here, the prosecutor presented charges and the grand jury failed to vote to either dismiss them or indict the defendant, a situation arose “in which the court, and not the prosecutor, should have decided whether re-presentation to a second grand jury was appropriate” (People v Credle, 17 NY3d 556, 561-562 [2011]; People v Wilkins, 68 NY2d 269, 273-274 [1986]).

2025There are exceptions to the authorization requirement, however, including, as relevant here, when such surgeries "are required in an emergency" (Workers' Compensation Law § 13-a [5]; see Matter of Langenmayr v Syracuse Univ. , 309 AD2d 1090, 1091 [3d Dept 2003]).

2008In any event, although the facility superintendent is directed to designate as a review officer a staff member of the rank of lieutenant or higher, we perceive no impropriety in the designation here inasmuch as it is within the superintendent’s discretion to designate “some other employee” (7 NYCRR 251-2.1; see Matter of Wright v Goord, 19 AD3d 855 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 711 [2005]).

2008Petitioner’s sole contention on appeal is that the misbehavior report was reviewed by a correction sergeant who was not properly authorized to act as a review officer and, as a result, the misbehavior report is invalid. * This claim is not properly preserved for our review as petitioner did not make an objection to the sergeant’s authorization at the hearing (see Matter of Carter v Goord, 45 AD3d 1077, 1078 [2007]; Matter of Hernandez v Goord, 37 AD3d 893, 894 [2007]; see also Matter of Roman v Goord, 11 AD3d 858, 859 [2004]).

2008In any event, although the facility superintendent is directed to designate as a review officer a staff member of the rank of lieutenant or higher, we perceive no impropriety in the designation here inasmuch as it is within the superintendent’s discretion to designate “some other employee” (7 NYCRR 251-2.1; see Matter of Wright v Goord, 19 AD3d 855 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 711 [2005]).

2008Petitioner’s sole contention on appeal is that the misbehavior report was reviewed by a correction sergeant who was not properly authorized to act as a review officer and, as a result, the misbehavior report is invalid. * This claim is not properly preserved for our review as petitioner did not make an objection to the sergeant’s authorization at the hearing (see Matter of Carter v Goord, 45 AD3d 1077, 1078 [2007]; Matter of Hernandez v Goord, 37 AD3d 893, 894 [2007]; see also Matter of Roman v Goord, 11 AD3d 858, 859 [2004]).

2008Petitioner’s sole contention on appeal is that the misbehavior report was reviewed by a correction sergeant who was not properly authorized to act as a review officer and, as a result, the misbehavior report is invalid. * This claim is not properly preserved for our review as petitioner did not make an objection to the sergeant’s authorization at the hearing (see Matter of Carter v Goord, 45 AD3d 1077, 1078 [2007]; Matter of Hernandez v Goord, 37 AD3d 893, 894 [2007]; see also Matter of Roman v Goord, 11 AD3d 858, 859 [2004]).

2004Even if we were inclined to a stricter view of the authorization requirement, we would defer to DHCR’s interpretation of this regulation (see Matter of Salvati v Eimicke, 72 NY2d 784, 791 [1988]).

2002(People v Ebner, 195 AD2d 1006 [4th Dept 1993].) The Ebner Court held that the results of the blood test must be suppressed because “[t]here was no showing that a physician had reached a ‘medical judgment’ that drawing blood would not put defendant, who was seriously injured, at risk or that a physician was present ‘to respond to inquiries and emergencies.’ ” (Id. at 1007, quoting People v Moser, supra; accord People v Olmstead, 233 AD2d 837, 837 [4th Dept 1996] [“The critical element, deemed essential by the Legislature when it amended the statute in 1969 (see L 1969, ch 669, § 1) is that a p

2002(People v Ebner, 195 AD2d 1006 [4th Dept 1993].) The Ebner Court held that the results of the blood test must be suppressed because “[t]here was no showing that a physician had reached a ‘medical judgment’ that drawing blood would not put defendant, who was seriously injured, at risk or that a physician was present ‘to respond to inquiries and emergencies.’ ” (Id. at 1007, quoting People v Moser, supra; accord People v Olmstead, 233 AD2d 837, 837 [4th Dept 1996] [“The critical element, deemed essential by the Legislature when it amended the statute in 1969 (see L 1969, ch 669, § 1) is that a p

2002(People v Ebner, 195 AD2d 1006 [4th Dept 1993].) The Ebner Court held that the results of the blood test must be suppressed because “[t]here was no showing that a physician had reached a ‘medical judgment’ that drawing blood would not put defendant, who was seriously injured, at risk or that a physician was present ‘to respond to inquiries and emergencies.’ ” (Id. at 1007, quoting People v Moser, supra; accord People v Olmstead, 233 AD2d 837, 837 [4th Dept 1996] [“The critical element, deemed essential by the Legislature when it amended the statute in 1969 (see L 1969, ch 669, § 1) is that a p

1998Artwork Is Written Matter Subject to the Statutory Exemptions Bery v City of New York ( 97 F3d 689, 692 [2d Cir 1996]) construed Administrative Code § 20-465 (j) to provide an exception for written matter from the Department of Parks’ authorization requirement: “Vending, except for written matter, in a park is barred without written authorization from the Department of Parks and Recreation”.