mera violation in Minnesota

2024See id. (distinguishing between “a defendant’s burden of proof on affirmative defenses to a MERA claim” and the separate analysis for “determining an appropriate remedy for a MERA violation”).

2024See id. (distinguishing between “a defendant’s burden of proof on affirmative defenses to a MERA claim” and the separate analysis for “determining an appropriate remedy for a MERA violation”).

2015Interest Research Grp. v. White Bear Rod & Gun Club, 257 N.W.2d 762, 768 (Minn.1977) (considering noise levels in the context of establishing a prima facie MERA violation even when the MPCA had not issued a standard regulating noise for skeet shooting); Citizens for a Safe Grant v. Lone Oak Sportsmen’s Club, Inc., 624 N.W.2d 796, 806 (Minn.App.2001) (“But the legislature did not exempt shooting sports clubs from MERA claims, only from MPCA’s regulatory authority.”).

2001But recognizing that there are instances when environmental regulations may not keep up with changing conditions, the statute also provides that a plaintiff may bring a claim if the defendant has caused or is "likely to cause the pollution, impairment, or destruction of the air, water, land or other natural resources." Id.; see also Minnesota Public Interest Research Group v. White Bear Rod & Gun Club, 257 N.W.2d 762 , 771 n. 6 (Minn.1977) (holding that the fact that Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) had not issued standards on gunfire noise did not bar a MERA claim based on noise poll

2011In fashioning its equitable remedy, the district court also reasoned, in part, that a crest elevation of 976 feet would result in widespread flooding, which would be “an undue and unwarranted hardship to impose on area land owners.” The district court further reasoned that such flooding “would result in harm to the Intervernors and others in the surrounding area well beyond the remedy that MERA appropriately provides in this particular circumstance.” On appeal, the association contends that a crest elevation of 976 feet would provide three feet of water in the lakes year-round, which “will pro

2011In fashioning its equitable remedy, the district court also reasoned, in part, that a crest elevation of 976 feet would result in widespread flooding, which would be “an undue and unwarranted hardship to impose on area land owners.” The district court further reasoned that such flooding “would result in harm to the Intervernors and others in the surrounding area well beyond the remedy that MERA appropriately provides in this particular circumstance.” On appeal, the association contends that a crest elevation of 976 feet would provide three feet of water in the lakes year-round, which “will pro

2011The district court summarized Swan Lake I by quoting the opinion’s holding: “In light of the broad language of Minn. Stat. § 116B.12, we conclude that the district court has subject matter jurisdiction over [the association’s] MERA claim regardless of the administrative processes and remedies available under the drainage provisions of Minn.Stat. §§ 103E.055-.812.” 711 N.W.2d at 525-26 .

2009Swan Lake Area Wildlife Ass’n v. Nicollet County Bd. of County Comm’rs, we held that “the district court has subject matter jurisdiction over [the Association’s] MERA claim regardless of the administrative processes and remedies available under the drainage provisions.” 711 N.W.2d 522, 525-26 (Minn.App.2006), review denied (Minn. June 20, 2006) (Swan Lake I).

2024See Swan Lake III, 799 N.W.2d at 631 (“Affirmative defenses are not at issue in this appeal because the district court concluded in 2007 that the county had committed a MERA violation, and we affirmed that conclusion in [State ex rel.

2024See Swan Lake III, 799 N.W.2d at 631 (“Affirmative defenses are not at issue in this appeal because the district court concluded in 2007 that the county had committed a MERA violation, and we affirmed that conclusion in [State ex rel.

2024See AMF Pinspotters, 110 N.W.2d at 351 .

2024See AMF Pinspotters, 110 N.W.2d at 351 .

2015See, e.g., State by Drabik v. Martz, 451 N.W.2d 893, 896-97 (Minn.App.1990) (upholding temporary injunction under MERA prohibiting certain conduct despite the county’s prior grant of a CUP allowing conduct); McGuire v. Cnty. of Scott, 525 N.W.2d 583, 584 (Minn.App.1994) (distinguishing between MERA violations based on enumerated government standards and those based on a general material adverse effect on the environment when homeowner brought MERA claim against the county for a highway’s violation of the noise pollution rules issued by MPCA); see Minn.Stat. § 116B.04 (2014) (requiring that a p

2015See, e.g., State by Drabik v. Martz, 451 N.W.2d 893, 896-97 (Minn.App.1990) (upholding temporary injunction under MERA prohibiting certain conduct despite the county’s prior grant of a CUP allowing conduct); McGuire v. Cnty. of Scott, 525 N.W.2d 583, 584 (Minn.App.1994) (distinguishing between MERA violations based on enumerated government standards and those based on a general material adverse effect on the environment when homeowner brought MERA claim against the county for a highway’s violation of the noise pollution rules issued by MPCA); see Minn.Stat. § 116B.04 (2014) (requiring that a p

2015Interest Research Grp. v. White Bear Rod & Gun Club, 257 N.W.2d 762, 768 (Minn.1977) (considering noise levels in the context of establishing a prima facie MERA violation even when the MPCA had not issued a standard regulating noise for skeet shooting); Citizens for a Safe Grant v. Lone Oak Sportsmen’s Club, Inc., 624 N.W.2d 796, 806 (Minn.App.2001) (“But the legislature did not exempt shooting sports clubs from MERA claims, only from MPCA’s regulatory authority.”).

2011Swan Lake II, 771 N.W.2d at 538 ; cf. Siewert v. Northern States Power Co., 793 N.W.2d 272, 283-86 (Minn.2011) (declining to apply primary jurisdiction doctrine).

2011Swan Lake II, 771 N.W.2d at 538 ; cf. Siewert v. Northern States Power Co., 793 N.W.2d 272, 283-86 (Minn.2011) (declining to apply primary jurisdiction doctrine).

2003State by Powderly v. Erickson, 285 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn.1979).

1999The Sipe court reasoned that fees for the MERA claim were governed by condemnation law because “the MERA case was actually a form of defense to the condemnation proceedings.” Id. at 912, 914 .

1999The Sipe court reasoned that fees for the MERA claim were governed by condemnation law because “the MERA case was actually a form of defense to the condemnation proceedings.” Id. at 912, 914 .

1991Because we conclude the Krmpotich claims fail even if the additional evidence is considered, we do not address the applicability to this appeal of Swanson v. City of Bloomington, 421 N.W.2d 307, 311-14 (Minn.1988), which sets out when a trial court may accept additional material evidence when reviewing a municipal body’s decision.

1991Because we conclude the Krmpotich claims fail even if the additional evidence is considered, we do not address the applicability to this appeal of Swanson v. City of Bloomington, 421 N.W.2d 307, 311-14 (Minn.1988), which sets out when a trial court may accept additional material evidence when reviewing a municipal body’s decision.