12 New Jersey opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Strawn v. Canusogreen2 sentences2018See Strawn v. Canuso, 140 N.J. 43, 60 (1995) ("Real estate brokers, agents, and salespersons representing professional sellers of real estate are subject to the provisions of the Consumer Fraud Act."). 2006Consistent with this view of the legislative intent in authorizing private consumer fraud actions, the Court has indicated that "the class action rule should be construed liberally in a case involving allegations of consumer fraud." In re Cadillac, supra, *1110 93 N.J. at 435 , 461 A. 2d 736 ; see also Strawn v. Canuso, 140 N.J. 43, 68 , 657 A. 2d 420 (1995) ("[A] class action is the superior method for adjudication of consumer-fraud claims[.]"); Riley v. New Rapids Carpet Ctr., 61 N.J. 218, 226-28 , 294 A. 2d 7 (1972) ("[A] court should be slow to hold that a suit [under the Consumer Fraud Ac | 2 | 2 |
D'Ercole Sales, Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp.green2 sentences1988In D'Ercole Sales, Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp., 206 N.J. 1988In D'Ercole Sales, Inc. v. Fruehauf Corp., 206 N.J. | 2 | 2 |
Chattin v. Cape May Greene, Inc.green2 sentences2018See id. at 613-14 . 2018See id. at 613-14 . | 1 | 1 |
Young v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, Inc.green2 sentences2010Co., 297 N.J.Super. 605, 608, 614-21 , 688 A. 2d 1069 (App.Div.1997) (Law Against Discrimination and Conscientious Employee Protection Act claims). 2010Co., 297 N.J.Super. 605, 608, 614-21 , 688 A. 2d 1069 (App.Div.1997) (Law Against Discrimination and Conscientious Employee Protection Act claims). | 1 | 1 |
Communications Workers v. Whitmangreen2 sentences2009See Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Whitman, 335 N.J.Super. 283, 288-90 , 762 A. 2d 284 (App.Div.2000), certif. denied, 167 N.J. 636 , 772 A. 2d 937 (2001). 2009See Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. Whitman, 335 N.J.Super. 283, 288-90 , 762 A. 2d 284 (App.Div.2000), certif. denied, 167 N.J. 636 , 772 A. 2d 937 (2001). | 1 | 1 |
Riley v. New Rapids Carpet Centergreen2 sentences2006Consistent with this view of the legislative intent in authorizing private consumer fraud actions, the Court has indicated that "the class action rule should be construed liberally in a case involving allegations of consumer fraud." In re Cadillac, supra, *1110 93 N.J. at 435 , 461 A. 2d 736 ; see also Strawn v. Canuso, 140 N.J. 43, 68 , 657 A. 2d 420 (1995) ("[A] class action is the superior method for adjudication of consumer-fraud claims[.]"); Riley v. New Rapids Carpet Ctr., 61 N.J. 218, 226-28 , 294 A. 2d 7 (1972) ("[A] court should be slow to hold that a suit [under the Consumer Fraud Ac 2006Consistent with this view of the legislative intent in authorizing private consumer fraud actions, the Court has indicated that "the class action rule should be construed liberally in a case involving allegations of consumer fraud." In re Cadillac, supra, *1110 93 N.J. at 435 , 461 A. 2d 736 ; see also Strawn v. Canuso, 140 N.J. 43, 68 , 657 A. 2d 420 (1995) ("[A] class action is the superior method for adjudication of consumer-fraud claims[.]"); Riley v. New Rapids Carpet Ctr., 61 N.J. 218, 226-28 , 294 A. 2d 7 (1972) ("[A] court should be slow to hold that a suit [under the Consumer Fraud Ac | 1 | 1 |
Wanetick v. Gateway Mitsubishigreen2 sentences2001We held that in the context of a Consumer Fraud Act claim, "an ultimate outcome charge is necessary here to aid the jury in its fact-finding role." Id. at 165, 723 A. 2d 100 . 2001We held that in the context of a Consumer Fraud Act claim, "an ultimate outcome charge is necessary here to aid the jury in its fact-finding role." Id. at 165, 723 A. 2d 100 . | 1 | 1 |
Daaleman v. Elizabethtown Gas Companygreen2 sentences2000We agree with the Appellate Division that those provisions are punitive in nature and reflect the Legislature’s “sense of outrage over marketplace fraud [that] is potentially present in every case in which a Consumer Fraud Act violation is alleged.” Wanetick, supra, 318 N.J.Super. at 165 , 723 A.2d 100 ; see also Daaleman v. Elizabethtown Gas Co., 77 N.J. 267, 272 , 390 A.2d 566 (1978) (observing that Act’s provisions providing for trebling of damages and awarding of counsel fees constitute “a punitive measure”). 2000We agree with the Appellate Division that those provisions are punitive in nature and reflect the Legislature’s “sense of outrage over marketplace fraud [that] is potentially present in every case in which a Consumer Fraud Act violation is alleged.” Wanetick, supra, 318 N.J.Super. at 165 , 723 A.2d 100 ; see also Daaleman v. Elizabethtown Gas Co., 77 N.J. 267, 272 , 390 A.2d 566 (1978) (observing that Act’s provisions providing for trebling of damages and awarding of counsel fees constitute “a punitive measure”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wanetick v. OCT PARTNERSHIP
green
2 sentences2001We held that in the context of a Consumer Fraud Act claim, "an ultimate outcome charge is necessary here to aid the jury in its fact-finding role." Id. at 165, 723 A. 2d 100 . 2001We held that in the context of a Consumer Fraud Act claim, "an ultimate outcome charge is necessary here to aid the jury in its fact-finding role." Id. at 165, 723 A. 2d 100 . | 2 | 2000–2001 |
McDarby v. Merck & Co.
green
1 sentence2010McDarby v. Merck, 401 N.J.Super. 10, 94-98 , 949 A.2d 223 (App.Div.2008), appeal dismissed, 200 N.J. 267 , 979 A.2d 766 (2009). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
In the Matter of Oxfeld
green
1 sentence2010McDarby v. Merck, 401 N.J.Super. 10, 94-98 , 949 A.2d 223 (App.Div.2008), appeal dismissed, 200 N.J. 267 , 979 A.2d 766 (2009). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
McDarby v. Merck & Co., Inc.
green
2 sentences2010McDarby v. Merck, 401 N.J.Super. 10, 94-98 , 949 A.2d 223 (App.Div.2008), appeal dismissed, 200 N.J. 267 , 979 A.2d 766 (2009). 2010McDarby v. Merck, 401 N.J.Super. 10, 94-98 , 949 A.2d 223 (App.Div.2008), appeal dismissed, 200 N.J. 267 , 979 A.2d 766 (2009). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Gras v. Associates First Capital Corp.
green
2 sentences2010First Capital Corp., 346 N.J.Super. 42, 54-57 , 786 A. 2d 886 (App.Div.2001) (Consumer Fraud Act claim); Young v. Prudential Ins. 2010First Capital Corp., 346 N.J.Super. 42, 54-57 , 786 A. 2d 886 (App.Div.2001) (Consumer Fraud Act claim); Young v. Prudential Ins. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC
green
2 sentences2006In support of its argument that a class action asserting a Consumer Fraud Act violation may be maintained only if the complaint alleges that not only the putative class representative but also all other class members suffered "ascertainable loss," U.S. Life relies upon Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz USA, 183 N.J. 234, 251-54 , 872 A. 2d 783 (2005); Weinberg, supra, 173 N.J. at 253-54 , 801 A. 2d 281 ; and N.J. 2006In support of its argument that a class action asserting a Consumer Fraud Act violation may be maintained only if the complaint alleges that not only the putative class representative but also all other class members suffered "ascertainable loss," U.S. Life relies upon Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz USA, 183 N.J. 234, 251-54 , 872 A. 2d 783 (2005); Weinberg, supra, 173 N.J. at 253-54 , 801 A. 2d 281 ; and N.J. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
New Jersey Citizen Action v. Schering-Plough Corp.
green
2 sentences2006Citizen Action v. Schering-Plough Corp., 367 N.J.Super. 8, 16 , 842 A. 2d 174 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 178 N.J. 249 , 837 A. 2d 1092 (2003). 2006Citizen Action v. Schering-Plough Corp., 367 N.J.Super. 8, 16 , 842 A. 2d 174 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 178 N.J. 249 , 837 A. 2d 1092 (2003). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
In Re the Cadillac V8-6-4 Class Action
green
2 sentences2006Consistent with this view of the legislative intent in authorizing private consumer fraud actions, the Court has indicated that "the class action rule should be construed liberally in a case involving allegations of consumer fraud." In re Cadillac, supra, *1110 93 N.J. at 435 , 461 A. 2d 736 ; see also Strawn v. Canuso, 140 N.J. 43, 68 , 657 A. 2d 420 (1995) ("[A] class action is the superior method for adjudication of consumer-fraud claims[.]"); Riley v. New Rapids Carpet Ctr., 61 N.J. 218, 226-28 , 294 A. 2d 7 (1972) ("[A] court should be slow to hold that a suit [under the Consumer Fraud Ac 2006Consistent with this view of the legislative intent in authorizing private consumer fraud actions, the Court has indicated that "the class action rule should be construed liberally in a case involving allegations of consumer fraud." In re Cadillac, supra, *1110 93 N.J. at 435 , 461 A. 2d 736 ; see also Strawn v. Canuso, 140 N.J. 43, 68 , 657 A. 2d 420 (1995) ("[A] class action is the superior method for adjudication of consumer-fraud claims[.]"); Riley v. New Rapids Carpet Ctr., 61 N.J. 218, 226-28 , 294 A. 2d 7 (1972) ("[A] court should be slow to hold that a suit [under the Consumer Fraud Ac | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Weinberg v. Sprint Corp.
green
2 sentences2006In support of its argument that a class action asserting a Consumer Fraud Act violation may be maintained only if the complaint alleges that not only the putative class representative but also all other class members suffered "ascertainable loss," U.S. Life relies upon Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz USA, 183 N.J. 234, 251-54 , 872 A. 2d 783 (2005); Weinberg, supra, 173 N.J. at 253-54 , 801 A. 2d 281 ; and N.J. 2006In support of its argument that a class action asserting a Consumer Fraud Act violation may be maintained only if the complaint alleges that not only the putative class representative but also all other class members suffered "ascertainable loss," U.S. Life relies upon Thiedemann v. Mercedes-Benz USA, 183 N.J. 234, 251-54 , 872 A. 2d 783 (2005); Weinberg, supra, 173 N.J. at 253-54 , 801 A. 2d 281 ; and N.J. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Neveroski v. Blair
green
2 sentences2003In Blatterfein , we affirmed a trial court ruling declining to dismiss a Consumer Fraud Act claim against an architect, observing that even if the "learned profession" bar against consumer fraud claims referred to in dictum in Neveroski v. Blair, 141 N.J.Super. 365, 379 , 358 A. 2d 473 (App.Div.1976), had any continuing validity, it could not be successfully asserted where the professional's conduct alleged as the basis of the claim implicated his commercial activity, such as the advertising of services, as distinguished from the rendition of the professional services themselves. 2003In Blatterfein , we affirmed a trial court ruling declining to dismiss a Consumer Fraud Act claim against an architect, observing that even if the "learned profession" bar against consumer fraud claims referred to in dictum in Neveroski v. Blair, 141 N.J.Super. 365, 379 , 358 A. 2d 473 (App.Div.1976), had any continuing validity, it could not be successfully asserted where the professional's conduct alleged as the basis of the claim implicated his commercial activity, such as the advertising of services, as distinguished from the rendition of the professional services themselves. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Meshinsky v. Nichols Yacht Sales, Inc.
green
2 sentences2003The New Jersey Supreme Court has concluded that the 1971 amendment to the Act permitting a private right of action imposes a higher standard of proof than that applicable to enforcement of proceedings brought by the state Attorney General, holding that [w]hile the Attorney General does not have to prove that the victim was damaged by the unlawful conduct, N.J.S.A. 56:8-2, a private plaintiff must show that he or she suffered "an ascertainable loss ... as a result of the unlawful conduct." Meshinsky v. Nichols Yacht Sales, Inc., supra., 110 N.J. at 473 , 541 A. 2d 1063 , (1988). 2003The New Jersey Supreme Court has concluded that the 1971 amendment to the Act permitting a private right of action imposes a higher standard of proof than that applicable to enforcement of proceedings brought by the state Attorney General, holding that [w]hile the Attorney General does not have to prove that the victim was damaged by the unlawful conduct, N.J.S.A. 56:8-2, a private plaintiff must show that he or she suffered "an ascertainable loss ... as a result of the unlawful conduct." Meshinsky v. Nichols Yacht Sales, Inc., supra., 110 N.J. at 473 , 541 A. 2d 1063 , (1988). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp.
green
2 sentences2003The allegations of the complaint, viewed with the requisite liberality and indulgence in favor of non-movants on motions addressed to the pleadings, see Printing Mart-Morristown, supra, 116 N.J. at 772 , 563 A. 2d 31 , assert a consumer fraud cause of action arising from the mere fact that plaintiffs were treated by Kellogg who, at the time, was not a fully licensed physician. 2003The allegations of the complaint, viewed with the requisite liberality and indulgence in favor of non-movants on motions addressed to the pleadings, see Printing Mart-Morristown, supra, 116 N.J. at 772 , 563 A. 2d 31 , assert a consumer fraud cause of action arising from the mere fact that plaintiffs were treated by Kellogg who, at the time, was not a fully licensed physician. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Silva v. Autos of Amboy, Inc.
green
2 sentences2002Silva v. Autos of Amboy, Inc., 267 N.J.Super. 546, 556 , 632 A. 2d 291 (App.Div.1993) (in awarding fee on successful Consumer Fraud Act claim, representing only one count of a seven count complaint, but all counts were interrelated factually and legally, trial court erred in awarding only one-seventh of the fee requested). 2002Silva v. Autos of Amboy, Inc., 267 N.J.Super. 546, 556 , 632 A. 2d 291 (App.Div.1993) (in awarding fee on successful Consumer Fraud Act claim, representing only one count of a seven count complaint, but all counts were interrelated factually and legally, trial court erred in awarding only one-seventh of the fee requested). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.