84 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2025 15 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Greergreen2 sentences2025As our supreme court has explained, 8 “It is only after a defendant’s petition has been found to set forth the gist of a meritorious claim, or the court fails to take any action on the petition within 90 days of filing, that the process advances to second-stage proceedings and counsel is appointed. [Citation.] Of course, in the latter instance, the petition may well be frivolous or patently without merit, and the defendant is appointed counsel only through the fortuity of the circuit court’s inaction.” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Greer, 212 Ill. 2d 192, 204 (2004). 2024The reason for the court’s holding in Kuehner was because the trial court advanced defendant’s pro se petition to the second stage after finding it set forth the gist of a meritorious claim, as opposed to People v. Greer, 212 Ill. 2d 192, 200 (2004), in which defendant’s petition was advanced by default. | 7 | 12 |
People v. Colemangreen2 sentences2022Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 385 . ¶ 61 On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his postconviction petition because he presented the gist of a meritorious claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to fully investigate his sanity at the time of the offense and present witness testimony from his treating physicians at Cermak. 2021Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 385 . ¶ 27 On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his postconviction petition because he presented the gist of a meritorious claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to file a motion to quash his arrest. | 4 | 6 |
People v. Priergreen2 sentences2001People v. Prier, 245 Ill. 2001People v. Prier , 245 Ill. | 4 | 4 |
People v. Edwardsgreen2 sentences2021Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 244 . 2021People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 244-45 (2001). | 3 | 6 |
People v. Edwardsgreen2 sentences2015App. 3d 914, 924 (2006) (holding that a section 122-1(f) motion “need state only the gist of a meritorious claim of cause and prejudice”), aff’d on other grounds, 227 Ill. 2d 39 (2007); People v. Evans, 2011 IL App (1st) 100391-U , ¶ 13 (rejecting LaPointe, and finding that a stricter standard applies to pro se successive petitions); People v. Smith, 2011 IL App (1st) 091938-U , ¶¶ 15-17 (rejecting LaPointe); People v. McKinley, 2012 IL App (1st) 110513-U , ¶¶ 13-15 (rejecting LaPointe); People v. Edwards, 2012 IL App (1st) 091651, ¶¶ 21-22 (rejecting LaPointe); People v. Files, 2012 IL App (2 2014App. 3d 914, 924 (2006) (holding that a -7- section 122-1(f) motion “need state only the gist of a meritorious claim of cause and prejudice”), aff’d on other grounds, 227 Ill. 2d 39 (2007); People v. Evans, 2011 IL App (1st) 100391-U , ¶ 13 (rejecting LaPointe, and finding that a stricter standard applies to pro se successive petitions); People v. Smith, 2011 IL App (1st) 091938-U , ¶¶ 15-17 (rejecting LaPointe); People v. McKinley, 2012 IL App (1st) 110513-U , ¶¶ 13-15 (rejecting LaPointe); People v. Edwards, 2012 IL App (1st) 091651, ¶¶ 21-22 (rejecting LaPointe); People v. Files, 2012 IL Ap | 3 | 3 |
People v. Odlegreen2 sentences2007The right to effective assistance refers to competent and not perfect representation (People v. Odle, 151 Ill. 2d 168, 173 , 601 N.E.2d 732, 735 (1992)), and mistakes in judgment will not, of themselves, render the representation incompetent (Palmer, 162 Ill. 2d at 476 , 643 N.E.2d at 801-02 ). 2007The right to effective assistance refers to competent and not perfect representation (People v. Odle, 151 Ill. 2d 168, 173 , 601 N.E.2d 732, 735 (1992)), and mistakes in judgment will not, of themselves, render the representation incompetent (Palmer, 162 Ill. 2d at 476 , 643 N.E.2d at 801-02 ). | 3 | 3 |
People v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2007See People v. Greer, 212 Ill. 2d 192, 211 , 817 N.E.2d 511, 523 (2004); People v. Jones, 144 Ill.2d 242, 263 , 579 N.E.2d 829, 838 (1991). 2007See People v. Greer, 212 Ill. 2d 192, 211 , 817 N.E.2d 511, 523 (2004); People v. Jones, 144 Ill.2d 242, 263 , 579 N.E.2d 829, 838 (1991). | 3 | 3 |
People v. Riveragreen2 sentences2020“If a single claim in a multiple-claim postconviction petition survives the summary dismissal stage of proceedings under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, then the entire petition must be docketed for second-stage proceedings regardless of the merits of the remaining claims in the petition.” People v. Romero, 2015 IL App (1st) 140205, ¶ 27 (citing People v. Rivera, 198 Ill. 2d 364, 371 (2001)). ¶ 15 On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his postconviction petition because he presented the gist of a meritorious claim of a Brady violation by the State as well as ine 2010Because partial dismissals are unauthorized (People v. Rivera, 198 Ill. 2d 364, 374 (2001)), the entire petition must be advanced to the next stage (see 725 ILCS 5/122—2.1(b) (West 2008)). | 2 | 5 |
People v. Hodgesgreen2 sentences2021People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 11 (2009). 2020People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 9 (2009). | 2 | 2 |
People v. Kanegreen2 sentences2020See People v. Kane, 2013 IL App (2d) 110594, ¶ 26 . 2020See People v. Kane, 2013 IL App (2d) 110594, ¶ 26 . ¶ 13 We review de novo the summary dismissal of a petition. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Hanksgreen2 sentences2010People v. Hanks, 335 Ill. 2010People v. Hanks, 335 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Phyfihergreen2 sentences2007App. 3d 1017, 1027 (2006) (dismissal of petition at first stage was appropriate because "defendant has failed to state the gist of a meritorious claim that counsel's failure to investigate his fitness and request a fitness hearing prejudiced him"); People v. Phyfiher, 361 Ill. 2007App. 3d 1017, 1027 (2006) (dismissal of petition at first stage was appropriate because “defendant has failed to state the gist of a meritorious claim that counsel’s failure to investigate his fitness and request a fitness hearing prejudiced him”); People v. Phyfiher, 361 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Gaultneygreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Donleygreen | 2 | 2 |
| People v. Portergreen | 2 | 2 |
People v. LaPointegreen2 sentences2015App. 3d 914, 924 (2006) (holding that a section 122-1(f) motion “need state only the gist of a meritorious claim of cause and prejudice”), aff’d on other grounds, 227 Ill. 2d 39 (2007); People v. Evans, 2011 IL App (1st) 100391-U , ¶ 13 (rejecting LaPointe, and finding that a stricter standard applies to pro se successive petitions); People v. Smith, 2011 IL App (1st) 091938-U , ¶¶ 15-17 (rejecting LaPointe); People v. McKinley, 2012 IL App (1st) 110513-U , ¶¶ 13-15 (rejecting LaPointe); People v. Edwards, 2012 IL App (1st) 091651, ¶¶ 21-22 (rejecting LaPointe); People v. Files, 2012 IL App (2 2014App. 3d 914, 924 (2006) (holding that a -7- section 122-1(f) motion “need state only the gist of a meritorious claim of cause and prejudice”), aff’d on other grounds, 227 Ill. 2d 39 (2007); People v. Evans, 2011 IL App (1st) 100391-U , ¶ 13 (rejecting LaPointe, and finding that a stricter standard applies to pro se successive petitions); People v. Smith, 2011 IL App (1st) 091938-U , ¶¶ 15-17 (rejecting LaPointe); People v. McKinley, 2012 IL App (1st) 110513-U , ¶¶ 13-15 (rejecting LaPointe); People v. Edwards, 2012 IL App (1st) 091651, ¶¶ 21-22 (rejecting LaPointe); People v. Files, 2012 IL Ap | 1 | 5 |
People v. Conickgreen2 sentences2012The Conick court's juxtaposing the review of an initial petition under the "`gist' standard" and "a proffered successive petition subject to the more exacting cause and *425 prejudice standard" (emphasis added)( Conick, 232 Ill.2d at 142 , 327 Ill.Dec. 516 , 902 N.E.2d 637 ), calls into question the declaration in the Second District's decision in LaPointe that "a section 122-1(f) motion need state only the gist of a meritorious claim of cause and prejudice." LaPointe, 365 Ill.App.3d at 924 , 303 Ill. 2012The Conick court's juxtaposing the review of an initial petition under the "`gist' standard" and "a proffered successive petition subject to the more exacting cause and *425 prejudice standard" (emphasis added)( Conick, 232 Ill.2d at 142 , 327 Ill.Dec. 516 , 902 N.E.2d 637 ), calls into question the declaration in the Second District's decision in LaPointe that "a section 122-1(f) motion need state only the gist of a meritorious claim of cause and prejudice." LaPointe, 365 Ill.App.3d at 924 , 303 Ill. | 1 | 3 |
| People v. Lemonsgreen | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Whitfieldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Morrisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Romerogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Andersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Andersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Seaberggreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2007Brady violations Defendant next contends that his petition states a gist of a meritorious claim under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 10 L. 2007Brady violations Defendant next contends that his petition states a gist of a meritorious claim under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 , 10 L. | 6 | 2006–2009 |
People v. LaPointe
green
2 sentences2014In that case, the Second District held that a section 122-1(f) motion “need state only the gist of a meritorious claim of cause and prejudice.” LaPointe, 365 Ill. 2014In that case, the Second District held that a section 122-1(f) motion “need state only the gist of a meritorious claim of cause and prejudice.” LaPointe, 365 Ill. | 4 | 2012–2014 |
People v. Palmer
green
2 sentences2007The right to effective assistance refers to competent and not perfect representation (People v. Odle, 151 Ill. 2d 168, 173 , 601 N.E.2d 732, 735 (1992)), and mistakes in judgment will not, of themselves, render the representation incompetent (Palmer, 162 Ill. 2d at 476 , 643 N.E.2d at 801-02 ). 2007The right to effective assistance refers to competent and not perfect representation (People v. Odle, 151 Ill. 2d 168, 173 , 601 N.E.2d 732, 735 (1992)), and mistakes in judgment will not, of themselves, render the representation incompetent (Palmer, 162 Ill. 2d at 476 , 643 N.E.2d at 801-02 ). | 3 | 2006–2007 |
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2002Defendant appeals, contending that his pro se petition set forth the gist of a meritorious claim based upon Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 147 L. 2002Defendant appeals, contending that his pro se petition set forth the gist of a meritorious claim based upon Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 147 L. | 3 | 2002–2002 |
People v. Dredge
green
2 sentences2000People v. Dredge, 148 Ill. 1992App. 3d 911 , 500 N.E.2d 445 , in which this court concluded a pro se defendant seeking post-conviction relief from an alleged constitutional violation need only include in the petition a simple statement representing the gist of a meritorious claim. | 3 | 1992–2000 |
People v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2024However, the plain and ordinary meaning of section 122-2.1(a)(2) authorizes first-stage dismissal of a postconviction petition when the petition is clearly, obviously, and plainly without merit. *** Summary dismissal is proper where there is no arguable basis in fact or in law that would give the petitioner standing to challenge his conviction.” People v. Johnson, 2021 IL 125738, ¶ 59 . 19 1-23-0057 under which the proceedings may be brought.” Johnson, 2021 IL 125738, ¶ 49 . 2021While a defendant need only present the gist of a meritorious claim in a pro se petition to survive summary dismissal, with sufficient facts to assert an arguable claim (Johnson, 2021 IL 125738, ¶¶ 25-26 ), defendant presented no unrefuted factual allegations in support of his Harris claim. | 2 | 2021–2024 |
People v. McDonald
green
2 sentences2019Id. ¶ 26 Defendant asserts that McDonald supports his contention that his pro se petition stated the gist of a meritorious claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him that, if he could not find suitable housing, he would spend some or all of his MSR term—potentially the rest of his life—in prison. 2019Id. ¶ 26 Defendant asserts that McDonald supports his contention that his pro se petition stated the gist of a meritorious claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him that, if he could not find suitable housing, he would spend some or all of his MSR term-potentially the rest of his life-in prison. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Tate
green
2 sentences2017Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 10 . ¶ 41 On appeal, the petitioner contends that the trial court erred when it summarily dismissed his pro se petition because he made the gist of a meritorious claim that his 50-year sentence violated his constitutional rights both under the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. 2017Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 10 . ¶ 41 On appeal, the petitioner contends that the trial court erred when it summarily dismissed his pro se petition because he made the gist of a meritorious claim that his 50-year sentence violated his constitutional rights both under the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Montgomery v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences2017Like other substantive rules, Miller is retroactive because it ‘ “necessarily carr[ies] a significant risk that a defendant” ’— here, the vast majority of juvenile offenders—‘ “faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.” ’ [Citation.]” Montgomery, 577 U.S. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 734 . 16 No. 1-14-2931 ¶ 52 On appeal, the State initially contends that the petitioner failed to set forth a gist of a meritorious claim of an eighth amendment violation because Miller applied only to mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole, and not to discretionary sentences, such as th 2017Like other substantive rules, Miller is retroactive because it ‘ “necessarily carr[ies] a significant risk that a defendant” ’—here, the vast majority of juvenile offenders—‘ “faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him.” ’ [Citation.]” Montgomery, 577 U.S. at ___, 136 S. Ct. at 734 . ¶ 52 On appeal, the State initially contends that the petitioner failed to set forth a gist of a meritorious claim of an eighth amendment violation because Miller applied only to mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole, and not to discretionary sentences, such as the -9- one here, wh | 2 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Nieto
green
2 sentences2017We acknowledge that when the parties filed this appeal, our appellate courts had split on this issue, with some holding that under Montgomery, Miller’s prohibition against mandatory life sentences without parole for juveniles applied equally to discretionary life sentences without parole (see, e.g., People v. Nieto, 2016 IL App (1st) 121604 , ¶¶ 46-49; People v. Ortiz, 2016 IL App (1st) 133294, ¶¶ 16-25 ; People v. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451 ), while others maintaining that Miller was reserved for mandatory sentences alone (see, e.g., People v. Wilson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141500, ¶ 30 ; Pe 2017We acknowledge that when the parties filed this appeal, our appellate court had split on this issue, with some holding that under Montgomery, Miller’s prohibition against mandatory life sentences without parole for juveniles applied equally to discretionary life sentences without parole (see, e.g., People v. Nieto, 2016 IL App (1st) 121604 , ¶¶ 46-49; People v. Ortiz, 2016 IL App (1st) 133294, ¶¶ 16-25 ; People v. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451 ), while others maintained that Miller was reserved for mandatory sentences alone (see, e.g., People v. Wilson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141500, ¶ 30 ; Peop | 2 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Wilson
green
2 sentences2017We acknowledge that when the parties filed this appeal, our appellate courts had split on this issue, with some holding that under Montgomery, Miller’s prohibition against mandatory life sentences without parole for juveniles applied equally to discretionary life sentences without parole (see, e.g., People v. Nieto, 2016 IL App (1st) 121604 , ¶¶ 46-49; People v. Ortiz, 2016 IL App (1st) 133294, ¶¶ 16-25 ; People v. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451 ), while others maintaining that Miller was reserved for mandatory sentences alone (see, e.g., People v. Wilson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141500, ¶ 30 ; Pe 2017We acknowledge that when the parties filed this appeal, our appellate court had split on this issue, with some holding that under Montgomery, Miller’s prohibition against mandatory life sentences without parole for juveniles applied equally to discretionary life sentences without parole (see, e.g., People v. Nieto, 2016 IL App (1st) 121604 , ¶¶ 46-49; People v. Ortiz, 2016 IL App (1st) 133294, ¶¶ 16-25 ; People v. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451 ), while others maintained that Miller was reserved for mandatory sentences alone (see, e.g., People v. Wilson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141500, ¶ 30 ; Peop | 2 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Reyes
green
2 sentences2017We acknowledge that when the parties filed this appeal, our appellate courts had split on this issue, with some holding that under Montgomery, Miller’s prohibition against mandatory life sentences without parole for juveniles applied equally to discretionary life sentences without parole (see, e.g., People v. Nieto, 2016 IL App (1st) 121604 , ¶¶ 46-49; People v. Ortiz, 2016 IL App (1st) 133294, ¶¶ 16-25 ; People v. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451 ), while others maintaining that Miller was reserved for mandatory sentences alone (see, e.g., People v. Wilson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141500, ¶ 30 ; Pe 2017We acknowledge that when the parties filed this appeal, our appellate court had split on this issue, with some holding that under Montgomery, Miller’s prohibition against mandatory life sentences without parole for juveniles applied equally to discretionary life sentences without parole (see, e.g., People v. Nieto, 2016 IL App (1st) 121604 , ¶¶ 46-49; People v. Ortiz, 2016 IL App (1st) 133294, ¶¶ 16-25 ; People v. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451 ), while others maintained that Miller was reserved for mandatory sentences alone (see, e.g., People v. Wilson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141500, ¶ 30 ; Peop | 2 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Ortiz
green
2 sentences2017We acknowledge that when the parties filed this appeal, our appellate courts had split on this issue, with some holding that under Montgomery, Miller’s prohibition against mandatory life sentences without parole for juveniles applied equally to discretionary life sentences without parole (see, e.g., People v. Nieto, 2016 IL App (1st) 121604 , ¶¶ 46-49; People v. Ortiz, 2016 IL App (1st) 133294, ¶¶ 16-25 ; People v. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451 ), while others maintaining that Miller was reserved for mandatory sentences alone (see, e.g., People v. Wilson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141500, ¶ 30 ; Pe 2017We acknowledge that when the parties filed this appeal, our appellate court had split on this issue, with some holding that under Montgomery, Miller’s prohibition against mandatory life sentences without parole for juveniles applied equally to discretionary life sentences without parole (see, e.g., People v. Nieto, 2016 IL App (1st) 121604 , ¶¶ 46-49; People v. Ortiz, 2016 IL App (1st) 133294, ¶¶ 16-25 ; People v. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451 ), while others maintained that Miller was reserved for mandatory sentences alone (see, e.g., People v. Wilson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141500, ¶ 30 ; Peop | 2 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Cavazos
green
2 sentences2017We acknowledge that when the parties filed this appeal, our appellate courts had split on this issue, with some holding that under Montgomery, Miller’s prohibition against mandatory life sentences without parole for juveniles applied equally to discretionary life sentences without parole (see, e.g., People v. Nieto, 2016 IL App (1st) 121604 , ¶¶ 46-49; People v. Ortiz, 2016 IL App (1st) 133294, ¶¶ 16-25 ; People v. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451 ), while others maintaining that Miller was reserved for mandatory sentences alone (see, e.g., People v. Wilson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141500, ¶ 30 ; Pe 2017We acknowledge that when the parties filed this appeal, our appellate court had split on this issue, with some holding that under Montgomery, Miller’s prohibition against mandatory life sentences without parole for juveniles applied equally to discretionary life sentences without parole (see, e.g., People v. Nieto, 2016 IL App (1st) 121604 , ¶¶ 46-49; People v. Ortiz, 2016 IL App (1st) 133294, ¶¶ 16-25 ; People v. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451 ), while others maintained that Miller was reserved for mandatory sentences alone (see, e.g., People v. Wilson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141500, ¶ 30 ; Peop | 2 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Gipson
green
2 sentences2017We acknowledge that when the parties filed this appeal, our appellate courts had split on this issue, with some holding that under Montgomery, Miller’s prohibition against mandatory life sentences without parole for juveniles applied equally to discretionary life sentences without parole (see, e.g., People v. Nieto, 2016 IL App (1st) 121604 , ¶¶ 46-49; People v. Ortiz, 2016 IL App (1st) 133294, ¶¶ 16-25 ; People v. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451 ), while others maintaining that Miller was reserved for mandatory sentences alone (see, e.g., People v. Wilson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141500, ¶ 30 ; Pe 2017We acknowledge that when the parties filed this appeal, our appellate court had split on this issue, with some holding that under Montgomery, Miller’s prohibition against mandatory life sentences without parole for juveniles applied equally to discretionary life sentences without parole (see, e.g., People v. Nieto, 2016 IL App (1st) 121604 , ¶¶ 46-49; People v. Ortiz, 2016 IL App (1st) 133294, ¶¶ 16-25 ; People v. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451 ), while others maintained that Miller was reserved for mandatory sentences alone (see, e.g., People v. Wilson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141500, ¶ 30 ; Peop | 2 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Banks
green
2 sentences2017We acknowledge that when the parties filed this appeal, our appellate courts had split on this issue, with some holding that under Montgomery, Miller’s prohibition against mandatory life sentences without parole for juveniles applied equally to discretionary life sentences without parole (see, e.g., People v. Nieto, 2016 IL App (1st) 121604 , ¶¶ 46-49; People v. Ortiz, 2016 IL App (1st) 133294, ¶¶ 16-25 ; People v. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451 ), while others maintaining that Miller was reserved for mandatory sentences alone (see, e.g., People v. Wilson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141500, ¶ 30 ; Pe 2017We acknowledge that when the parties filed this appeal, our appellate court had split on this issue, with some holding that under Montgomery, Miller’s prohibition against mandatory life sentences without parole for juveniles applied equally to discretionary life sentences without parole (see, e.g., People v. Nieto, 2016 IL App (1st) 121604 , ¶¶ 46-49; People v. Ortiz, 2016 IL App (1st) 133294, ¶¶ 16-25 ; People v. Gipson, 2015 IL App (1st) 122451 ), while others maintained that Miller was reserved for mandatory sentences alone (see, e.g., People v. Wilson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141500, ¶ 30 ; Peop | 2 | 2017–2017 |
| People v. Stivers green | 2 | 2003–2003 |
| People v. Bates green | 2 | 2002–2002 |
| People v. Moore green | 2 | 2001–2001 |
| In Re Muraviov green | 2 | 2001–2001 |
| People v. McCain green | 2 | 2000–2000 |
| People v. Marks neutral | 2 | 2000–2000 |
| People v. Jones green | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| People v. Kuehner green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Harris green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Brown green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Reyes green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. Thomas green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| People v. West green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| People v. Tate green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Collins green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Johnson neutral | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Pennsylvania v. Finley green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Smith green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Evans green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Beard neutral | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| People v. Arias green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| People v. Von Perbandt green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.