12 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1969–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Mooregreen2 sentences2015As our supreme court said in People v. Moore, 171 Ill. 2d 74, 105-06 (1996), "[t]he act of sustaining an objection and properly admonishing the jury is usually viewed as sufficient to cure any prejudice." We do not see the single remark in this argument as so severely prejudicial as to require a retrial, especially because the trial court sustained a prompt objection to the remark. ¶ 60 Questioning Barnes ¶ 61 Swift argues that the judge became an advocate for the State when the judge questioned Barnes as to whether he told police and the State's Attorney that the statement he signed at the po 2015As our supreme court said in People v. Moore, 171 Ill. 2d 74, 105-06 (1996), "[t]he act of sustaining an objection and properly admonishing the jury is usually viewed as sufficient to cure any prejudice." We do not see the single remark in this argument as so severely prejudicial as to require a retrial, especially because the trial court sustained a prompt objection to the remark. ¶ 60 Questioning Barnes ¶ 61 Swift argues that the judge became an advocate for the State when the judge questioned Barnes as to whether he told police and the State's Attorney that the statement he signed at the po | 2 | 2 |
People v. Harrisgreen2 sentences1996People v. Harris, 132 Ill. 2d 366, 386 (1989). 1996People v. Harris, 132 Ill.2d 366, 386 , 138 Ill.Dec. 620 , 547 N.E.2d 1241 (1989). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Baptist
green
2 sentences1993The trial judge sustained defense counsel’s objection to the prosecutor’s comment, and we believe that the ruling would have been sufficient to overcome whatever prejudicial effect the comment might otherwise have engendered. “[Although the prejudicial effect of an improper argument cannot always be erased from the minds of the jurors by an admonishment from the court [citation], the act of promptly sustaining the objection and instructing the jury to disregard such argument has usually been viewed as sufficient to cure any prejudice. [Citations.]” (People v. Baptist (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 19, 30 1991(People v. Baptist (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 19, 30 , 389 N.E.2d 1200 .) In this case, the trial judge sustained defense counsel’s objection and sufficiently admonished the jury. | 2 | 1991–1993 |
Karr v. Noel
green
1 sentence1996The trial court relied upon Karr v. Noel, 212 Ill. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
People v. Hood
green
2 sentences1996App. 3d 202 , 593 N.E.2d 805 , we found an unresponsive answer by a former prosecutor was prejudicial, even though the trial judge sustained the defense objection, instructed the jury to disregard the answer, and ordered the answer stricken from the record. 1996We said, "The State’s responsibility is not alleviated because Kogut’s answer was unresponsive.” Hood, 229 Ill. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
People v. Jones
green
2 sentences1995People v. Jones (1993), 156 Ill.2d 225, 249-50 , 189 Ill.Dec. 357 , 620 N.E.2d 325 ; People v. Morgan (1986), 112 Ill.2d 111, 135 , 97 Ill.Dec. 430 , 492 N.E.2d 1303 . 1995People v. Jones (1993), 156 Ill. 2d 225, 249-50 ; People v. Morgan (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 111, 135 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
People v. Landwer
green
2 sentences1995The appellate court majority believed that the judge erroneously sustained the objection because of the use of the word "killing." ( 254 Ill.App.3d at 131 , 193 Ill.Dec. 273 , 626 N.E.2d 306 .) In contrast, the dissent believed that the trial judge correctly sustained the objection and corrected the prosecutor by informing the jury that the defendant must have originated the idea of "killing someone." ( 254 Ill.App.3d at 138 , 193 Ill.Dec. 273 , 626 N.E.2d 306 (Doyle, J., dissenting).) Ambiguity aside, the fact remains that the trial judge sustained defense counsel's objection and thereby redu 1995The appellate court majority believed that the judge erroneously sustained the objection because of the use of the word "killing." ( 254 Ill.App.3d at 131 , 193 Ill.Dec. 273 , 626 N.E.2d 306 .) In contrast, the dissent believed that the trial judge correctly sustained the objection and corrected the prosecutor by informing the jury that the defendant must have originated the idea of "killing someone." ( 254 Ill.App.3d at 138 , 193 Ill.Dec. 273 , 626 N.E.2d 306 (Doyle, J., dissenting).) Ambiguity aside, the fact remains that the trial judge sustained defense counsel's objection and thereby redu | 1 | 1995–1995 |
People v. Morgan
green
2 sentences1995People v. Jones (1993), 156 Ill.2d 225, 249-50 , 189 Ill.Dec. 357 , 620 N.E.2d 325 ; People v. Morgan (1986), 112 Ill.2d 111, 135 , 97 Ill.Dec. 430 , 492 N.E.2d 1303 . 1995People v. Jones (1993), 156 Ill. 2d 225, 249-50 ; People v. Morgan (1986), 112 Ill. 2d 111, 135 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
People v. Hrobowski
green
1 sentence1992Sustaining a defense objection to improper remarks during argument tends to cure any possible resulting prejudice. {Peopie v. Hrobowski (1991), 216 Ill. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
People v. Weinger
green
1 sentence1986The defendant cites People v. Weinstein (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 467 , 220 N.E.2d 432 , and People v. Weinger (1981), 101 Ill. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
The People v. Weinstein
green
2 sentences1986The defendant cites People v. Weinstein (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 467 , 220 N.E.2d 432 , and People v. Weinger (1981), 101 Ill. 1986The defendant cites People v. Weinstein (1966), 35 Ill. 2d 467 , 220 N.E.2d 432 , and People v. Weinger (1981), 101 Ill. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
The People v. Burgard
green
2 sentences1974(People v. Burgard, 377 Ill. 322 , 36 N.E.2d 558 .) In the case before us, defense counsel’s objection was overruled, and defendant Neeley’s proffered instruction, to the effect that rape is not a probationable offense, was refused. 1974(People v. Burgard, 377 Ill. 322 , 36 N.E.2d 558 .) In the case before us, defense counsel’s objection was overruled, and defendant Neeley’s proffered instruction, to the effect that rape is not a probationable offense, was refused. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
The PEOPLE v. Pelegri
green
1 sentence1969In People v. Pelegri, 39 Ill.2d 568, 574-75 , the defendant complained of numerous instances of improper closing argument by the State, but the trial judge sustained defense objections to portions of the argument which were in fact improper and also remarked from the bench that he was aware of the nature of the argument. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
The People v. Wallenberg
green
1 sentence1969Likewise, in People v. Wallenberg, 24 Ill.2d 350, 353 , it appeared from the record that the court was not influenced by the improper evidence because he ordered the improper question to be stricken and stated that there was nothing therein of probative value with respect to the defendant. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.