lent employee doctrine in Arizona

2022Instead, the ALJ issued a Decision Upon Review that recited A.R.S. § 23–901.08(D)(3) and the lent-employee doctrine as adopted in Word v. Motorola, Inc., 135 Ariz. 517 (1983), which made a “lent employee” a covered employee of the business to which they are lent.

2015In eases involving labor contractors, “employers obtaining workers from [a labor service provider] have usually, but not invariably, been held to assume the status of special employer.” Id. at 520 n. 5, 662 P.2d at 1027 n. 5 (internal quotation omitted). ¶ 33 Lee asserts there is no evidence that M & H exercised sufficient control over Lee to render him an M & H employee under the lent employee doctrine.

2003Comm’n, 73 Ariz. 264, 270 , 240 P.2d 536, 540 (1952)). ¶ 20 Furthermore, when a loaned servant is subject to some control from both his general employer and the special employer in performing his specific job functions, both are vicariously hable for his torts.

2003Comm’n, 73 Ariz. 264, 270 , 240 P.2d 536, 540 (1952)). ¶ 20 Furthermore, when a loaned servant is subject to some control from both his general employer and the special employer in performing his specific job functions, both are vicariously hable for his torts.

2015See Tarron, 225 Ariz. at 150, ¶ 14 , 235 P.3d at 1033 (noting that the plaintiff employee sustained injuries due to the negligence of borrowed employees loaned to the special employer by the defendant general employer), Inmon, 205 Ariz. at 131-32, ¶ 2 , 67 P.3d at 727-28 (explaining that plaintiffs, who were steel company employees, sustained injuries due to the negligence of borrowed employees provided by the defendant general employer, a crane rental service company). ¶ 38 Finally, no case in Arizona applying the lent employee doctrine mandates that a special employer must have had workers’

2015See Tarron, 225 Ariz. at 150, ¶ 14 , 235 P.3d at 1033 (noting that the plaintiff employee sustained injuries due to the negligence of borrowed employees loaned to the special employer by the defendant general employer), Inmon, 205 Ariz. at 131-32, ¶ 2 , 67 P.3d at 727-28 (explaining that plaintiffs, who were steel company employees, sustained injuries due to the negligence of borrowed employees provided by the defendant general employer, a crane rental service company). ¶ 38 Finally, no case in Arizona applying the lent employee doctrine mandates that a special employer must have had workers’

2015See Avila, 179 Ariz. at 504 , 5 MOORE v. BREWER COTE Decision of the Court 880 P.2d at 724 (“[F]or the lent employee doctrine to apply, the employee need only be aware of and consent to the facts that give rise to the lent employee relationship. [The employee] need not be aware of and consent to the legal consequences of such facts.”).

2015See Avila, 179 Ariz. at 504 , 5 MOORE v. BREWER COTE Decision of the Court 880 P.2d at 724 (“[F]or the lent employee doctrine to apply, the employee need only be aware of and consent to the facts that give rise to the lent employee relationship. [The employee] need not be aware of and consent to the legal consequences of such facts.”).

1985The lent employee doctrine was presented as an alternative argument to the trial court and was argued by the parties on appeal in light of the supreme court’s decisions in Word and Young v. Environmental Air Products, 136 Ariz. 158 , 665 P.2d 40 (1983). 2 .

1985The lent employee doctrine was presented as an alternative argument to the trial court and was argued by the parties on appeal in light of the supreme court’s decisions in Word and Young v. Environmental Air Products, 136 Ariz. 158 , 665 P.2d 40 (1983). 2 .

2015See Tarron, 225 Ariz. at 150, ¶ 14 , 235 P.3d at 1033 (noting that the plaintiff employee sustained injuries due to the negligence of borrowed employees loaned to the special employer by the defendant general employer), Inmon, 205 Ariz. at 131-32, ¶ 2 , 67 P.3d at 727-28 (explaining that plaintiffs, who were steel company employees, sustained injuries due to the negligence of borrowed employees provided by the defendant general employer, a crane rental service company). ¶ 38 Finally, no case in Arizona applying the lent employee doctrine mandates that a special employer must have had workers’

2015See Tarron, 225 Ariz. at 150, ¶ 14 , 235 P.3d at 1033 (noting that the plaintiff employee sustained injuries due to the negligence of borrowed employees loaned to the special employer by the defendant general employer), Inmon, 205 Ariz. at 131-32, ¶ 2 , 67 P.3d at 727-28 (explaining that plaintiffs, who were steel company employees, sustained injuries due to the negligence of borrowed employees provided by the defendant general employer, a crane rental service company). ¶ 38 Finally, no case in Arizona applying the lent employee doctrine mandates that a special employer must have had workers’

2015Comm’n, 234 Ariz. 53, 59-60, ¶ 21 , 316 P.3d 1241, 1247-48 (App.2014) (recognizing that a foreign company, as a special employer under the lent employee doctrine, was subject to Arizona’s workers’ compensation statutes for injuries *182 sustained by an employee).

2015Comm’n, 234 Ariz. 53, 59-60, ¶ 21 , 316 P.3d 1241, 1247-48 (App.2014) (recognizing that a foreign company, as a special employer under the lent employee doctrine, was subject to Arizona’s workers’ compensation statutes for injuries *182 sustained by an employee).

2015Comm’n, 172 Ariz. 319, 323 , 836 P.2d 1029, 1033 (App. 1992); Lee v. M & H Enterprises, Inc., ___ Ariz. ___, ___, ¶¶ 31-32, ___ P.3d ___, ___, 2015 WL 1813948 , at *8, (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015) (discussing the lent employee doctrine).

2015Comm’n, 172 Ariz. 319, 323 , 836 P.2d 1029, 1033 (App. 1992); Lee v. M & H Enterprises, Inc., ___ Ariz. ___, ___, ¶¶ 31-32, ___ P.3d ___, ___, 2015 WL 1813948 , at *8, (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015) (discussing the lent employee doctrine).

2003See also Brumbaugh v. Pet Inc., 129 Ariz. 12, 13 , 628 P.2d 49, 50 (App.1981) (agent’s immunity does not prevent vicarious liability for the agent’s acts from attaching to the principal). ¶ 13 Further, the first element of the “lent employee” test is not satisfied unless the party losing its right to bring suit at least impliedly consented to the control over him by the employer who receives the immunity.

2003See also Brumbaugh v. Pet Inc., 129 Ariz. 12, 13 , 628 P.2d 49, 50 (App.1981) (agent’s immunity does not prevent vicarious liability for the agent’s acts from attaching to the principal). ¶ 13 Further, the first element of the “lent employee” test is not satisfied unless the party losing its right to bring suit at least impliedly consented to the control over him by the employer who receives the immunity.

1983See Livingston v. Citizens Utility, Inc., 107 Ariz. 62 , 481 P.2d 855 (1971); Basurto v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 15 Ariz.App. 35 , 485 P.2d 859 (1971).

1983See Livingston v. Citizens Utility, Inc., 107 Ariz. 62 , 481 P.2d 855 (1971); Basurto v. Utah Construction & Mining Co., 15 Ariz.App. 35 , 485 P.2d 859 (1971).