personal animus exception in Pennsylvania

2000“In order for an employee to set forth a valid cause of action against his employer under the personal animus exception, ‘an employee must assert that his injuries are not work-related because he was injured by a co-worker for purely personal reasons.’ ” Hammerstein v. Lindsay, 440 Pa.Super. 350 , 655 A.2d 597, 601 (1995)(emphasis original)(quoting Kohler v. McCrory Stores, 582 Pa. 130 , 137-138, 615 A.2d 27, 30 (1992)).

1995In Kohler, this Court held that “only a final adjudication of work-relatedness can es-top an employee from asserting that his injuries are not work-related for purposes of maintaining an action against his employer under the personal animus exception to the Act.” Id. at 1B4, 615 A.2d at 29 .

2006See also, Fiorentino, 571 A.2d at 556 (finding that the "twenty-day appeal period [from a decision of the WCJ] is jurisdictional" such that the failure to properly preserve an issue in appeal documents prevents the Board and, subsequently, this Court, from reviewing it.) Because the issue was not preserved, as clearly stated in Rule 1551, we can not hear it. ("No question shall be heard or considered by the court which was not raised before the government unit.") We note that this is not inconsistent with our Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Heath v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board

2006Heath v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole), 580 Pa. 174, 181 , 860 A.2d 25, 29 (2004).

2024See Grabowski, 230 A.3d at 475 (holding that the personal animus exception did not apply where the plaintiff failed to allege any motivation for the attack in the pleadings and judgment on the pleadings was proper based on WCA immunity); see also Scantlin v. Ulrich, 465 A.2d 19, 21 (Pa. Super. 1983) (affirming judgment on pleadings where the plaintiff asserted an intentional injury caused by co- worker in the complaint but did not state that co-worker’s action was taken because of personal animosity toward the plaintiff).

2024See Grabowski, 230 A.3d at 475 (holding that the personal animus exception did not apply where the plaintiff failed to allege any motivation for the attack in the pleadings and judgment on the pleadings was proper based on WCA immunity); see also Scantlin v. Ulrich, 465 A.2d 19, 21 (Pa. Super. 1983) (affirming judgment on pleadings where the plaintiff asserted an intentional injury caused by co- worker in the complaint but did not state that co-worker’s action was taken because of personal animosity toward the plaintiff).

2020“For the personal animus exception to apply there must be some intention on the part of the assailant to inflict the injury for personal reasons.” M & B Inn Partners, 940 A.2d at 1259 .

2020We have explained that “[t]he party asserting the personal animus exception must establish that the assailant had a pre[]existing relationship with, or a pre[]existing animosity toward, the employee and that he or she intended to injure the employee for reasons personal to the assailant.” M & B Inn Partners, 940 A.2d at 1259 .

2006See also, Fiorentino, 571 A.2d at 556 (finding that the "twenty-day appeal period [from a decision of the WCJ] is jurisdictional" such that the failure to properly preserve an issue in appeal documents prevents the Board and, subsequently, this Court, from reviewing it.) Because the issue was not preserved, as clearly stated in Rule 1551, we can not hear it. ("No question shall be heard or considered by the court which was not raised before the government unit.") We note that this is not inconsistent with our Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Heath v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board

2006Heath v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole), 580 Pa. 174, 181 , 860 A.2d 25, 29 (2004).

2000“In order for an employee to set forth a valid cause of action against his employer under the personal animus exception, ‘an employee must assert that his injuries are not work-related because he was injured by a co-worker for purely personal reasons.’ ” Hammerstein v. Lindsay, 440 Pa.Super. 350 , 655 A.2d 597, 601 (1995)(emphasis original)(quoting Kohler v. McCrory Stores, 582 Pa. 130 , 137-138, 615 A.2d 27, 30 (1992)).

2000“In order for an employee to set forth a valid cause of action against his employer under the personal animus exception, ‘an employee must assert that his injuries are not work-related because he was injured by a co-worker for purely personal reasons.’ ” Hammerstein v. Lindsay, 440 Pa.Super. 350 , 655 A.2d 597, 601 (1995)(emphasis original)(quoting Kohler v. McCrory Stores, 582 Pa. 130 , 137-138, 615 A.2d 27, 30 (1992)).

2024See Grabowski, 230 A.3d at 475 (holding that the personal animus exception did not apply where the plaintiff failed to allege any motivation for the attack in the pleadings and judgment on the pleadings was proper based on WCA immunity); see also Scantlin v. Ulrich, 465 A.2d 19, 21 (Pa. Super. 1983) (affirming judgment on pleadings where the plaintiff asserted an intentional injury caused by co- worker in the complaint but did not state that co-worker’s action was taken because of personal animosity toward the plaintiff).

2024See Grabowski, 230 A.3d at 475 (holding that the personal animus exception did not apply where the plaintiff failed to allege any motivation for the attack in the pleadings and judgment on the pleadings was proper based on WCA immunity); see also Scantlin v. Ulrich, 465 A.2d 19, 21 (Pa. Super. 1983) (affirming judgment on pleadings where the plaintiff asserted an intentional injury caused by co- worker in the complaint but did not state that co-worker’s action was taken because of personal animosity toward the plaintiff).

2006Helm v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (U.S. Gypsum Company), 139 Pa. Cmwlth.587, 591 A.2d 8, 10 (1991).

2006See also, Fiorentino, 571 A.2d at 556 (finding that the "twenty-day appeal period [from a decision of the WCJ] is jurisdictional" such that the failure to properly preserve an issue in appeal documents prevents the Board and, subsequently, this Court, from reviewing it.) Because the issue was not preserved, as clearly stated in Rule 1551, we can not hear it. ("No question shall be heard or considered by the court which was not raised before the government unit.") We note that this is not inconsistent with our Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Heath v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board

2002The personal animus exception provides that an employee may bring a cause of action based upon an injury occurring within the course of employment only if the injury was “caused by an act of a third person intended to injure the employe because of reasons personal to him, and not di rected against him as an employee or because of his employment.” Shaffer v. Procter & Gamble, 412 Pa. Super. 630, 635 , 604 A.2d 289, 292 (1992); 77 P.S. §411(1).

2002The personal animus exception provides that an employee may bring a cause of action based upon an injury occurring within the course of employment only if the injury was “caused by an act of a third person intended to injure the employe because of reasons personal to him, and not di rected against him as an employee or because of his employment.” Shaffer v. Procter & Gamble, 412 Pa. Super. 630, 635 , 604 A.2d 289, 292 (1992); 77 P.S. §411(1).

2002“If the third party would have attacked a different person in the same position as the injured employee, the attack falls outside the ‘third party attack’ exception.” Id. at 635, 604 A.2d at 292 (quoting Vosburg v. Connolly, 405 Pa. Super. 121, 126-27 , 591 A.2d 1128, 1131 (1991)).

2002“If the third party would have attacked a different person in the same position as the injured employee, the attack falls outside the ‘third party attack’ exception.” Id. at 635, 604 A.2d at 292 (quoting Vosburg v. Connolly, 405 Pa. Super. 121, 126-27 , 591 A.2d 1128, 1131 (1991)).

2002See Feidler v. Morris Coupling Co., 784 A.2d 812 (Pa. Super. 2001).

1995Pa.R.C.P. 1034; Giddings v. Tartler, 130 Pa.Cmwlth. 175, 177 , 567 A.2d 766, 767 (1989).

1995Pa.R.C.P. 1034; Giddings v. Tartler, 130 Pa.Cmwlth. 175, 177 , 567 A.2d 766, 767 (1989).

1995The court stated: By virtue of the Compensation Act, an employee’s common law right to damages for injuries suffered in the course of his employment as a result of his employer’s negligence is completely surrendered in exchange for the exclusive statutory right of the employee to compensation for all such injuries, regardless of negligence, and the employer’s liability as a tortfeasor under the law of negligence for injuries to his employee is abrogated. [Socha v. Metz, 385 Pa. 632, 637 , 123 A.2d 837, 839 (1956) ].

1995The court stated: By virtue of the Compensation Act, an employee’s common law right to damages for injuries suffered in the course of his employment as a result of his employer’s negligence is completely surrendered in exchange for the exclusive statutory right of the employee to compensation for all such injuries, regardless of negligence, and the employer’s liability as a tortfeasor under the law of negligence for injuries to his employee is abrogated. [Socha v. Metz, 385 Pa. 632, 637 , 123 A.2d 837, 839 (1956) ].