12 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1965–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Whitakergreen2 sentences2018Craig, however, argues that the criminal damage charge is the only charge to which the exception to the anti-marital fact privilege applies and such testimony should be precluded for the other charged offenses pursuant to the privilege. ¶ 7 The legislative purpose of the privilege is "to support the peace and tranquility of families and to protect the marital relation[ship]." Whitaker , 112 Ariz. at 540 , 544 P.2d at 222 . 2018Craig, however, argues that the criminal damage charge is the only charge to which the exception to the anti-marital fact privilege applies and such testimony should be precluded for the other charged offenses pursuant to the privilege. ¶ 7 The legislative purpose of the privilege is "to support the peace and tranquility of families and to protect the marital relation[ship]." Whitaker , 112 Ariz. at 540 , 544 P.2d at 222 . | 3 | 3 |
State v. Watkinsgreen2 sentences2018As our supreme court has recognized, the Arizona Legislature has "made it clear that it places paramount importance on the marital relationship and believes the privilege is necessary to protect that relationship from the strain which would be placed upon it if spouses were allowed to testify against each other." Williams , 133 Ariz. at 232 , 650 P.2d at 1214 ; see also State v. Watkins , 126 Ariz. 293 , 298, 614 P.2d 835 , 840 (1980) ("The anti-marital fact privilege exists by virtue of legislative fiat, as a matter of policy to protect certain interests" involved in the marital relationship. 2018As our supreme court has recognized, the Arizona Legislature has "made it clear that it places paramount importance on the marital relationship and believes the privilege is necessary to protect that relationship from the strain which would be placed upon it if spouses were allowed to testify against each other." Williams , 133 Ariz. at 232 , 650 P.2d at 1214 ; see also State v. Watkins , 126 Ariz. 293 , 298, 614 P.2d 835 , 840 (1980) ("The anti-marital fact privilege exists by virtue of legislative fiat, as a matter of policy to protect certain interests" involved in the marital relationship. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Drurygreen2 sentences2008Id. at 502 , 844 P.2d at 1152 ; see also State v. Whitaker, 112 Ariz. 537, 540 , 544 P.2d 219, 222 (1975) (“The anti-marital fact privilege, as distinguished from the privilege for confidential communications between a husband and wife ... under Arizona law gives a criminal defendant, except in enumerated types of cases, an absolute right to prevent his or her spouse from being called as a witness.”); State v. Drury, 110 Ariz. 447, 451 , 520 P.2d 495, 499 (1974) (holding that the anti-marital fact privilege “operates to absolutely disqualify a spouse as a witness for or against the other witho 2008Id. at 502 , 844 P.2d at 1152 ; see also State v. Whitaker, 112 Ariz. 537, 540 , 544 P.2d 219, 222 (1975) (“The anti-marital fact privilege, as distinguished from the privilege for confidential communications between a husband and wife ... under Arizona law gives a criminal defendant, except in enumerated types of cases, an absolute right to prevent his or her spouse from being called as a witness.”); State v. Drury, 110 Ariz. 447, 451 , 520 P.2d 495, 499 (1974) (holding that the anti-marital fact privilege “operates to absolutely disqualify a spouse as a witness for or against the other witho | 2 | 2 |
State v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2018As our supreme court has recognized, the Arizona Legislature has "made it clear that it places paramount importance on the marital relationship and believes the privilege is necessary to protect that relationship from the strain which would be placed upon it if spouses were allowed to testify against each other." Williams , 133 Ariz. at 232 , 650 P.2d at 1214 ; see also State v. Watkins , 126 Ariz. 293 , 298, 614 P.2d 835 , 840 (1980) ("The anti-marital fact privilege exists by virtue of legislative fiat, as a matter of policy to protect certain interests" involved in the marital relationship. 2018As our supreme court has recognized, the Arizona Legislature has "made it clear that it places paramount importance on the marital relationship and believes the privilege is necessary to protect that relationship from the strain which would be placed upon it if spouses were allowed to testify against each other." Williams , 133 Ariz. at 232 , 650 P.2d at 1214 ; see also State v. Watkins , 126 Ariz. 293 , 298, 614 P.2d 835 , 840 (1980) ("The anti-marital fact privilege exists by virtue of legislative fiat, as a matter of policy to protect certain interests" involved in the marital relationship. | 1 | 2 |
Blazek v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2018This testimonial privilege, known as the anti-marital fact privilege, enables a defendant-spouse in a criminal proceeding "to prevent the other spouse from testifying." Blazek v. Superior Court , 177 Ariz. 535 , 538, 869 P.2d 509 (App. 1994). 1 ¶ 8 The anti-marital fact privilege, though rooted in common law, has existed in Arizona in some statutory form since before statehood. 2018This testimonial privilege, known as the anti-marital fact privilege, enables a defendant-spouse in a criminal proceeding "to prevent the other spouse from testifying." Blazek v. Superior Court , 177 Ariz. 535 , 538, 869 P.2d 509 (App. 1994). 1 ¶ 8 The anti-marital fact privilege, though rooted in common law, has existed in Arizona in some statutory form since before statehood. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Crowgreen2 sentences2018As our supreme court has recognized, the Arizona Legislature has "made it clear that it places paramount importance on the marital relationship and believes the privilege is necessary to protect that relationship from the strain which would be placed upon it if spouses were allowed to testify against each other." Williams , 133 Ariz. at 232 , 650 P.2d at 1214 ; see also State v. Watkins , 126 Ariz. 293 , 298, 614 P.2d 835 , 840 (1980) ("The anti-marital fact privilege exists by virtue of legislative fiat, as a matter of policy to protect certain interests" involved in the marital relationship. 2018As our supreme court has recognized, the Arizona Legislature has "made it clear that it places paramount importance on the marital relationship and believes the privilege is necessary to protect that relationship from the strain which would be placed upon it if spouses were allowed to testify against each other." Williams , 133 Ariz. at 232 , 650 P.2d at 1214 ; see also State v. Watkins , 126 Ariz. 293 , 298, 614 P.2d 835 , 840 (1980) ("The anti-marital fact privilege exists by virtue of legislative fiat, as a matter of policy to protect certain interests" involved in the marital relationship. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Burchettgreen2 sentences2018As our supreme court has recognized, the Arizona Legislature has "made it clear that it places paramount importance on the marital relationship and believes the privilege is necessary to protect that relationship from the strain which would be placed upon it if spouses were allowed to testify against each other." Williams , 133 Ariz. at 232 , 650 P.2d at 1214 ; see also State v. Watkins , 126 Ariz. 293 , 298, 614 P.2d 835 , 840 (1980) ("The anti-marital fact privilege exists by virtue of legislative fiat, as a matter of policy to protect certain interests" involved in the marital relationship. 2018As our supreme court has recognized, the Arizona Legislature has "made it clear that it places paramount importance on the marital relationship and believes the privilege is necessary to protect that relationship from the strain which would be placed upon it if spouses were allowed to testify against each other." Williams , 133 Ariz. at 232 , 650 P.2d at 1214 ; see also State v. Watkins , 126 Ariz. 293 , 298, 614 P.2d 835 , 840 (1980) ("The anti-marital fact privilege exists by virtue of legislative fiat, as a matter of policy to protect certain interests" involved in the marital relationship. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Olquingreen2 sentences2018See State v. Olquin , 216 Ariz. 250 , 254, ¶ 22, 165 P.3d 228 , 232 (App. 2007) (observing that a DUI is considered a victimless crime because it can be committed absent involvement of any other person); State v. Sorkhabi , 202 Ariz. 450 , 453, ¶ 11, 46 P.3d 1071 , 1074 (App. 2002) (a "victimless crime" is "a crime which generally involves only the criminal, and which has no direct victim"); Weston v. State , 49 Ariz. 183 , 186, 65 P.2d 652 (1937) (noting DUI legislation enacted because "driving an automobile under these circumstances is such a menace to public safety"). ¶ 17 The City next arg 2018See State v. Olquin , 216 Ariz. 250 , 254, ¶ 22, 165 P.3d 228 , 232 (App. 2007) (observing that a DUI is considered a victimless crime because it can be committed absent involvement of any other person); State v. Sorkhabi , 202 Ariz. 450 , 453, ¶ 11, 46 P.3d 1071 , 1074 (App. 2002) (a "victimless crime" is "a crime which generally involves only the criminal, and which has no direct victim"); Weston v. State , 49 Ariz. 183 , 186, 65 P.2d 652 (1937) (noting DUI legislation enacted because "driving an automobile under these circumstances is such a menace to public safety"). ¶ 17 The City next arg | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bayardigreen2 sentences2018See Bayardi , 230 Ariz. at 197 , ¶ 7 , 281 P.3d at 1065 (court sua sponte accepted special action jurisdiction). ¶ 6 Accordingly, we review the superior court's ruling on the applicability of the anti-marital fact privilege for an abuse of discretion. 2018See Bayardi , 230 Ariz. at 197 , ¶ 7 , 281 P.3d at 1065 (court sua sponte accepted special action jurisdiction). ¶ 6 Accordingly, we review the superior court's ruling on the applicability of the anti-marital fact privilege for an abuse of discretion. | 1 | 1 |
Cv-12-0319-Pr State of Arizona v. Joseph Coopermangreen2 sentences2018See State v. Whitaker , 112 Ariz. 537 , 542, 544 P.2d 219 (1975) ; see also State v. Cooperman , 232 Ariz. 347 , 349 ¶ 7, 306 P.3d 4 (2013). 2018See State v. Whitaker , 112 Ariz. 537 , 542, 544 P.2d 219 (1975) ; see also State v. Cooperman , 232 Ariz. 347 , 349 ¶ 7, 306 P.3d 4 (2013). | 1 | 1 |
Taylor v. Cruikshankgreen2 sentences2008Taylor v. Cruikshank, 214 Ariz. 40, 43, ¶ 10 , 148 P.3d 84, 87 (App.2006). ¶ 7 Arizona recognizes two marital privileges: the anti-marital fact privilege and the marital communications privilege. 2008Taylor v. Cruikshank, 214 Ariz. 40, 43, ¶ 10 , 148 P.3d 84, 87 (App.2006). ¶ 7 Arizona recognizes two marital privileges: the anti-marital fact privilege and the marital communications privilege. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Thomasongreen2 sentences2008“Statutes relating to the same subject matter should be read in pari materia to determine legislative intent and to maintain harmony.” Goulder v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 177 Ariz. 414 , 416, 868 P.2d 997 , 999 (App. 1993); see State v. Thomason, 162 Ariz. 363, 366 , 783 P.2d 809, 812 (App.1989) (“A statute should be explained in conjunction with other statutes which relate to the same subject or have the same general purpose.”) (citing State ex rel. 2008“Statutes relating to the same subject matter should be read in pari materia to determine legislative intent and to maintain harmony.” Goulder v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 177 Ariz. 414 , 416, 868 P.2d 997 , 999 (App. 1993); see State v. Thomason, 162 Ariz. 363, 366 , 783 P.2d 809, 812 (App.1989) (“A statute should be explained in conjunction with other statutes which relate to the same subject or have the same general purpose.”) (citing State ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Hicksgreen1 sentence1980See United States v. Hicks, 420 F.Supp. 533 (N.D.Tex.1976). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
De Leon v. Territory of Arizona
green
2 sentences1983In De-Leon v. Territory, 9 Ariz. 161 , 80 P. 348 this court held that the defendant waived the privilege when he wrote a letter from jail to his wife knowing that *435 the jailer would read it. 1983In De-Leon v. Territory, 9 Ariz. 161 , 80 P. 348 this court held that the defendant waived the privilege when he wrote a letter from jail to his wife knowing that *435 the jailer would read it. | 2 | 1965–1983 |
Phx. City Prosecutor v. Lowery
neutral
1 sentence2018City Prosecutor v. Lowery , 244 Ariz. 308 , 310 ¶ 1, 418 P.3d 1081 (App. 2018). ¶ 5 We granted review because the scope of the anti-marital fact privilege and the crime exception are recurring issues of statewide importance. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State Ex Rel. Romley v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2018The City cites only Romley , 184 Ariz. 409 , 909 P.2d 476 , arguing that because *1086 the "victim" of the DUI offense was shielded from the defendant's deposition requests under the VBR, the exception for crimes committed by one spouse against another applies here. 2018The City cites only Romley , 184 Ariz. 409 , 909 P.2d 476 , arguing that because *1086 the "victim" of the DUI offense was shielded from the defendant's deposition requests under the VBR, the exception for crimes committed by one spouse against another applies here. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Salazar
green
2 sentences2018And although the defendant in Salazar was also charged with a DUI, the issue of whether the DUI offense fell within the exception to the anti-marital fact privilege was not before the court. 146 Ariz. at 550 , 707 P.2d at 954 . ¶ 10 The City next argues, citing Salazar , that if the exception to the anti-marital fact privilege applies to one charge, it applies to all charges when the charges arise out of the same course of conduct. 3 Contrary to the City's argument, Salazar did not hold that if the exception applies to one charge, it applies to all of the others. ¶ 11 The City then argues that 2018And although the defendant in Salazar was also charged with a DUI, the issue of whether the DUI offense fell within the exception to the anti-marital fact privilege was not before the court. 146 Ariz. at 550 , 707 P.2d at 954 . ¶ 10 The City next argues, citing Salazar , that if the exception to the anti-marital fact privilege applies to one charge, it applies to all charges when the charges arise out of the same course of conduct. 3 Contrary to the City's argument, Salazar did not hold that if the exception applies to one charge, it applies to all of the others. ¶ 11 The City then argues that | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Sorkhabi
green
2 sentences2018See State v. Olquin , 216 Ariz. 250 , 254, ¶ 22, 165 P.3d 228 , 232 (App. 2007) (observing that a DUI is considered a victimless crime because it can be committed absent involvement of any other person); State v. Sorkhabi , 202 Ariz. 450 , 453, ¶ 11, 46 P.3d 1071 , 1074 (App. 2002) (a "victimless crime" is "a crime which generally involves only the criminal, and which has no direct victim"); Weston v. State , 49 Ariz. 183 , 186, 65 P.2d 652 (1937) (noting DUI legislation enacted because "driving an automobile under these circumstances is such a menace to public safety"). ¶ 17 The City next arg 2018See State v. Olquin , 216 Ariz. 250 , 254, ¶ 22, 165 P.3d 228 , 232 (App. 2007) (observing that a DUI is considered a victimless crime because it can be committed absent involvement of any other person); State v. Sorkhabi , 202 Ariz. 450 , 453, ¶ 11, 46 P.3d 1071 , 1074 (App. 2002) (a "victimless crime" is "a crime which generally involves only the criminal, and which has no direct victim"); Weston v. State , 49 Ariz. 183 , 186, 65 P.2d 652 (1937) (noting DUI legislation enacted because "driving an automobile under these circumstances is such a menace to public safety"). ¶ 17 The City next arg | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Weston v. State of Arizona
green
2 sentences2018See State v. Olquin , 216 Ariz. 250 , 254, ¶ 22, 165 P.3d 228 , 232 (App. 2007) (observing that a DUI is considered a victimless crime because it can be committed absent involvement of any other person); State v. Sorkhabi , 202 Ariz. 450 , 453, ¶ 11, 46 P.3d 1071 , 1074 (App. 2002) (a "victimless crime" is "a crime which generally involves only the criminal, and which has no direct victim"); Weston v. State , 49 Ariz. 183 , 186, 65 P.2d 652 (1937) (noting DUI legislation enacted because "driving an automobile under these circumstances is such a menace to public safety"). ¶ 17 The City next arg 2018See State v. Olquin , 216 Ariz. 250 , 254, ¶ 22, 165 P.3d 228 , 232 (App. 2007) (observing that a DUI is considered a victimless crime because it can be committed absent involvement of any other person); State v. Sorkhabi , 202 Ariz. 450 , 453, ¶ 11, 46 P.3d 1071 , 1074 (App. 2002) (a "victimless crime" is "a crime which generally involves only the criminal, and which has no direct victim"); Weston v. State , 49 Ariz. 183 , 186, 65 P.2d 652 (1937) (noting DUI legislation enacted because "driving an automobile under these circumstances is such a menace to public safety"). ¶ 17 The City next arg | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Trammel v. United States
green
2 sentences2018Stat. Ariz. Territory, Penal Code § 1111 (1901); Trammel v. United States , 445 U.S. 40 , 43-45, 100 S.Ct. 906 , 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980) (noting the "ancient roots" of the anti-marital fact privilege in the early common law). 2018Stat. Ariz. Territory, Penal Code § 1111 (1901); Trammel v. United States , 445 U.S. 40 , 43-45, 100 S.Ct. 906 , 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980) (noting the "ancient roots" of the anti-marital fact privilege in the early common law). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Goulder v. ARIZONA DEPT. OF TRANSP., MOTOR VEH.
green
2 sentences2008“Statutes relating to the same subject matter should be read in pari materia to determine legislative intent and to maintain harmony.” Goulder v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 177 Ariz. 414 , 416, 868 P.2d 997 , 999 (App. 1993); see State v. Thomason, 162 Ariz. 363, 366 , 783 P.2d 809, 812 (App.1989) (“A statute should be explained in conjunction with other statutes which relate to the same subject or have the same general purpose.”) (citing State ex rel. 2008“Statutes relating to the same subject matter should be read in pari materia to determine legislative intent and to maintain harmony.” Goulder v. Ariz. Dep’t of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 177 Ariz. 414 , 416, 868 P.2d 997 , 999 (App. 1993); see State v. Thomason, 162 Ariz. 363, 366 , 783 P.2d 809, 812 (App.1989) (“A statute should be explained in conjunction with other statutes which relate to the same subject or have the same general purpose.”) (citing State ex rel. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State Ex Rel. Woods v. Cohen
green
2 sentences2008Woods v. Cohen, 173 Ariz. 497 , 844 P.2d 1147 (1992), the court considered the meaning of “for or against” in the context of construing A.R.S. § 13-4062(1) (Supp.2007), 4 the anti-marital fact privilege applicable in criminal proceedings. 2008Woods v. Cohen, 173 Ariz. 497 , 844 P.2d 1147 (1992), the court considered the meaning of “for or against” in the context of construing A.R.S. § 13-4062(1) (Supp.2007), 4 the anti-marital fact privilege applicable in criminal proceedings. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
United States v. Benford
green
2 sentences1995The dissent cites United States v. Benford, 457 F. Supp. 589 (E.D.Mich. 1978), a criminal case that we distinguish because it, too, involves the testimonial (anti-marital fact) privilege rather than the marital communications privilege. [4] The majority finds waiver of the attorney-client privilege on two grounds. 1995The dissent cites United States v. Benford, 457 F.Supp. 589 (E.D.Mich.1978), a criminal case that we distinguish because it, too, involves the testimonial (anti-marital fact) privilege rather than the marital communications privilege. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
State v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1992A husband for or against his wife without her consent, nor a wife for or *502 against her husband without his consent, as to events occurring during the marriage ____ The court of appeals interpreted the statute to forbid testimony from a person which is “against” that person’s spouse in the sense that it concerns events during marriage “which at least impliedly suggest criminal conduct.” 169 Ariz. at 553 , 821 P.2d at 214 . 1992A husband for or against his wife without her consent, nor a wife for or *502 against her husband without his consent, as to events occurring during the marriage ____ The court of appeals interpreted the statute to forbid testimony from a person which is “against” that person’s spouse in the sense that it concerns events during marriage “which at least impliedly suggest criminal conduct.” 169 Ariz. at 553 , 821 P.2d at 214 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Vance v. Rice
green
2 sentences1982As an example of the problem that can be created by strict adherence to the anti-marital fact privilege, see Vance v. Rice, 524 F. Supp. 1297 (1981), where the District Court for the Southern District of Iowa upheld a jailer's refusal to allow a defendant and a material witness, pregnant by the defendant, to be married because of the fear that the defendant would then invoke Iowa's marital immunity statute at a later trial. 1982As an example of the problem that can be created by strict adherence to the anti-marital fact privilege, see Vance v. Rice, 524 F.Supp. 1297 (1981), where the District Court for the Southern District of Iowa upheld a jailer’s refusal to allow a defendant and a material witness, pregnant by the defendant, to be married because of the fear that the defendant would then invoke Iowa’s marital immunity statute at a later trial. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Califano v. Boles
green
2 sentences1980Cf. Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 , 99 S.Ct. 2767 , 61 L.Ed.2d 541 (1979); Developments in the Law — The Constitution and the Family, 93 Harv.L.Rev. 1157, 1294 (1980). 1980Cf. Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 , 99 S.Ct. 2767 , 61 L.Ed.2d 541 (1979); Developments in the Law — The Constitution and the Family, 93 Harv.L.Rev. 1157, 1294 (1980). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
State v. Turnbow
green
2 sentences1968The defendant alleges that it was error to try him and his wife during the same trial because it deprived them of the anti-marital fact privilege, A.R.S. § 12-2232, citing State v. Turnbow, 67 N.M. 241 , 354 P.2d 533 , 89 A.L.R.2d 461 (1960). 1968The defendant alleges that it was error to try him and his wife during the same trial because it deprived them of the anti-marital fact privilege, A.R.S. § 12-2232, citing State v. Turnbow, 67 N.M. 241 , 354 P.2d 533 , 89 A.L.R.2d 461 (1960). | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.