12 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1987–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Blocker v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2014Moreover, the trial court, while giving the second-degree murder instruction, repeated its instruction on first-degree murder and explained that, the newly-given lesser included charge notwithstanding, the jury must “first consider whether the defendant is guilty of first degree premeditated murder while armed.” Thus the trial court was careful not to place any improper emphasis on the new charge or act in a manner so as to cause “a reasonable jury [to] believe that the trial court was now endorsing the new instructions.” Blocker, supra, 940 A.2d at 1048 (citation and internal quotation marks 2014Moreover, the trial court, while giving the second-degree murder instruction, repeated its instruction on first-degree murder and explained that, the newly-given lesser included charge notwithstanding, the jury must “first consider whether the defendant is guilty of first degree premeditated murder while armed.” Thus the trial court was careful not to place any improper emphasis on the new charge or act in a manner so as to cause “a reasonable jury [to] believe that the trial court was now endorsing the new instructions.” Blocker, supra, 940 A.2d at 1048 (citation and internal quotation marks | 1 | 1 |
Lee v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2009See Lee v. United States, 959 A.2d 1141, 1143 (D.C.2008) (holding that appellant preserved an objection where after the instructions were read, he argued that the trial court had erroneously taken out the mitigating circumstances language from the second degree murder instruction); Comber v. United States, 584 A.2d 26 , 53 n. 47 (D.C.1990) (en banc) ("The government contends that appellant Hayward never objected to the wording of the voluntary manslaughter instruction, and that we must review that contention under the plain error standard. | 1 | 1 |
Hall v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2004See Bright v. United States, 698 A.2d 450, 458 (D.C.1997) (“homicides that are unplanned or impulsive, even though they are intentional and with malice aforethought, are murder in the second degree.”) (quoting Hall v. United States, 454 A.2d 314, 317 (D.C.1982)). 3) The plea agreements with Hill and Murphy did not violate 18 U.S.C. § 201 (c)(2) and cannot be considered to be prosecutorial misconduct. | 1 | 1 |
Bright v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2004See Bright v. United States, 698 A.2d 450, 458 (D.C.1997) (“homicides that are unplanned or impulsive, even though they are intentional and with malice aforethought, are murder in the second degree.”) (quoting Hall v. United States, 454 A.2d 314, 317 (D.C.1982)). 3) The plea agreements with Hill and Murphy did not violate 18 U.S.C. § 201 (c)(2) and cannot be considered to be prosecutorial misconduct. | 1 | 1 |
Nelson v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2003See Nelson, 601 A.2d at 595 . | 1 | 1 |
Boykins v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1998See Boykins v. United States, 702 A.2d 1242, 1250 (D.C. 1997); Shuler, supra, 677 A.2d at 1017 . | 1 | 1 |
Robinson v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1995Fifth, given our affirmance of appellant’s conviction for felony murder while armed, the asserted error in the judge’s instruction concerning second-degree murder will be mooted by the vacatur of that conviction which we direct. 9 We note, however, the government’s agreement that the judge “misplaced” the lack of provocation/heat of passion element by including it as part of the *876 voluntary manslaughter instruction rather than as part of the second-degree murder instruction. 10 Finally, although post-trial investigative services are allowable under D.C.Code § ll-2605(a) (1989), see Robinson | 1 | 1 |
Leon Jackson v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1987See also Jackson v. United States, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 181, 183 , 313 F.2d 572, 574 (1962). 1987See also Jackson v. United States, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 181, 183 , 313 F.2d 572, 574 (1962). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Shuler v. United States
green
2 sentences1998See Boykins v. United States, 702 A.2d 1242, 1250 (D.C. 1997); Shuler, supra, 677 A.2d at 1017 . 1997Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the request for a second degree murder instruction because there was no “evidence to support a finding of guilt on the lesser offense.” Id. | 2 | 1997–1998 |
Comber v. United States
green
1 sentence2009See Lee v. United States, 959 A.2d 1141, 1143 (D.C.2008) (holding that appellant preserved an objection where after the instructions were read, he argued that the trial court had erroneously taken out the mitigating circumstances language from the second degree murder instruction); Comber v. United States, 584 A.2d 26 , 53 n. 47 (D.C.1990) (en banc) ("The government contends that appellant Hayward never objected to the wording of the voluntary manslaughter instruction, and that we must review that contention under the plain error standard. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Gardner v. United States
green
1 sentence2008Jones argues that there was no evidentiary basis for the second-degree murder instruction because it was “[t]he government’s theory ... that the decedents were killed in a cold-blooded, deliberate revenge killing for having broken into Mr. Jones’s car.” See Gardner v. United States, 898 A.2d 367 , 375 n. 20 (D.C.2006) (noting that first-degree murder requires “deliberate and premeditated malice,” while second-degree murder does not (quoting D.C.Code § 22-2101)). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Woodard v. United States
green
1 sentence2005So, I will give second degree.” Based on the legal principles enunciated in Woodard, supra, and the evidence presented at trial, while the jury could conclude reasonably that testimony from all three eyewitnesses showed malice on Mr. Tucker’s part, Mr. Carter’s and Ms. Washington’s testimony presented some evidence which might lead reasonable jurors to conclude that there was no premeditation. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Hebron v. United States
green
2 sentences1996But the standard to be applied is whether a jury, by crediting Douglas’ testimony and discounting part of Sharp’s, would have any “rational basis,” Hebron, supra, 625 A.2d at 885 , for retaining a doubt as to premeditation and deliberation. 1996But the standard to be applied is whether a jury, by crediting Douglas’ testimony and discounting part of Sharp’s, would have any “rational basis,” Hebron, supra, 625 A.2d at 885 , for retaining a doubt as to premeditation and deliberation. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Bostick v. United States
green
1 sentence1994CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra, Nos. 4.21 and 4.23. [15] For this reason, we are unpersuaded by appellant's arguments that the instructions did not require the government to prove absence of mitigation as an element of first-degree murder and that premeditation and deliberation are unrelated to the absence of mitigation. [16] Indeed, although the trial court gave no instruction on voluntary manslaughter despite the foregoing instruction with respect to second-degree murder, cf. Bostick, supra, it did instruct the jury that if it was not satisfied that the defendant did not injure the deceas | 1 | 1994–1994 |
William H. Fuller v. United States
green
1 sentence1987Declining to rule on the applicability of the transferred intent doctrine in the District, the Fuller court could offer as its only justification for the rule the fact that the practice had been permitted for a long time in the District; therefore, defense counsel in a felony murder trial would be on notice that a second degree murder instruction would be allowed the prosecution even though not charged in the indictment. 132 U.S. App.D.C. at 294-95, 407 F.2d at 1229-30 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.