host factors in Georgia

2019(Citations and punctuation omitted.) *391 Collum v. State , 281 Ga. 719 , 721-722 (2), 642 S.E.2d 640 (2007).

2019(Citations and punctuation omitted.) *391 Collum v. State , 281 Ga. 719 , 721-722 (2), 642 S.E.2d 640 (2007).

2016“A consent to search will normally be held voluntary if the totality of the circumstances fails to show that the officers used fear, intimidation, threat of physical punishment, or lengthy detention to obtain the consent.” Cuaresma v. State, 292 Ga. App. 43, 47 (2) ( 663 SE2d 396 ) (2008).

2016“A consent to search will normally be held voluntary if the totality of the circumstances fails to show that the officers used fear, intimidation, threat of physical punishment, or lengthy detention to obtain the consent.” Cuaresma v. State, 292 Ga. App. 43, 47 (2) ( 663 SE2d 396 ) (2008).

2011Our Supreme Court has explained that the test for harmless error depends on several factors: Whether a violation of the Confrontation Clause is harmless depends on a host of factors, including “the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case. [Cits.]” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U. S. 673, 684 (106 SC 1431,

2007Whether a violation of the Confrontation Clause is harmless depends on a host of factors, including the importance of the witness’ testimony in the prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case. [Cits.] Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U. S. 673, 684 (106 SC 1431, 89 LE2d 674) (1986).

2022(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Carcamo v. State, 348 Ga. App. 383, 390 (1) (b) ( 823 SE2d 68 ) (2019).

2022(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Carcamo v. State, 348 Ga. App. 383, 390 (1) (b) ( 823 SE2d 68 ) (2019).

2022Retail Ventures, LLC, 330 Ga. App. 282, 288 (2) n.7 ( 767 SE2d 40 (2014). 21 Nicholson, 307 Ga. at 475 (5); accord Branch, 361 Ga. App. at 92 (5); Koules, 330 Ga. App. at 288 (2) n.7; see also United States v. Lanzon, 639 F3d 1293, 1301 (II) (C) (11th Cir. 2011) (“The proponent need only present enough evidence to make out a prima facie case that the proffered evidence is what it purports to be.” (punctuation omitted)). 22 Johnson, 348 Ga. App. at 677 (1) (punctuation omitted); accord Pierce v. State, 302 Ga. 389, 396 (2) (a) ( 807 SE2d 425 ) (2017); Paul S. Milich, GA.

2022Retail Ventures, LLC, 330 Ga. App. 282, 288 (2) n.7 ( 767 SE2d 40 (2014). 21 Nicholson, 307 Ga. at 475 (5); accord Branch, 361 Ga. App. at 92 (5); Koules, 330 Ga. App. at 288 (2) n.7; see also United States v. Lanzon, 639 F3d 1293, 1301 (II) (C) (11th Cir. 2011) (“The proponent need only present enough evidence to make out a prima facie case that the proffered evidence is what it purports to be.” (punctuation omitted)). 22 Johnson, 348 Ga. App. at 677 (1) (punctuation omitted); accord Pierce v. State, 302 Ga. 389, 396 (2) (a) ( 807 SE2d 425 ) (2017); Paul S. Milich, GA.

2022Retail Ventures, LLC, 330 Ga. App. 282, 288 (2) n.7 ( 767 SE2d 40 (2014). 21 Nicholson, 307 Ga. at 475 (5); accord Branch, 361 Ga. App. at 92 (5); Koules, 330 Ga. App. at 288 (2) n.7; see also United States v. Lanzon, 639 F3d 1293, 1301 (II) (C) (11th Cir. 2011) (“The proponent need only present enough evidence to make out a prima facie case that the proffered evidence is what it purports to be.” (punctuation omitted)). 22 Johnson, 348 Ga. App. at 677 (1) (punctuation omitted); accord Pierce v. State, 302 Ga. 389, 396 (2) (a) ( 807 SE2d 425 ) (2017); Paul S. Milich, GA.

2022Retail Ventures, LLC, 330 Ga. App. 282, 288 (2) n.7 ( 767 SE2d 40 (2014). 21 Nicholson, 307 Ga. at 475 (5); accord Branch, 361 Ga. App. at 92 (5); Koules, 330 Ga. App. at 288 (2) n.7; see also United States v. Lanzon, 639 F3d 1293, 1301 (II) (C) (11th Cir. 2011) (“The proponent need only present enough evidence to make out a prima facie case that the proffered evidence is what it purports to be.” (punctuation omitted)). 22 Johnson, 348 Ga. App. at 677 (1) (punctuation omitted); accord Pierce v. State, 302 Ga. 389, 396 (2) (a) ( 807 SE2d 425 ) (2017); Paul S. Milich, GA.

2022Carlson & Michael Scott Carlson, CARLSON ON EVIDENCE, p. 654 (6th ed. 2018) (noting that courts consider a host of factors in determining whether there is evidence sufficient to authenticate text messages under OCGA § 24-9-901 (b), such as the device in question being found on the defendant and the content of the relevant text messages). 11 law governing the authentication of electronic documents or communications.”20 As a result, after the party seeking to authenticate evidence “presents a prima facie case that the evidence is what it purports to be, the evidence is properly admitted, leaving

2022Carlson & Michael Scott Carlson, CARLSON ON EVIDENCE, p. 654 (6th ed. 2018) (noting that courts consider a host of factors in determining whether there is evidence sufficient to authenticate text messages under OCGA § 24-9-901 (b), such as the device in question being found on the defendant and the content of the relevant text messages). 11 law governing the authentication of electronic documents or communications.”20 As a result, after the party seeking to authenticate evidence “presents a prima facie case that the evidence is what it purports to be, the evidence is properly admitted, leaving

2022Retail Ventures, LLC, 330 Ga. App. 282, 288 (2) n.7 ( 767 SE2d 40 (2014). 21 Nicholson, 307 Ga. at 475 (5); accord Branch, 361 Ga. App. at 92 (5); Koules, 330 Ga. App. at 288 (2) n.7; see also United States v. Lanzon, 639 F3d 1293, 1301 (II) (C) (11th Cir. 2011) (“The proponent need only present enough evidence to make out a prima facie case that the proffered evidence is what it purports to be.” (punctuation omitted)). 22 Johnson, 348 Ga. App. at 677 (1) (punctuation omitted); accord Pierce v. State, 302 Ga. 389, 396 (2) (a) ( 807 SE2d 425 ) (2017); Paul S. Milich, GA.

2022Retail Ventures, LLC, 330 Ga. App. 282, 288 (2) n.7 ( 767 SE2d 40 (2014). 21 Nicholson, 307 Ga. at 475 (5); accord Branch, 361 Ga. App. at 92 (5); Koules, 330 Ga. App. at 288 (2) n.7; see also United States v. Lanzon, 639 F3d 1293, 1301 (II) (C) (11th Cir. 2011) (“The proponent need only present enough evidence to make out a prima facie case that the proffered evidence is what it purports to be.” (punctuation omitted)). 22 Johnson, 348 Ga. App. at 677 (1) (punctuation omitted); accord Pierce v. State, 302 Ga. 389, 396 (2) (a) ( 807 SE2d 425 ) (2017); Paul S. Milich, GA.

2010“But showing that an employee was merely working in the immediate area of a foreign substance is not enough; the employee must have been in a position to have easily seen the substance and removed it.” (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Hardee’s Food Systems, 232 Ga. App. at 866-867 (2) (a).