positional risk test in District of Columbia

2019Under the positional-risk test, “an injury arises out of employment so long as it would not have happened but for the fact that conditions and obligations of the employment placed claimant in a position where he was injured.” Id.

2009In cases where an employee’s injury arises neither out of a risk directly associated with employment nor out of a risk personal to the employee, this court has employed the positional risk doctrine, explaining that an employee’s injury arises out of his employment “so long as it would not have happened but for the fact that conditions and obligations of the employment placed claimant in a position where he was injured.” Clark, supra, 743 A.2d at 727 (citing Grayson v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 516 A.2d 909 , 911 & n. 4 (D.C.1986) (emphasis in original)).

2009In cases where an employee’s injury arises neither out of a risk directly associated with employment nor out of a risk personal to the employee, this court has employed the positional risk doctrine, explaining that an employee’s injury arises out of his employment “so long as it would not have happened but for the fact that conditions and obligations of the employment placed claimant in a position where he was injured.” Clark, supra, 743 A.2d at 727 (citing Grayson v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 516 A.2d 909 , 911 & n. 4 (D.C.1986) (emphasis in original)).

2009On the other hand, “when it is clear that the employment contributed nothing to the episode, ... [the episode and resulting injury] should be held noncompensable even in states fully accepting the positional risk test, since that test applies only when the risk is ‘neutral.’ ” Id. (citing 1 Larson, supra note 1, §§ 3.05, 8.02[l][c] (1999)).

2024Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

2023We therefore consider Brogdon’s injury as arising from a neutral risk, and assess its compensability under the positional-risk test. 2 As noted, this test asks whether the employee’s injuries “would not have happened but for the fact that conditions and obligations of the employment placed [them] in a position where [they were] injured.” Bentt, 979 A.2d at 1230 (citation omitted).

2022That renders her injuries compensable under the positional-risk test. 12 Our opinion in Gaines confirms our conclusions at both steps of the analysis above. 1 In Gaines, we held that a WMATA employee suffered a compensable injury when she fell on an escalator during an unpaid two-hour break between shifts. 210 A.3d at 772-74 .

2019See Gaines, 210 A.3d at 773 (“[S]o narrow an approach would lead to absurd consequences, because many workplace injuries occur in circumstances in which the employer did not dictate the precise location of the employee at the precise time of the injury.”).

2009"Under the positional-risk test, an injury arises out of employment so long as it would not have happened but for the fact that conditions and obligations of the employment placed claimant in the position where she was injured." Id. at 872 .

2009“Under the positional-risk test, an injury arises out of employment so long as it would not have happened but for the fact that conditions and obligations of the employment placed claimant in the position where she was injured.” Id. at 872 .

2009Ctr. v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 821 A.2d 898, 901 (D.C.2003) (describing and applying the positional-risk standard); Clark, supra, 743 A.2d at 727 (same).

2009In that circumstance, a resulting injury would not be compensable unless it is concluded, with a reasoned explication of the positional risk doctrine, that the doctrine extends so far as to require compensation. 10 See, e.g., Svehla v. Beverly Enterprises, 5 Neb.App. 765 , 567 N.W.2d 582, 590-91 (1997) (“The ‘unexplained fall rule,’ even if deemed a corollary to the positional risk doctrine ... is not applicable when there is evidence of a possible idiopathic origin to the fall.”); Indian Leasing Co. v. Turbyfill, 577 S.W.2d 24, 27-28 (Ky.Ct.App.1978) (“Liability under the positional risk theo

2009We recently clarified that the positional-risk standard is applied only "[i]n cases where an employee's injury arises neither out of a risk directly associated with employment nor out of a risk personal to the employee. . . ." Georgetown Univ. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 971 A.2d 909, 916 (D.C.2009) (" Ford ").

2009We recently clarified that the positional-risk standard is applied only “[i]n cases where an employee’s injury arises neither out of a risk directly associated with employment nor out of a risk personal to the employee....” Georgetown Univ. v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 971 A.2d 909, 916 (D.C.2009) (“Ford”).

2009In that circumstance, a resulting injury would not be compensable unless it is concluded, with a reasoned explication of the positional risk doctrine, that the doctrine extends so far as to require compensation. 10 See, e.g., Svehla v. Beverly Enterprises, 5 Neb.App. 765 , 567 N.W.2d 582, 590-91 (1997) (“The ‘unexplained fall rule,’ even if deemed a corollary to the positional risk doctrine ... is not applicable when there is evidence of a possible idiopathic origin to the fall.”); Indian Leasing Co. v. Turbyfill, 577 S.W.2d 24, 27-28 (Ky.Ct.App.1978) (“Liability under the positional risk theo

2009In that circumstance, a resulting injury would not be compensable unless it is concluded, with a reasoned explication of the positional risk doctrine, that the doctrine extends so far as to require compensation. 10 See, e.g., Svehla v. Beverly Enterprises, 5 Neb.App. 765 , 567 N.W.2d 582, 590-91 (1997) (“The ‘unexplained fall rule,’ even if deemed a corollary to the positional risk doctrine ... is not applicable when there is evidence of a possible idiopathic origin to the fall.”); Indian Leasing Co. v. Turbyfill, 577 S.W.2d 24, 27-28 (Ky.Ct.App.1978) (“Liability under the positional risk theo

2000The Presumption of Coverage D.C.Code § 36-321(1) establishes a presumption in favor of compensability for employees injured on the job. 4 The presumption is “designed to effectuate the humanitarian purposes of the statute” and “reflects a ‘strong legislative policy favoring awards in arguable cases.’ ” Ferreira v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 531 A.2d 651, 655 (D.C.1987) (quoting Wheatley v. Adler, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 177, 183 , 407 F.2d 307, 313 (1968) (en banc)).

2000The Presumption of Coverage D.C.Code § 36-321(1) establishes a presumption in favor of compensability for *728 employees injured on the job. [4] The presumption is "designed to effectuate the humanitarian purposes of the statute" and "reflects a `strong legislative policy favoring awards in arguable cases.'" Ferreira v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 531 A.2d 651, 655 (D.C.1987) (quoting Wheatley v. Adler, 132 U.S.App.

2000The Presumption of Coverage D.C.Code § 36-321(1) establishes a presumption in favor of compensability for employees injured on the job. 4 The presumption is “designed to effectuate the humanitarian purposes of the statute” and “reflects a ‘strong legislative policy favoring awards in arguable cases.’ ” Ferreira v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 531 A.2d 651, 655 (D.C.1987) (quoting Wheatley v. Adler, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 177, 183 , 407 F.2d 307, 313 (1968) (en banc)).

2000The Presumption of Coverage D.C.Code § 36-321(1) establishes a presumption in favor of compensability for employees injured on the job. 4 The presumption is “designed to effectuate the humanitarian purposes of the statute” and “reflects a ‘strong legislative policy favoring awards in arguable cases.’ ” Ferreira v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Employment Servs., 531 A.2d 651, 655 (D.C.1987) (quoting Wheatley v. Adler, 132 U.S.App.D.C. 177, 183 , 407 F.2d 307, 313 (1968) (en banc)).

1986Whetro v. Awkerman, supra, 383 Mich. 235, 242 , 174 N.W.2d 783, 785 (1970) (adopting the positional-risk standard similar to that used by the Director in our case).

1986Whetro v. Awkerman, supra, 383 Mich. 235, 242 , 174 N.W.2d 783, 785 (1970) (adopting the positional-risk standard similar to that used by the Director in our case).