sentence below standard in Washington

90 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2026 28 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (14)

Case	Followed	Cited
State v. O'Dellgreen wash · 2015 · cited in 13 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2016–2025 2 sentences 2022Today, if youth relates to a defendant’s crime, it can “amount to a substantial and compelling factor, in particular cases, justifying a sentence below the standard range.” Id. at 696 . 2022Under O’Dell, a sentencing court must consider the defendant’s youth only if it relates to the offense and “amount[s] to a substantial and compelling factor . . . justifying a sentence below the standard range.” Id. at 696 .	3	13
Miller v. Alabamagreen scotus · 2012 · cited in 8 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2015–2026 2 sentences 2026In the conclusions of law, the trial court stated that “it has been shown by a preponderance of the evidence, . . . that to a significant degree, the defendant’s youth was a significant factor in the offense and [ ] his maturation since that time supports a sentence below the standard range.” Id. at 447. 5 No. 61187-2-II Leo’s updated sentence on his aggravated murder convictions is outlined in his J&S addendum, but Leo’s original J&S is still in effect with respect to his assault convictions and their firearm enhancements.4 II. 2022In Houston-Sconiers, our Supreme Court held that when sentencing juveniles, the Eighth Amendment requires courts to consider the “ ‘hallmark features’ ” of youth and have discretion to impose a sentence below the standard range. 188 Wn.2d 1 at 23 (quoting Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 477 , 132 S. Ct. 2455 , 183 L.	2	8
State v. Bauchamgreen washctapp · 1995 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1997–1997 2 sentences 1997See Baucham, 76 Wn. 1997See Baucham, 76 Wash.App. 749 , 887 P.2d 909 .	2	2
State v. Houston-Sconiersgreen wash · 2017 · cited in 8 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2020–2026 2 sentences 2025Rather, in the face of Grantham’s desire for the level of consideration addressed in State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1 , 391 P.3d 409 (2017), we merely held that “because Grantham was not receiving a mandatory life without parole (LWOP) sentence and did not seek a mitigated sentence below the standard range, the authorities cited by Grantham did not require the superior court to undertake the type of consideration Grantham demands.” Grantham I, slip op. at 3. 8 No. 60087-1-II have persuaded the superior court to impose a sentence below the standard sentencing range. 2025Rather, in the face of Grantham’s desire for the level of consideration addressed in State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1 , 391 P.3d 409 (2017), we merely held that “because Grantham was not receiving a mandatory life without parole (LWOP) sentence and did not seek a mitigated sentence below the standard range, the authorities cited by Grantham did not require the superior court to undertake the type of consideration Grantham demands.” Grantham I, slip op. at 3. 8 No. 60087-1-II have persuaded the superior court to impose a sentence below the standard sentencing range.	1	8
State v. Alexandergreen wash · 1995 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1995–1997 2 sentences 1997App. at 337-38 . 5 We also reject Enriquez’s argument that he was entitled to a sentence below the standard range based on State v. Alexander, 125 Wn.2d 717 , 888 P.2d 1169 331 (1995). 1997App. at 337-38 . 5 We also reject Enriquez’s argument that he was entitled to a sentence below the standard range based on State v. Alexander, 125 Wn.2d 717 , 888 P.2d 1169 331 (1995).	1	2
State v. Alexandergreen washctapp · 1993 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1994–1995 2 sentences 1995Alexander, 70 Wn. 1995Alexander, 70 Wn.	1	2
State v. Gregggreen wash · 2020 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025 2 sentences 2025State v. Gregg, 196 Wn.2d 473, 482 , 474 P.3d 539 (2020) (“We have held that trial courts, when sentencing juveniles, have discretion to impose a sentence below the standard range and may, where required, disregard mandatory enhancements when supported by evidence presented at sentencing as to mitigating qualities of youth.”); Anderson, 200 Wn.2d at 285 (“[A] juvenile offender must show that their immaturity, impetuosity, or failure to appreciate risks and consequences—characteristics of youth that suggest a juvenile offender may be less culpable than an adult offender—contributed to the commi 2025State v. Gregg, 196 Wn.2d 473, 482 , 474 P.3d 539 (2020) (“We have held that trial courts, when sentencing juveniles, have discretion to impose a sentence below the standard range and may, where required, disregard mandatory enhancements when supported by evidence presented at sentencing as to mitigating qualities of youth.”); Anderson, 200 Wn.2d at 285 (“[A] juvenile offender must show that their immaturity, impetuosity, or failure to appreciate risks and consequences—characteristics of youth that suggest a juvenile offender may be less culpable than an adult offender—contributed to the commi	1	1
State v. Delbosquegreen wash · 2020 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2025–2025 1 sentence 2025State v. Delbosque, 195 Wn.2d 106, 123 (2020).	1	1
North Carolina v. Alfordgreen scotus · 1970 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022 1 sentence 2022According to the court, the disharmony between Mr. Winters and his wife did “not reach that standard.” Id. at 296.	1	1
State v. Evansgreen wash · 2005 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021	1	1
State v. Evansgreen wash · 2005 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021	1	1
State v. Bridgesgreen washctapp · 2001 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2013–2013	1	1
State v. Freitaggreen wash · 1995 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2011–2011	1	1
State v. Estrellagreen wash · 1990 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1990–1990	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (2)

Case	Negative	Cited
State v. Lawgreen wash · 2005 · cited in 3 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2008–2017 2 sentences 2017App. at 218-19 . 7 No. 75129-8-1 /8 discussion of what may constitute a nonstatutory factor justifying a sentence below the standard range. 154 Wn.2d 85, 94-98 , 110 P.3d 717 (2005). 2016Notably, the O'Dell Court's holding was explicitly limited to youth. 183 Wn.2d at 696 (stating that youth can amountto a substantial and compelling factor justifying a sentence below the standard range). 6 At the sentencing hearing, Young stated that he had deep regret for his actions and that he sought to take full responsibility for his actions. 13 No. 73760-1-1/14 restitution if not incarcerated is a factor personal in nature.7 See Law, 154 Wn.2d at 104 .	1	3
State v. Lawgreen wash · 2005 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2008–2017 2 sentences 2017App. at 218-19 . 7 No. 75129-8-1 /8 discussion of what may constitute a nonstatutory factor justifying a sentence below the standard range. 154 Wn.2d 85, 94-98 , 110 P.3d 717 (2005). 2008But see State v. Law, 154 Wash.2d 85, 93 , 110 P.3d 717 (2005); State v. McKee, 141 Wash.App. 22, 32-33 , 167 P.3d 575 (2007); State v. Smith, 124 Wash.App. 417, 435 , 102 P.3d 158 (2004), aff'd, 159 Wash.2d 778, 793 , 154 P.3d 873 (2007) (all employing the three-prong analysis when the trial court imposes a sentence below the standard range and, therefore, the trial court, not the jury, found mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt). [6] Former RCW 9.94A.535(3)(v) provided: "The offense was committed against a law enforcement officer who was performing his or her official duties at	1	2

Also cited on this issue (44)

Case	Cited	Years
State v. Garcia-Martinez green washctapp · 1997 2 sentences 2025App. 322, 330 , 944 P.2d 1104 (1997). 6 No. 60116-8-II A court refuses to exercise discretion where it categorically refuses to impose an exceptional sentence “under any circumstances; i.e., it takes the position that it will never impose a sentence below the standard range.” Id. 2025App. 322, 330 , 944 P.2d 1104 (1997). 6 No. 60116-8-II A court refuses to exercise discretion where it categorically refuses to impose an exceptional sentence “under any circumstances; i.e., it takes the position that it will never impose a sentence below the standard range.” Id.	21	2013–2025
State v. Fowler green wash · 2002 2 sentences 2005In Fowler, following testimony from the defendant’s family, the trial court imposed a sentence below the standard range, based in part on a finding that the defendant “had a ‘great deal of family support.’ ” Fowler, 145 Wn.2d at 411 (quoting trial court record). 2005A court must generally impose a sentence within the standard sentence range, but a court may impose a sentence below the standard range for reasons that are “substantial and compelling.” State v. Fowler, 145 Wn.2d 400, 404 , 38 P.3d 335 (2002); see also former RCW 9.94A.535 (2001).	7	2004–2021
State v. Fowler green wash · 2002 2 sentences 2005A court must generally impose a sentence within the standard sentence range, but a court may impose a sentence below the standard range for reasons that are “substantial and compelling.” State v. Fowler, 145 Wn.2d 400, 404 , 38 P.3d 335 (2002); see also former RCW 9.94A.535 (2001). 2005In Fowler , following testimony from the defendant's family, the trial court imposed a sentence below the standard range, based in part on a finding that the defendant "had a `great deal of family support.'" Fowler, 145 Wash.2d at 411 , 38 P.3d 335 (quoting trial court record).	5	2004–2005
State v. Ha'mim red wash · 1997 2 sentences 2016O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d at 683 . ¶15 The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that in light of what we know today about adolescents’ cognitive and emotional development, we conclude that youth may, in fact, “ ‘relate to [a defendant’s] crime,’ ” [Ha’mim, 132 Wn.2d at 847 ] (quoting RCW 9.94A.340); that it is far more likely to diminish a defendant’s culpability than this court implied in Ha’mim; and that youth can, therefore, amount to a substantial and compelling factor, in particular cases, justifying a sentence below the standard range. 2016The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that in light of what we know today about adolescents’ cognitive and emotional development, we conclude that youth may, in fact, “relate to [a defendant’s] crime,” [Ha’mim, 132 Wn.2d at 847 ] (quoting RCW 9.94A.340); that it is far more likely to diminish a defendant’s culpability than this court implied in Ha’mim; and that youth can, therefore, amount to a substantial and compelling factor, in particular cases, justifying a sentence below the standard range.	4	2015–2016
State v. Moore green washctapp · 1994 2 sentences 2004State v. Moore, 73 Wn. 2004State v. Moore, 73 Wash.App. 789, 798-99 , 871 P.2d 642 (1994). [35] As a result of prosecutorial vindictiveness here, however, Korum's charges, and consequently his resultant sentences, far exceeded those of his more culpable co-conspirators.	4	1995–2004
State v. Grayson green wash · 2005 2 sentences 2021Under Washington law, “no defendant is entitled” to a sentence below the standard range, but “every defendant is entitled to ask the trial court to consider such a sentence and to have the alternative actually considered.” State v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333, 342 , 111 P.3d 1183 (2005). 2014"The failure to consider an exceptional sentence is reversible error." State v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333, 342 , 111 P.3d 1183 (2005). 17 No. 31037-0-111 State v. Nichols RCW 9 .94A.589( 1)(c) provides that where "an offender is convicted under RCW 9.41.040 for unlawful possession of a firearm ... and for the felony crimes of theft of a firearm[,] ...[t]he offender shall serve consecutive sentences/or each conviction . .. , and for each firearm unlawfully possessed." (Emphasis added.) RCW 9.41.040(6) similarly provides: Notwithstanding any other law, if the offender is convicted under this sectio	3	2014–2021
State of Washington v. Cecily Zorada McFarland green washctapp · 2021 2 sentences 2026App. 2d 528 , 538, 492 P.3d 829 (2021) (quoting RCW 9.94A.535(1)). 2025App. 2d 528, 538, 492 P.3d 829 (2021) (quoting RCW 9.94A.535).	2	2025–2026
State v. Grayson green wash · 2005 2 sentences 2021Under Washington law, “no defendant is entitled” to a sentence below the standard range, but “every defendant is entitled to ask the trial court to consider such a sentence and to have the alternative actually considered.” State v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333, 342 , 111 P.3d 1183 (2005). 2014"The failure to consider an exceptional sentence is reversible error." State v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333, 342 , 111 P.3d 1183 (2005). 17 No. 31037-0-111 State v. Nichols RCW 9 .94A.589( 1)(c) provides that where "an offender is convicted under RCW 9.41.040 for unlawful possession of a firearm ... and for the felony crimes of theft of a firearm[,] ...[t]he offender shall serve consecutive sentences/or each conviction . .. , and for each firearm unlawfully possessed." (Emphasis added.) RCW 9.41.040(6) similarly provides: Notwithstanding any other law, if the offender is convicted under this sectio	2	2014–2021
State v. Smith green wash · 2007 2 sentences 2008App. 417, 435 , 102 P.3d 158 (2004), aff’d, 159 Wn.2d 778, 793 , 154 P.3d 873 (2007) (all employing the three-prong analysis when the trial court imposes a sentence below the standard range and, therefore, the trial court, not the jury, found mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt). 2008But see State v. Law, 154 Wash.2d 85, 93 , 110 P.3d 717 (2005); State v. McKee, 141 Wash.App. 22, 32-33 , 167 P.3d 575 (2007); State v. Smith, 124 Wash.App. 417, 435 , 102 P.3d 158 (2004), aff'd, 159 Wash.2d 778, 793 , 154 P.3d 873 (2007) (all employing the three-prong analysis when the trial court imposes a sentence below the standard range and, therefore, the trial court, not the jury, found mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt). [6] Former RCW 9.94A.535(3)(v) provided: "The offense was committed against a law enforcement officer who was performing his or her official duties at	2	2008–2008
State v. Smith green washctapp · 2004 2 sentences 2008App. 417, 435 , 102 P.3d 158 (2004), aff’d, 159 Wn.2d 778, 793 , 154 P.3d 873 (2007) (all employing the three-prong analysis when the trial court imposes a sentence below the standard range and, therefore, the trial court, not the jury, found mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt). 2008But see State v. Law, 154 Wash.2d 85, 93 , 110 P.3d 717 (2005); State v. McKee, 141 Wash.App. 22, 32-33 , 167 P.3d 575 (2007); State v. Smith, 124 Wash.App. 417, 435 , 102 P.3d 158 (2004), aff'd, 159 Wash.2d 778, 793 , 154 P.3d 873 (2007) (all employing the three-prong analysis when the trial court imposes a sentence below the standard range and, therefore, the trial court, not the jury, found mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt). [6] Former RCW 9.94A.535(3)(v) provided: "The offense was committed against a law enforcement officer who was performing his or her official duties at	2	2008–2008
State v. Smith green wash · 2007 2 sentences 2008App. 417, 435 , 102 P.3d 158 (2004), aff’d, 159 Wn.2d 778, 793 , 154 P.3d 873 (2007) (all employing the three-prong analysis when the trial court imposes a sentence below the standard range and, therefore, the trial court, not the jury, found mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt). 2008But see State v. Law, 154 Wash.2d 85, 93 , 110 P.3d 717 (2005); State v. McKee, 141 Wash.App. 22, 32-33 , 167 P.3d 575 (2007); State v. Smith, 124 Wash.App. 417, 435 , 102 P.3d 158 (2004), aff'd, 159 Wash.2d 778, 793 , 154 P.3d 873 (2007) (all employing the three-prong analysis when the trial court imposes a sentence below the standard range and, therefore, the trial court, not the jury, found mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt). [6] Former RCW 9.94A.535(3)(v) provided: "The offense was committed against a law enforcement officer who was performing his or her official duties at	2	2008–2008
State v. Sledge green wash · 1997 2 sentences 2003State v. Sledge, 133 Wn.2d 828, 844 , 947 P.2d 1199 (1997). 2003State v. Sledge, 133 Wash.2d 828, 844 , 947 P.2d 1199 (1997).	2	2003–2003
State v. Sledge green wash · 1998 2 sentences 2003State v. Sledge, 133 Wn.2d 828, 844 , 947 P.2d 1199 (1997). 2003State v. Sledge, 133 Wash.2d 828, 844 , 947 P.2d 1199 (1997).	2	2003–2003
State v. Pennington green wash · 1989 2 sentences 1991This mitigating factor is the primary reason the trial court imposed a sentence below the standard range. [10] State v. Pennington, 112 Wn.2d 606 , 772 P.2d 1009 (1989) establishes that an alcohol problem in and of itself is not a reason justifying an exceptional sentence. 1991This mitigating factor is the primary reason the trial court imposed a sentence below the standard range. [10] State v. Pennington, 112 Wn.2d 606 , 772 P.2d 1009 (1989) establishes that an alcohol problem in and of itself is not a reason justifying an exceptional sentence.	2	1991–1993
State v. Roggenkamp green wash · 2005 1 sentence 2026RELEVANT STATUTES RCW 46.61.520(1) states that a driver is guilty of vehicular homicide if driving a vehicle causes the death of a person and “the driver was operating a motor vehicle . . . (b) In a reckless manner.” RCW 46.61.522(1) states that a driver is guilty of vehicular assault if the driver “operates or drives any vehicle . . . (a) In a reckless manner and causes substantial bodily harm to another.” Driving in a reckless manner under both statutes means “to operate a vehicle in a rash or heedless manner, indifferent to the consequences.” State v. Roggenkamp, 153 Wn.2d 614, 631 , 106 P.	1	2026–2026
State v. Roggenkamp green wash · 2005 1 sentence 2026RELEVANT STATUTES RCW 46.61.520(1) states that a driver is guilty of vehicular homicide if driving a vehicle causes the death of a person and “the driver was operating a motor vehicle . . . (b) In a reckless manner.” RCW 46.61.522(1) states that a driver is guilty of vehicular assault if the driver “operates or drives any vehicle . . . (a) In a reckless manner and causes substantial bodily harm to another.” Driving in a reckless manner under both statutes means “to operate a vehicle in a rash or heedless manner, indifferent to the consequences.” State v. Roggenkamp, 153 Wn.2d 614, 631 , 106 P.	1	2026–2026
In re Pers. Restraint of Light-Roth green wash · 2018 1 sentence 2025Restraint of Light-Roth, 191 Wn.2d 328 , 336, 422 P.3d 444 (“RCW 9.94A.535(1)(e) has always provided the opportunity to raise youth for the purpose of requesting an exceptional sentence downward, and mitigation based on youth is within the trial court's discretion.”). 16 No. 85086-5-I/17 sentence aligns with the goal of rehabilitation, given the court’s imposition of a sentence below the standard range after considering Hardy’s youth and TBI.	1	2025–2025
In re Pers. Restraint of Monschke green wash · 2021 1 sentence 2025Before Monschke, the only possible sentence for young adults convicted of aggravated murder in the first degree was mandatory LWOP. 197 Wn.2d at 308 .	1	2025–2025
State v. Blake green wash · 2021 2 sentences 2023Mr. Richmond appeals, asking us to hold that sentencing courts must not only entertain a request for a below-standard range sentence but also—if they deny the request—must explain the weight given to the alleged mitigating factor and enter findings that can be tested for completeness and evidentiary support on appeal. 1 197 Wn.2d 170 , 481 P.3d 521 (2021). 2023Mr. Richmond appeals, asking us to hold that sentencing courts must not only entertain a request for a below-standard range sentence but also—if they deny the request—must explain the weight given to the alleged mitigating factor and enter findings that can be tested for completeness and evidentiary support on appeal. 1 197 Wn.2d 170 , 481 P.3d 521 (2021).	1	2023–2023
In re Meippen green wash · 2019	1	2021–2021
State v. Gunwall green wash · 1986	1	2020–2020
State v. Ramos green wash · 2017	1	2020–2020
State v. Grier green wash · 2011	1	2017–2017
State v. Scott green washctapp · 1993	1	2017–2017
Graham v. Florida green scotus · 2010	1	2015–2015
State v. Hutsell green wash · 1993	1	2015–2015
State v. Khanteechit green washctapp · 2000	1	2015–2015
State v. DUNCALF neutral wash · 2012	1	2013–2013
State v. Bunker green washctapp · 2008	1	2013–2013
State v. Duncalf green washctapp · 2011	1	2013–2013
State v. McKee green washctapp · 2007	1	2008–2008
State v. Smith neutral washctapp · 2004	1	2008–2008
State v. McKee green washctapp · 2007	1	2008–2008
State v. Norlin green wash · 1998	1	2005–2005
State v. Norlin green wash · 1998	1	2005–2005
Cossel v. Skagit County red wash · 1992	1	1995–1995
State v. Sanchez green washctapp · 1993	1	1995–1995
State v. Allert green wash · 1991	1	1995–1995
State v. Hodges green washctapp · 1993	1	1995–1995
State v. Mail green wash · 1993	1	1994–1994

Statutes the citing opinions construe

WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.535 (49) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 2.06.040 (43) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.585 (33) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.010 (20) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.589 (17) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.030 (14) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.090 (10) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.340 (10) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 10.73.100 (8) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 9.94A.730 (8) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.030 (7) WA § Wash. Rev. Code § 69.50.401 (7)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

WA 90 (1990–2026) PA 2 (2018–2026)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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