stare decisis is not an inflexible doctrine in Illinois

1990The doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule requiring this court to blindly follow precedents and adhere to prior decisions. ( Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302 (1959), 18 Ill.2d 11, 26 .) Anderson and Mega were wrongly decided.

1977The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly held, “the doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule requiring this court to blindly follow precedents and adhere to prior decisions, and that when it appears that public policy and social needs require a departure from prior decisions, it is our duty as a court of last resort to overrule those decisions and establish a rule consonant with our present day concepts of right and justice.” (Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302 (1959), 18 Ill. 2d 11, 26 , 163 N.E.2d 89, 96 .) See Amann v. Faidy (1953), 415 Ill. 422 , 114 N.E.2d 412

1977The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly held, “the doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule requiring this court to blindly follow precedents and adhere to prior decisions, and that when it appears that public policy and social needs require a departure from prior decisions, it is our duty as a court of last resort to overrule those decisions and establish a rule consonant with our present day concepts of right and justice.” (Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302 (1959), 18 Ill. 2d 11, 26 , 163 N.E.2d 89, 96 .) See Amann v. Faidy (1953), 415 Ill. 422 , 114 N.E.2d 412

1977The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly held, “the doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule requiring this court to blindly follow precedents and adhere to prior decisions, and that when it appears that public policy and social needs require a departure from prior decisions, it is our duty as a court of last resort to overrule those decisions and establish a rule consonant with our present day concepts of right and justice.” (Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302 (1959), 18 Ill. 2d 11, 26 , 163 N.E.2d 89, 96 .) See Amann v. Faidy (1953), 415 Ill. 422 , 114 N.E.2d 412

1977The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly held, “the doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule requiring this court to blindly follow precedents and adhere to prior decisions, and that when it appears that public policy and social needs require a departure from prior decisions, it is our duty as a court of last resort to overrule those decisions and establish a rule consonant with our present day concepts of right and justice.” (Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302 (1959), 18 Ill. 2d 11, 26 , 163 N.E.2d 89, 96 .) See Amann v. Faidy (1953), 415 Ill. 422 , 114 N.E.2d 412

1977The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly held, “the doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule requiring this court to blindly follow precedents and adhere to prior decisions, and that when it appears that public policy and social needs require a departure from prior decisions, it is our duty as a court of last resort to overrule those decisions and establish a rule consonant with our present day concepts of right and justice.” (Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302 (1959), 18 Ill. 2d 11, 26 , 163 N.E.2d 89, 96 .) See Amann v. Faidy (1953), 415 Ill. 422 , 114 N.E.2d 412

1977No. 302 (1959), 18 Ill.2d 11, 26 , 163 N.E.2d 89, 96 , may appropriately be said again: `We have repeatedly held that the doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule requiring this court to blindly follow precedents and adhere to prior decisions, and that when it appears that public policy and social needs require a *788 departure from prior decisions, it is our duty as a court of last resort to overrule those decisions and establish a rule consonant with our present day concepts of right and justice. ( Bradley v. Fox, 7 Ill.2d 106, 111 ; Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill.2d 608, 615 ; Amann v.

1977No. 302 (1959), 18 Ill.2d 11, 26 , 163 N.E.2d 89, 96 , may appropriately be said again: `We have repeatedly held that the doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule requiring this court to blindly follow precedents and adhere to prior decisions, and that when it appears that public policy and social needs require a *788 departure from prior decisions, it is our duty as a court of last resort to overrule those decisions and establish a rule consonant with our present day concepts of right and justice. ( Bradley v. Fox, 7 Ill.2d 106, 111 ; Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill.2d 608, 615 ; Amann v.

1983Mortgages secs. 627d, 704b, 813c, 834g (1949 & Supp. 1982).) Moreover, while the doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule prohibiting the reexamination of legal concepts (Williams v. Crickman (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 105 , 405 N.E.2d 799 ), a rule of law, once settled, should be followed unless it can be shown that it is likely to give rise to serious detriment prejudicial to the public interest (Maki v. Frelk (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 193 , 239 N.E.2d 445 ).

1983Mortgages secs. 627d, 704b, 813c, 834g (1949 & Supp. 1982).) Moreover, while the doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule prohibiting the reexamination of legal concepts (Williams v. Crickman (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 105 , 405 N.E.2d 799 ), a rule of law, once settled, should be followed unless it can be shown that it is likely to give rise to serious detriment prejudicial to the public interest (Maki v. Frelk (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 193 , 239 N.E.2d 445 ).

1983Mortgages secs. 627d, 704b, 813c, 834g (1949 & Supp. 1982).) Moreover, while the doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule prohibiting the reexamination of legal concepts (Williams v. Crickman (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 105 , 405 N.E.2d 799 ), a rule of law, once settled, should be followed unless it can be shown that it is likely to give rise to serious detriment prejudicial to the public interest (Maki v. Frelk (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 193 , 239 N.E.2d 445 ).

1983Mortgages secs. 627d, 704b, 813c, 834g (1949 & Supp. 1982).) Moreover, while the doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule prohibiting the reexamination of legal concepts (Williams v. Crickman (1980), 81 Ill. 2d 105 , 405 N.E.2d 799 ), a rule of law, once settled, should be followed unless it can be shown that it is likely to give rise to serious detriment prejudicial to the public interest (Maki v. Frelk (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 193 , 239 N.E.2d 445 ).

1977Accordingly, we hold that Baird ( 11 Ill.

1977The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly held, “the doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule requiring this court to blindly follow precedents and adhere to prior decisions, and that when it appears that public policy and social needs require a departure from prior decisions, it is our duty as a court of last resort to overrule those decisions and establish a rule consonant with our present day concepts of right and justice.” (Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302 (1959), 18 Ill. 2d 11, 26 , 163 N.E.2d 89, 96 .) See Amann v. Faidy (1953), 415 Ill. 422 , 114 N.E.2d 412

1977The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly held, “the doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule requiring this court to blindly follow precedents and adhere to prior decisions, and that when it appears that public policy and social needs require a departure from prior decisions, it is our duty as a court of last resort to overrule those decisions and establish a rule consonant with our present day concepts of right and justice.” (Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302 (1959), 18 Ill. 2d 11, 26 , 163 N.E.2d 89, 96 .) See Amann v. Faidy (1953), 415 Ill. 422 , 114 N.E.2d 412

1974Co. (1894), 154 U.S. 288, 322 , 38 L.Ed. 992, 1000 ), we declare Holton and the cases which have followed it overruled.” The court further said: “ We have repeatedly held that the doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule requiring this court to blindly follow precedents and adhere to prior decisions, and that when it appears that public policy and social needs require a departure from prior decisions, it is our duty as a court of last resort to overrule those decisions and establish a rule consonant with our present day concepts of right and justice.’ ” We therefore conclude that th

1974Co. (1894), 154 U.S. 288, 322 , 38 L.Ed. 992, 1000 ), we declare Holton and the cases which have followed it overruled.” The court further said: “ We have repeatedly held that the doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule requiring this court to blindly follow precedents and adhere to prior decisions, and that when it appears that public policy and social needs require a departure from prior decisions, it is our duty as a court of last resort to overrule those decisions and establish a rule consonant with our present day concepts of right and justice.’ ” We therefore conclude that th

1973Although we are mindful “that the doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule requiring this court to blindly follow precedents and adhere to policy decisions” (Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302 (1959), 18 Ill.2d 11, 26 , 163 N.E.2d 89 ; see also Nudd v. Matsoukas (1956), 7 Ill.2d 608, 615 , 131 N.E.2d 525 ; and Doggett v. North American Life Insurance Co. (1947), 396 Ill. 354, 360-61 , 71 N.E.2d 686 ), we feel compelled to follow the rule adhered to by the courts of this State for over 75 years.

1973Although we are mindful “that the doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule requiring this court to blindly follow precedents and adhere to policy decisions” (Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302 (1959), 18 Ill.2d 11, 26 , 163 N.E.2d 89 ; see also Nudd v. Matsoukas (1956), 7 Ill.2d 608, 615 , 131 N.E.2d 525 ; and Doggett v. North American Life Insurance Co. (1947), 396 Ill. 354, 360-61 , 71 N.E.2d 686 ), we feel compelled to follow the rule adhered to by the courts of this State for over 75 years.