contradiction doctrine in New Hampshire

2023See State v. Wamala, 158 N.H. 583, 589 (2009) (“The curative admissibility doctrine applies when inadmissible prejudicial evidence has been erroneously admitted, and the opponent seeks to introduce testimony to counter the prejudice.” (quotation omitted)); cf. DePaula, 170 N.H. at 149 (discussing the strong interest, under the specific contradiction doctrine, in refuting admissible evidence that creates a misleading advantage).

2020Compare Morrill, 154 N.H. at 551-52 (concluding that trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion in admitting rebuttal evidence, noting whatever misleading impression the defendant may have given the jury about a father’s delay in reporting his daughter’s abuse had already been countered by admissible evidence that directly countered this theory), with Wamala, 158 N.H. at 590-91 (concluding, under the specific contradiction doctrine, that victim’s admissible testimony about prior assaults “did not directly counter the defendant’s theory that she fabricated her allegations against him” a

2024Id.

2023See State v. Wamala, 158 N.H. 583, 589 (2009) (“The curative admissibility doctrine applies when inadmissible prejudicial evidence has been erroneously admitted, and the opponent seeks to introduce testimony to counter the prejudice.” (quotation omitted)); cf. DePaula, 170 N.H. at 149 (discussing the strong interest, under the specific contradiction doctrine, in refuting admissible evidence that creates a misleading advantage).

2020Compare Morrill, 154 N.H. at 551-52 (concluding that trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion in admitting rebuttal evidence, noting whatever misleading impression the defendant may have given the jury about a father’s delay in reporting his daughter’s abuse had already been countered by admissible evidence that directly countered this theory), with Wamala, 158 N.H. at 590-91 (concluding, under the specific contradiction doctrine, that victim’s admissible testimony about prior assaults “did not directly counter the defendant’s theory that she fabricated her allegations against him” a

2019See, e.g., DePaula, 170 N.H. at 146 ; State v. Mazzaglia, 169 N.H. 489, 495 (2016); State v. Gaudet, 166 N.H. 390, 396 (2014); Nightingale, 160 N.H. at 579 ; State v. Wamala, 158 N.H. 583, 589 (2009); State v. White, 155 N.H. 119, 124 (2007); see also State v. Morrill, 154 N.H. 547, 549-50 (2006) (drawing the distinction between the two but applying neither).

2019See, e.g., DePaula, 170 N.H. at 146 ; State v. Mazzaglia, 169 N.H. 489, 495 (2016); State v. Gaudet, 166 N.H. 390, 396 (2014); Nightingale, 160 N.H. at 579 ; State v. Wamala, 158 N.H. 583, 589 (2009); State v. White, 155 N.H. 119, 124 (2007); see also State v. Morrill, 154 N.H. 547, 549-50 (2006) (drawing the distinction between the two but applying neither).

2017“The trial court is in the best position to gauge the prejudicial impact of particular testimony.” Id. (quotation omitted).

2023See, e.g., State v. Nightingale, 160 N.H. 569, 579-80 (2010) (discussing the specific contradiction doctrine and whether rebuttal evidence specifically contradicted the admitted evidence). 9 The defendant asserts that the trial court erred by allowing the State to introduce the nurse’s testimony because it exceeded the scope of the “open door.” In ruling that the defense opened the door, the trial court explicitly stated that the nurse’s testimony “is only admissible to the extent necessary to rebut the unfair advantage gained” and that she could “testify about this issue of how likely or unli

2019See, e.g., DePaula, 170 N.H. at 146 ; State v. Mazzaglia, 169 N.H. 489, 495 (2016); State v. Gaudet, 166 N.H. 390, 396 (2014); Nightingale, 160 N.H. at 579 ; State v. Wamala, 158 N.H. 583, 589 (2009); State v. White, 155 N.H. 119, 124 (2007); see also State v. Morrill, 154 N.H. 547, 549-50 (2006) (drawing the distinction between the two but applying neither).

2019See, e.g., DePaula, 170 N.H. at 146 ; State v. Mazzaglia, 169 N.H. 489, 495 (2016); State v. Gaudet, 166 N.H. 390, 396 (2014); Nightingale, 160 N.H. at 579 ; State v. Wamala, 158 N.H. 583, 589 (2009); State v. White, 155 N.H. 119, 124 (2007); see also State v. Morrill, 154 N.H. 547, 549-50 (2006) (drawing the distinction between the two but applying neither).

2009Id.

2025Cf. State v. Allen, 128 N.H. 390, 397 (1986) (finding that the weight of a prior bad act that occurred more than three years prior to the charged conduct may have been reduced “to some degree” but “its force had certainly not diminished entirely”). 7 [¶22] We also reject the defendant’s argument that the admission of the recorded phone call opened the door to his statements to the police pursuant to the specific contradiction doctrine.

2024See State v. Cressey, 137 N.H. 402, 410-11 (1993).

2019See, e.g., DePaula, 170 N.H. at 146 ; State v. Mazzaglia, 169 N.H. 489, 495 (2016); State v. Gaudet, 166 N.H. 390, 396 (2014); Nightingale, 160 N.H. at 579 ; State v. Wamala, 158 N.H. 583, 589 (2009); State v. White, 155 N.H. 119, 124 (2007); see also State v. Morrill, 154 N.H. 547, 549-50 (2006) (drawing the distinction between the two but applying neither).

2015See Ramsey, 166 N.H. at 49 .

2013See State v. McLaughlin, 135 N.H. 669, 672 (1992).

2010See State v. Goodman, 145 N.H. 526, 529-30 (2000); State v. Fecteau, 133 N.H. 860, 874 (1991).

2010See State v. Goodman, 145 N.H. 526, 529-30 (2000); State v. Fecteau, 133 N.H. 860, 874 (1991).