89 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 2000–2025 15 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Bloomergreen2 sentences2011See also State v. Bloomer, 122 Ohio St.3d 200 , 2009-Ohio-2462 , 909 N.E.2d 1254, ¶ 70 (noting that a defendant cannot be subjected to another sentencing hearing after he “has completed the prison term imposed in his original sentence”); State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94 , 2007-Ohio-3250 , 868 N.E.2d 961, ¶ 18 (concluding that defendant could not be resentenced because he had “already served the prison term ordered by the trial court”). {¶ 24} In Bloomer , the Ohio Supreme Court further explained at ¶ 72: {¶ 25} “[T]he legislature has now amended R.C. 2929.14(F)(1) to provide: ‘If a court impo 2011See also State v. Bloomer, 122 Ohio St.3d 200 , 2009-Ohio-2462 , 909 N.E.2d 1254, ¶ 70 (noting that a defendant cannot be subjected to another sentencing hearing after he “has completed the prison term imposed in his original sentence”); State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94 , 2007-Ohio-3250 , 868 N.E.2d 961, ¶ 18 (concluding that defendant could not be resentenced because he had “already served the prison term ordered by the trial court”). {¶ 24} In Bloomer , the Ohio Supreme Court further explained at ¶ 72: {¶ 25} “[T]he legislature has now amended R.C. 2929.14(F)(1) to provide: ‘If a court impo | 3 | 7 |
State v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2019Hamilton No. C-130442, 2014-Ohio-4237, ¶ 40 (defendant’s post-release control, which was not administratively revoked, did not terminate until the trial court imposed a prison term for the post-release control violation). 2018Hamilton No. C- 130442, 2014-Ohio-4237, ¶ 40 (defendant’s post-release control, which was not administratively revoked, did not terminate until the trial court imposed a prison term for the post-release control violation). | 2 | 4 |
State v. Fischergreen2 sentences2017Assignments of Error {¶ 8} Dixon assigns the following errors for our review: [1.] Did the Tenth District Court of appeal error when it Limited Appellant's re-sentencing to the Constraints of State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3drd 92 2010-Ohio-6238 absent a Post Release Control violation. [2.] The trial court erred by imposing a imposition of PRC in this case, Appellant was not subject to any Post Release portion of Post release Control, the Imposition of Post Release Control should be reversed and remanded. [3.] The trial court erred when it denied Appellant opportunity to present his Newly disco 2017Assignments of Error {¶ 8} Dixon assigns the following errors for our review: [1.] Did the Tenth District Court of appeal error when it Limited Appellant's re-sentencing to the Constraints of State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3drd 92 2010-Ohio-6238 absent a Post Release Control violation. [2.] The trial court erred by imposing a imposition of PRC in this case, Appellant was not subject to any Post Release portion of Post release Control, the Imposition of Post Release Control should be reversed and remanded. [3.] The trial court erred when it denied Appellant opportunity to present his Newly disco | 1 | 10 |
State v. Singletonred2 sentences2014Id. at ¶ 21 (nunc pro tunc entry can be used to reflect what actually took place where notification was properly given at sentencing hearing), comparing State v. Singleton, 124 Ohio St.3d 173 , 2009-Ohio-6434 , 920 N.E.2d 958, ¶ 4 (where the court failed to notify of the consequences of a post- release control violation at sentencing hearing). {¶16} In accordance, where the trial court does not advise the defendant at the sentencing hearing that the parole board can impose a prison term of up to one- half of his original sentence for a violation of post-release control, this court reverses and 2014Id. at ¶ 21 (nunc pro tunc entry can be used to reflect what actually took place where notification was properly given at sentencing hearing), comparing State v. Singleton, 124 Ohio St.3d 173 , 2009-Ohio-6434 , 920 N.E.2d 958, ¶ 4 (where the court failed to notify of the consequences of a post- release control violation at sentencing hearing). {¶16} In accordance, where the trial court does not advise the defendant at the sentencing hearing that the parole board can impose a prison term of up to one- half of his original sentence for a violation of post-release control, this court reverses and | 1 | 6 |
State v. Martellogreen2 sentences2020(Emphasis added). {¶14} It is evident that R.C. 2929.141 has explicitly taken into consideration the length of time the offender had served while on post-release control when it authorizes a trial court to impose the time remaining to be served on post-release control or twelve months, whichever is greater. {¶15} In State v. Martello, the Ohio Supreme Court held, R.C. 2967.28(F)(4), which specifies that a person released on post- release control who violates conditions of that post-release control faces a term of incarceration for the violation as well as criminal prosecution for the conduct t 2020(Emphasis added). {¶14} It is evident that R.C. 2929.141 has explicitly taken into consideration the length of time the offender had served while on post-release control when it authorizes a trial court to impose the time remaining to be served on post-release control or twelve months, whichever is greater. {¶15} In State v. Martello, the Ohio Supreme Court held, R.C. 2967.28(F)(4), which specifies that a person released on post- release control who violates conditions of that post-release control faces a term of incarceration for the violation as well as criminal prosecution for the conduct t | 1 | 5 |
State v. Bishop (Slip Opinion)green2 sentences2023The imposition of a prison term for the post-release control violation shall terminate the period of post-release control for the earlier felony. * * * {¶ 15} In State v. Bishop, 156 Ohio St.3d 156 , 2018-Ohio-5132 , 124 N.E.3d 766, ¶ 21 , the Supreme Court of Ohio held: Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) requires a trial court to advise a criminal defendant on post-release control for a prior felony, during his plea hearing in a new felony case, of the trial court’s authority under R.C. 2929.141 to terminate the defendant’s existing post-release control and to impose a consecutive prison sentence for the po 2023The imposition of a prison term for the post-release control violation shall terminate the period of post-release control for the earlier felony. * * * {¶ 15} In State v. Bishop, 156 Ohio St.3d 156 , 2018-Ohio-5132 , 124 N.E.3d 766, ¶ 21 , the Supreme Court of Ohio held: Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) requires a trial court to advise a criminal defendant on post-release control for a prior felony, during his plea hearing in a new felony case, of the trial court’s authority under R.C. 2929.141 to terminate the defendant’s existing post-release control and to impose a consecutive prison sentence for the po | 1 | 4 |
State v. Martellogreen2 sentences2020(Emphasis added). {¶14} It is evident that R.C. 2929.141 has explicitly taken into consideration the length of time the offender had served while on post-release control when it authorizes a trial court to impose the time remaining to be served on post-release control or twelve months, whichever is greater. {¶15} In State v. Martello, the Ohio Supreme Court held, R.C. 2967.28(F)(4), which specifies that a person released on post- release control who violates conditions of that post-release control faces a term of incarceration for the violation as well as criminal prosecution for the conduct t 2019Lake Nos. 2009-L-025, 2009-L-26, 2009-Ohio-6382 , ¶29, the court discussed the notification at the new felony sentencing and wrote “the General Assembly has indicated its clear intent that the prison term imposed for the violation of post-release control is a reinstatement of part of the original sentence for violating the conditions of supervision, and is not meant to be a separate criminal punishment.” Ervin, supra, at ¶ 31, citing State v. Martello, 97 Ohio St.3d 398 , 2002-Ohio-6661 , 780 N.E.2d 250, ¶ 19 . | 1 | 4 |
State v. Bezakred2 sentences2011See also State v. Bloomer, 122 Ohio St.3d 200 , 2009-Ohio-2462 , 909 N.E.2d 1254, ¶ 70 (noting that a defendant cannot be subjected to another sentencing hearing after he “has completed the prison term imposed in his original sentence”); State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94 , 2007-Ohio-3250 , 868 N.E.2d 961, ¶ 18 (concluding that defendant could not be resentenced because he had “already served the prison term ordered by the trial court”). {¶ 24} In Bloomer , the Ohio Supreme Court further explained at ¶ 72: {¶ 25} “[T]he legislature has now amended R.C. 2929.14(F)(1) to provide: ‘If a court impo 2011See also State v. Bloomer, 122 Ohio St.3d 200 , 2009-Ohio-2462 , 909 N.E.2d 1254, ¶ 70 (noting that a defendant cannot be subjected to another sentencing hearing after he “has completed the prison term imposed in his original sentence”); State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94 , 2007-Ohio-3250 , 868 N.E.2d 961, ¶ 18 (concluding that defendant could not be resentenced because he had “already served the prison term ordered by the trial court”). {¶ 24} In Bloomer , the Ohio Supreme Court further explained at ¶ 72: {¶ 25} “[T]he legislature has now amended R.C. 2929.14(F)(1) to provide: ‘If a court impo | 1 | 2 |
State v. Eischengreen1 sentence2025Godsey argues that two other Ohio Appellate Districts have determined that R.C. 2929.141(A)(1) “does not authorize a trial court to terminate a postrelease control sanction upon the violation of a community control sanction.” State v. Eischen, 2021-Ohio-23, ¶ 16 (6th Dist.); State v. Prince, 2016-Ohio-2724, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
Cleveland Hts. v. Colemangreen1 sentence2025E.g., Harris at ¶ 15 ; Cleveland Hts. v. Coleman, 2021-Ohio-846, ¶ 19-20 (8th Dist.); State v. Clark, 2008-Ohio-5208, ¶ 37 (12th Dist.); State v. Beverly, 2005-Ohio-4954 -10- (4th Dist.). {¶ 30} Nelson was arrested in this case on April 16, 2024, at Ross Correctional Institution, where he was serving time for a post-release control violation in another case. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Clark, Ca2007-03-037 (10-6-2008)green1 sentence2025E.g., Harris at ¶ 15 ; Cleveland Hts. v. Coleman, 2021-Ohio-846, ¶ 19-20 (8th Dist.); State v. Clark, 2008-Ohio-5208, ¶ 37 (12th Dist.); State v. Beverly, 2005-Ohio-4954 -10- (4th Dist.). {¶ 30} Nelson was arrested in this case on April 16, 2024, at Ross Correctional Institution, where he was serving time for a post-release control violation in another case. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Princegreen1 sentence2025Godsey argues that two other Ohio Appellate Districts have determined that R.C. 2929.141(A)(1) “does not authorize a trial court to terminate a postrelease control sanction upon the violation of a community control sanction.” State v. Eischen, 2021-Ohio-23, ¶ 16 (6th Dist.); State v. Prince, 2016-Ohio-2724, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cheekgreen2 sentences2024The prison term for the post-release control violation “must be served consecutively to the prison term imposed on the new felony.” Id., citing R.C. 2929.141(A)(1). {¶ 13} We note that Monfort does not dispute that he was on post-release control when he committed his two drug possession offenses. 2024As previously discussed, under “R.C. 2929.141 * * * a defendant who commits a new felony offense while on [post-release control] can be ordered by the trial court that is imposing [a] sentence on the new felony offense to serve additional sanctions for violating [post- release control] including a prison term.” Cheek, 2022-Ohio-4736, at ¶ 11 (2d Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Brewergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Kelley, Unpublished Decision (2-13-2006)green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Qualls
green
2 sentences2018State v. Qualls, 131 Ohio St.3d 499 , 2012-Ohio-1111 , 967 N.E.2d 718 , ¶ 18-19. “[T]he sentencing entry must contain the following information: (1) whether postrelease control is discretionary or mandatory, (2) the duration of the postrelease-control period, and (3) a statement to the effect that the Adult Parole Authority (‘APA’) will administer the postrelease control pursuant to R.C. 2967.28 and that any violation by the offender of the conditions of postrelease control will subject the offender to the consequences set forth in that statute.” State v. Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19 , 2017-Ohio- 2018State v. Qualls, 131 Ohio St.3d 499 , 2012-Ohio-1111 , 967 N.E.2d 718 , ¶ 18-19. “[T]he sentencing entry must contain the following information: (1) whether postrelease control is discretionary or mandatory, (2) the duration of the postrelease-control period, and (3) a statement to the effect that the Adult Parole Authority (‘APA’) will administer the postrelease control pursuant to R.C. 2967.28 and that any violation by the offender of the conditions of postrelease control will subject the offender to the consequences set forth in that statute.” State v. Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19 , 2017-Ohio- | 11 | 2013–2020 |
Woods v. Telb
green
2 sentences2003Woods v. Telb , 89 Ohio St.3d 504 , 2000-Ohio-171 , characterized post-release control as a "part of an offender's sentence." Id., at 513. {¶ 17} A court that imposes a sentence that includes post-release control must notify the offender of the post-release control requirement at sentencing, and that "if the offender violates that supervision or condition of post-release control . . . the parole board may impose a prison term, as a part of the sentence, of up to one-half of the stated prison term originally imposed on the offender." R.C. 2929.19 (B)(3)(e). 2003Woods v. Telb, 89 Ohio St.3d 504 , 2000-Ohio-171 , characterized post-release control as a "part of an offender's sentence." Id., at 513. {¶ 17} A court that imposes a sentence that includes post-release control must notify the offender of the post-release control requirement at sentencing, and that "if the offender violates that supervision or condition of post-release control . . . the parole board may impose a prison term, as a part of the sentence, of up to one-half of the stated prison term originally imposed on the offender." R.C. 2929.19 (B)(3)(e). | 4 | 2000–2022 |
Anders v. California
green
2 sentences2017Following the court’s May 12, 2015 judgment entry, this consolidated appeal followed. {¶ 4} In counsel’s appellate brief, under procedures announced in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 , 87 S.Ct. 1396 , 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), counsel indicates that she has thoroughly examined the record, discussed the case with appellant, and is unable to find meritorious grounds for appeal. 2017Following the court’s May 12, 2015 judgment entry, this consolidated appeal followed. {¶ 4} In counsel’s appellate brief, under procedures announced in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 , 87 S.Ct. 1396 , 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), counsel indicates that she has thoroughly examined the record, discussed the case with appellant, and is unable to find meritorious grounds for appeal. | 4 | 2008–2017 |
State v. Stiggers
neutral
2 sentences2018Summit No. 25486, 2011-Ohio-4225, ¶ 6 , citing Fischer at ¶ 27–28. {¶8} Courts have recognized “that a trial court exceeds its sentencing authority when it conducts a[n entire] de novo [re]sentencing to correct a post- release control error * * * [b]ecause resentencing [under those circumstances] is limited to the imposition of post-release control, any additional action taken by the trial court with respect to the sentence is a nullity.” Stiggers at ¶ 7, citing State v. Cool, 9th Dist. 2012An appeal from the resentencing will be “limited to issues arising at the resentencing hearing.” Id. at paragraph four of the syllabus. “[W]here a trial court has erroneously conducted a de novo resentencing to remedy a post-release control error, this Court has excised the proper post-release control notification portion of the new sentencing entry and vacated the remainder of the entry.” State v. Wrenn, 9th Dist. | 3 | 2011–2018 |
Woods v. Telb
green
2 sentences2003Woods v. Telb , 89 Ohio St.3d 504 , 2000-Ohio-171 , characterized post-release control as a "part of an offender's sentence." Id., at 513. {¶ 17} A court that imposes a sentence that includes post-release control must notify the offender of the post-release control requirement at sentencing, and that "if the offender violates that supervision or condition of post-release control . . . the parole board may impose a prison term, as a part of the sentence, of up to one-half of the stated prison term originally imposed on the offender." R.C. 2929.19 (B)(3)(e). 2003Woods v. Telb, 89 Ohio St.3d 504 , 2000-Ohio-171 , characterized post-release control as a "part of an offender's sentence." Id., at 513. {¶ 17} A court that imposes a sentence that includes post-release control must notify the offender of the post-release control requirement at sentencing, and that "if the offender violates that supervision or condition of post-release control . . . the parole board may impose a prison term, as a part of the sentence, of up to one-half of the stated prison term originally imposed on the offender." R.C. 2929.19 (B)(3)(e). | 3 | 2000–2003 |
State v. Wells
green
2 sentences2024ANALYSIS {¶49} In State v. Wells, 2015-Ohio-39 (5th Dist.), this Court addressed the same issue raised in the case sub judice. 2022Licking No. 14-CA-36, 2015-Ohio-39, ¶ 8 . {¶12} In other words, the trial court should have reached a total of 709 days for Mills’s maximum sentence for the post-release control violation without applying any jail-time credit. | 2 | 2022–2024 |
State v. Grimes (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2021Put another way, Chears contends that the trial court improperly told him at the plea hearing that he -12- Case No. 5-20-24 was potentially facing more prison time if he violated post-release control than he actually would have been subject to if he violated post-release control in the future. {¶26} In State v. Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19 , 2017-Ohio-2927, ¶ 1 , the Supreme Court of Ohio defined what is required to impose post-release control, holding, that to validly impose postrelease control when the court orally provides all the required advisements at the sentencing hearing, the sentencing 2018State v. Qualls, 131 Ohio St.3d 499 , 2012-Ohio-1111 , 967 N.E.2d 718 , ¶ 18-19. “[T]he sentencing entry must contain the following information: (1) whether postrelease control is discretionary or mandatory, (2) the duration of the postrelease-control period, and (3) a statement to the effect that the Adult Parole Authority (‘APA’) will administer the postrelease control pursuant to R.C. 2967.28 and that any violation by the offender of the conditions of postrelease control will subject the offender to the consequences set forth in that statute.” State v. Grimes, 151 Ohio St.3d 19 , 2017-Ohio- | 2 | 2018–2021 |
State v. Sarkozy
green
2 sentences2020Bishop at ¶ 19 , quoting Clark at ¶ 32, quoting State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86 , 2008-Ohio-509 , 881 N.E.2d 1224, ¶ 22 . {¶ 8} Turning then to the maximum penalty advisement that is required when a defendant is on PRC, R.C. 2929.141(A)(1) provides the following: -6- (A) Upon the conviction of or plea of guilty to a felony by a person on post- release control at the time of the commission of the felony, the court may terminate the term of post-release control, and the court may do either of the following regardless of whether the sentencing court or another court of this state imposed the 2020Bishop at ¶ 19 , quoting Clark at ¶ 32, quoting State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86 , 2008-Ohio-509 , 881 N.E.2d 1224, ¶ 22 . {¶ 8} Turning then to the maximum penalty advisement that is required when a defendant is on PRC, R.C. 2929.141(A)(1) provides the following: -6- (A) Upon the conviction of or plea of guilty to a felony by a person on post- release control at the time of the commission of the felony, the court may terminate the term of post-release control, and the court may do either of the following regardless of whether the sentencing court or another court of this state imposed the | 2 | 2011–2020 |
State v. Crangle
green
2 sentences2019Id. 2018Id. | 2 | 2018–2019 |
State v. Branham
neutral
2 sentences2017Clark No. 2013 CA 49, 2014-Ohio-5067 , and State v. Landgraf, 2d Dist. 2017Clark No. 2013 CA 49, 2014-Ohio-5067 , this court addressed a similar issue. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2003No. C-000533. 4 See Sheppard , supra. 5 See Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668 , 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . 6 The record does not include the transcript of the plea and sentencing hearings in the sexual-battery case. 7 Specifically, the court cited Edwards's post-release-control status in finding that he posed the "greatest likelihood of recidivism" under R.C. 2929.14 (C). 8 The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that there is no double jeopardy violation where a trial court imposes imprisonment for a post-release-control violation and for the offense that was the subject of the violation. 2003No. C-000533. 4 See Sheppard , supra. 5 See Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668 , 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . 6 The record does not include the transcript of the plea and sentencing hearings in the sexual-battery case. 7 Specifically, the court cited Edwards's post-release-control status in finding that he posed the "greatest likelihood of recidivism" under R.C. 2929.14 (C). 8 The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that there is no double jeopardy violation where a trial court imposes imprisonment for a post-release-control violation and for the offense that was the subject of the violation. | 2 | 2003–2006 |
State v. Carroll
green
2 sentences2003State v. Carroll (1995), 104 Ohio App.3d 372 . {¶ 26} R.C. 2929.14 (F) provides that a post-release control requirement is a part of an offender's "sentence," a point confirmed by Woods v. Telb . 2003State v. Carroll (1995), 104 Ohio App.3d 372 . {¶ 26} R.C. 2929.14 (F) provides that a post-release control requirement is a part of an offender's "sentence," a point confirmed by Woods v. Telb. | 2 | 2003–2003 |
Goldberg v. Kelly
green
2 sentences2000In Goldberg v. Kelly (1970), 397 U.S. 254 , the United States Supreme Court concluded that "the fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard in a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Woods, supra , at __. 2000We conclude that these protections provided in the Ohio Administrative Code not only comport with those required by Morrissey v. Brewer, but go beyond Morrissey by guaranteeing the right to counsel as well. {¶ 39} In Goldberg v. Kelly (1970), 397 U.S. 254 , 90 S.Ct. 1011 , 25 L.Ed.2d 287 , the United States Supreme Court considered what process was due in the revocation of public assistance benefits. | 2 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Beverly, Unpublished Decision (9-13-2005)
green
1 sentence2025E.g., Harris at ¶ 15 ; Cleveland Hts. v. Coleman, 2021-Ohio-846, ¶ 19-20 (8th Dist.); State v. Clark, 2008-Ohio-5208, ¶ 37 (12th Dist.); State v. Beverly, 2005-Ohio-4954 -10- (4th Dist.). {¶ 30} Nelson was arrested in this case on April 16, 2024, at Ross Correctional Institution, where he was serving time for a post-release control violation in another case. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Nero
green
1 sentence2025“The test for prejudice is ‘whether the plea would have otherwise been made.’ ” Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, at ¶ 16 , quoting Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d at 108 . {¶ 13} In this case, Smith failed to point to anything in the record indicating that he would not have entered his guilty plea to domestic violence but for the post-release- control error in the plea form. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Dangler (Slip Opinion)
green
1 sentence2025“The test for prejudice is ‘whether the plea would have otherwise been made.’ ” Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, at ¶ 16 , quoting Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d at 108 . {¶ 13} In this case, Smith failed to point to anything in the record indicating that he would not have entered his guilty plea to domestic violence but for the post-release- control error in the plea form. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. McIntosh
green
1 sentence2024McIntosh, 2023-Ohio-4022, at ¶ 65 . {¶ 102} Furthermore, unlike post-release control, the Reagan Tokes notifications do not apply to every prison sentence, and the statutory scheme does not allow the DRC to restrain a defendant’s liberty after serving his or her sentence like a post-release control violation could. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| State v. Krouskoupf neutral | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Fultz neutral | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Lincoln neutral | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State Ex Rel. Jordan v. Haskins neutral | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Flanagan neutral | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| United States v. Brown green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Nixon v. Administrator of General Services green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Figueroa neutral | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| v. Department of Corrections green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Clark green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Anderson neutral | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Dunwoody neutral | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Belton neutral | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Rice green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State ex rel. Carnail v. McCormick green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Harkins green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Cool neutral | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Welch green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Billiter green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Dowey neutral | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Wooden neutral | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State ex rel. Gregley v. Friedman (Slip Opinion) neutral | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Hach neutral | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.