breath or urine test in Florida

2025We refused to exclude a blood test requested outside of a medical facility if that test was the result of voluntary consent and “provided [that] the person has been fully informed that the implied consent law requires submission only to a breath or urine test and that the blood test is offered as an alternative.” Id. at 332 . 2 Post-Chu, one of our sister courts took a different approach.

2019However, the circuit court relied on our earlier opinion, Chu v. State, 521 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988), for the proposition that the blood draw at issue was not legislatively authorized under Florida’s implied consent law because nothing in the record suggested that a breath or urine test was impossible or impractical.

2025Despite the defendants’ “voluntary consent to the blood draws,” the trial court granted their motion to suppress “because they should have been informed that the implied consent law requires submission only to a breath or urine test, and that a blood test is offered only as an alternative.” Id.

2025Because the Murray defendants “were not under lawful arrest and did not seek medical treatment, and the troopers did not have probable cause to believe that they were impaired . . . the implied consent law was clearly not implicated.” Id. at 595 n.1; see also Montes-Valeton v. State, 216 So. 2 In the past decade, we have dispensed with limiting “voluntary consent” to situations where the consenting party had “full knowledge that the implied consent laws required submission only to a breath or urine test and that the blood test was being offered as an alternative.” State v. Dubiel, 958 So. 2d 4

2025Because the Murray defendants “were not under lawful arrest and did not seek medical treatment, and the troopers did not have probable cause to believe that they were impaired . . . the implied consent law was clearly not implicated.” Id. at 595 n.1; see also Montes-Valeton v. State, 216 So. 2 In the past decade, we have dispensed with limiting “voluntary consent” to situations where the consenting party had “full knowledge that the implied consent laws required submission only to a breath or urine test and that the blood test was being offered as an alternative.” State v. Dubiel, 958 So. 2d 4

2019In Dubiel, we held that a blood draw is legislatively authorized when a suspect is in a hospital and voluntarily consents. 958 So. 2d at 488 .

1990State v Hilton, 498 So.2d 698 (5th DCA 1986).

1987Hilton , at p. 700.

2023“The ruling of the trial court on a motion to suppress . . . is clothed with the presumption of correctness, and the reviewing court will interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences and deductions derived therefrom in a manner most favorable to sustain the trial court’s ruling.” McNamara v. State, 357 So. 2d 410, 412 (Fla. 1978). “[A]n appellate court must determine whether competent, substantial evidence supports the lower court’s factual findings, but the trial court’s application of the law to the facts is reviewed de novo.” State v. Murray, 51 So. 3d 593, 594 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). “[T]

2023“The ruling of the trial court on a motion to suppress . . . is clothed with the presumption of correctness, and the reviewing court will interpret the evidence and reasonable inferences and deductions derived therefrom in a manner most favorable to sustain the trial court’s ruling.” McNamara v. State, 357 So. 2d 410, 412 (Fla. 1978). “[A]n appellate court must determine whether competent, substantial evidence supports the lower court’s factual findings, but the trial court’s application of the law to the facts is reviewed de novo.” State v. Murray, 51 So. 3d 593, 594 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011). “[T]

2023Pursuant to section 316.1932(1)(c), Florida Statutes (2021), in relevant part, a driver is deemed to have consented to having blood drawn for testing for alcohol content or the presence of chemical substances or controlled substances where (1) there is reasonable cause to believe the driver has been driving under the influence of alcohol or chemical or controlled substances, (2) the driver appears for treatment at a hospital, and (3) the administration of a breath or urine test is impractical or 2 impossible. 1 “Any person who is incapable of refusal by reason of unconsciousness or other menta

2019Id. (“The Florida Supreme Court has explained . . . that if a defendant expressly consents to a blood test, ‘then the blood test falls wholly outside the scope of the implied consent law.’”) (quoting Robertson v. State, 604 So. 2d 783, 790 (Fla. 1992)).

2018See State v. Polak, 598 So. 2d 150 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).

2018State v. Serrago, 875 So. 2d 815, 819 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004).

2011Section 316.1932(l)(a)l.a. provides in pertinent part that “[t]he refusal to submit to a chemical or physical breath test upon the request of a law enforcement officer as provided in this section is admissible into evidence in any criminal proceeding.” § 316.1932(l)(a)l.a., Fla. Stat. (2010); see also State v. Kline, 764 So.2d 716, 717 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (holding that implied consent law requires admission of a defendant’s refusal to submit to a breath or urine test).

1995As the Florida Supreme Court has stated, "[u]nder this provision, a conscious person is given the right to refuse to take a chemical [breath or urine] test if he [or she] is willing to suffer a ... suspension of his [or her] driving privilege," and "[a]ny careful reading of section [316.1932(1)] leads to the inescapable conclusion that a person is given the right to refuse [breath or urine] testing." Sambrine v. State, 386 So.2d 546, 548 (Fla. 1980).

1991Here the trial court expressly found that because the defendant was unconscious “the administration of a breathalyzer test [was] impractical or impossible.” The applicability of section 316.1932(l)(c), Florida Statutes (1989) was discussed in State v Burnett, 536 So.2d 375, 377 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988), where the court observed that the following two requirements must be present before the section is applicable: (1) The individual tested must appear for treatment at a hospital, clinic, or medical facility as a result of his involvement as a driver in a motor vehicle accident and (2) the administrati

1988Addressing the first question, we apply the rule of statutory analysis that "where the language of the statute is so plain and unambiguous as to fix the legislative intent and leave no room for construction, the courts should not depart from the plain language used by the legislature." Citizens of the State v. Public Service Comm'n, 425 So.2d 534, 541-42 (Fla. 1982) (citing Carson v. Miller, 370 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1979)).