defendant requests instruction in Minnesota

2019Because there is a qualitative difference between a limiting instruction and an accomplice-testimony instruction, my analysis is not inconsistent with State v. Strommen , 648 N.W.2d 681 , 689 (Minn. 2002) ("[T]he duty to instruct on accomplice testimony remains regardless of whether counsel for the defendant requests the instruction."), or State v. Barrientos-Quintana , 787 N.W.2d 603 , 610 (Minn. 2010) (same).

2015Barrientos– Quintana, 787 N.W.2d at 612 . “[T]he duty to instruct on accomplice testimony remains regardless of whether counsel for the defendant requests the instruction.” State v. Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681, 689 (Minn. 2002).

2017In State v. Thompson, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a district court should in most cases obtain a criminal defendant’s permission before giving a no-adverse-inference instruction and that a record should be made “regarding the defendant’s preference in the matter.” 430 N.W.2d 161, 153 (Minn. 1988), In State v. Gomez, the supreme court characterized the applicable rule as “[i]f the defendant requests the instruction, the court or the defendant’s counsel must make a record of the defendant’s clear consent and insistence that the instruction be given.” 721 N.W.2d at 880 (quotation omitte

2014The supreme court has held that when a district court must decide whether to give the right-not-to-testify instruction, “the better practice is for the [district] court to inquire of the defendant . . . whether [he or she] wishes to have such an instruction.” State v. Clifton, 701 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Minn. 2005); accord McCollum, 640 N.W.2d at 617 (stating that if the defendant requests the instruction, the district court or defense counsel should make a record of “the defendant’s clear consent and insistence that the instruction be given”).

2019Because there is a qualitative difference between a limiting instruction and an accomplice-testimony instruction, my analysis is not inconsistent with State v. Strommen , 648 N.W.2d 681 , 689 (Minn. 2002) ("[T]he duty to instruct on accomplice testimony remains regardless of whether counsel for the defendant requests the instruction."), or State v. Barrientos-Quintana , 787 N.W.2d 603 , 610 (Minn. 2010) (same).

2015Barrientos– Quintana, 787 N.W.2d at 612 . “[T]he duty to instruct on accomplice testimony remains regardless of whether counsel for the defendant requests the instruction.” State v. Strommen, 648 N.W.2d 681, 689 (Minn. 2002).

2016State v. Broulik, 606 N.W.2d 64, 69 (Minn. 2000).

2005The DeYoung court concluded that this result was mandated by State v. Broulik, 606 N.W.2d 64 (Minn.2000) in which the Minnesota Supreme Court questioned the rationale behind the relevant CRIMJIG instruction and endorsed the practice of the federal courts, which require a specific limiting instruction when requested.

2014The supreme court has held that when a district court must decide whether to give the right-not-to-testify instruction, “the better practice is for the [district] court to inquire of the defendant . . . whether [he or she] wishes to have such an instruction.” State v. Clifton, 701 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Minn. 2005); accord McCollum, 640 N.W.2d at 617 (stating that if the defendant requests the instruction, the district court or defense counsel should make a record of “the defendant’s clear consent and insistence that the instruction be given”).

2006If the defendant requests the instruction, the court or the defendant’s counsel must make a record of “the defendant’s clear consent and insistence that the instruction be given.” McCollum, 640 N.W.2d at 617 .

2017In State v. Thompson, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a district court should in most cases obtain a criminal defendant’s permission before giving a no-adverse-inference instruction and that a record should be made “regarding the defendant’s preference in the matter.” 430 N.W.2d 161, 153 (Minn. 1988), In State v. Gomez, the supreme court characterized the applicable rule as “[i]f the defendant requests the instruction, the court or the defendant’s counsel must make a record of the defendant’s clear consent and insistence that the instruction be given.” 721 N.W.2d at 880 (quotation omitte

2015State v. Williams, 593 N.W.2d 227, 237 (Minn. 1999).

2010Because of the “very real possibility that the jury could reject corroborating evidence and convict on the testimony of the accomplice standing alone,” the court’s “duty to instruct on accomplice testimony remains regardless of whether counsel for the defendant requests the instruction.” Id. (citing Shoop, 441 N.W.2d at 481 .) The rule “reflects an inherent distrust of testimony from accomplices, who ‘may testify against another in the hope of or upon a promise of immunity or clemency or to satisfy other self-serving or malicious motives.’ ” State v. Clark, 755 N.W.2d 241, 251 (Minn.2008) (quo

2010Because of the "very real possibility that the jury could reject corroborating evidence and convict on the testimony of the accomplice standing alone," the court's "duty to instruct on accomplice testimony remains regardless of whether counsel for the defendant requests the instruction." Id. (citing Shoop, 441 N.W.2d at 481 .) The rule "reflects an inherent distrust of testimony from accomplices, who `may testify against another in the hope of or upon a promise of immunity or clemency or to satisfy other self-serving or malicious motives.'" State v. Clark, 755 N.W.2d 241, 251 (Minn.2008) (quot

2008See id. at 594 ; Cooper v. State, 745 N.W.2d 188, 193 (Minn.2008).

2008See id. at 594 ; Cooper v. State, 745 N.W.2d 188, 193 (Minn.2008).

2005In State v. DeYoung, 672 N.W.2d 208, 212 (Minn.App.2003), this court held that when a defendant requests an instruction limiting the specific purpose for which Spreigl evidence may be considered, the district court must give the instruction.