newly-discovered fact exception in Pennsylvania

2026Appellant did not invoke the newly-discovered fact exception in any other manner and did not assert facts sufficient to support a finding that he had satisfied the exception pursuant to Commonwealth v. - 11 - J-S05039-26 Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264 (Pa. 2007) (total abandonment by PCRA counsel on appeal may serve to be a newly-discovered fact entitling petitioner to file an out-of-time PCRA petition).

2025Petitioner requests reinstatement of PCRA appellate rights nunc pro tunc, pleads an exception to the time-bar[.] See Commonwealth v. Bennett[,] 593 Pa. 382 [,] 930 A.2d 1264 (Pa. 2007), requests counsel assistance please. -7- J-S43039-24 Petition, 7/7/23, at 2.5 In Bennett, our Supreme Court held that the PCRA petitioner was entitled to the application of the newly-discovered fact exception under Section 9545(b)(ii), because he asserted that he was unaware his counsel had abandoned him on appeal.

2026To establish the newly discovered fact exception to the PCRA time bar, a petitioner must demonstrate that “he did not know the facts upon which he based his petition and could not have learned those facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).

2025See id. - 10 - J-S24011-25 Further, Appellant contends that his discovery of an article and case law regarding RRRI eligibility satisfies the newly-discovered fact exception.

2026See Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618, 629 (Pa. 2017) (discussing the newly- discovered fact exception).

2025In Small, our Supreme Court cited its previous decision in Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618 , 636-37 (Pa. 2018) to explain how - 10 - J-S21006-25 a PCRA court should properly consider the newly-discovered-fact exception.

2026The focus of the newly discovered fact exception is on “newly discovered facts, not on a newly discovered or newly willing source for previously known facts.” Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 720 (Pa. 2008) (emphasis omitted).

2026“The focus of the newly- discovered fact exception is on the newly discovered facts, not on a newly discovered or newly willing source for previously known facts.’” Commonwealth v. Marshall, 947 A.2d 714, 720 (Pa. 2008) (emphasis in original; citation, internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).

2026See PCRA Petition, 3/25/24, at 15-16.14 To establish the newly-discovered fact exception, the petitioner bears the burden of pleading and proving “(1) the facts upon which the claim was predicated were unknown[;] and (2) they could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 146 A.3d 221, 227 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted).

2026To establish the newly-discovered fact exception, the petitioner bears the burden of pleading and proving “(1) the facts upon which the claim was predicated were unknown[;] and (2) they could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 146 A.3d 221, 227 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted).

2024Our Supreme Court has held that “judicial determinations do not satisfy the newly discovered fact exception because an in-court ruling or published judicial opinion is law, for it is simply the embodiment of abstract principles applied to actual events.” Commonwealth v. Reid, 235 A.3d 1124 , 1146 (Pa. 2020) (citations omitted and formatting altered); see also Watts, 23 A.3d at 986 (stating that “judicial determinations are not facts.”).

2024Following our review of the record, we agree with the PCRA court that Appellant has failed to meet the newly discovered fact exception based on his Federal Habeas Case because a judicial determination is not a “fact.” See Blakeney, 193 A.3d at 361; see also Reid, 235 A.3d at 1146-47; Watts, 23 A.3d at 986-87 .9 Insofar as Appellant relies on Lawson, we note the facts of that case are distinguishable.

2026With respect to the newly-discovered fact exception at Section 9545(b)(1)(ii), the petitioner must establish that “the facts upon which the Brady claim is predicated were not previously known to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained through due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 941 A.2d 1263, 1268 (Pa. 2008) (citation omitted).

2026Our Supreme Court determined the petitioner failed to establish the newly-discovered fact exception, in part because he “offer[ed] no explanation as to why [the witness], who asserted he was aware of [the facts stated in his affidavit] in 1984, did not come forward with this information until nearly 20 years later.” Id. at 1269 . - 24 - J-S09003-26 [Appellant’s] trial concluded.

2025In Commonwealth v. Brown, J., 141 A.3d 491, 502 (Pa. Super. 2016), we explained that newspaper articles are insufficient to establish a newly-discovered fact exception: Our Supreme Court addressed a situation like the one in the case sub judice in Commonwealth v. Castro, 625 Pa. 582 , 93 A.3d 818 (2014).

2025Adopting the logic applied in another case of this Court: In Commonwealth v. Brown, 141 A.3d 491, 502 (Pa. Super. 2016), we explained that newspaper articles are insufficient to establish a newly-discovered fact exception: Our Supreme Court addressed a situation like the one in the case sub judice in Commonwealth v. Castro, [] 93 A.3d 818 ([Pa.] 2014).

2026Moreover, our Supreme Court has held that a claim that previous counsel was ineffective is, in the vast majority of cases, not a newly-discovered fact entitling an appellant to the benefit of the newly-discovered fact exception and does not save an otherwise untimely PCRA petition for review on the merits.3 See Commonwealth v. Gamboa Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 785 (Pa. 2000) (holding that a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel does not save an otherwise untimely petition for review on the merits because a conclusion that previous counsel was ineffective is not the type of newly-discovered fa

2025If a PCRA petition invoking the newly-discovered fact exception is not filed within one year of the date that Appellant became aware of the underlying facts, “the [PCRA] court has no power to address the substantive merits of a petitioner’s PCRA claims.” Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 783 (Pa. 2000).

2023Newly-Discovered Fact Exception The newly-discovered fact exception requires proof that (1) “the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner[,]” and (2) the facts “could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence[.]” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii).7 To satisfy the due diligence element of the exception, the petitioner must show that he made reasonable efforts “based on the particular circumstances, to uncover facts that may support a claim for collateral relief.” Commonwealth v. Burton, 121 A.3d 1063, 1071 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc), aff’d 158 A.3d 618

2022The newly discovered fact exception requires a petitioner to plead and prove “that the facts upon which the claim is based were unknown to him and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Burton, 158 A.3d 618, 629 (Pa. 2017); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). “[D]ue diligence requires neither perfect vigilance nor punctilious care, but rather it requires reasonable efforts by a petitioner, based ____________________________________________ 4 The Legislature amended Subsection 9545(b)(2) from 60 days to one year for all claims arising on or after December

2026In Davis, we observed that “[f]or purposes of the newly- discovered fact exception, our Supreme Court has ruled that mere allegations of police misconduct in unrelated cases, whether true or false, do not constitute new facts under the PCRA.” Id. (unpublished memorandum at 10) (citing Commonwealth v. Castro, 93 A.3d 818, 825-27 (Pa. 2014)).

2025In Commonwealth v. Brown, J., 141 A.3d 491, 502 (Pa. Super. 2016), we explained that newspaper articles are insufficient to establish a newly-discovered fact exception: Our Supreme Court addressed a situation like the one in the case sub judice in Commonwealth v. Castro, 625 Pa. 582 , 93 A.3d 818 (2014).

2026See Myers, supra, 303 A.3d at 122-23 (holding that a Appellant failed to establish the newly discovered fact exception to the PCRA timeliness ____________________________________________ 6 While we acknowledge that no valid presumption applies to pro se PCRA Appellants that information which is of public record cannot be deemed “unknown” for purposes of the newly discovered facts exception, to obtain the benefit of the newly discovered fact timeliness exception, the PCRA Appellant must still establish that the facts were unknown to him and that the facts could not have been ascertained by the

2026See Myers, supra, 303 A.3d at 122-23 (holding that a Appellant failed to establish the newly discovered fact exception to the PCRA timeliness ____________________________________________ 6 While we acknowledge that no valid presumption applies to pro se PCRA Appellants that information which is of public record cannot be deemed “unknown” for purposes of the newly discovered facts exception, to obtain the benefit of the newly discovered fact timeliness exception, the PCRA Appellant must still establish that the facts were unknown to him and that the facts could not have been ascertained by the

2024Cf. Shannon, 184 A.3d at 1015-16 .4 As Appellant has failed to plead and prove the newly-discovered fact exception to the PCRA’s time-bar, this Court, like the PCRA court, lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of Appellant’s issues.

2023Commonwealth v. Shannon, 184 A.3d 1010, 1017 (Pa. Super. 2018).6 To explain this requisite nexus, the Court has observed that a petitioner cannot satisfy the newly-discovered fact exception by claiming that he recently discovered that the “the Houston Astros won the 2017 World Series” without showing how this fact matters in regard to the claim he asserts in his PCRA.

2026See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 232 A.3d 739, 745 (Pa. Super. 2020) (reiterating that the focus of the newly- discovered-fact exception to the PCRA’s time bar “is on newly-discovered facts, not on newly-discovered or newly-willing sources that corroborate previously known facts or previously raised claims”) (en banc).

2025See Commonwealth v. Mickeals, 335 A.3d 13 , 24 (Pa. Super. 2025) (explaining “new sources of previously known facts do not satisfy the newly-discovered fact exception”); Commonwealth v. Maxwell, 232 A.3d 739, 746 (Pa. Super. 2020) (same).

2026See Hernandez, supra. In his PCRA petition, Thomas asserted that he could meet the newly- discovered fact exception to the PCRA’s one-year time bar.

2025See Hernandez, supra. Hart argues that the PCRA court erred in finding no merit to his claim that he established both the newly-discovered-fact exception and the governmental interference exception in two respects: 1) for withholding evidence of Detective James Miles’ “pattern and practice” of police misconduct; and 2) for withholding evidence that the Commonwealth’s “star witness,” Clifford Bryant, who was the only witness who identified him as the perpetrator in a pre-trial photo array, actually was “legally blind.” Hart’s Brief at iii.

2026See Brensinger, supra; Monaco, supra; Carr, supra. Therefore, Appellant’s claim does not satisfy the newly-discovered fact exception to the PCRA time bar.

2023See Brensinger, supra; Monaco, supra. Therefore, Appellant’s claim does not satisfy the newly-discovered fact exception to the PCRA time bar.

2020See id.; see also Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 953 A.2d 1248, 1253 (Pa. 2006) (stating that when a petitioner invokes the governmental interference exception of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i), the petitioner must demonstrate due diligence in obtaining the facts at issue); Commonwealth v. Edminston, 65 A.3d 339, 350 (Pa. 2013) (stating that the newly-discovered fact exception at 42 -6- J-S42032-20 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii) also requires a petitioner to demonstrate due diligence in obtaining the facts at issue); Commonwealth v. Watts, 23 A.3d 980, 986 (Pa. 2011) (stating that judicial decisions are n

2017In order for a study to satisfy the newly discovered fact exception, the Court said, the information “may not be part of a public record.” Id. (citation omitted).

2026To successfully invoke the newly-discovered fact exception, a petitioner must plead and prove “the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). “[T]he focus of this exception is on the newly[-]discovered facts, not on a newly[-]discovered or newly[-]willing source for previously known facts.” Commonwealth v. Reeves, 296 A.3d 1228, 1232 (Pa. Super. 2023).

2025“However, a petitioner may overcome the PCRA’s time-bar if he pleads and proves one of the statutory exceptions set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b).” Reeves, 296 A.3d at 1231 . -9- J-S37026-24 The newly-discovered fact exception “requires a petitioner to demonstrate he did not know the facts upon which he based his petition and could not have learned of those facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 204 A.3d 524, 526 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(ii)).

2026Our Supreme Court has instructed that “the newly discovered fact exception does not require any merits analysis of the underlying claim, and application of the time-bar exception therefore does not necessitate proof of the elements of a claim of after-discovered evidence.” Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267 , 1286 (Pa. 2020) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Branthafer, 315 A.3d 113, 128 (Pa. Super. 2024) (noting that “the newly-discovered facts exception to the jurisdictional time-bar is distinct from an after-discovered evidence claim, which is a sub

2025“Pennsylvania law is unmistakably clear that only new facts, not newly- uncovered information pertinent to previously known facts, trigger the timeliness exception pursuant to Section 9545(b)(1)(ii).” Branthafer, 315 A.3d at 130 (emphasis added); Commonwealth v. Lopez, 249 A.3d 993 , 1000 (Pa. 2021) (explaining that the focus of the newly-discovered fact exception “is on the newly discovered facts, not on a newly discovered or - 14 - J-S11013-25 newly willing source for previously known facts.” (citation, emphasis, and footnote omitted)).

2026We have long held that the newly- discovered-fact exception is based on “newly discovered facts, not on a newly J-S43038-25 discovered or newly willing source for previously known facts.” Commonwealth v. Balestier-Marrero, 314 A.3d 549, 554 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation omitted).

2026The newly discovered fact exception “requires a petitioner to demonstrate he did not know the facts upon which he based his petition and could not have learned those facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Balestier-Marrero, 314 A.3d 549, 554 (Pa. Super. -6- J-S01025-26 2024), appeal denied, 330 A.3d 1245 (Pa. 2024) (citations omitted).

2024See Notice of Intent to Dismiss PCRA Petition, 3/30/2023, ¶¶ 3-4; PCRA Court Opinion, 6/23/2023, at 1-2; see also Kretchmar, 189 A.3d at 467 (holding that judicial decisions are not new “facts” for purposes of the newly-discovered fact exception); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 283 A.3d 178 , 187 (Pa. 2022) (stating that in order to satisfy the new constitutional right exception “a petitioner must prove that there is a ‘new’ constitutional right and that the right ‘has been held’ by that court to apply retroactively”).

2023See Kretchmar, -6- J-S33040-22 189 A.3d at 467 ; Watts, 23 A.3d at 987 .5 As Cacho failed to establish a newly discovered fact exception to the PCRA’s timeliness requirement, the PCRA court correctly concluded it lacked jurisdiction over Cacho’s untimely petition.

2026The Court decided that Peterson had successfully invoked the newly-discovered fact exception based on first PCRA counsel’s per se ineffectiveness, “and the PCRA court made factual findings that Peterson did not know about the untimely filing and could not have ascertained this fact through the exercise of due diligence.” Id. at 325, 192 A.3d at 1130-31 (emphasis added).

2026While not cited by counsel in the supplemental PCRA petitions, we find that the facts here are analogous to those in Commonwealth v. Peterson, 192 A.3d 1123 , 1124–25 (Pa. 2018), where our Supreme Court applied the newly-discovered-fact exception to an instance of per se ineffectiveness that wholly foreclosed review of Peterson’s claims.

2026Commonwealth v. Robinson, 185 A.3d 1055, 1059 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc) (citing Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1270-72 (Pa. 2007)).

2026Commonwealth v. Robinson, 185 A.3d 1055, 1059 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc) (citing Commonwealth v. Bennett, 930 A.2d 1264, 1270-72 (Pa. 2007)).

2024See Spotz, 171 A.3d at 679 .3 In his final issue, Calhoun claims that the PCRA court erred in dismissing his petition on the basis that he requested the recusal of the PCRA court judge, ____________________________________________ 3 In his brief, Calhoun argues that he satisfied the newly-discovered fact exception to the PCRA’s one-year time bar; however, he did not assert this timeliness exception in his petition.

2024Spotz, 171 A.3d at 676 . ____________________________________________ 4 See Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a) (providing for 30 days after entry of an order of the Superior Court to file a timely petition for allowance of appeal). 5 A timely PCRA petition shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). - 11 - J-A18041-24 To satisfy the newly-discovered fact exception to the PCRA time bar, a petitioner must demonstrate that he “did not know the facts upon which he based his petition and could not have learned those facts earlier by the exercise of due

2020See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1093 (Pa. 2010). -5- J-S26028-20 Diaz argues that the newly-discovered fact exception under section 9545(b)(1)(ii) renders his petition timely.

2019Appellant fails to satisfy any of the exceptions to the PCRA’s time-bar and, thus, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to address the merits of Appellant’s newly discovered fact claims.1 See Albrecht, 994 A.2d at 1093 . ____________________________________________ 1 We note that, in discussing the requirements of the newly discovered fact exception, the PCRA court applied an erroneous standard when it opined that a petitioner must demonstrate that the new evidence “(1) could not have been obtained prior to the conclusion of the trial by the exercise of reasonable diligence; (2) is not merely co

2026Moreover, our Supreme Court has held that a claim that previous counsel was ineffective is, in the vast majority of cases, not a newly-discovered fact entitling an appellant to the benefit of the newly-discovered fact exception and does not save an otherwise untimely PCRA petition for review on the merits.3 See Commonwealth v. Gamboa Taylor, 753 A.2d 780, 785 (Pa. 2000) (holding that a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel does not save an otherwise untimely petition for review on the merits because a conclusion that previous counsel was ineffective is not the type of newly-discovered fa

2022Lark, 746 A.2d at 588 (some formatting altered); see also Commonwealth v. Breeden, 715 EDA 2020, 2021 WL 1627209 at *3 (Pa. Super. filed Apr. 27, 2021) (unpublished mem.) (concluding that the appellant met the one- year time limit for a newly discovered fact claim by raising the issue within one year “after the appeal of his [prior] PCRA petition’s dismissal”).