statutory rebuttable presumption in Oregon

2023If the experts conclude that the blood tests show the possibility of the alleged father’s paternity, admission of this evi- dence is within the discretion of the court, depending upon the infrequency of the blood type.” Or Laws 1953, ch 628, §§ 1, 4. 3 By the mid-1990s, DNA testing had “progressed to the point where the reli- ability and validity of properly collected and analyzed DNA data should not be in doubt.” State v. Lyons, 324 Or 256, 267 , 924 P2d 802 (1996); see also Jill Adams, Paternity Testing: Blood Types and DNA, 1 Nat Educ 146 (2008). 4 Under ORS 109.070(2), the statutory rebutt

2023If the experts conclude that the blood tests show the possibility of the alleged father’s paternity, admission of this evi- dence is within the discretion of the court, depending upon the infrequency of the blood type.” Or Laws 1953, ch 628, §§ 1, 4. 3 By the mid-1990s, DNA testing had “progressed to the point where the reli- ability and validity of properly collected and analyzed DNA data should not be in doubt.” State v. Lyons, 324 Or 256, 267 , 924 P2d 802 (1996); see also Jill Adams, Paternity Testing: Blood Types and DNA, 1 Nat Educ 146 (2008). 4 Under ORS 109.070(2), the statutory rebutt

2001ORS 107.105(1)(f). 4 Stice and Stice, 308 Or 316, 325 , 779 P2d 1020 (1989).

1993“Marital assets are subject to the statutory rebuttable presumption of equality of contribution and to the ownership provisions of ORS 107.105(l)(f). * * * “Whether or not the statutory presumption of equality of contribution has been rebutted, ORS 107.105(l)(f) ultimately authorizes and requires courts to distribute any and all of the spouses’ property, including separate property, ‘as may bejust and proper in all the circumstances.’ ” (Citations omitted.) Stice used the term “marital property” interchangeably with the statutory name for the second category of property, “marital assets.” The

1999Id. at 594-96 .

1999Id. at 599-600 .

1996Richardson and Richardson, 307 Or 370 , 769 P2d 179 (1989).

1996Richardson and Richardson, 307 Or 370 , 769 P2d 179 (1989).

1989Marital assets are subject to the statutory rebuttable presumption of equality of contribution and to the ownership provisions of ORS 107.105(l)(f). 2 See Engle and Engle, supra, 293 Or at 214-15 .

1983Pierson and Pierson, 294 Or 117 , 653 P2d 1258 (1982) (construing ORS 107.105(1)(e)).

1983Pierson and Pierson, 294 Or 117 , 653 P2d 1258 (1982) (construing ORS 107.105(1)(e)).

1982The presumption of the husband’s equal contribution by non-financial means is rebutted because wife’s acquisition was by sole inheritance after the parties separated, cf. Lemke and Lemke, 289 Or 145 , 611 P2d 295 (1980), unaffected by efforts of the husband. 2 We therefore consider the inherited property to be free from any claim of husband arising from real or presumed contribution to its acquisition.

1982The presumption of the husband’s equal contribution by non-financial means is rebutted because wife’s acquisition was by sole inheritance after the parties separated, cf. Lemke and Lemke, 289 Or 145 , 611 P2d 295 (1980), unaffected by efforts of the husband. 2 We therefore consider the inherited property to be free from any claim of husband arising from real or presumed contribution to its acquisition.

1982The statutory presumption of equality of contribution to the acquisition of marital assets, as we stated in Grove and Grove, 280 Or. 341, 346 , 571 P.2d 477 , reh. den. and modified 280 Or. 769 , 572 P.2d 1320 (1977), "indicates a legislative intent that the homemaker spouse who is most likely to seek spousal support, be recognized as an economic contributor to the marriage rather than as a passive recipient of economic benefits provided by the breadwinner." It would apply, for example, to a distribution of marital assets purchased with the earnings of one spouse.

1982The statutory presumption of equality of contribution to the acquisition of marital assets, as we stated in Grove and Grove, 280 Or. 341, 346 , 571 P.2d 477 , reh. den. and modified 280 Or. 769 , 572 P.2d 1320 (1977), "indicates a legislative intent that the homemaker spouse who is most likely to seek spousal support, be recognized as an economic contributor to the marriage rather than as a passive recipient of economic benefits provided by the breadwinner." It would apply, for example, to a distribution of marital assets purchased with the earnings of one spouse.

1982The statutory presumption of equality of contribution to the acquisition of marital assets, as we stated in Grove and Grove, 280 Or. 341, 346 , 571 P.2d 477 , reh. den. and modified 280 Or. 769 , 572 P.2d 1320 (1977), "indicates a legislative intent that the homemaker spouse who is most likely to seek spousal support, be recognized as an economic contributor to the marriage rather than as a passive recipient of economic benefits provided by the breadwinner." It would apply, for example, to a distribution of marital assets purchased with the earnings of one spouse.

1982The statutory presumption of equality of contribution to the acquisition of marital assets, as we stated in Grove and Grove, 280 Or. 341, 346 , 571 P.2d 477 , reh. den. and modified 280 Or. 769 , 572 P.2d 1320 (1977), "indicates a legislative intent that the homemaker spouse who is most likely to seek spousal support, be recognized as an economic contributor to the marriage rather than as a passive recipient of economic benefits provided by the breadwinner." It would apply, for example, to a distribution of marital assets purchased with the earnings of one spouse.