recidivism factors in Ohio

2024State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 , 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶ 36 . {¶31} R.C. 2929.12(A) grants the sentencing judge discretion “‘to determine the most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing.’” Foster at ¶ 37, quoting R.C. 2929.12(A). “[I]n exercising that discretion, the court shall consider, along with any other ‘relevant’ factors, the seriousness factors set forth in divisions (B) and (C) and the recidivism factors in divisions (D) and (E) of R.C. 2929.12.” Id., quoting R.C. 2929.12(A).

2024State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1 , 2006-Ohio-856 , 845 N.E.2d 470, ¶ 36 . {¶31} R.C. 2929.12(A) grants the sentencing judge discretion “‘to determine the most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing.’” Foster at ¶ 37, quoting R.C. 2929.12(A). “[I]n exercising that discretion, the court shall consider, along with any other ‘relevant’ factors, the seriousness factors set forth in divisions (B) and (C) and the recidivism factors in divisions (D) and (E) of R.C. 2929.12.” Id., quoting R.C. 2929.12(A).

2010See also State v. Bowshier, Clark App. No. 08-CA-58, 2009-Ohio-3429 , 2009 WL 2031670 , ¶ 6, citing State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23 , 2008-Ohio-4912 , 896 N.E.2d 124 ; State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio St.3d 54 , 2006-Ohio-855 , 846 N.E.2d 1 . “ ‘ “[Contrary to law” means that a sentencing decision manifestly ignores an issue or factor which a statute requires a court to consider.’ ” Hawkins at ¶ 8, quoting State v. Lofton, Montgomery App. No. 19852, 2004-Ohio-169 , 2004 WL 67960 , ¶ 11. {¶ 39} When a trial court imposes a sentence that falls within the applicable statutory range, the court is requ

2010See also State v. Bowshier, Clark App. No. 08-CA-58, 2009-Ohio-3429 , 2009 WL 2031670 , ¶ 6, citing State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23 , 2008-Ohio-4912 , 896 N.E.2d 124 ; State v. Mathis, 109 Ohio St.3d 54 , 2006-Ohio-855 , 846 N.E.2d 1 . “ ‘ “[Contrary to law” means that a sentencing decision manifestly ignores an issue or factor which a statute requires a court to consider.’ ” Hawkins at ¶ 8, quoting State v. Lofton, Montgomery App. No. 19852, 2004-Ohio-169 , 2004 WL 67960 , ¶ 11. {¶ 39} When a trial court imposes a sentence that falls within the applicable statutory range, the court is requ

2008No. 2005-L-078, 2006-Ohio-2379 , at ¶ 14-15 , this court indicated that the Supreme Court of Ohio in Foster , supra, at ¶ 37 , stated the following with respect to R.C. 2929.12 : {¶ 38} "`"(* * *) R.C. 2929.12 , grants the sentencing judge discretion `to determine the most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing.' R.C. 2929.12 (A) directs that in exercising that discretion, the court shall consider, along with any other `relevant' factors, the seriousness factors set forth in divisions (B) and (C) and the recidivism factors in divisions (D) and (E) of R.C. 2929.1

2008No. 2005-L-078, 2006-Ohio-2379 , at ¶ 14-15 , this court indicated that the Supreme Court of Ohio in Foster , supra, at ¶ 37 , stated the following with respect to R.C. 2929.12 : {¶ 12} "`"(* * *) R.C. 2929.12 , grants the sentencing judge discretion `to determine the most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing.' R.C. 2929.12 (A) directs that in exercising that discretion, the court shall consider, along with any other `relevant' factors, the seriousness factors set forth in divisions (B) and (C) and the recidivism factors in divisions (D) and (E) of R.C. 2929.1

2025Indeed, appellant’s involvement in an incident that also involved the lack of supervision of a child in his care that occurred only a month before the conduct giving rise to the instant charge was relevant to the recidivism factors a sentencing court is required to consider pursuant to R.C. 2929.12. {¶ 5} In State v. Jones, 2020-Ohio-6729, ¶ 42 , the Ohio Supreme Court held that R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) does not permit an “appellate court to independently weigh the evidence in the record and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court concerning the sentence that best reflects compliance wit

2022“In exercising that discretion, the court shall consider, along with any other “‘relevant’” factors, the seriousness factors set forth in divisions (B) and (C) and the recidivism factors in divisions (D) and (E) of R.C. 2929.12.” Watson at ¶ 25, quoting Foster at ¶ 37, quoting R.C. 2929.12(A). {¶48} With respect to our review of a felony sentence, this court is not permitted to “independently weigh the evidence in the record and substitute its judgment for that of 26 Case No. 2022-A-0012 the trial court concerning the sentence that best reflects compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.” State

2012Hawkins, supra, at ¶8, citing State v. Lofton, Montgomery App. No. 19852, 2004-Ohio-169, ¶11 . {¶ 65} “When a trial court imposes a sentence that falls within the applicable statutory range, the court is required to consider the purposes and principles set forth in R.C. 2929.11, as well as the recidivism factors enumerated in R.C. 2929.12.

2011Hawkins, supra, at ¶8, citing State v. Lofton, Montgomery App. No. 19852, 2004-Ohio-169, ¶11 . {¶ 14} “When a trial court imposes a sentence that falls within the applicable statutory range, the court is required to consider the purposes and principles set forth in R.C. 2929.11, as well as the recidivism factors enumerated in R.C. 2929.12.

2023Cuyahoga No. 106103, 2018-Ohio-1963 . {¶25} In rejecting said arguments, appellate courts have explained the serious and recidivism factors set forth in R.C. §2929.12 require trial courts to consider an offender's juvenile adjudications in determining whether the defendant is likely to reoffend Coshocton County, Case No. 2023 CA 0017 8 in the future.

2019Cuyahoga No. 106103, 2018-Ohio-1963, ¶ 25 ; State v. Ward, 2d Dist.

2019Cuyahoga No. 98682, 2013-Ohio-1891, ¶ 17 , citing State v. Edmonson, 86 Ohio St.3d 324, 326 (1999).

2015Cuyahoga No. 98682, 2013-Ohio-1891 , 992 N.E.2d 453 , ¶ 17, citing State v. Edmonson, 86 Ohio St.3d 324, 326 , 715 N.E.2d 131 (1999) (compliance with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires separate and distinct findings in addition to any findings related to the purposes and principles of sentencing within R.C. 2929.11 or the recidivism factors within R.C. 2929.12). {¶28} According to the Ohio Supreme Court, “a word-for-word recitation of the language of the statute is not required, and as long as the reviewing court can discern that the trial court engaged in the correct analysis and can determine that

2026Although the court did not explicitly discuss the relevant recidivism factors, the court “has no obligation to state reasons to support its findings.” Id.

2015Cuyahoga No. 98682, 2013-Ohio-1891 , 992 N.E.2d 453 , ¶ 17, citing State v. Edmonson, 86 Ohio St.3d 324, 326 , 715 N.E.2d 131 (1999) (compliance with R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) requires separate and distinct findings in addition to any findings related to the purposes and principles of sentencing within R.C. 2929.11 or the recidivism factors within R.C. 2929.12). {¶28} According to the Ohio Supreme Court, “a word-for-word recitation of the language of the statute is not required, and as long as the reviewing court can discern that the trial court engaged in the correct analysis and can determine that

2024We conclude that, although the trial court may not have correlated specific findings to factors with great specificity, as in Kennedy, supra, the court in the case at bar made the appropriate R.C. 2929.20(J)(1)(a) and (b) findings and justified its findings with analysis of the relevant R.C. 2929.12 factors. {¶28} Moreover, in determining a motion for judicial ATHENS, 23CA9 23 release, “the trial court [is] authorized to look beyond the seriousness factors and the recidivism factors in determining whether to exercise its discretion in favor of judicial release.” State v. Ledford, 2017-Ohio-149

2017Id. {¶ 30} In addition, when addressing a motion for judicial release, " 'the trial court [is] authorized to look beyond the seriousness factors and the recidivism factors in determining whether to exercise its discretion in favor of judicial release.' " Ledford , 2017-Ohio-149 , 77 N.E.3d 479 at ¶ 17, quoting State v. Grilliot , 2d Dist.

2022However, it was for the trial court to decide whether such claim was outweighed by the recidivism factors and any other factor the court believed was relevant. “[A] court that imposes a sentence under this chapter upon an offender for a felony has discretion to determine the most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in section 2929.11 of the Revised Code.” R.C. 2929.12(A) (upon considering the factors in the statute and “any other factors that are relevant to achieving those purposes and principles of sentencing.”). {¶17} “[N]either R.C. 2929.11 nor

2022However, it was for the trial court to decide whether such claim was outweighed by the recidivism factors and any other factor the court believed was relevant. “[A] court that imposes a sentence under this chapter upon an offender for a felony has discretion to determine the most effective way to comply with the purposes and principles of sentencing set forth in section 2929.11 of the Revised Code.” R.C. 2929.12(A) (upon considering the factors in the statute and “any other factors that are relevant to achieving those purposes and principles of sentencing.”). {¶17} “[N]either R.C. 2929.11 nor

2021Franklin Nos. 17AP-251 and 17AP-252, 2019-Ohio-2928 , the Tenth Appellate District held that former R.C. 2950.09(F) did not entitle out-of-state offenders to a recidivism hearing.

2020(Nos. 2019-1247 and 2019-1309—Submitted July 8, 2020—Decided December 23, 2020.) APPEAL from and CERTIFIED by the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, Nos. 17AP-251 and 17AP-252, 2019-Ohio-2928 . _______________________ KENNEDY, J.

2019Portage No. 2017-P- 0004, 2017-Ohio-8689, ¶ 20 .

2019Portage No. 2017-P- 0004, 2017-Ohio-8689, ¶ 20 .

2019State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516 , 2016-Ohio-1002 , 59 N.E.3d 1231 , ¶ 22.

2019State v. Marcum, 146 Ohio St.3d 516 , 2016-Ohio-1002 , 59 N.E.3d 1231 , ¶ 22.

2019“The fact that the trial court chose to weigh various sentencing factors differently than how appellant would have weighed them does not mean the trial court erred in imposing appellant’s sentence.” Id. {¶16} Next, Meeks argues that the trial court abused its discretion by weighing the recidivism factors and by reaching the conclusion that Meeks did not respond favorably to community-control sanctions.3 See R.C. 2929.12(D)(1).

2018“The fact that the trial court chose to weigh various sentencing factors differently than how appellant would have weighed them does not mean the trial court erred in imposing appellant’s sentence.” Id. {¶14} After weighing the recidivism factors, the trial court ultimately concluded that Vanmeter failed to overcome the presumption in favor of prison after concluding that he is likely to commit future crimes.

2025Id. {¶36} As stated, R.C. 2929.11(A) requires the trial court to “be guided by” the three purposes of felony sentencing; it does not require the court to “consider” them.

2024Franklin Nos. 22AP-534 and 22AP-536, 2023-Ohio-3078 , in addition ATHENS, 23CA9 22 to the findings required by R.C. 2929.20(J)(1) and (2), the trial court’s entry stated, “[I]n considering the recidivism factors under R.C. 2929[.12](D) and (E), the Court finds [appellee] had not been adjudicated a delinquent child, had a single conviction for a misdemeanor of the fourth degree (M4), led a law-abiding life for a significant number of years prior to the offenses, and the offense occurred under circumstances not likely to recur.” Id. at ¶ 38.

2024We conclude that, although the trial court may not have correlated specific findings to factors with great specificity, as in Kennedy, supra, the court in the case at bar made the appropriate R.C. 2929.20(J)(1)(a) and (b) findings and justified its findings with analysis of the relevant R.C. 2929.12 factors. {¶28} Moreover, in determining a motion for judicial ATHENS, 23CA9 23 release, “the trial court [is] authorized to look beyond the seriousness factors and the recidivism factors in determining whether to exercise its discretion in favor of judicial release.” State v. Ledford, 2017-Ohio-149

2022(Tr. 28-29.) Accordingly, we find that any effect of the state’s purportedly improper remarks about the 2018 shaving incident was cured by the trial court’s independent review of the record, the information presented at sentencing, and the applicable sentencing factors. “[T]his court will presume that the judge considered only the relevant, material, and competent evidence in arriving at a judgment, unless the contrary affirmatively appears from the record.” State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 433 , 683 N.E.2d 1096 (1997), citing State v. Post, 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 384 , 513 N.E.2d 754 (1987), a

2022(Tr. 28-29.) Accordingly, we find that any effect of the state’s purportedly improper remarks about the 2018 shaving incident was cured by the trial court’s independent review of the record, the information presented at sentencing, and the applicable sentencing factors. “[T]his court will presume that the judge considered only the relevant, material, and competent evidence in arriving at a judgment, unless the contrary affirmatively appears from the record.” State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 433 , 683 N.E.2d 1096 (1997), citing State v. Post, 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 384 , 513 N.E.2d 754 (1987), a

2022(Tr. 28-29.) Accordingly, we find that any effect of the state’s purportedly improper remarks about the 2018 shaving incident was cured by the trial court’s independent review of the record, the information presented at sentencing, and the applicable sentencing factors. “[T]his court will presume that the judge considered only the relevant, material, and competent evidence in arriving at a judgment, unless the contrary affirmatively appears from the record.” State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 433 , 683 N.E.2d 1096 (1997), citing State v. Post, 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 384 , 513 N.E.2d 754 (1987), a

2022(Tr. 28-29.) Accordingly, we find that any effect of the state’s purportedly improper remarks about the 2018 shaving incident was cured by the trial court’s independent review of the record, the information presented at sentencing, and the applicable sentencing factors. “[T]his court will presume that the judge considered only the relevant, material, and competent evidence in arriving at a judgment, unless the contrary affirmatively appears from the record.” State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 433 , 683 N.E.2d 1096 (1997), citing State v. Post, 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 384 , 513 N.E.2d 754 (1987), a

2022(Tr. 28-29.) Accordingly, we find that any effect of the state’s purportedly improper remarks about the 2018 shaving incident was cured by the trial court’s independent review of the record, the information presented at sentencing, and the applicable sentencing factors. “[T]his court will presume that the judge considered only the relevant, material, and competent evidence in arriving at a judgment, unless the contrary affirmatively appears from the record.” State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 433 , 683 N.E.2d 1096 (1997), citing State v. Post, 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 384 , 513 N.E.2d 754 (1987), a

2022(Tr. 28-29.) Accordingly, we find that any effect of the state’s purportedly improper remarks about the 2018 shaving incident was cured by the trial court’s independent review of the record, the information presented at sentencing, and the applicable sentencing factors. “[T]his court will presume that the judge considered only the relevant, material, and competent evidence in arriving at a judgment, unless the contrary affirmatively appears from the record.” State v. Dennis, 79 Ohio St.3d 421, 433 , 683 N.E.2d 1096 (1997), citing State v. Post, 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 384 , 513 N.E.2d 754 (1987), a

2022As we have previously recounted, the Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. Gwynne, 158 Ohio St.3d 279 , 2019-Ohio-4761 , 141 N.E.3d 169 , “explained that ‘R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12 both clearly apply only to individual sentences[,]’ and that ‘[c]onsecutive service may not be ordered under R.C. 2929.14(C)(4) until the sentencing judge imposes * * * a sentence for each count by considering the purposes and principles of felony sentencing under R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12.’ ” State v. Derrick, 2d Dist.

2021State v. Mitchell, 8th District Cuyahoga No. 105053, 2017-Ohio-6888, ¶ 13 .

2020Wayne No. 18AP0001, 2018-Ohio-4463, ¶ 12 , quoting State v. Thrasher, 9th Dist.