ingress and egress rule in Georgia

12 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2021 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (16)

Case	Followed	Cited
FRETT v. STATE FARM EMPLOYEE WORKERS' COMPENSATIONgreen ga · 2020 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021 2 sentences 2021See Frett II, 309 Ga. 44 at 62 (3) (c), n.16. 3 As our Supreme Court stated, “[t]o be sure, the ingress and egress rule appears to be a sound principle, and the Court of Appeals acted quite logically in extending it to lunch breaks.” Frett II, 309 Ga. at 60 (3) (b). 5 both arose out of and was in the course of her employment and was thus compensable under the Act. 2021See Frett II, 309 Ga. 44 at 62 (3) (c), n.16. 3 As our Supreme Court stated, “[t]o be sure, the ingress and egress rule appears to be a sound principle, and the Court of Appeals acted quite logically in extending it to lunch breaks.” Frett II, 309 Ga. at 60 (3) (b). 5 both arose out of and was in the course of her employment and was thus compensable under the Act.	2	2
MacY's South, Inc. v. Clarkgreen gactapp · 1994 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012 2 sentences 2012See id. at 664 (2). 2012See id. at 664 (2).	2	2
Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Conyers Toyota, Inc.green gactapp · 1989 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1992–2007 2 sentences 2007Co. v. Conyers Toyota, 190 Ga. App. 792, 793 ( 380 SE2d 296 ) (1989) (also describing overlap between the laws of negligence and workers’ compensation on this point). 4 But this last statement should not be misread to alter the true meaning of the ingress and egress rule quoted above. 2007Co. v. Conyers Toyota, 190 Ga. App. 792, 793 ( 380 SE2d 296 ) (1989) (also describing overlap between the laws of negligence and workers’ compensation on this point). 4 But this last statement should not be misread to alter the true meaning of the ingress and egress rule quoted above.	2	2
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Smithgreen gactapp · 1954 · cited in 4 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2007–2021 2 sentences 2018Thus, we extended the ingress and egress rule to cover situations where "the claimant has departed from his employment to go elsewhere to eat his lunch on time given him for that purpose, but ... is returning to his employment and is injured at a place and time where it is necessary for him to be in order to get back to his work station at the time set for him to recommence his duties." (Emphasis supplied.) Id. 2018Thus, we extended the ingress and egress rule to cover situations where “the claimant has departed from his employment to go elsewhere to eat his lunch on time given him for that purpose, but . . . is returning to his employment and is injured at a place and time where it is necessary for him to be in order to get back to his work 9 station at the time set for him to recommence his duties.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id.	1	4
Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Farrgreen ga · 1935 · cited in 3 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2020–2021 2 sentences 2021Recognizing our duty to follow existing Supreme Court precedent on the lunch break exception to compensability first set out in Ocean Acc. and Guarantee Corp. v. Farr, 180 Ga. 266 ( 178 SE 728 ) (1935), we “conclude[d] that the extension of the ingress and egress rule to cover cases in which the employee is injured while leaving and returning to work on a regularly scheduled break was an improper dilution of the 4 Supreme Court’s decision in Farr.” 348 Ga. App. at 36 . 2021Recognizing our duty to follow existing Supreme Court precedent on the lunch break exception to compensability first set out in Ocean Acc. and Guarantee Corp. v. Farr, 180 Ga. 266 ( 178 SE 728 ) (1935), we “conclude[d] that the extension of the ingress and egress rule to cover cases in which the employee is injured while leaving and returning to work on a regularly scheduled break was an improper dilution of the 4 Supreme Court’s decision in Farr.” 348 Ga. App. at 36 .	1	3
Hill v. Omni Hotel at CNN Centergreen gactapp · 2004 · cited in 3 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2019–2020 2 sentences 2019Under the ingress and egress rule, this Court has concluded that the Workers' Compensation Act applies "where an employee is injured while still on the employer's premises in the act of going to or coming from his or her workplace." (Citation omitted.) Hill, 268 Ga. App. at 147 , 601 S.E.2d 472 . 2019Under the ingress and egress rule, this Court has concluded that the Workers' Compensation Act applies "where an employee is injured while still on the employer's premises in the act of going to or coming from his or her workplace." (Citation omitted.) Hill, 268 Ga. App. at 147 , 601 S.E.2d 472 .	1	3
Miles v. Brown Transport Corporationgreen gactapp · 1982 · cited in 2 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019 2 sentences 2019Under the scheduled break exception, this Court has carved out an exception to the Workers' Compensation Act "for injuries occurring during a regularly scheduled lunch break or rest break and at a time claimant is free to do as she chooses." Miles v. Brown Transport Corp. , 163 Ga. App. 563 , 564, 294 S.E.2d 734 (1982). 2019Under the scheduled break exception, this Court has carved out an exception to the Workers' Compensation Act "for injuries occurring during a regularly scheduled lunch break or rest break and at a time claimant is free to do as she chooses." Miles v. Brown Transport Corp. , 163 Ga. App. 563 , 564, 294 S.E.2d 734 (1982).	1	2
Parks v. Parksgreen tenn · 1928 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2021–2021 1 sentence 2021See Frett II, 309 Ga. 44 at 62 (3) (c), n.16. 3 As our Supreme Court stated, “[t]o be sure, the ingress and egress rule appears to be a sound principle, and the Court of Appeals acted quite logically in extending it to lunch breaks.” Frett II, 309 Ga. at 60 (3) (b). 5 Smith, 91 Ga. App. at 311.	1	1
Thornton v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.green ga · 1945 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020 1 sentence 2020See Frett, 348 Ga. App at 35. acting “in the course of” her employment, see Farr, 180 Ga. at 270 - 271, but at the same time, that employee was engaged wholly in her personal affairs, and so any injury suffered by the employee would not “arise out of” employment, see id., unless, of course, that employee was on a business trip, in which case the injury probably would arise out of employment, see Thornton, 198 Ga. at 795 .	1	1
Edwards v. Liberty Mutual Insurancegreen gactapp · 1973 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020 1 sentence 2020See Edwards, 130 Ga. App. at 24 (2) (the scheduled break exception “will not be extended to unscheduled breaks under the facts here when the employee finds it necessary to go to the rest room, even though he is permitted to do so without obtaining permission from his supervisor, for the reason that the time is not released to him as free time during which he may do as he will and it cannot be construed as an altogether personal pursuit, as is the case during scheduled breaks”).	1	1
Holder v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co.green tenn · 1987 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018 1 sentence 2018Compare Holder v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 723 SW2d 104, 107 (Tenn. 1987) (“Where the employee is injured on the employer’s premises during a break period provided by the employer, such an injury is generally compensable. . . .”) (citation and punctuation omitted). 3 While we recognize that a line could be drawn where employees returning to work after a lunch break could be compensated, see Smith, supra, while those leaving for their lunch break are not compensated, see Honea, supra, such a result would continue the practice of arbitrary and anomalous results within this body of law. 12 part	1	1
Hearthstone Manor v. Stuartgreen orctapp · 2004 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 2018–2018 1 sentence 2018After carefully considering the anomalies created by layering the ingress and egress rule on top of the scheduled break exception, as well as this Court’s duty to apply existing Georgia Supreme Court precedent, we conclude that the extension of the ingress and egress rule to cover cases in which the employee is injured while leaving and returning to work on a regularly scheduled break was an improper dilution of the Supreme Court’s decision in Farr.2 We therefore disapprove our previous holdings to the contrary in Smith, Chandler, and Rockwell.3 In our view, any decision to apply the ingress a	1	1
Peoples v. Emory Universitygreen gactapp · 1992 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1994–1994 2 sentences 1994“For purposes of the ingress and egress rule, an employer’s premises is real property owned, maintained, or controlled by the employer.” Peoples v. Emory Univ., 206 Ga. App. 213, 214 ( 424 SE2d 874 ) (1992). 1994“For purposes of the ingress and egress rule, an employer’s premises is real property owned, maintained, or controlled by the employer.” Peoples v. Emory Univ., 206 Ga. App. 213, 214 ( 424 SE2d 874 ) (1992).	1	1
Labelle v. Listergreen gactapp · 1989 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992 1 sentence 1992Tate v. Bruno’s /Food Max, 200 Ga. App. 395, 396 (1) ( 408 SE2d 456 ); Crawford v. Meyer, 195 Ga. App. 867 ( 395 SE2d 327 ); Labelle v. Lister, 192 Ga. App. 464, 465 (1) ( 385 SE2d 118 ); Southern Bell Tel. &c.	1	1
West Point Pepperell, Inc. v. McEntiregreen gactapp · 1979 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992 1 sentence 1992See West Point Pepperell v. McEntire, 150 Ga. App. 728, 729 (1), supra, and DeHowitt v. Hartford Fire Ins.	1	1
Tate v. Bruno's, Inc.green gactapp · 1991 · cited in 1 Georgia opinions naming this issue, 1992–1992 2 sentences 1992Tate v. Bruno’s /Food Max, 200 Ga. App. 395, 396 (1) ( 408 SE2d 456 ); Crawford v. Meyer, 195 Ga. App. 867 ( 395 SE2d 327 ); Labelle v. Lister, 192 Ga. App. 464, 465 (1) ( 385 SE2d 118 ); Southern Bell Tel. &c. 1992Tate v. Bruno’s /Food Max, 200 Ga. App. 395, 396 (1) ( 408 SE2d 456 ); Crawford v. Meyer, 195 Ga. App. 867 ( 395 SE2d 327 ); Labelle v. Lister, 192 Ga. App. 464, 465 (1) ( 385 SE2d 118 ); Southern Bell Tel. &c.	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (5)

Case	Cited	Years
Rockwell v. Lockheed Martin Corp. green gactapp · 2001 2 sentences 2019Relying upon this Court's decision in Rockwell v. Lockheed Martin Corp. , 248 Ga. App. 73 , 545 S.E.2d 121 (2001), the Administrative Law Judge with the trial division of the State Board of Workers' Compensation ("ALJ") concluded, inter alia, that Daniel was entitled to income benefits under the ingress and egress rule on a scheduled lunch break. 2019Relying upon this Court's decision in Rockwell v. Lockheed Martin Corp. , 248 Ga. App. 73 , 545 S.E.2d 121 (2001), the Administrative Law Judge with the trial division of the State Board of Workers' Compensation ("ALJ") concluded, inter alia, that Daniel was entitled to income benefits under the ingress and egress rule on a scheduled lunch break.	6	2018–2021
Frett v. State Farm Emp. Workers' Comp. green gactapp · 2018 2 sentences 2020Attempting to resolve this conflict, the Court of Appeals determined that its prior decisions applying the ingress and egress rule to scheduled lunch breaks were “an improper dilution” of Farr, and so, it “disapprove[d]” those decisions, noting that “any decision to apply the ingress and egress rule to the scheduled break exception should be made by our Supreme Court, particularly because the Supreme Court has never expressed its view on the ingress and egress rule generally.” Id. at 36 . 2019Frett v. State Farm Employee Workers' Compensation , 348 Ga. App. 30 , 821 S.E.2d 132 (2018).	3	2019–2020
Chandler v. General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. green gactapp · 1960 2 sentences 2021Rockwell, 248 Ga. App. at 74 ; Chandler, 101 Ga. App. at 599-600 ; 2 The Supreme Court also specifically overruled cases from this Court that applied the scheduled break rule to deny compensability under the Act. 2021Rockwell, 248 Ga. App. at 74 ; Chandler, 101 Ga. App. at 599-600 ; Smith, 91 Ga. App. at 311 .	2	2021–2021
Freeman v. Southwire Co. green gactapp · 2004 2 sentences 2018"Because the relevant facts are not in dispute, and because [Frett] contends that the Board applied an erroneous theory of law to the facts, we apply a de novo standard of review." Freeman v. Southwire Co. , 269 Ga. App. 692 , 693, 605 S.E.2d 95 (2004). 2018"Because the relevant facts are not in dispute, and because [Frett] contends that the Board applied an erroneous theory of law to the facts, we apply a de novo standard of review." Freeman v. Southwire Co. , 269 Ga. App. 692 , 693, 605 S.E.2d 95 (2004).	1	2018–2018
Crawford v. Meyer green gactapp · 1990 2 sentences 1992Tate v. Bruno’s /Food Max, 200 Ga. App. 395, 396 (1) ( 408 SE2d 456 ); Crawford v. Meyer, 195 Ga. App. 867 ( 395 SE2d 327 ); Labelle v. Lister, 192 Ga. App. 464, 465 (1) ( 385 SE2d 118 ); Southern Bell Tel. &c. 1992Tate v. Bruno’s /Food Max, 200 Ga. App. 395, 396 (1) ( 408 SE2d 456 ); Crawford v. Meyer, 195 Ga. App. 867 ( 395 SE2d 327 ); Labelle v. Lister, 192 Ga. App. 464, 465 (1) ( 385 SE2d 118 ); Southern Bell Tel. &c.	1	1992–1992

Statutes the citing opinions construe

GA § 34-9-1 (10) GA § 34-9-108 (4) GA § 34-9-23 (4)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

GA 12 (1992–2021) TX 3 (1957–1963) TN 2 (1984–1999)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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