12 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Murray v. Stategreen2 sentences2018See Murray, 692 So. 2d at 163 (holding that as the proponent of DNA evidence admitted at trial, the State failed to carry its burden of establishing the admissibility of probability calculations for a DNA profile developed from the crime scene when its expert had no knowledge about the database used to calculate the frequency statistics about which he testified); Casias v. State, 94 So. 3d 611, 613-15 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (holding that the admission of testimony about the statistical analysis of a DNA match was erroneous when the expert failed to identify the statistical method used and the tria 2004Regarding the statistical analysis, a qualified expert must demonstrate a "sufficient knowledge of the database grounded in the study of authoritative sources." 842 So.2d at 828 (quoting Murray v. State, 692 So.2d 157, 164 (Fla.1997)). | 2 | 3 |
Frye v. United Statesred2 sentences2018For unexplained reasons, Dr. Riebsame appears to have performed the statistical analysis at issue during the one-month period between the date of his deposition and the day he testified at trial, even though he testified that it was "the most widely used actuarial statistical tool for predicting violence in the future." Frye v. United States , 293 F. 1013 (D.C. 1923). 1997See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923)(holding that the scientific basis for an expert opinion must, as a prerequisite to admissibility, be shown to be generally accepted in the relevant scientific community). | 1 | 2 |
Gibson v. Stategreen2 sentences2018See Murray, 692 So. 2d at 163 (holding that as the proponent of DNA evidence admitted at trial, the State failed to carry its burden of establishing the admissibility of probability calculations for a DNA profile developed from the crime scene when its expert had no knowledge about the database used to calculate the frequency statistics about which he testified); Casias v. State, 94 So. 3d 611, 613-15 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (holding that the admission of testimony about the statistical analysis of a DNA match was erroneous when the expert failed to identify the statistical method used and the tria 2011There, the DNA analyst “explained that in performing ■ the statistical analysis, she uses nationally recognized and accepted scientific procedures. [She] used three different populations, Caucasian, African-American, and Hispanic, in her analysis.” 915 So.2d at 200 . | 1 | 2 |
Miles v. Stategreen2 sentences2018See Murray, 692 So. 2d at 163 (holding that as the proponent of DNA evidence admitted at trial, the State failed to carry its burden of establishing the admissibility of probability calculations for a DNA profile developed from the crime scene when its expert had no knowledge about the database used to calculate the frequency statistics about which he testified); Casias v. State, 94 So. 3d 611, 613-15 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (holding that the admission of testimony about the statistical analysis of a DNA match was erroneous when the expert failed to identify the statistical method used and the tria 2018See Murray, 692 So. 2d at 163 (holding that as the proponent of DNA evidence admitted at trial, the State failed to carry its burden of establishing the admissibility of probability calculations for a DNA profile developed from the crime scene when its expert had no knowledge about the database used to calculate the frequency statistics about which he testified); Casias v. State, 94 So. 3d 611, 613-15 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (holding that the admission of testimony about the statistical analysis of a DNA match was erroneous when the expert failed to identify the statistical method used and the tria | 1 | 1 |
Perdomo v. Stategreen2 sentences2018Citing to Perdomo v. State, 829 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002), Mr. Cruz requested an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the proper predicate could be laid for Ms. Ragsdale's testimony about the statistical analysis. 2018See Murray, 692 So. 2d at 163 (holding that as the proponent of DNA evidence admitted at trial, the State failed to carry its burden of establishing the admissibility of probability calculations for a DNA profile developed from the crime scene when its expert had no knowledge about the database used to calculate the frequency statistics about which he testified); Casias v. State, 94 So. 3d 611, 613-15 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (holding that the admission of testimony about the statistical analysis of a DNA match was erroneous when the expert failed to identify the statistical method used and the tria | 1 | 1 |
Casias v. Stategreen2 sentences2018See Murray, 692 So. 2d at 163 (holding that as the proponent of DNA evidence admitted at trial, the State failed to carry its burden of establishing the admissibility of probability calculations for a DNA profile developed from the crime scene when its expert had no knowledge about the database used to calculate the frequency statistics about which he testified); Casias v. State, 94 So. 3d 611, 613-15 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (holding that the admission of testimony about the statistical analysis of a DNA match was erroneous when the expert failed to identify the statistical method used and the tria 2018See Murray, 692 So. 2d at 163 (holding that as the proponent of DNA evidence admitted at trial, the State failed to carry its burden of establishing the admissibility of probability calculations for a DNA profile developed from the crime scene when its expert had no knowledge about the database used to calculate the frequency statistics about which he testified); Casias v. State, 94 So. 3d 611, 613-15 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (holding that the admission of testimony about the statistical analysis of a DNA match was erroneous when the expert failed to identify the statistical method used and the tria | 1 | 1 |
SOUTHERN BELL TELEPHONE & T. CO. v. County of Dadegreen2 sentences2011It was based on such a statistical analysis that the supreme court concluded not that documentary stamps prove value by themselves but that, “taken as a whole, sales prices are acceptable indicators of value.” Id. at 9 (emphasis added). 2011It was based on such a statistical analysis that the supreme court concluded not that documentary stamps prove value by themselves but that, “taken as a whole, sales prices are acceptable indicators of value.” Id. at 9 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Bevil v. Stategreen2 sentences2007See, e.g., Bevil v. State, 875 So.2d 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (reversing a conviction based upon the use of the same database for the statistical analysis of DNA evidence when the State’s witness admitted that errors in the database had caused the FDLE to terminate use of the database and the State presented no evidence to otherwise support the validity of the analysis performed). 2007See, e.g., Bevil v. State, 875 So.2d 1265 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (reversing a conviction based upon the use of the same database for the statistical analysis of DNA evidence when the State’s witness admitted that errors in the database had caused the FDLE to terminate use of the database and the State presented no evidence to otherwise support the validity of the analysis performed). | 1 | 1 |
Earnest v. Amoco Oil Co.green1 sentence2005See id. at 1260 . | 1 | 1 |
Brim v. Stategreen1 sentence2002This Court, in its de novo review of a trial court's Frye determination (described by this Court in Brim as a question of law, 695 So.2d at 274), may examine "`expert testimony, scientific and legal writings, and judicial opinions' to decide whether the scientific principles and procedures relied upon to create such evidence are generally accepted by a relevant scientific community both at the time of trial and today." Brim v. State, 779 So.2d 427, 428 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (citing Hadden v. State, 690 So.2d 573, 578 (Fla.1997)). | 1 | 1 |
Hadden v. Stategreen1 sentence2002This Court, in its de novo review of a trial court's Frye determination (described by this Court in Brim as a question of law, 695 So.2d at 274), may examine "`expert testimony, scientific and legal writings, and judicial opinions' to decide whether the scientific principles and procedures relied upon to create such evidence are generally accepted by a relevant scientific community both at the time of trial and today." Brim v. State, 779 So.2d 427, 428 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000) (citing Hadden v. State, 690 So.2d 573, 578 (Fla.1997)). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Joint Eastern & Southern District Asbestos Litigation.green1 sentence1998Asbestos Litig., 52 F.3d at 1134 (an argument that an epidemiological study must show a relative risk greater than 2.0 is a sufficiency argument not an admissibility argument). [13] Our conclusion is strongly influenced by the fact that the epidemiological studies here were conducted independently of this litigation and were peer-reviewed and accepted by journals that are widely acknowledged in the scientific and medical communities. | 1 | 1 |
Amy Deluca v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.green1 sentence1998See, e.g., DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 955 (declining to rule as a matter of law that any expert opinion rooted in a statistical analysis where the results of the underlying studies are not significant at a .05 level would not be allowed where the record contained virtually no relevant help from the parties or from qualified experts); In re Joint E. & S. Dist. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brim v. State
green
2 sentences2018Id. at 827-28 (citing Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1997)). 2011Without such evidence, the trial court, whose gatekeeping role required it to determine whether the methodology used to generate the statistical analysis satisfied the Frye test, see Brim, 695 So.2d at 272 , simply had no basis to do so. | 2 | 2011–2018 |
Butler v. State
green
2 sentences2018Id. at 827-28 (citing Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 1997)). 2004Regarding the statistical analysis, a qualified expert must demonstrate a "sufficient knowledge of the database grounded in the study of authoritative sources." 842 So.2d at 828 (quoting Murray v. State, 692 So.2d 157, 164 (Fla.1997)). | 2 | 2004–2018 |
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2018Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 2018Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Sonny Boy Oats, Jr. v. State of Florida
green
2 sentences2016As this Court stated in Oats, Hall did not just require that courts consider the statistical error margin in determining IQ, it also changed the manner in which intellectual disability evidence must be considered: “courts must consider all three prongs in determining an intellectual disability, as opposed to relying on just one factor as dispositive . . . because these factors are interdependent, if one of the prongs is relatively less strong, a finding of intellectual disability may still be warranted based on the strength of other prongs.” 181 So. 3d at 467-68 . 2016As this Court stated in Oats, Hall did not just require that courts consider the statistical error margin in determining IQ, it also changed the manner in which intellectual disability evidence must be considered: “courts must consider all three prongs in determining an intellectual disability, as opposed to relying on just one factor as dispositive ... because these factors are interdependent, if one of the prongs is relatively less strong, a finding of intellectual disability may still be warranted based on the strength of other prongs.” 181 So.3d at 467-68 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Hall v. Florida
green
2 sentences2016In Hall, the United States Supreme Court made clear that the assessment for intellectual disability is a “conjunctive and interrelated assessment.” 134 S. Ct. at 2001 . 2016In Hall, the United States Supreme Court made clear that the assessment for intellectual disability is a “conjunctive and interrelated assessment.” 134 S.Ct. at 2001 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.