91 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2023 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Frostgreen2 sentences2022See State v. Frost, 297 Ga. 296, 304-305 (773 SE2d 700) (2015) (A trier of fact may infer from a defendant’s refusal of a chemical test that, if the accused had submitted to the test, it would have shown some presence of an intoxicant.); Taylor v. State, 278 Ga. App. 181, 183 (3) (628 SE2d 611) (2006) (holding no error resulted from the argument that the defendant refused the requested chemical test because she was conscious of her impairment or guilt); Kelly v. State, 242 Ga. App. 30, 34 (5) (528 SE2d 812) (2000) (concluding it was not unreasonable to infer from a DUI suspect’s refusal to sub 2022See State v. Frost, 297 Ga. 296, 304-305 (773 SE2d 700) (2015) (A trier of fact may infer from a defendant’s refusal of a chemical test that, if the accused had submitted to the test, it would have shown some presence of an intoxicant.); Taylor v. State, 278 Ga. App. 181, 183 (3) (628 SE2d 611) (2006) (holding no error resulted from the argument that the defendant refused the requested chemical test because she was conscious of her impairment or guilt); Kelly v. State, 242 Ga. App. 30, 34 (5) (528 SE2d 812) (2000) (concluding it was not unreasonable to infer from a DUI suspect’s refusal to sub | 4 | 8 |
State v. Levinergreen2 sentences1997See State v. Leviner, 213 Ga. App. 99, 100 (3) ( 443 SE2d 688 ) (1994) (DUI suspects must be properly advised regarding the implied consent law in order for their refusal to submit to a state-administered test to be admissible). 1997See State v. Leviner, 213 Ga. App. 99, 100 (3) ( 443 SE2d 688 ) (1994) (DUI suspects must be properly advised regarding the implied consent law in order for their refusal to submit to a state-administered test to be admissible). | 4 | 4 |
State v. Buttongreen2 sentences2001And if the suspect does agree to the state-administered test, then the police officer must make "`a reasonable effort to accommodate the accused who seeks an independent test.' (Cit.)" State v. Button, [supra at 674 , 426 S.E.2d 194 ]. 1999And if the suspect does agree to the state-administered test, then the police officer must make “ ‘a reasonable effort to accommodate the accused who seeks an independent test. [Cit.]” State v. Button, 206 Ga. App. 673, 674 ( 426 SE2d 194 ) (1992). | 3 | 4 |
Hynes v. the Stategreen2 sentences2018See Hynes v. State , 341 Ga. App. 500 , 508, 801 S.E.2d 306 (2017) ("The case law interpreting implied consent laws demonstrates that the judiciary overwhelmingly sanctions the use of civil penalties and evidentiary consequences against DUI suspects who refuse to comply."); Williams v. State , 297 Ga. App. 626 , 628, 677 S.E.2d 773 (2009) ("The implied consent statute grants drivers the right to *411 refuse to take a state-administered test, with one of the consequences of exercising that right being that evidence of such refusal is admissible at trial."); OCGA § 40-6-392 (d) ("In any criminal 2018See Hynes v. State , 341 Ga. App. 500 , 508, 801 S.E.2d 306 (2017) ("The case law interpreting implied consent laws demonstrates that the judiciary overwhelmingly sanctions the use of civil penalties and evidentiary consequences against DUI suspects who refuse to comply."); Williams v. State , 297 Ga. App. 626 , 628, 677 S.E.2d 773 (2009) ("The implied consent statute grants drivers the right to *411 refuse to take a state-administered test, with one of the consequences of exercising that right being that evidence of such refusal is admissible at trial."); OCGA § 40-6-392 (d) ("In any criminal | 3 | 3 |
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences2018See Hynes v. State , 341 Ga. App. 500 , 508, 801 S.E.2d 306 (2017) ("The case law interpreting implied consent laws demonstrates that the judiciary overwhelmingly sanctions the use of civil penalties and evidentiary consequences against DUI suspects who refuse to comply."); Williams v. State , 297 Ga. App. 626 , 628, 677 S.E.2d 773 (2009) ("The implied consent statute grants drivers the right to *411 refuse to take a state-administered test, with one of the consequences of exercising that right being that evidence of such refusal is admissible at trial."); OCGA § 40-6-392 (d) ("In any criminal 2018See Hynes v. State , 341 Ga. App. 500 , 508, 801 S.E.2d 306 (2017) ("The case law interpreting implied consent laws demonstrates that the judiciary overwhelmingly sanctions the use of civil penalties and evidentiary consequences against DUI suspects who refuse to comply."); Williams v. State , 297 Ga. App. 626 , 628, 677 S.E.2d 773 (2009) ("The implied consent statute grants drivers the right to *411 refuse to take a state-administered test, with one of the consequences of exercising that right being that evidence of such refusal is admissible at trial."); OCGA § 40-6-392 (d) ("In any criminal | 3 | 3 |
King v. Stategreen2 sentences2009Id. at 793 (1). 9 Supra, 276 Ga. 126 . 10 262 Ga. 805 ( 426 SE2d 553 ) (1993). 11 (Citations omitted.) Id. at 807 (3). 12 Supra, 276 Ga. 126 . 13 See also Rylee v. State, 288 Ga. App. 784, 785-786 (1) ( 655 SE2d 239 ) (2007) (defendant’s exercise of constitutional right to refuse a state-administered test is independent of state’s decision to obtain other evidence of a crime by utilizing a search warrant for the defendant’s medical records). 14 (Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Fletcher v. State, 284 Ga. 653, 655 (3) ( 670 SE2d 411 ) (2008). 15 State v. Donaldson, 281 Ga. App. 51, 52 ( 635 2009Id. at 793 (1). 9 Supra, 276 Ga. 126 . 10 262 Ga. 805 ( 426 SE2d 553 ) (1993). 11 (Citations omitted.) Id. at 807 (3). 12 Supra, 276 Ga. 126 . 13 See also Rylee v. State, 288 Ga. App. 784, 785-786 (1) ( 655 SE2d 239 ) (2007) (defendant’s exercise of constitutional right to refuse a state-administered test is independent of state’s decision to obtain other evidence of a crime by utilizing a search warrant for the defendant’s medical records). 14 (Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Fletcher v. State, 284 Ga. 653, 655 (3) ( 670 SE2d 411 ) (2008). 15 State v. Donaldson, 281 Ga. App. 51, 52 ( 635 | 3 | 3 |
Frost v. the Stategreen2 sentences2016Relying on this Court’s decision in Frost v. State, 328 Ga. App. 337 ( 761 SE2d 875 ) (2014) (“Frost I”), the trial court concluded that Tittle’s prior DUI conviction could be introduced only if, during the presentation of his defense, Tittle attempted “to suggest that he did not take the test because he did not understand it, or he did not know that he could take a test, or that he would never take such a test.” Frost I, 328 Ga. App. at 343 (2) (citation and punctuation omitted). 2015The Court of Appeals then noted that the record in this case did not show that Frost likely would offer any explanation or excuse at trial for his failure to take the state-administered test in 2012, and in any event, *299 Frost had refused on both occasions in 2009 to take the state-administered tests. 328 Ga. App. at 343 (2). | 3 | 3 |
Howell v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Howell v. State, 266 Ga. App. 480, 485 ( 597 SE2d 546 ) (2004). 2015Howell v. State, 266 Ga. App. 480, 485 ( 597 SE2d 546 ) (2004). | 3 | 3 |
Vansant v. Stategreen2 sentences2008See OCGA § 40-5-55 (a); Hough v. State, 279 Ga. 711, 713 (1) (a) ( 620 SE2d 380 ) (2005). 2 See State v. Brown, 278 Ga. App. 457, 460 ( 629 SE2d 123 ) (2006). 3 Id. at 459-460 . 4 (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) State v. McKinney, 276 Ga. App. 69, 71 (1) ( 622 SE2d 429 ) (2005). 5 See Silva v. State, 278 Ga. 506, 507-508 ( 604 SE2d 171 ) (2004); Vansant v. State, 264 Ga. 319, 320 (1) ( 443 SE2d 474 ) (1994). 6 See Brown, supra; see also Tate v. State, 264 Ga. 53, 54 (1) ( 440 SE2d 646 ) (1994). 7 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Poppell, 277 Ga. 595 (2) ( 2008See OCGA § 40-5-55 (a); Hough v. State, 279 Ga. 711, 713 (1) (a) ( 620 SE2d 380 ) (2005). 2 See State v. Brown, 278 Ga. App. 457, 460 ( 629 SE2d 123 ) (2006). 3 Id. at 459-460 . 4 (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) State v. McKinney, 276 Ga. App. 69, 71 (1) ( 622 SE2d 429 ) (2005). 5 See Silva v. State, 278 Ga. 506, 507-508 ( 604 SE2d 171 ) (2004); Vansant v. State, 264 Ga. 319, 320 (1) ( 443 SE2d 474 ) (1994). 6 See Brown, supra; see also Tate v. State, 264 Ga. 53, 54 (1) ( 440 SE2d 646 ) (1994). 7 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Poppell, 277 Ga. 595 (2) ( | 3 | 3 |
State v. Whitegreen2 sentences2002Andrews, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur. 1 Ladow does not appeal her conviction for failure to maintain lane. 2 Vansant v. State, 264 Ga. 319, 320 (1) ( 443 SE2d 474 ) (1994). 3 Smith, v. State, 250 Ga. App. 583, 584 (1) ( 552 SE2d 528 ) (2001). 4 Id. 5 State v. Button, 206 Ga. App. 673, 674 ( 426 SE2d 194 ) (1992). 6 See Church v. State, 210 Ga. App. 670, 671 (1) ( 436 SE2d 809 ) (1993). 7 OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (1), (2), (3). 8 See State v. Leviner, 213 Ga. App. 99, 101 (3) (a) ( 443 SE2d 688 ) (1994) (in enacting that statute, the legislature intended to impose additional implied consent notic 2002Andrews, P. J., and Mikell, J., concur. 1 Ladow does not appeal her conviction for failure to maintain lane. 2 Vansant v. State, 264 Ga. 319, 320 (1) ( 443 SE2d 474 ) (1994). 3 Smith, v. State, 250 Ga. App. 583, 584 (1) ( 552 SE2d 528 ) (2001). 4 Id. 5 State v. Button, 206 Ga. App. 673, 674 ( 426 SE2d 194 ) (1992). 6 See Church v. State, 210 Ga. App. 670, 671 (1) ( 436 SE2d 809 ) (1993). 7 OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (1), (2), (3). 8 See State v. Leviner, 213 Ga. App. 99, 101 (3) (a) ( 443 SE2d 688 ) (1994) (in enacting that statute, the legislature intended to impose additional implied consent notic | 3 | 3 |
Allen v. Stategreen2 sentences1986The facts in this case are more akin to those in Allen v. State, 254 Ga. 433 ( 330 SE2d 588 ) (1985), where the evidence of refusal to take a state-administered test was at issue. 1986The facts in this case are more akin to those in Allen v. State, 254 Ga. 433 ( 330 SE2d 588 ) (1985), where the evidence of refusal to take a state-administered test was at issue. | 2 | 4 |
Bello v. Stategreen2 sentences2017Outside the First Amendment context, a plaintiff faces a difficult task in mounting a successful facial challenge to a statute, “because it requires one to establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid, i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications, or at least that the statute lacks a plainly legitimate sweep.” Bello v. State, 300 Ga. 682, 686 (1) ( 797 SE2d 882 ) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Blevins v. Dade County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 288 Ga. 113, 118 (3) ( 702 SE2d 145 ) (2010). 2017Outside the First Amendment context, a plaintiff faces a difficult task in mounting a successful facial challenge to a statute, “because it requires one to establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid, i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications, or at least that the statute lacks a plainly legitimate sweep.” Bello v. State, 300 Ga. 682, 686 (1) ( 797 SE2d 882 ) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Blevins v. Dade County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 288 Ga. 113, 118 (3) ( 702 SE2d 145 ) (2010). | 2 | 2 |
Blevins v. Dade County Board of Tax Assessorsgreen2 sentences2017Outside the First Amendment context, a plaintiff faces a difficult task in mounting a successful facial challenge to a statute, “because it requires one to establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid, i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications, or at least that the statute lacks a plainly legitimate sweep.” Bello v. State, 300 Ga. 682, 686 (1) ( 797 SE2d 882 ) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Blevins v. Dade County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 288 Ga. 113, 118 (3) ( 702 SE2d 145 ) (2010). 2017Outside the First Amendment context, a plaintiff faces a difficult task in mounting a successful facial challenge to a statute, “because it requires one to establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid, i.e., that the law is unconstitutional in all of its applications, or at least that the statute lacks a plainly legitimate sweep.” Bello v. State, 300 Ga. 682, 686 (1) ( 797 SE2d 882 ) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted); see also Blevins v. Dade County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 288 Ga. 113, 118 (3) ( 702 SE2d 145 ) (2010). | 2 | 2 |
South Dakota v. Nevillegreen2 sentences2017In Neville, supra, the United States Supreme Court implicitly approved the use of such an incentive, which we interpret conversely: If a DUI suspect chooses not to take the State-administered test, he or she is not entitled to take advantage of the “additional test” incentive. 2017In Neville, supra, the United States Supreme Court implicitly approved the use of such an incentive, which we interpret conversely: If a DUI suspect chooses not to take the State-administered test, he or she is not entitled to take advantage of the “additional test” incentive. | 2 | 2 |
The State v. Padgettgreen2 sentences2017Thus, if a State-administered test *232 complies with the statutory requirements in OCGA § 40-6-392 (a), the test results ‘shall be admissible,’ and conversely, if the State-administered test does not comply with the statute, it is inadmissible.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Padgett, 329 Ga. App. 747, 750 (1) ( 766 SE2d 143 ) (2014). 2017Thus, if a State-administered test *232 complies with the statutory requirements in OCGA § 40-6-392 (a), the test results ‘shall be admissible,’ and conversely, if the State-administered test does not comply with the statute, it is inadmissible.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) State v. Padgett, 329 Ga. App. 747, 750 (1) ( 766 SE2d 143 ) (2014). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Hambygreen2 sentences2016The standard is one of “objective reasonableness,” requiring consideration of “whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the request,” State v. Hamby, 317 Ga. App. 480, 483 ( 731 SE2d 374 ) (2012), not whether the defendant may have subjectively preferred not to consent, but nonetheless made a decision to actually consent. 2016The standard is one of “objective reasonableness,” requiring consideration of “whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the request,” State v. Hamby, 317 Ga. App. 480, 483 ( 731 SE2d 374 ) (2012), not whether the defendant may have subjectively preferred not to consent, but nonetheless made a decision to actually consent. | 2 | 2 |
| Jones v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
Massa v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See Massa, 287 Ga. App. at 495 (1); Hoffman, 275 Ga. App. at 358 (1); Jones, 273 Ga. App. at 194 (1) (b); Walker, 239 Ga. App. at 831 . 2014See Massa, 287 Ga. App. at 495 (1); Hoffman, 275 Ga. App. at 358 (1); Jones, 273 Ga. App. at 194 (1) (b); Walker, 239 Ga. App. at 831 . | 2 | 2 |
| Bruce v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
Hoffman v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See Massa, 287 Ga. App. at 495 (1); Hoffman, 275 Ga. App. at 358 (1); Jones, 273 Ga. App. at 194 (1) (b); Walker, 239 Ga. App. at 831 . 2014See Massa, 287 Ga. App. at 495 (1); Hoffman, 275 Ga. App. at 358 (1); Jones, 273 Ga. App. at 194 (1) (b); Walker, 239 Ga. App. at 831 . | 2 | 2 |
| Anderton v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| Hough v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| Allen v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| Wessels v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Six months later, she filed a brief asserting that the state-administered test results should be excluded because the State would not be able to demonstrate, under the totality of the circumstances analysis of Williams v. State, 296 Ga. 817 ( 771 SE2d 373 ) (2015), that she had freely and voluntarily consented to the test. 2016Six months later, she filed a brief asserting that the state-administered test results should be excluded because the State would not be able to demonstrate, under the totality of the circumstances analysis of Williams v. State, 296 Ga. 817 ( 771 SE2d 373 ) (2015), that she had freely and voluntarily consented to the test. | 1 | 6 |
Olevik v. Stategreen2 sentences2021Citing Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228 ( 806 SE2d 505 ) (2017), and Elliott v. State, 305 Ga. 179 ( 824 SE2d 265 ) (2019), Davis argues that the trial court erred by 11 admitting evidence that he refused to submit to a State-administered test of his blood or urine. 2021Citing Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228 ( 806 SE2d 505 ) (2017), and Elliott v. State, 305 Ga. 179 ( 824 SE2d 265 ) (2019), Davis argues that the trial court erred by 11 admitting evidence that he refused to submit to a State-administered test of his blood or urine. | 1 | 3 |
Ladow v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Under this statutory framework, this Court has concluded that when a suspect “requests an independent test but is unable to obtain it, the results of the State-administered test cannot be used by the State as evidence against [him] unless the failure to obtain the test is justified.” Ladow v. State, 256 Ga. App. 726, 728 ( 569 SE2d 572 ) (2002) (citation and punctuation omitted). 2016Under this statutory framework, this Court has concluded that when a suspect “requests an independent test but is unable to obtain it, the results of the State-administered test cannot be used by the State as evidence against [him] unless the failure to obtain the test is justified.” Ladow v. State, 256 Ga. App. 726, 728 ( 569 SE2d 572 ) (2002) (citation and punctuation omitted). | 1 | 3 |
Perano v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See also Perano, 250 Ga. at 708 (referring to a test performed at a hospital at the request of an officer as “the [S]tate’s test”). 13 (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Nesbitt, 305 Ga. App. 28, 36 (2) (c) ( 699 SE2d 368 ) (2010). 2003Id. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Colliergreen2 sentences2008The implied consent statute “affords a suspect the opportunity to refuse to submit to a State-administered test of the suspect’s blood, urine, or other bodily substances.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Collier, 279 Ga. 316 ( 612 SE2d 281 ) (2005). 2008The implied consent statute “affords a suspect the opportunity to refuse to submit to a State-administered test of the suspect’s blood, urine, or other bodily substances.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Collier, 279 Ga. 316 ( 612 SE2d 281 ) (2005). | 1 | 3 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences2020“If an individual requests an independent test but is unable to obtain it, the results of the State-administered test cannot be used by the State as evidence against him unless the failure to obtain the test is justified.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Johnson v. State, 261 Ga. App. 633, 636 (2) ( 583 SE2d 489 ) (2003).3 Here, after Henry was read the implied consent notice and asked to consent to a blood test for the second time, he asked the trooper, “so you are saying I can take, my blood, my blood, my doctor can do my blood test and all that?” The trooper responded to Henry’s questio 2020“If an individual requests an independent test but is unable to obtain it, the results of the State-administered test cannot be used by the State as evidence against him unless the failure to obtain the test is justified.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Johnson v. State, 261 Ga. App. 633, 636 (2) ( 583 SE2d 489 ) (2003).3 Here, after Henry was read the implied consent notice and asked to consent to a blood test for the second time, he asked the trooper, “so you are saying I can take, my blood, my blood, my doctor can do my blood test and all that?” The trooper responded to Henry’s questio | 1 | 2 |
McGinn v. Stategreen2 sentences2007Phipps and Mikell, JJ., concur. 1 OCGA§ 40-6-391 (a) (1). 2 OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5). 3 OCGA § 40-6-184 (a) (1). 4 State v. Sledge, 264 Ga. App. 612, 613 ( 591 SE2d 479 ) (2003). 5 Id. 6 Davis v. State, 278 Ga. 305, 306 (1) ( 602 SE2d 563 ) (2004). 7 Id. 8 270 Ga. App. 111 ( 605 SE2d 835 ) (2004). 9 256 Ga. App. 726 ( 569 SE2d 572 ) (2002). 10 Id. at 728 . 11 Gillaspy, supra at 112 . 12 Ladow, supra at 728 . 13 SeeAnderton v. State, 283 Ga. App. 493, 494-495 (1) ( 642 SE2d 137 ) (2007) (defendant’s request of a blood test in response to officer’s request was not a request for an independent tes 2007Phipps and Mikell, JJ., concur. 1 OCGA§ 40-6-391 (a) (1). 2 OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5). 3 OCGA § 40-6-184 (a) (1). 4 State v. Sledge, 264 Ga. App. 612, 613 ( 591 SE2d 479 ) (2003). 5 Id. 6 Davis v. State, 278 Ga. 305, 306 (1) ( 602 SE2d 563 ) (2004). 7 Id. 8 270 Ga. App. 111 ( 605 SE2d 835 ) (2004). 9 256 Ga. App. 726 ( 569 SE2d 572 ) (2002). 10 Id. at 728 . 11 Gillaspy, supra at 112 . 12 Ladow, supra at 728 . 13 SeeAnderton v. State, 283 Ga. App. 493, 494-495 (1) ( 642 SE2d 137 ) (2007) (defendant’s request of a blood test in response to officer’s request was not a request for an independent tes | 1 | 2 |
| Allen v. Stategreen | 1 | 2 |
| Duckett v. Stategreen | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Vandervoortgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Whittington v. Stategreen | 1 | 2 |
| Awad v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bryant v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Taylor v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fox v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kelly v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| Collins v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Elliott v. State
green
2 sentences2021Citing Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228 ( 806 SE2d 505 ) (2017), and Elliott v. State, 305 Ga. 179 ( 824 SE2d 265 ) (2019), Davis argues that the trial court erred by 11 admitting evidence that he refused to submit to a State-administered test of his blood or urine. 2021Citing Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228 ( 806 SE2d 505 ) (2017), and Elliott v. State, 305 Ga. 179 ( 824 SE2d 265 ) (2019), Davis argues that the trial court erred by 11 admitting evidence that he refused to submit to a State-administered test of his blood or urine. | 3 | 2020–2021 |
Modlin v. State
green
2 sentences2000Toller, Assistant Solicitors, for appellee. 1 OCGA § 40-6-392 (a) (1) (B). 2 OCGA § 40-6-392 (a) (3); Modlin v. State, 176 Ga. App. 83 ( 335 SE2d 312 ) (1985). 3 Turner v. State, 199 Ga. App. 466 ( 405 SE2d 296 ) (1991). 4 Id. 5 Wessels v. State, 169 Ga. App. 246, 247 (2) ( 312 SE2d 361 ) (1983). 6 Komala v. State, 237 Ga. App. 236, 237 (2) ( 515 SE2d 185 ) (1999). 7 Cf. Allen v. State, 229 Ga. App. 435, 436-438 (1) ( 494 SE2d 229 ) (1997) (where defendant repeatedly failed to provide adequate breath samples and instrument did not produce a printed alcohol concentration analysis, his actions c 2000Toller, Assistant Solicitors, for appellee. 1 OCGA § 40-6-392 (a) (1) (B). 2 OCGA § 40-6-392 (a) (3); Modlin v. State, 176 Ga. App. 83 ( 335 SE2d 312 ) (1985). 3 Turner v. State, 199 Ga. App. 466 ( 405 SE2d 296 ) (1991). 4 Id. 5 Wessels v. State, 169 Ga. App. 246, 247 (2) ( 312 SE2d 361 ) (1983). 6 Komala v. State, 237 Ga. App. 236, 237 (2) ( 515 SE2d 185 ) (1999). 7 Cf. Allen v. State, 229 Ga. App. 435, 436-438 (1) ( 494 SE2d 229 ) (1997) (where defendant repeatedly failed to provide adequate breath samples and instrument did not produce a printed alcohol concentration analysis, his actions c | 3 | 1997–2000 |
Garrett v. Department of Public Safety
green
2 sentences1983Or, does Garrett, 237 Ga. at 415 , supra, implicitly establish a broader `intelligent choice' standard of compliance, correctly effectuated by the Court of Appeals in Rayburn, 140 Ga. App. 712 , supra, and in Huff, 144 Ga. App. 764 , supra, so that the requirements of Code Ann. § 68A-902.1 (a) (4) are substantially satisfied if, prior to choosing whether to undergo or to refuse the state-administered test, a defendant-motorist is advised of his right to an additional test and his subsequent `intelligent choice' in this regard is binding on him?" In order to answer these questions it is necessa 1983Or, does Garrett, 237 Ga. at 415 , supra, implicitly establish a broader ‘intelligent choice’ standard of compliance, correctly effectuated by the Court of Appeals in Rayburn, 140 Ga. App. 712 , supra, and in Huff, 144 Ga. App. 764 , supra, so that the requirements of Code Ann. § 68A-902.1 (a) (4) are substantially satisfied if, prior to choosing whether to undergo or to refuse the state-administered test, a defendant-motorist is advised of his right to an additional test and his subsequent ‘intelligent choice’ in this regard is binding on him?” In order to answer these questions it is necessa | 3 | 1983–1997 |
Walker v. State
green
2 sentences2014See Massa, 287 Ga. App. at 495 (1); Hoffman, 275 Ga. App. at 358 (1); Jones, 273 Ga. App. at 194 (1) (b); Walker, 239 Ga. App. at 831 . 2014See Massa, 287 Ga. App. at 495 (1); Hoffman, 275 Ga. App. at 358 (1); Jones, 273 Ga. App. at 194 (1) (b); Walker, 239 Ga. App. at 831 . | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Hazley v. State
green
2 sentences2014Here, following defense counsel’s objection, the prosecutor ultimately clarified to the jury that Hammill’s refusal to take a State-administered test “needfed] to be taken with other evidence in order to come to a conclusion of impairment.” This clarification by the prosecutor was consistent with our case law reflecting that a defendant’s refusal to take a State-administered test “together with other evidence will support an inference that he was an impaired driver.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hazley, 289 Ga. App. at 559-560 . 2014Here, following defense counsel’s objection, the prosecutor ultimately clarified to the jury that Hammill’s refusal to take a State-administered test “needfed] to be taken with other evidence in order to come to a conclusion of impairment.” This clarification by the prosecutor was consistent with our case law reflecting that a defendant’s refusal to take a State-administered test “together with other evidence will support an inference that he was an impaired driver.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hazley, 289 Ga. App. at 559-560 . | 2 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Tosar green | 2 | 2002–2002 |
| Huff v. State green | 2 | 1983–1997 |
| Williams v. the State green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Patton v. Vanterpool green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Clegg v. State neutral | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Davis v. the State green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Oldham v. State green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Klink v. State red | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Sears v. State green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.