12 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1973–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Arizona v. Gantgreen2 sentences2013While Foster’s motion for new trial was pending, however, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its decision in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U. S. 332 ( 129 SCt 1710 , 173 LE2d 485) (2009). 2013While Foster’s motion for new trial was pending, however, the Supreme Court of the United States issued its decision in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U. S. 332 (129 SC 1710, 173 LE2d 485) (2009). | 2 | 2 |
Britt v. Smithgreen2 sentences2013See generally Britt v. Smith, 274 Ga. 611, 614 ( 556 SE2d 435 ) (2001) (“decisions [of the Supreme Court of Georgia] dealing with the validity of a guilty plea are generally couched in terms of the defendant’s waiver of the three Boykin rights”) (citation omitted). 3. 2013See generally Britt v. Smith, 274 Ga. 611, 614 ( 556 SE2d 435 ) (2001) (“decisions [of the Supreme Court of Georgia] dealing with the validity of a guilty plea are generally couched in terms of the defendant’s waiver of the three Boykin rights”) (citation omitted). 3. | 2 | 2 |
Bandy v. Hendersongreen2 sentences2016Indeed, “[t]he trial court’s discretion in granting or refusing a continuance will not be interfered with by the appellate courts unless it clearly appears that the judge abused his discretion.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Bandy v. Henderson, 284 Ga. 692, 694 (3) ( 670 SE2d 792 ) (2008). 2016Indeed, “[t]he trial court’s discretion in granting or refusing a continuance will not be interfered with by the appellate courts unless it clearly appears that the judge abused his discretion.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Bandy v. Henderson, 284 Ga. 692, 694 (3) ( 670 SE2d 792 ) (2008). | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Harris v. State, 278 Ga. 805, 806 (2) ( 606 SE2d 248 ) (2004). 2014Harris v. State, 278 Ga. 805, 806 (2) ( 606 SE2d 248 ) (2004). | 1 | 1 |
Rice v. Stategreen2 sentences2010See Rice v. State, 281 Ga. 149 (1) ( 635 SE2d 707 ) (2006). (e) Foster also contends that the jury commission engaged in improper forced balancing to achieve representation of racial groups in the grand and traverse jury pools. 2010See Rice v. State, 281 Ga. 149 (1) ( 635 SE2d 707 ) (2006). (e) Foster also contends that the jury commission engaged in improper forced balancing to achieve representation of racial groups in the grand and traverse jury pools. | 1 | 1 |
Terrell v. Stategreen2 sentences2010Terrell v. State, 276 Ga. 34, 41 (5) ( 572 SE2d 595 ) (2002). 2010Terrell v. State, 276 Ga. 34, 41 (5) ( 572 SE2d 595 ) (2002). | 1 | 1 |
Whitesides v. Stategreen2 sentences2006Whitesides v. State, 266 Ga. App. 181, 187 (3) ( 596 SE2d 706 ) (2004). 2006Whitesides v. State, 266 Ga. App. 181, 187 (3) ( 596 SE2d 706 ) (2004). | 1 | 1 |
Holden v. Stategreen2 sentences1993These facts, however, were not in dispute; Lampkin stipulated that the vehicle needed to be towed and stored. “(T)he admission or exclusion of evidence which is objected to on the ground of relevancy lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, whose decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Holden v. State, 202 Ga. App. 558, 562 (3) ( 414 SE2d 910 ) (1992). 1993These facts, however, were not in dispute; Lampkin stipulated that the vehicle needed to be towed and stored. “(T)he admission or exclusion of evidence which is objected to on the ground of relevancy lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, whose decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Holden v. State, 202 Ga. App. 558, 562 (3) ( 414 SE2d 910 ) (1992). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Placegreen1 sentence1993If, as the trial court concluded, the officers had a reasonable basis to conduct a Terry-type detention of Foster, the fact that Foster refused to consent to a search of his bag is no basis to conclude that the bag could not be otherwise briefly detained without his consent for an investigation within the scope of the Terry stop. 1 “ ‘(W)hen an officer’s observations lead him reasonably to believe that a traveler is carrying luggage that contains narcotics, the principles of Terry (v. Ohio, [supra]) and its progeny would permit the officer to detain the luggage briefly to investigate the circu | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Downs v. State
green
2 sentences2014Downs v. State, 270 Ga. 310 ( 509 SE2d 40 ) (1998). 2014Downs v. State, 270 Ga. 310 ( 509 SE2d 40 ) (1998). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Batson v. Kentucky
green
1 sentence2000The trial court overruled Foster’s objection under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79 (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986) after concluding that the State set forth racially neutral reasons for striking three prospective African-American jurors. 1 Foster contends that the striking of prospective juror Shropshire on the basis of his extensive medical knowledge was improper because the State failed to strike a similarly-situated white juror who was a medical nurse. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Zant v. Foster
green
2 sentences2000Zant v. Foster, 261 Ga. 450 ( 406 SE2d 74 ) (1991). 2000Zant v. Foster, 261 Ga. 450 ( 406 SE2d 74 ) (1991). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Baker v. State
green
1 sentence2000Because we found no error in the jury being informed that their consideration of the mental retardation issue arose in the context of criminal proceedings brought against Foster, see Division 3, supra, the trial court did not err by admitting testimony by State’s witness, Dr. Perri, that Foster’s depression during the admission of an IQ test may have stemmed in part from his incarceration at that time. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Cromartie v. State
green
2 sentences2000Even applying the standard for change of venue in death penalty cases, see, e.g., Cromartie v. State, 270 Ga. 780 (2) ( 514 SE2d 205 ) (1999), a review of the record establishes that Foster made no substantive showing of an inherently prejudicial trial setting or actual bias on the part of individual jurors. 2000Even applying the standard for change of venue in death penalty cases, see, e.g., Cromartie v. State, 270 Ga. 780 (2) ( 514 SE2d 205 ) (1999), a review of the record establishes that Foster made no substantive showing of an inherently prejudicial trial setting or actual bias on the part of individual jurors. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Terry v. Ohio
green
1 sentence1993If, as the trial court concluded, the officers had a reasonable basis to conduct a Terry-type detention of Foster, the fact that Foster refused to consent to a search of his bag is no basis to conclude that the bag could not be otherwise briefly detained without his consent for an investigation within the scope of the Terry stop. 1 “ ‘(W)hen an officer’s observations lead him reasonably to believe that a traveler is carrying luggage that contains narcotics, the principles of Terry (v. Ohio, [supra]) and its progeny would permit the officer to detain the luggage briefly to investigate the circu | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Register v. Stone's Independent Oil Distributors, Inc.
green
2 sentences1973The trial court granted Foster's motion and dismissed his joinder as a party defendant under the authority of Register v. Stone's Independent Oil Distributors, 227 Ga. 123 ( 179 SE2d 68 ). 1973The trial court granted Foster's motion and dismissed his joinder as a party defendant under the authority of Register v. Stone's Independent Oil Distributors, 227 Ga. 123 ( 179 SE2d 68 ). | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.