Barker-Doggett factors in Georgia

2025See also Ruffin v. State, 284 Ga. 52, 56-57 ( 663 SE2d 189 ) (2008) (explaining that “[i]t is important that trial courts not limit their consideration of the 5 lengthiness of the pretrial delay to the threshold question of presumptive prejudice and remember to count it again as one of four criteria to be weighed in the balancing process at the second stage of the Barker-Doggett analysis”).

2025See also Ruffin v. State, 284 Ga. 52, 56-57 ( 663 SE2d 189 ) (2008) (explaining that “[i]t is important that trial courts not limit their consideration of the 5 lengthiness of the pretrial delay to the threshold question of presumptive prejudice and remember to count it again as one of four criteria to be weighed in the balancing process at the second stage of the Barker-Doggett analysis”).

2020See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 530 ( 92 SCt 2182 , 33 LE2d 101) (1972); Doggett v. United States, 505 U. S. 647, 652 ( 112 SCt 2686 , 120 LE2d 520) (1992); see also Redd v. State, 261 Ga. 300 , 301 n.1 10 ( 404 SE2d 264 ) (1991) (applying the Barker-Doggett factors to speedy trial claims under the Georgia Constitution).

2020See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 530 ( 92 SCt 2182 , 33 LE2d 101) (1972); Doggett v. United States, 505 U. S. 647, 652 ( 112 SCt 2686 , 120 LE2d 520) (1992); see also Redd v. State, 261 Ga. 300 , 301 n.1 10 ( 404 SE2d 264 ) (1991) (applying the Barker-Doggett factors to speedy trial claims under the Georgia Constitution).

2020See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 530 ( 92 SCt 2182 , 33 LE2d 101) (1972); Doggett v. United States, 505 U. S. 647, 652 ( 112 SCt 2686 , 120 LE2d 520) (1992); see also Redd v. State, 261 Ga. 300 , 301 n.1 10 ( 404 SE2d 264 ) (1991) (applying the Barker-Doggett factors to speedy trial claims under the Georgia Constitution).

2020See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514, 530 ( 92 SCt 2182 , 33 LE2d 101) (1972); Doggett v. United States, 505 U. S. 647, 652 ( 112 SCt 2686 , 120 LE2d 520) (1992); see also Redd v. State, 261 Ga. 300 , 301 n.1 10 ( 404 SE2d 264 ) (1991) (applying the Barker-Doggett factors to speedy trial claims under the Georgia Constitution).

2024While “under the circumstances of a particular case, any one factor may be weighty enough to tip the balance” during weighing, State v. Porter, 288 Ga. 524, 533 (2) (d) (705 SE2d 636) (2011), “no one element is either necessary or sufficient to conclude that the right to a speedy trial has been violated.” Sweatman v. State, 287 Ga. 872, 873 (2) (700 SE2d 579) 8 See, e.g., Henderson, 310 Ga. at 240 (2) (d) (holding that the trial court acted within its discretion in applying the Barker-Doggett factors and committed no clear factual or legal errors when it found no violation of the speedy-trial

2024While “under the circumstances of a particular case, any one factor may be weighty enough to tip the balance” during weighing, State v. Porter, 288 Ga. 524, 533 (2) (d) (705 SE2d 636) (2011), “no one element is either necessary or sufficient to conclude that the right to a speedy trial has been violated.” Sweatman v. State, 287 Ga. 872, 873 (2) (700 SE2d 579) 8 See, e.g., Henderson, 310 Ga. at 240 (2) (d) (holding that the trial court acted within its discretion in applying the Barker-Doggett factors and committed no clear factual or legal errors when it found no violation of the speedy-trial

2016In the first stage of the Barker-Doggett analysis, “the court must determine whether the pretrial delay is sufficiently long to be considered presumptively prejudicial.” Ferguson v. State, 303 Ga. App. 341, 342 ( 693 SE2d 578 ) (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2016In the first stage of the Barker-Doggett analysis, “the court must determine whether the pretrial delay is sufficiently long to be considered presumptively prejudicial.” Ferguson v. State, 303 Ga. App. 341, 342 ( 693 SE2d 578 ) (2010) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2022See State v. Pickett, 288 Ga. 674, 676 (2) (b) ( 706 SE2d 561 ) (2011). 2.

2013Given the longstanding commitment of the weighing of the Barker-Doggett factors to the discretion of the trial courts, we have explained that “[i]t is not the job of [an] appellate court... to weigh the Barker[-Doggett] factors in the first instance.” Pickett, 288 Ga. at 679-680 (2) (d).

2024We remind the State, however, “that the speedy trial clock is still ticking, and the trial court’s analysis on remand should take into account that the length of the pretrial delay continues to run until entry of a [second] written order applying the Barker-Doggett framework.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.

2024We remind the State, however, “that the speedy trial clock is still ticking, and the trial court’s analysis on remand should take into account that the length of the pretrial delay continues to run until entry of a [second] written order applying the Barker-Doggett framework.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.

2024While “under the circumstances of a particular case, any one factor may be weighty enough to tip the balance” during weighing, State v. Porter, 288 Ga. 524, 533 (2) (d) (705 SE2d 636) (2011), “no one element is either necessary or sufficient to conclude that the right to a speedy trial has been violated.” Sweatman v. State, 287 Ga. 872, 873 (2) (700 SE2d 579) 8 See, e.g., Henderson, 310 Ga. at 240 (2) (d) (holding that the trial court acted within its discretion in applying the Barker-Doggett factors and committed no clear factual or legal errors when it found no violation of the speedy-trial

2024While “under the circumstances of a particular case, any one factor may be weighty enough to tip the balance” during weighing, State v. Porter, 288 Ga. 524, 533 (2) (d) (705 SE2d 636) (2011), “no one element is either necessary or sufficient to conclude that the right to a speedy trial has been violated.” Sweatman v. State, 287 Ga. 872, 873 (2) (700 SE2d 579) 8 See, e.g., Henderson, 310 Ga. at 240 (2) (d) (holding that the trial court acted within its discretion in applying the Barker-Doggett factors and committed no clear factual or legal errors when it found no violation of the speedy-trial

2023See Redding, supra, 309 Ga. at 129-130 (2) (vacating the trial court’s judgment for failing to conduct an analysis of the defendant’s constitutional speedy trial claim pursuant to the Barker-Doggett factors, and remanding the case to the trial court to enter the necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law on the claim).

2023See Redding, supra, 309 Ga. at 129-130 (2) (vacating the trial court’s judgment for failing to conduct an analysis of the defendant’s constitutional speedy trial claim pursuant to the Barker-Doggett factors, and remanding the case to the trial court to enter the necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law on the claim).

2022See Labbee, 362 Ga. App. at 562-563 (1)-(2) (a), 565 (2) (b) (iv). 10 necessary analysis.6 See Johnson, 291 Ga. at 868 (3) (concluding that the trial court had erred in its consideration of the Barker-Doggett factors and remanding “for the trial court to correctly apply the pertinent legal principles” and reconsider the defendant’s speedy trial claim); Porter, 288 Ga. at 534 (2) (e) (holding that “the trial court could not properly balance the Barker factors” due to errors and omissions in its speedy trial analysis, which required a remand for the court “to exercise its discretion again using

2022See Labbee, 362 Ga. App. at 562-563 (1)-(2) (a), 565 (2) (b) (iv). 10 necessary analysis.6 See Johnson, 291 Ga. at 868 (3) (concluding that the trial court had erred in its consideration of the Barker-Doggett factors and remanding “for the trial court to correctly apply the pertinent legal principles” and reconsider the defendant’s speedy trial claim); Porter, 288 Ga. at 534 (2) (e) (holding that “the trial court could not properly balance the Barker factors” due to errors and omissions in its speedy trial analysis, which required a remand for the court “to exercise its discretion again using

2024While “the length of the pretrial delay in absolute terms plays a role in the threshold determination of presumptive prejudice . . . it also wears another hat as one of the four interrelated criteria that must be weighed in the balance at the second stage of the Barker-Doggett analysis.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Dillard, 297 Ga. at 760 (4).

2024While “the length of the pretrial delay in absolute terms plays a role in the threshold determination of presumptive prejudice . . . it also wears another hat as one of the four interrelated criteria that must be weighed in the balance at the second stage of the Barker-Doggett analysis.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Dillard, 297 Ga. at 760 (4).

2022“The second factor in the Barker- Doggett analysis requires the court to examine both the reason for the delay and whether this is attributable to the defendant or the [S]tate.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hayes v. State, 298 Ga. App. 338, 341 (2) (b) ( 680 SE2d 182 ) (2009).

2022“The second factor in the Barker- Doggett analysis requires the court to examine both the reason for the delay and whether this is attributable to the defendant or the [S]tate.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Hayes v. State, 298 Ga. App. 338, 341 (2) (b) ( 680 SE2d 182 ) (2009).

2012“The pretrial delay is measured from the accused’s arrest, indictment, or other formal accusation, whichever comes first, to the trial or, if the accused files a motion to dismiss the indictment, until the trial court denies the motion.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Moore v. State, 314 Ga. App. 219, 220 ( 723 SE2d 508 ) (2012).

2012“The pretrial delay is measured from the accused’s arrest, indictment, or other formal accusation, whichever comes first, to the trial or, if the accused files a motion to dismiss the indictment, until the trial court denies the motion.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Moore v. State, 314 Ga. App. 219, 220 ( 723 SE2d 508 ) (2012).

2025See also Ruffin v. State, 284 Ga. 52, 56-57 ( 663 SE2d 189 ) (2008) (explaining that “[i]t is important that trial courts not limit their consideration of the 5 lengthiness of the pretrial delay to the threshold question of presumptive prejudice and remember to count it again as one of four criteria to be weighed in the balancing process at the second stage of the Barker-Doggett analysis”).

2025See also Ruffin v. State, 284 Ga. 52, 56-57 ( 663 SE2d 189 ) (2008) (explaining that “[i]t is important that trial courts not limit their consideration of the 5 lengthiness of the pretrial delay to the threshold question of presumptive prejudice and remember to count it again as one of four criteria to be weighed in the balancing process at the second stage of the Barker-Doggett analysis”).

2013Additionally, “if the trial court enters a new order [granting or] denying a motion to dismiss on 5 speedy trial grounds, the length of the pretrial delay runs to the entry of the new order rather than the original order, where an appellate court vacated the original order and remanded for the entry of a new order expressly applying the Barker-Doggett framework.” Richardson v. State, 318 Ga. App. 155, 158 (1) ( 733 SE2d 444 ) (2012); see also Goddard v. State, 315 Ga. App. 868, 870-871 ( 729 SE2d 397 ) (2012).

2013Additionally, “if the trial court enters a new order [granting or] denying a motion to dismiss on 5 speedy trial grounds, the length of the pretrial delay runs to the entry of the new order rather than the original order, where an appellate court vacated the original order and remanded for the entry of a new order expressly applying the Barker-Doggett framework.” Richardson v. State, 318 Ga. App. 155, 158 (1) ( 733 SE2d 444 ) (2012); see also Goddard v. State, 315 Ga. App. 868, 870-871 ( 729 SE2d 397 ) (2012).

2024While “under the circumstances of a particular case, any one factor may be weighty enough to tip the balance” during weighing, State v. Porter, 288 Ga. 524, 533 (2) (d) (705 SE2d 636) (2011), “no one element is either necessary or sufficient to conclude that the right to a speedy trial has been violated.” Sweatman v. State, 287 Ga. 872, 873 (2) (700 SE2d 579) 8 See, e.g., Henderson, 310 Ga. at 240 (2) (d) (holding that the trial court acted within its discretion in applying the Barker-Doggett factors and committed no clear factual or legal errors when it found no violation of the speedy-trial

2024While “under the circumstances of a particular case, any one factor may be weighty enough to tip the balance” during weighing, State v. Porter, 288 Ga. 524, 533 (2) (d) (705 SE2d 636) (2011), “no one element is either necessary or sufficient to conclude that the right to a speedy trial has been violated.” Sweatman v. State, 287 Ga. 872, 873 (2) (700 SE2d 579) 8 See, e.g., Henderson, 310 Ga. at 240 (2) (d) (holding that the trial court acted within its discretion in applying the Barker-Doggett factors and committed no clear factual or legal errors when it found no violation of the speedy-trial

2024While “under the circumstances of a particular case, any one factor may be weighty enough to tip the balance” during weighing, State v. Porter, 288 Ga. 524, 533 (2) (d) (705 SE2d 636) (2011), “no one element is either necessary or sufficient to conclude that the right to a speedy trial has been violated.” Sweatman v. State, 287 Ga. 872, 873 (2) (700 SE2d 579) 8 See, e.g., Henderson, 310 Ga. at 240 (2) (d) (holding that the trial court acted within its discretion in applying the Barker-Doggett factors and committed no clear factual or legal errors when it found no violation of the speedy-trial

2024While “under the circumstances of a particular case, any one factor may be weighty enough to tip the balance” during weighing, State v. Porter, 288 Ga. 524, 533 (2) (d) (705 SE2d 636) (2011), “no one element is either necessary or sufficient to conclude that the right to a speedy trial has been violated.” Sweatman v. State, 287 Ga. 872, 873 (2) (700 SE2d 579) 8 See, e.g., Henderson, 310 Ga. at 240 (2) (d) (holding that the trial court acted within its discretion in applying the Barker-Doggett factors and committed no clear factual or legal errors when it found no violation of the speedy-trial

2025“If the trial court would still have discretion to reach a different judgment, we remand for the trial court to reweigh the factors and exercise its discretion using the correct factual and legal analysis.” Id. (a) Because the first factor in the Barker-Doggett test involves a determination of the length of the delay in obtaining a trial, we 15 begin with the State’s contention that the trial court erred in determining that the December 19 trial was void and thus that the pretrial delay was still continuing after nine years.

2025“If the trial court would still have discretion to reach a different judgment, we remand for the trial court to reweigh the factors and exercise its discretion using the correct factual and legal analysis.” Id. (a) Because the first factor in the Barker-Doggett test involves a determination of the length of the delay in obtaining a trial, we 15 begin with the State’s contention that the trial court erred in determining that the December 19 trial was void and thus that the pretrial delay was still continuing after nine years.

2014With respect to the length of delay, “a court must decide whether the case was prosecuted with customary promptness, keeping in mind that the delay that can be tolerated in a particular case depends to some extent on the complexity and seriousness of the charges in that case.” Alexander, supra, 295 Ga. at 157 (2) (a) (citations and punctuation omitted).

2014With respect to the length of delay, “a court must decide whether the case was prosecuted with customary promptness, keeping in mind that the delay that can be tolerated in a particular case depends to some extent on the complexity and seriousness of the charges in that case.” Alexander, supra, 295 Ga. at 157 (2) (a) (citations and punctuation omitted).

2024See Redding II, 313 Ga. at 736 (2); Johnson, 291 Ga. at 868 (3).10 Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction.

2024See Redding II, 313 Ga. at 736 (2); Johnson, 291 Ga. at 868 (3).10 Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction.

2022See Dillard, 297 Ga. at 761 - 763 (4) (determining that the prejudice factor “weigh[ed] against [the] appellant” where he “failed to show the delay interfered with his ability to present evidence which would have strengthened his defense” and “could not point to any harm other than the incarceration itself”); Taylor, 312 Ga. at 14 (4) (b) (iv) (determining that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the prejudice factor against the appellant when she only “generally assert[ed] that her defense was prejudiced”). 21 Given Williams’s delay in asserting his right to speedy trial

2022See Dillard, 297 Ga. at 761 - 763 (4) (determining that the prejudice factor “weigh[ed] against [the] appellant” where he “failed to show the delay interfered with his ability to present evidence which would have strengthened his defense” and “could not point to any harm other than the incarceration itself”); Taylor, 312 Ga. at 14 (4) (b) (iv) (determining that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in weighing the prejudice factor against the appellant when she only “generally assert[ed] that her defense was prejudiced”). 21 Given Williams’s delay in asserting his right to speedy trial

2019See Ruffin v. State, 284 Ga. 52, 65-66 (3) ( 663 SE2d 189 ) (2008) (trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s speedy trial claim when defendant delayed in asserting his right and could show no actual prejudice resulting from the delay, despite the fact that the first two factors weighed against the State); Nusser, supra, 275 Ga. App. at 902 (same). 13 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in evaluating Jung’s speedy-trial claim under the Barker-Doggett test, and we affirm the denial of Jung’s motion to dismiss.2 Judgment affirmed.

2019See Ruffin v. State, 284 Ga. 52, 65-66 (3) ( 663 SE2d 189 ) (2008) (trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant’s speedy trial claim when defendant delayed in asserting his right and could show no actual prejudice resulting from the delay, despite the fact that the first two factors weighed against the State); Nusser, supra, 275 Ga. App. at 902 (same). 13 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in evaluating Jung’s speedy-trial claim under the Barker-Doggett test, and we affirm the denial of Jung’s motion to dismiss.2 Judgment affirmed.

2019However, it also wears another hat as one of the four interrelated criteria that must be weighed in the balance at the second stage of the Barker-Doggett analysis.” Ditman v. State, 301 Ga. App. 187, 190 (2) (a) ( 687 SE2d 155 ) (2009) (citation omitted).

2019However, it also wears another hat as one of the four interrelated criteria that must be weighed in the balance at the second stage of the Barker-Doggett analysis.” Ditman v. State, 301 Ga. App. 187, 190 (2) (a) ( 687 SE2d 155 ) (2009) (citation omitted).

2016“The second factor in the Barker-Doggett analysis requires the court to examine both the reason for the delay and whether this is attributable to the defendant or the state.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Thomas v. State, 331 Ga. App. 641, 661-662 (8) (b) (ii) ( 771 SE2d 255 ) (2015).

2016“The second factor in the Barker-Doggett analysis requires the court to examine both the reason for the delay and whether this is attributable to the defendant or the state.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Thomas v. State, 331 Ga. App. 641, 661-662 (8) (b) (ii) ( 771 SE2d 255 ) (2015).

2016Although the trial court made no finding of presumptive prejudice, the 45-month delay in this case was sufficient to raise a presumption of prejudice such that the trial court was required to engage in the second part of the Barker-Doggett test, “with the length of the delay also factored into [its] consideration of prejudice.” Bass v. State, 275 Ga. App. 259, 260 (1) ( 620 SE2d 184 ) (2005), citing State v. Johnson, 274 Ga. 511, 512 (1) ( 555 SE2d 710 ) (2001). (b) The Balancing Test: (i) Whether the Delay Was Uncommonly Long. “[A] trial court’s order must provide sufficient findings of fact

2016Although the trial court made no finding of presumptive prejudice, the 45-month delay in this case was sufficient to raise a presumption of prejudice such that the trial court was required to engage in the second part of the Barker-Doggett test, “with the length of the delay also factored into [its] consideration of prejudice.” Bass v. State, 275 Ga. App. 259, 260 (1) ( 620 SE2d 184 ) (2005), citing State v. Johnson, 274 Ga. 511, 512 (1) ( 555 SE2d 710 ) (2001). (b) The Balancing Test: (i) Whether the Delay Was Uncommonly Long. “[A] trial court’s order must provide sufficient findings of fact

2016“In reviewing the trial court’s resolution of a speedy trial claim, we must accept the court’s findings of fact if the record contains any evidence to support them, and we will defer to the trial court’s ultimate conclusion unless it amounts to an abuse of discretion!)]” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) York v. State, 334 Ga. App. 581, 584 (2) ( 780 SE2d 352 ) (2015).

2016“In reviewing the trial court’s resolution of a speedy trial claim, we must accept the court’s findings of fact if the record contains any evidence to support them, and we will defer to the trial court’s ultimate conclusion unless it amounts to an abuse of discretion!)]” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) York v. State, 334 Ga. App. 581, 584 (2) ( 780 SE2d 352 ) (2015).

2015However, it also wears another hat as one of the four interrelated criteria that must be weighed in the balance at the second stage of the Barker-Doggett analysis.” Ditman, 301 Ga. App. at 190 (2) (a) (citation omitted); Fallen v. State, 289 Ga. 247, 248 (1) ( 710 SE2d 559 ) (2011) (“The delay is then considered a second time by factoring it into the prejudice prong of the Barker analysis, with the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifying over time.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2015However, it also wears another hat as one of the four interrelated criteria that must be weighed in the balance at the second stage of the Barker-Doggett analysis.” Ditman, 301 Ga. App. at 190 (2) (a) (citation omitted); Fallen v. State, 289 Ga. 247, 248 (1) ( 710 SE2d 559 ) (2011) (“The delay is then considered a second time by factoring it into the prejudice prong of the Barker analysis, with the presumption that pretrial delay has prejudiced the accused intensifying over time.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2014See Brock v. State, 293 Ga. 156, 160 ( 743 SE2d 410 ) (2013).

2014See Brock v. State, 293 Ga. 156, 160 ( 743 SE2d 410 ) (2013).

2020See also Johnson, 300 Ga. at 258 (3) (“It is not the job of an appellate court to apply the Barker-Doggett framework in the first instance.”).

2020See also Johnson, 300 Ga. at 258 (3) (“It is not the job of an appellate court to apply the Barker-Doggett framework in the first instance.”).

2020“Both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Georgia Constitution provide that a criminal defendant shall have the right to a speedy trial.” State v. Bonawitz, 339 Ga. App. 299, 300 (1) ( 793 SE2d 191 ) (2016) (citations omitted).

2020“Both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and the Georgia Constitution provide that a criminal defendant shall have the right to a speedy trial.” State v. Bonawitz, 339 Ga. App. 299, 300 (1) ( 793 SE2d 191 ) (2016) (citations omitted).