novel constitutional doctrine in Rhode Island

2026Nevertheless, Vasquez argues that, in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779 (2024), discussed infra, issued during the pendency of his appeal, the state’s failure to present Vele as a witness violated the Confrontation Clause. 6 “When an intervening decision of this Court or of the Supreme Court of the United States establishes a novel constitutional doctrine, counsel’s failure to raise the issue at trial will not preclude our review.” State v. Moten, 64 A.3d 1232, 1240 (R.I. 2013) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Burke, 522 A.2d 725, 731 (R.

2020For the exception to apply, “the alleged error must be more than harmless, and the exception must implicate an issue of constitutional dimension derived from a novel rule of law that could not reasonably have been known to counsel at the time of trial.” Id. (quoting In re Miguel A., 990 A.2d at 1223 ); see State v. Burke, 522 A.2d 725, 731 (R.I. 1987) (providing that the exception may apply, for example, “when an intervening decision of this [C]ourt or of the Supreme Court of the United States establishes a novel constitutional doctrine” during the course of a trial).

2013For the exception to apply, “the alleged error must be more than harmless, and the exception must implicate an issue of constitutional dimension derived from a novel rule of law that could not reasonably have been known to counsel at the time of trial.” State v. Breen, 767 A.2d 50, 57 (R.I.2001); see also State v. Burke, 522 A.2d 725, 731 (R.I.1987) (“[Wjhen an intervening decision of this [Cjourt or of the Supreme Court of the United States establishes a novel constitutional doctrine, counsel’s failure to raise the issue at trial will not preclude our review.”).

2013For the exception to - 12 - apply, ―the alleged error must be more than harmless, and the exception must implicate an issue of constitutional dimension derived from a novel rule of law that could not reasonably have been known to counsel at the time of trial.‖ State v. Breen, 767 A.2d 50, 57 (R.I. 2001); see also State v. Burke, 522 A.2d 725, 731 (R.I. 1987) (―[W]hen an intervening decision of this [C]ourt or of the Supreme Court of the United States establishes a novel constitutional doctrine, counsel‘s failure to raise the issue at trial will not preclude our review.‖).

1996See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1 , 104 S.Ct. 2901 , 82 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984); State v. Amado, 433 A.2d 233 (R.I.1981); State v. Reis, 430 A.2d 749 (R.I.1981).” Burke, 522 A.2d at 731 .

1996See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1 , 104 S.Ct. 2901 , 82 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984); State v. Amado, 433 A.2d 233 (R.I.1981); State v. Reis, 430 A.2d 749 (R.I.1981).” Burke, 522 A.2d at 731 .

2026In analyzing both cases, this Court pointed out that the Melendez-Diaz decision held that affidavits containing forensic analysis were testimonial in nature under Crawford and that the Bullcoming decision held that “surrogate testimony” of an analyst who had not actually performed the - 12 - relevant testing “‘does not meet the constitutional requirement’ of the Sixth Amendment.” Id. (quoting Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 652). 7 Smith, which Vasquez contends announced a novel constitutional rule, “concern[ed] the application of [Confrontation Clause] principles to a case in which an expert witness

2013Instead, defendant argues that two cases decided after Crawford — viz., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 , 129 S.Ct. 2527 , 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009) and Bullcoming v. New Mexico, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2705 , 180 L.Ed.2d 610 (2011)— serve as “intervening decision[s] * * * of the Supreme Court of the United States [that] establish[] a novel constitutional doctrine * * *.” See Burke, 522 A.2d at 731 .

2026In analyzing both cases, this Court pointed out that the Melendez-Diaz decision held that affidavits containing forensic analysis were testimonial in nature under Crawford and that the Bullcoming decision held that “surrogate testimony” of an analyst who had not actually performed the - 12 - relevant testing “‘does not meet the constitutional requirement’ of the Sixth Amendment.” Id. (quoting Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 652). 7 Smith, which Vasquez contends announced a novel constitutional rule, “concern[ed] the application of [Confrontation Clause] principles to a case in which an expert witness

2026Nevertheless, Vasquez argues that, in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779 (2024), discussed infra, issued during the pendency of his appeal, the state’s failure to present Vele as a witness violated the Confrontation Clause. 6 “When an intervening decision of this Court or of the Supreme Court of the United States establishes a novel constitutional doctrine, counsel’s failure to raise the issue at trial will not preclude our review.” State v. Moten, 64 A.3d 1232, 1240 (R.I. 2013) (brackets omitted) (quoting State v. Burke, 522 A.2d 725, 731 (R.

2013Other courts have similarly stated that Melendez-Diaz did nothing more than apply Crawford to a different set of facts — a scenario that surely does not constitute “a novel constitutional rule.” See, e.g., Peak v. Webb, 673 F.3d 465, 480 (6th Cir.2012) (noting that Melendez-Diaz “did not provide a new or novel interpreta tion of the Confrontation Clause”); Hatley v. State, 290 Ga. 480 , 722 S.E.2d 67, 70 (2012) (“Some of the Confrontation Clause issues left unanswered by Crawford were clarified in Melendez-Diaz.”)-, State v. Sorensen, 283 Neb. 932 , 814 N.W.2d 371 , 376 (2012) (“The Court subs

2013Other courts have similarly stated that Melendez-Diaz did nothing more than apply Crawford to a different set of facts—a scenario that surely does not constitute ―a novel constitutional rule.‖ See, e.g., Peak v. Webb, 673 F.3d 465, 480 (6th Cir. 2012) (noting that Melendez-Diaz ―did not provide a new or novel interpretation of the Confrontation Clause‖); Hatley v. State, 722 S.E.2d 67, 70 (Ga. 2012) (―Some of the Confrontation Clause issues left unanswered by Crawford were clarified in Melendez–Diaz.‖); State v. Sorensen, 814 N.W.2d 371 , 376 (Neb. 2012) (―The Court subsequently clarified the

2013Other courts have similarly stated that Melendez-Diaz did nothing more than apply Crawford to a different set of facts — a scenario that surely does not constitute “a novel constitutional rule.” See, e.g., Peak v. Webb, 673 F.3d 465, 480 (6th Cir.2012) (noting that Melendez-Diaz “did not provide a new or novel interpreta tion of the Confrontation Clause”); Hatley v. State, 290 Ga. 480 , 722 S.E.2d 67, 70 (2012) (“Some of the Confrontation Clause issues left unanswered by Crawford were clarified in Melendez-Diaz.”)-, State v. Sorensen, 283 Neb. 932 , 814 N.W.2d 371 , 376 (2012) (“The Court subs

2013Other courts have similarly stated that Melendez-Diaz did nothing more than apply Crawford to a different set of facts — a scenario that surely does not constitute “a novel constitutional rule.” See, e.g., Peak v. Webb, 673 F.3d 465, 480 (6th Cir.2012) (noting that Melendez-Diaz “did not provide a new or novel interpreta tion of the Confrontation Clause”); Hatley v. State, 290 Ga. 480 , 722 S.E.2d 67, 70 (2012) (“Some of the Confrontation Clause issues left unanswered by Crawford were clarified in Melendez-Diaz.”)-, State v. Sorensen, 283 Neb. 932 , 814 N.W.2d 371 , 376 (2012) (“The Court subs

2013Other courts have similarly stated that Melendez-Diaz did nothing more than apply Crawford to a different set of facts — a scenario that surely does not constitute “a novel constitutional rule.” See, e.g., Peak v. Webb, 673 F.3d 465, 480 (6th Cir.2012) (noting that Melendez-Diaz “did not provide a new or novel interpreta tion of the Confrontation Clause”); Hatley v. State, 290 Ga. 480 , 722 S.E.2d 67, 70 (2012) (“Some of the Confrontation Clause issues left unanswered by Crawford were clarified in Melendez-Diaz.”)-, State v. Sorensen, 283 Neb. 932 , 814 N.W.2d 371 , 376 (2012) (“The Court subs

2013Other courts have similarly stated that Melendez-Diaz did nothing more than apply Crawford to a different set of facts — a scenario that surely does not constitute “a novel constitutional rule.” See, e.g., Peak v. Webb, 673 F.3d 465, 480 (6th Cir.2012) (noting that Melendez-Diaz “did not provide a new or novel interpreta tion of the Confrontation Clause”); Hatley v. State, 290 Ga. 480 , 722 S.E.2d 67, 70 (2012) (“Some of the Confrontation Clause issues left unanswered by Crawford were clarified in Melendez-Diaz.”)-, State v. Sorensen, 283 Neb. 932 , 814 N.W.2d 371 , 376 (2012) (“The Court subs

1996See also State v. Estrada, 537 A.2d 983, 987 (R.I.1988).

1996See also State v. Estrada, 537 A.2d 983, 987 (R.I. 1988).

1985In support of this position, they cite Infantolino v. State, — R.I. —, —, 414 A.2d 793, 796 (1980), a case in which we dispensed with our usual *9 procedural requirements for raising a constitutional question on appeal because it involved a novel constitutional claim that could not be anticipated at trial.

1981See State v. Duggan, R.I., 414 A.2d 788 (1980).

1980See State v. McGehearty, 394 A.2d at 1352-53 . *826 The crucial factor in our determination was that McGehearty raised on appeal a novel constitutional claim which we could not have reasonably expected his counsel to appreciate at the time of trial.

1980See State v. Pope, 414 A.2d at 786-87.