Donald hearing in Arizona

2006The Donald majority concluded that "when all relevant factors are balanced, we do not find that a reinstatement order would so significantly encroach on the executive department as to amount to an unconstitutional usurpation of power." Id. at 418, ¶ 44 , 10 P.3d at 1205 . ¶ 21 We believe the Donald analysis is flawed for several reasons. [7] First, in determining that specific performance of a plea offer should be an available remedy to cure ineffective assistance, the majority failed to fully acknowledge the nature of plea bargaining and the extent to which it constitutes a core prosecutorial

2006The Donald majority concluded that "when all relevant factors are balanced, we do not find that a reinstatement order would so significantly encroach on the executive department as to amount to an unconstitutional usurpation of power." Id. at 418, ¶ 44 , 10 P.3d at 1205 . ¶ 21 We believe the Donald analysis is flawed for several reasons. [7] First, in determining that specific performance of a plea offer should be an available remedy to cure ineffective assistance, the majority failed to fully acknowledge the nature of plea bargaining and the extent to which it constitutes a core prosecutorial

2025More than a year passed from the original trial date to when he was tried in absentia. ¶16 Thus, although Melendez was “technically without personal notice of his trial date,” he failed to appear at any proceedings after the Donald hearing or “keep in contact with trial counsel to ascertain his trial date.” State v. Muniz-Caudillo, 185 Ariz. 261, 262 (App. 1996).

2025More than a year passed from the original trial date to when he was tried in absentia. ¶16 Thus, although Melendez was “technically without personal notice of his trial date,” he failed to appear at any proceedings after the Donald hearing or “keep in contact with trial counsel to ascertain his trial date.” State v. Muniz-Caudillo, 185 Ariz. 261, 262 (App. 1996).

2019A Donald hearing is a pre-trial hearing where a defendant is informed of any outstanding plea offer and the consequences of conviction so that a record of the defendant’s rejection of the plea offer can be made to guard against any “late, frivolous, or fabricated claims” of ineffective assistance of counsel “after a trial leading to conviction with resulting harsh consequences.” Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 146 (2012).

2019A Donald hearing is a pre-trial hearing where a defendant is informed of any outstanding plea offer and the consequences of conviction so that a record of the defendant’s rejection of the plea offer can be made to guard against any “late, frivolous, or fabricated claims” of ineffective assistance of counsel “after a trial leading to conviction with resulting harsh consequences.” Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 146 (2012).

2016See Spreitz, 202 Ariz. at 3, ¶ 9 , 39 P.3d at 527 .

2016See Spreitz, 202 Ariz. at 3, ¶ 9 , 39 P.3d at 527 .

2016Difficulty understanding English is an appropriate ground for excusing a prospective juror, see State v. Sanderson, 182 Ariz. 534, 539 , 898 P.2d 483, 488 (App. 1995); A.R.S. § 21-202(B)(3), as is “undue or extreme . . . financial hardship,” A.R.S. § 21-202(B)(4); accord State v. Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, 497, ¶ 11 , 314 P.3d 1239, 1252 (2013) (citing A.R.S. § 21-202(B)(4), (6)).

2016Difficulty understanding English is an appropriate ground for excusing a prospective juror, see State v. Sanderson, 182 Ariz. 534, 539 , 898 P.2d 483, 488 (App. 1995); A.R.S. § 21-202(B)(3), as is “undue or extreme . . . financial hardship,” A.R.S. § 21-202(B)(4); accord State v. Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, 497, ¶ 11 , 314 P.3d 1239, 1252 (2013) (citing A.R.S. § 21-202(B)(4), (6)).

2016See Brown v. Ariz. Dep't of Real Estate, 181 Ariz. 320, 324 , 890 P.2d 615, 619 (App. 1995). 7 HACKETT v. HACKETT Decision of the Court CONCLUSION ¶18 In 1 CA-CV 15-0384, we dismiss the appeal as to issues arising from Donald’s claim for partition and we vacate the judgment as to James’s counterclaim and remand that claim to the superior court.

2016See Brown v. Ariz. Dep't of Real Estate, 181 Ariz. 320, 324 , 890 P.2d 615, 619 (App. 1995). 7 HACKETT v. HACKETT Decision of the Court CONCLUSION ¶18 In 1 CA-CV 15-0384, we dismiss the appeal as to issues arising from Donald’s claim for partition and we vacate the judgment as to James’s counterclaim and remand that claim to the superior court.

2016The “same transaction or occurrence” standard is a flexible one “that is met when a logical relationship exists between the current cause of action and the previous one.” Id. (citing Technical Air Prods., Inc. v. Sheridan-Gray, Inc., 103 Ariz. 450, 452 , 445 P.2d 426, 428 (1968)). 6 HACKETT v. HACKETT Decision of the Court ¶17 Clearly there was a “logical relationship” between Donald’s claim for partition and James’s claim against Donald for breach of contract involving the same property.

2016The “same transaction or occurrence” standard is a flexible one “that is met when a logical relationship exists between the current cause of action and the previous one.” Id. (citing Technical Air Prods., Inc. v. Sheridan-Gray, Inc., 103 Ariz. 450, 452 , 445 P.2d 426, 428 (1968)). 6 HACKETT v. HACKETT Decision of the Court ¶17 Clearly there was a “logical relationship” between Donald’s claim for partition and James’s claim against Donald for breach of contract involving the same property.

2016Difficulty understanding English is an appropriate ground for excusing a prospective juror, see State v. Sanderson, 182 Ariz. 534, 539 , 898 P.2d 483, 488 (App. 1995); A.R.S. § 21-202(B)(3), as is “undue or extreme . . . financial hardship,” A.R.S. § 21-202(B)(4); accord State v. Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, 497, ¶ 11 , 314 P.3d 1239, 1252 (2013) (citing A.R.S. § 21-202(B)(4), (6)).

2016Difficulty understanding English is an appropriate ground for excusing a prospective juror, see State v. Sanderson, 182 Ariz. 534, 539 , 898 P.2d 483, 488 (App. 1995); A.R.S. § 21-202(B)(3), as is “undue or extreme . . . financial hardship,” A.R.S. § 21-202(B)(4); accord State v. Payne, 233 Ariz. 484, 497, ¶ 11 , 314 P.3d 1239, 1252 (2013) (citing A.R.S. § 21-202(B)(4), (6)).

2004Jackson did not argu e, as did the defendant in Donald , that his 2 The trial court’s ruling was not groundless; there is nothing in the record suggesting any such plea offer except Jackson’s affidavit, made over twelve years after the purported offer, and defense counsel’s oblique reference at sentencing to the possibility of an offer being “reopened.” When we addressed the ineffective assistance of trial counsel issue on appeal, we stated, “[t]he [ap pellate] record does not in dicate that the state ever offered a plea agreement.” Jackson, 170 Ariz. at 91, 821 P.2d at 1376.

2004Jackson did not argu e, as did the defendant in Donald , that his 2 The trial court’s ruling was not groundless; there is nothing in the record suggesting any such plea offer except Jackson’s affidavit, made over twelve years after the purported offer, and defense counsel’s oblique reference at sentencing to the possibility of an offer being “reopened.” When we addressed the ineffective assistance of trial counsel issue on appeal, we stated, “[t]he [ap pellate] record does not in dicate that the state ever offered a plea agreement.” Jackson, 170 Ariz. at 91, 821 P.2d at 1376.