13 Ohio opinions name it 3 courts 2010–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Perrygreen1 sentence2024See State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 176 (1967). {¶26} Appellant thus argues the voidness doctrine applies to avoid the timeliness and res judicata prohibitions, but he cites plain error principles on merger to support the argument. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Quallsgreen2 sentences2017Ashtabula No. 2016-A-0069, 2017-Ohio-4376 . {¶12} The Ohio Supreme Court’s “main focus in interpreting the sentencing statutes regarding postrelease control has always been on the notification itself and not on the sentencing entry.” State v. Qualls, 131 Ohio St.3d 499 , 2012-Ohio-1111, ¶19 (citations omitted). 2017Ashtabula No. 2016-A-0069, 2017-Ohio-4376 . {¶12} The Ohio Supreme Court’s “main focus in interpreting the sentencing statutes regarding postrelease control has always been on the notification itself and not on the sentencing entry.” State v. Qualls, 131 Ohio St.3d 499 , 2012-Ohio-1111, ¶19 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Perkinsgreen1 sentence2016Montgomery No. 25808, 2014-Ohio-1863, ¶ 57 (noting that Fisher “limited the application of the voidness doctrine.”) {¶ 23} In Bell, we held that a defendant’s argument about a defective verdict form for his murder conviction was barred by res judicata because the matter could have been raised on direct appeal. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Simpkinsgreen1 sentence2013See State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420 , 2008-Ohio-1197 , 884 N.E.2d 568 , ¶ 20-24 (defendant was informed of post-release control, but entry did not impose it. | 1 | 1 |
Summers v. Stategreen2 sentences2010Although the interests in finality of a sentence are important, they cannot trump the interests of justice, which require a judge to follow the letter of the law in sentencing a defendant. {¶ 24} Other states’ courts hold similarly, using the voidness doctrine as well as a related theory, the illegal-sentence doctrine.1 See, e.g., Summers v. State (Tenn.2007), 212 S.W.3d 251, 256 (describing a sentence imposed in direct contravention of a statute as illegal and subject to correction at any time); State v. Gayden (2006), 281 Kan. 290, 292-293 , 130 P.3d 108 (“A sentence for which no statutory a 2010Although the interests in finality of a sentence are important, they cannot trump the interests of justice, which require a judge to follow the letter of the law in sentencing a defendant. {¶ 24} Other states’ courts hold similarly, using the voidness doctrine as well as a related theory, the illegal-sentence doctrine. 1 See, e.g., Summers v. State (Tenn.2007), 212 S.W.3d 251, 256 (describing a sentence imposed in direct contravention of a statute as illegal and subject to correction at any time); State v. Gayden (2006), 281 Kan. 290, 292-293 , 130 P.3d 108 (“A sentence for which no statutory | 1 | 1 |
Mizell v. Stategreen2 sentences2010Although the interests in finality of a sentence are important, they cannot trump the interests of justice, which require a judge to follow the letter of the law in sentencing a defendant. {¶ 24} Other states’ courts hold similarly, using the voidness doctrine as well as a related theory, the illegal-sentence doctrine.1 See, e.g., Summers v. State (Tenn.2007), 212 S.W.3d 251, 256 (describing a sentence imposed in direct contravention of a statute as illegal and subject to correction at any time); State v. Gayden (2006), 281 Kan. 290, 292-293 , 130 P.3d 108 (“A sentence for which no statutory a 2010Although the interests in finality of a sentence are important, they cannot trump the interests of justice, which require a judge to follow the letter of the law in sentencing a defendant. {¶ 24} Other states’ courts hold similarly, using the voidness doctrine as well as a related theory, the illegal-sentence doctrine. 1 See, e.g., Summers v. State (Tenn.2007), 212 S.W.3d 251, 256 (describing a sentence imposed in direct contravention of a statute as illegal and subject to correction at any time); State v. Gayden (2006), 281 Kan. 290, 292-293 , 130 P.3d 108 (“A sentence for which no statutory | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Daniel Greatwalkergreen2 sentences2010Although the interests in finality of a sentence are important, they cannot trump the interests of justice, which require a judge to follow the letter of the law in sentencing a defendant. {¶ 24} Other states’ courts hold similarly, using the voidness doctrine as well as a related theory, the illegal-sentence doctrine.1 See, e.g., Summers v. State (Tenn.2007), 212 S.W.3d 251, 256 (describing a sentence imposed in direct contravention of a statute as illegal and subject to correction at any time); State v. Gayden (2006), 281 Kan. 290, 292-293 , 130 P.3d 108 (“A sentence for which no statutory a 2010Although the interests in finality of a sentence are important, they cannot trump the interests of justice, which require a judge to follow the letter of the law in sentencing a defendant. {¶ 24} Other states’ courts hold similarly, using the voidness doctrine as well as a related theory, the illegal-sentence doctrine. 1 See, e.g., Summers v. State (Tenn.2007), 212 S.W.3d 251, 256 (describing a sentence imposed in direct contravention of a statute as illegal and subject to correction at any time); State v. Gayden (2006), 281 Kan. 290, 292-293 , 130 P.3d 108 (“A sentence for which no statutory | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Fischer
green
2 sentences2018Because I believe Grimes does not apply retroactively to require a nunc pro tunc entry in this case, I dissent. {¶ 22} The majority opinion at paragraph 15 justifies retroactively applying Grimes by citing to State v. Fischer , 128 Ohio St.3d 92 , 2010-Ohio-6238 , 942 N.E.2d 332 , and its invocation of the voidness doctrine to remedy improperly imposed post-release control. 2018Because I believe Grimes does not apply retroactively to require a nunc pro tunc entry in this case, I dissent. {¶ 22} The majority opinion at paragraph 15 justifies retroactively applying Grimes by citing to State v. Fischer , 128 Ohio St.3d 92 , 2010-Ohio-6238 , 942 N.E.2d 332 , and its invocation of the voidness doctrine to remedy improperly imposed post-release control. | 5 | 2012–2023 |
State v. Harper (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2021We recognize that at the time of our decision in Stansell III, the Ohio Supreme had issued the first of two decisions, State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480 , 2020-Ohio-2913 , 159 N.E.3d 248 , seemingly reversing course on the voidness doctrine in criminal sentencing. 2021In State v. Harper, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2020-Ohio-2913 , the Supreme Court of Ohio recalibrated the voidness doctrine, holding that voidness arises only when a trial court lacks jurisdiction over the subject- matter of the case or personal jurisdiction over the accused. | 3 | 2021–2023 |
State v. Hall
green
1 sentence2017Ashtabula No. 2016-A-0069, 2017-Ohio-4376 . {¶12} The Ohio Supreme Court’s “main focus in interpreting the sentencing statutes regarding postrelease control has always been on the notification itself and not on the sentencing entry.” State v. Qualls, 131 Ohio St.3d 499 , 2012-Ohio-1111, ¶19 (citations omitted). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Lester
green
2 sentences2017Appellant also unsuccessfully raised the voidness doctrine in his 2015 “petition for re-sentencing St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-5204 , 958 N.E.2d 142 , the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[a] nunc pro tunc judgment entry issued for the sole purpose of complying with Crim.R. 32(C) to correct a clerical omission in a final judgment entry is not a new final order from which a new appeal may be taken.” Id., at paragraph two of the syllabus. based on void waiver and judgment,” and he filed no appeal of said decision. 2017Appellant also unsuccessfully raised the voidness doctrine in his 2015 “petition for re-sentencing St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-5204 , 958 N.E.2d 142 , the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[a] nunc pro tunc judgment entry issued for the sole purpose of complying with Crim.R. 32(C) to correct a clerical omission in a final judgment entry is not a new final order from which a new appeal may be taken.” Id., at paragraph two of the syllabus. based on void waiver and judgment,” and he filed no appeal of said decision. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Strattman v. Studt
green
1 sentence2014Id. at ¶ 22-23 {¶ 57} As was noted, Fisher was decided subsequently, and limited the application of the voidness doctrine. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Harris
green
1 sentence2012Harris, ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2012-Ohio-1908 , ___ N.E.2d ___, at ¶ 15-16. | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Allen v. United States
green
1 sentence2010Although the interests in finality of a sentence are important, they cannot trump the interests of justice, which require a judge to follow the letter of the law in sentencing a defendant. {¶ 24} Other states’ courts hold similarly, using the voidness doctrine as well as a related theory, the illegal-sentence doctrine. 1 See, e.g., Summers v. State (Tenn.2007), 212 S.W.3d 251, 256 (describing a sentence imposed in direct contravention of a statute as illegal and subject to correction at any time); State v. Gayden (2006), 281 Kan. 290, 292-293 , 130 P.3d 108 (“A sentence for which no statutory | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Edwards v. State
green
2 sentences2010Although the interests in finality of a sentence are important, they cannot trump the interests of justice, which require a judge to follow the letter of the law in sentencing a defendant. {¶ 24} Other states’ courts hold similarly, using the voidness doctrine as well as a related theory, the illegal-sentence doctrine. 1 See, e.g., Summers v. State (Tenn.2007), 212 S.W.3d 251, 256 (describing a sentence imposed in direct contravention of a statute as illegal and subject to correction at any time); State v. Gayden (2006), 281 Kan. 290, 292-293 , 130 P.3d 108 (“A sentence for which no statutory 2010Although the interests in finality of a sentence are important, they cannot trump the interests of justice, which require a judge to follow the letter of the law in sentencing a defendant. {¶ 24} Other states’ courts hold similarly, using the voidness doctrine as well as a related theory, the illegal-sentence doctrine. 1 See, e.g., Summers v. State (Tenn.2007), 212 S.W.3d 251, 256 (describing a sentence imposed in direct contravention of a statute as illegal and subject to correction at any time); State v. Gayden (2006), 281 Kan. 290, 292-293 , 130 P.3d 108 (“A sentence for which no statutory | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Sullivan v. State
green
2 sentences2010Although the interests in finality of a sentence are important, they cannot trump the interests of justice, which require a judge to follow the letter of the law in sentencing a defendant. {¶ 24} Other states’ courts hold similarly, using the voidness doctrine as well as a related theory, the illegal-sentence doctrine.1 See, e.g., Summers v. State (Tenn.2007), 212 S.W.3d 251, 256 (describing a sentence imposed in direct contravention of a statute as illegal and subject to correction at any time); State v. Gayden (2006), 281 Kan. 290, 292-293 , 130 P.3d 108 (“A sentence for which no statutory a 2010Although the interests in finality of a sentence are important, they cannot trump the interests of justice, which require a judge to follow the letter of the law in sentencing a defendant. {¶ 24} Other states’ courts hold similarly, using the voidness doctrine as well as a related theory, the illegal-sentence doctrine.1 See, e.g., Summers v. State (Tenn.2007), 212 S.W.3d 251, 256 (describing a sentence imposed in direct contravention of a statute as illegal and subject to correction at any time); State v. Gayden (2006), 281 Kan. 290, 292-293 , 130 P.3d 108 (“A sentence for which no statutory a | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Gayden
green
2 sentences2010Although the interests in finality of a sentence are important, they cannot trump the interests of justice, which require a judge to follow the letter of the law in sentencing a defendant. {¶ 24} Other states’ courts hold similarly, using the voidness doctrine as well as a related theory, the illegal-sentence doctrine.1 See, e.g., Summers v. State (Tenn.2007), 212 S.W.3d 251, 256 (describing a sentence imposed in direct contravention of a statute as illegal and subject to correction at any time); State v. Gayden (2006), 281 Kan. 290, 292-293 , 130 P.3d 108 (“A sentence for which no statutory a 2010Although the interests in finality of a sentence are important, they cannot trump the interests of justice, which require a judge to follow the letter of the law in sentencing a defendant. {¶ 24} Other states’ courts hold similarly, using the voidness doctrine as well as a related theory, the illegal-sentence doctrine.1 See, e.g., Summers v. State (Tenn.2007), 212 S.W.3d 251, 256 (describing a sentence imposed in direct contravention of a statute as illegal and subject to correction at any time); State v. Gayden (2006), 281 Kan. 290, 292-293 , 130 P.3d 108 (“A sentence for which no statutory a | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.