Landgraf test in Illinois

2018Alvarez v. Howard , 2016 IL 120729 , ¶ 20, 410 Ill.Dec. 960 , 72 N.E.3d 346 ; Caveney , 207 Ill. 2d at 100 , 278 Ill.Dec. 1 , 797 N.E.2d 596 (Freeman, J., specially concurring, joined by McMorrow, C.J., and Kilbride, J.) ("the court errs when it holds that section 4 serves as the clear expression of legislative intent that is contemplated in the first step of the Landgraf analysis"). ¶ 42 Moreover, where the legislature has not expressly indicated its intent as to temporal reach, "a presumption arises that the amended statute is not to be applied retroactively." J.T.

2018Alvarez v. Howard , 2016 IL 120729 , ¶ 20, 410 Ill.Dec. 960 , 72 N.E.3d 346 ; Caveney , 207 Ill. 2d at 100 , 278 Ill.Dec. 1 , 797 N.E.2d 596 (Freeman, J., specially concurring, joined by McMorrow, C.J., and Kilbride, J.) ("the court errs when it holds that section 4 serves as the clear expression of legislative intent that is contemplated in the first step of the Landgraf analysis"). ¶ 42 Moreover, where the legislature has not expressly indicated its intent as to temporal reach, "a presumption arises that the amended statute is not to be applied retroactively." J.T.

2023“Under the Landgraf test, if the legislature has clearly indicated what the temporal reach of an amended statute should be, then, absent a constitutional prohibition, that expression of legislative intent must be given effect.” Id. at 38 .

2023“Under the Landgraf test, if the legislature has clearly indicated what the temporal reach of an amended statute should be, then, absent a constitutional prohibition, that expression of legislative intent must be given effect.” Id. at 38 .

2018We adopted the Landgraf analysis "with its focus on legislative intent, because we believed it provided the appropriate framework for evaluating whether a new law should apply to existing controversies." Doe A. v. Diocese of Dallas , 234 Ill. 2d 393 , 411, 334 Ill.Dec. 649 , 917 N.E.2d 475 (2009).

2018We adopted the Landgraf analysis "with its focus on legislative intent, because we believed it provided the appropriate framework for evaluating whether a new law should apply to existing controversies." Doe A. v. Diocese of Dallas , 234 Ill. 2d 393 , 411, 334 Ill.Dec. 649 , 917 N.E.2d 475 (2009).

2017The court reiterated its determination that in light of section 4, “an Illinois court need never go beyond step one of the Landgraf test” “because the legislature will always have clearly indicated the temporal reach of an amended statute, either expressly in the new legislative enactment or by default in section 4 of the Statute on Statutes.” Id. at 332 . -8- ¶ 32 In Hunter, another division of this court determined that Caveney did not require the retroactive application of procedural amendments, and recent supreme court opinions (Hayashi v. Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Re

2017The court reiterated its determination that in light of section 4, “an Illinois court need never go beyond step one of the Landgraf test” “because the legislature will always have clearly indicated the temporal reach of an amended statute, either expressly in the new legislative enactment or by default in section 4 of the Statute on Statutes.” Id. at 332 . -8- ¶ 32 In Hunter, another division of this court determined that Caveney did not require the retroactive application of procedural amendments, and recent supreme court opinions (Hayashi v. Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Re

2016Id. at 505 . ¶ 37 Under the second step of the Landgraf analysis, if the amendment contains no express provision regarding its temporal reach, “the court must go on to determine whether applying the statute would have a retroactive impact.” J.T.

2016Id. at 505 . ¶ 37 Under the second step of the Landgraf analysis, if the amendment contains no express provision regarding its temporal reach, “the court must go on to determine whether applying the statute would have a retroactive impact.” J.T.

2019If the legislature has indicated no particular intent, the court must conduct a retroactive impact analysis, in which it considers whether retroactive application of the amended statute " 'would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed.' " Id. at 37 , 255 Ill.Dec. 482 , 749 N.E.2d 964 (quoting Landgraf , 511 U.S. at 280 , 114 S.Ct. 1483 ). ¶ 16 Two years after our supreme court decided Commonwealth Edison , it clarified that section 4 of the Statute on Statutes ( 5 ILCS 70/4

2019If the legislature has indicated no particular intent, the court must conduct a retroactive impact analysis, in which it considers whether retroactive application of the amended statute " 'would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed.' " Id. at 37 , 255 Ill.Dec. 482 , 749 N.E.2d 964 (quoting Landgraf , 511 U.S. at 280 , 114 S.Ct. 1483 ). ¶ 16 Two years after our supreme court decided Commonwealth Edison , it clarified that section 4 of the Statute on Statutes ( 5 ILCS 70/4

2020Einoder, Inc., 2015 IL 117193, ¶ 30 . ¶ 18 Illinois courts, however, rarely look beyond the first step of the Landgraf analysis.

2020Einoder, Inc., 2015 IL 117193, ¶ 30 . ¶ 18 Illinois courts, however, rarely look beyond the first step of the Landgraf analysis.

2009People v. Atkins, 217 Ill. 2d 66, 71 (2005).

2009People v. Atkins, 217 Ill. 2d 66, 71 (2005).

2006Commonwealth Edison Co., 196 Ill. 2d at 34 , 749 N.E.2d at 969 (relying on Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d at 288 , 664 N.E.2d at 39 ). 5 In order to resolve the conflict between these conflicting lines of cases, the Commonwealth Edison Co. court formally adopted the Landgraf test.

2006Commonwealth Edison Co., 196 Ill. 2d at 34 , 749 N.E.2d at 969 (relying on Armstead, 171 Ill. 2d at 288 , 664 N.E.2d at 39 ). 5 In order to resolve the conflict between these conflicting lines of cases, the Commonwealth Edison Co. court formally adopted the Landgraf test.

2018See Thomas v. Guardsmark, LLC , 487 F.3d 531 , 536-37 (7th Cir. 2007) ("[A]n Illinois court (and consequently, a federal court applying substantive Illinois law) need never go beyond step one of the Landgraf test.").

2018See Thomas v. Guardsmark, LLC , 487 F.3d 531 , 536-37 (7th Cir. 2007) ("[A]n Illinois court (and consequently, a federal court applying substantive Illinois law) need never go beyond step one of the Landgraf test.").

2017The court reiterated its determination that in light of section 4, “an Illinois court need never go beyond step one of the Landgraf test” “because the legislature will always have clearly indicated the temporal reach of an amended statute, either expressly in the new legislative enactment or by default in section 4 of the Statute on Statutes.” Id. at 332 . -8- ¶ 32 In Hunter, another division of this court determined that Caveney did not require the retroactive application of procedural amendments, and recent supreme court opinions (Hayashi v. Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Re

2017The court reiterated its determination that in light of section 4, “an Illinois court need never go beyond step one of the Landgraf test” “because the legislature will always have clearly indicated the temporal reach of an amended statute, either expressly in the new legislative enactment or by default in section 4 of the Statute on Statutes.” Id. at 332 . -8- ¶ 32 In Hunter, another division of this court determined that Caveney did not require the retroactive application of procedural amendments, and recent supreme court opinions (Hayashi v. Illinois Department of Financial & Professional Re

2005Applying that test (see Commonwealth Edison, 196 Ill.2d at 38 , 255 Ill.Dec. 482 , 749 N.E.2d 964 (applying Landgraf test); see also People v. Ramsey, 192 Ill.2d 154, 186 , 248 Ill.Dec. 882 , 735 N.E.2d 533 (2000) (Freeman, J., specially concurring, joined by McMorrow, J.) (discussing application of Landgraf with the context of criminal cases)), I reach the same conclusion as that reached by my colleagues—that the amendment at issue here may not be applied retroactively.

2005Applying that test (see Commonwealth Edison, 196 Ill. 2d at 38 (applying Landgraf test); see also People v. Ramsey, 192 Ill. 2d 154, 186 (2000) (Freeman, J., specially concurring, joined by McMorrow, J.) (discussing application of Landgraf with the context of criminal cases)), I reach the same conclusion as that reached by my colleagues — that the amendment at issue here may not be applied retroactively.

2004While we need not reach the second prong of the Landgraf test, we note that this argument nevertheless is inaccurate and misconstrues the true impact of section 10 on a party’s vested contractual right. “[I]t is well settled that a party’s rights under a contract become ‘vested’ for the purposes of the retroactive application of a statute when the contract is entered into rather than when the rights thereunder are asserted.” Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Scott, 161 Ill.

2004While we need not reach the second prong of the Landgraf test, we note that this argument nevertheless is inaccurate and misconstrues the true impact of section 10 on a party’s vested contractual right. “[I]t is well settled that a party’s rights under a contract become ‘vested’ for the purposes of the retroactive application of a statute when the contract is entered into rather than when the rights thereunder are asserted.” Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Scott, 161 Ill.

2019Hunter, 2017 IL 121306, ¶ 21 (citing Howard, 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 20 ).

2019Hunter, 2017 IL 121306, ¶ 21 (citing Howard, 2016 IL 120729, ¶ 20 ).

2009Although the supreme court has never directly held that the Landgraf approach applies to determining whether a repeal of a statute of repose applies retroactively and Commonwealth Edison Co. did not specifically apply the Landgraf analysis to a statute of repose, the Landgraf approach requires courts, faced with any legislative amendment, to “balance the reasons for and against a retroactive application and consider whether it is fair to apply the change retroactively.” Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill.

2009Although the supreme court has never directly held that the Landgraf approach applies to determining whether a repeal of a statute of repose applies retroactively and Commonwealth Edison Co. did not specifically apply the Landgraf analysis to a statute of repose, the Landgraf approach requires courts, faced with any legislative amendment, to “balance the reasons for and against a retroactive application and consider whether it is fair to apply the change retroactively.” Diocese of Dallas, 379 Ill.

2018See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will County Collector , 196 Ill. 2d 27 , 33, 255 Ill.Dec. 482 , 749 N.E.2d 964 (2001) (describing First of America Trust Co. v. Armstead , 171 Ill. 2d 282 , 287-88, 215 Ill.Dec. 639 , 664 N.E.2d 36 (1996), as "[r]ecognizing that the principles for determining whether a statutory amendment applies to an existing controversy on appeal ha[s] 'not been consistently stated' "); Kopec v. City of Elmhurst , 193 F.3d 894 , 906 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J., dissenting) ("Illinois law on retroactivity is in a state of some muddle"); Orlicki v. McCarthy , 4 Ill. 2d 342 , 3

2018See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will County Collector , 196 Ill. 2d 27 , 33, 255 Ill.Dec. 482 , 749 N.E.2d 964 (2001) (describing First of America Trust Co. v. Armstead , 171 Ill. 2d 282 , 287-88, 215 Ill.Dec. 639 , 664 N.E.2d 36 (1996), as "[r]ecognizing that the principles for determining whether a statutory amendment applies to an existing controversy on appeal ha[s] 'not been consistently stated' "); Kopec v. City of Elmhurst , 193 F.3d 894 , 906 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J., dissenting) ("Illinois law on retroactivity is in a state of some muddle"); Orlicki v. McCarthy , 4 Ill. 2d 342 , 3

2018See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will County Collector , 196 Ill. 2d 27 , 33, 255 Ill.Dec. 482 , 749 N.E.2d 964 (2001) (describing First of America Trust Co. v. Armstead , 171 Ill. 2d 282 , 287-88, 215 Ill.Dec. 639 , 664 N.E.2d 36 (1996), as "[r]ecognizing that the principles for determining whether a statutory amendment applies to an existing controversy on appeal ha[s] 'not been consistently stated' "); Kopec v. City of Elmhurst , 193 F.3d 894 , 906 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J., dissenting) ("Illinois law on retroactivity is in a state of some muddle"); Orlicki v. McCarthy , 4 Ill. 2d 342 , 3

2018See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Will County Collector , 196 Ill. 2d 27 , 33, 255 Ill.Dec. 482 , 749 N.E.2d 964 (2001) (describing First of America Trust Co. v. Armstead , 171 Ill. 2d 282 , 287-88, 215 Ill.Dec. 639 , 664 N.E.2d 36 (1996), as "[r]ecognizing that the principles for determining whether a statutory amendment applies to an existing controversy on appeal ha[s] 'not been consistently stated' "); Kopec v. City of Elmhurst , 193 F.3d 894 , 906 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, C.J., dissenting) ("Illinois law on retroactivity is in a state of some muddle"); Orlicki v. McCarthy , 4 Ill. 2d 342 , 3