12 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Xiegreen2 sentences2023Even though the presentence standard is more lenient than the “manifest injustice” standard applicable to post-sentence motions, withdrawing a presentence plea is not a given because “a trial court retains discretion to overrule a presentence plea-withdrawal motion.” Id. 2017Xie at 527, 584 N.E.2d 715 . {¶ 46} As noted above, both parties agree that the presentence standard applies to the motion at issue. | 2 | 4 |
Gregg v. Georgiagreen2 sentences1991While such remarks border on irrelevancy, the Supreme Court has approved “open and far-ranging argument * * *” and observed that “[s]o long as the evidence introduced and the arguments made at the presentence hearing do not prejudice a defendant, it is preferable not to impose restrictions. * * *” Gregg v. Georgia (1976), 428 U.S. 153, 203-204 (plurality opinion). 1986The United States Supreme Court stated in Gregg v. Georgia (1976), 428 U.S. 153 , 203-204 that “[s]o long as the evidence introduced and the arguments made at the presentence hearing do not prejudice a defendant, it is preferable not to impose restrictions.” (Emphasis added.) The important protections provided by the Rules of Evidence can not be swept out the door in the penalty phase of a capital case because they are reflective in many instances of important constitutional and procedural safeguards. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Millergreen1 sentence2024State v. Miller, 2021-Ohio-2606, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rozellgreen2 sentences2019“Nevertheless, even under the presentence standard, the right to withdraw a plea is not absolute, and a trial court retains discretion to overrule a presentence motion to withdraw a plea.” State v. Rozell, 2018-Ohio-1722 , 111 N.E.3d 861, ¶ 24 (2d Dist.), citing Xie at 527 . {¶ 12} This court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion. 2019“Nevertheless, even under the presentence standard, the right to withdraw a plea is not absolute, and a trial court retains discretion to overrule a presentence motion to withdraw a plea.” State v. Rozell, 2018-Ohio-1722 , 111 N.E.3d 861, ¶ 24 (2d Dist.), citing Xie at 527 . {¶ 12} This court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Smith
green
2 sentences2019Portage No. 2015-P-0032, 2016-Ohio-2690, ¶ 28 . {¶17} Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not err in failing to apply the presentence factors cited by Austin and in evaluating the motion under a “manifest injustice” standard. {¶18} Austin also contends that the lower court’s failure to provide a proper post- release control advisement “merits re-visiting the propriety of the whole plea” since such an advisement “factors into the voluntariness and knowingness of a guilty plea.” {¶19} As described above, the lower court was required to determine whether “manifest injustice” occurred, a s 2019Portage No. 2015-P-0032, 2016-Ohio-2690, ¶ 28 . {¶17} Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not err in failing to apply the presentence factors cited by Austin and in evaluating the motion under a “manifest injustice” standard. {¶18} Austin also contends that the lower court’s failure to provide a proper post- release control advisement “merits re-visiting the propriety of the whole plea” since such an advisement “factors into the voluntariness and knowingness of a guilty plea.” {¶19} As described above, the lower court was required to determine whether “manifest injustice” occurred, a s | 2 | 2019–2019 |
AAAA Enterprises, Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp.
green
1 sentence2019Id. at ¶ 25, citing State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 264 , 361 N.E.2d 1324 (1977), paragraph two of the syllabus. “ ‘Abuse of discretion’ has been defined as an attitude that is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” (Citation omitted.) AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 , 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Michaels
green
1 sentence2019Id. at ¶ 25, citing State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261, 264 , 361 N.E.2d 1324 (1977), paragraph two of the syllabus. “ ‘Abuse of discretion’ has been defined as an attitude that is unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable.” (Citation omitted.) AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161 , 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Weideman
neutral
1 sentence2019Portage No. 2015-P-0032, 2016-Ohio-2690, ¶ 28 . {¶17} Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not err in failing to apply the presentence factors cited by Austin and in evaluating the motion under a “manifest injustice” standard. {¶18} Austin also contends that the lower court’s failure to provide a proper post- release control advisement “merits re-visiting the propriety of the whole plea” since such an advisement “factors into the voluntariness and knowingness of a guilty plea.” {¶19} As described above, the lower court was required to determine whether “manifest injustice” occurred, a s | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Clark
green
2 sentences2011R.C. 2967.28; State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239 , 893 N.E.2d 462 , 2008-Ohio-3748 . 2011R.C. 2967.28; State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239 , 893 N.E.2d 462 , 2008-Ohio-3748 . | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Boswell
green
2 sentences2011Appellant argues that because the trial court failed to impose postrelease control at the time he was sentenced for aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary, his sentence is void and the court should have applied the more liberal presentence standard to his motion to withdraw his plea, citing State v. Boswell, 121 Ohio St. 3d 575 , 906 N.E.2d 422 , 2009-Ohio-1577 .1 1 Appellant was convicted of two counts of aggravated murder; however, aggravated murder is an unclassified felony to which the postrelease control statute does not apply. 2011Appellant argues that because the trial court failed to impose postrelease control at the time he was sentenced for aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary, his sentence is void and the court should have applied the more liberal presentence standard to his motion to withdraw his plea, citing State v. Boswell, 121 Ohio St. 3d 575 , 906 N.E.2d 422 , 2009-Ohio-1577 .1 1 Appellant was convicted of two counts of aggravated murder; however, aggravated murder is an unclassified felony to which the postrelease control statute does not apply. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Spivey
green
1 sentence1998[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 81 Ohio St.3d 405 .] THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. SPIVEY, APPELLANT. [Cite as State v. Spivey, 1998-Ohio-437 .] Criminal law—Aggravated murder—Defendant competent to stand trial and enter pleas, when—Presentence motion to withdraw no contest pleas properly denied—XYY syndrome raised in mitigation phase—Mitigation not established under R.C. 2929.04(B)(3), when—Death penalty upheld, when. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Spivey
green
1 sentence1998[This opinion has been published in Ohio Official Reports at 81 Ohio St.3d 405 .] THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLEE, v. SPIVEY, APPELLANT. [Cite as State v. Spivey, 1998-Ohio-437 .] Criminal law—Aggravated murder—Defendant competent to stand trial and enter pleas, when—Presentence motion to withdraw no contest pleas properly denied—XYY syndrome raised in mitigation phase—Mitigation not established under R.C. 2929.04(B)(3), when—Death penalty upheld, when. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Davis
green
2 sentences1984State v. Davis (1978), 56 Ohio St. 2d 51 [ 10 O.O.3d 87 ], The purpose of the presentence hearing is distinct from that of the trial. 1984State v. Davis (1978), 56 Ohio St. 2d 51 [ 10 O.O.3d 87 ], The purpose of the presentence hearing is distinct from that of the trial. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.