12 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2009 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuitgreen2 sentences2009Corp., 911 F.2d at 877 (“there was substantial evidence from which the jury could have concluded that [claimant] was aware of the drug trafficking”); 1813 15th St. 2007In Tellevik v. Real Property Known as 31641 West Rutherford Street, 120 Wash.2d 68, 88 , 838 P.2d 111 (1992) (quoting United States v. 141st Street Corp. by Hersh, 911 F.2d 870, 879 (2d Cir.1990)), our Supreme Court defined "consent," in the context of the innocent owner exception to the real property forfeiture provision of RCW 69.50.505, as "the failure to take all reasonable steps to prevent illicit use of premises once one acquires knowledge of that use." (Emphasis added.) See RCW 69.50.505(1)(h). | 4 | 4 |
City of Bellevue v. Cashier's Check for $51,000 & $1,130 in U.S. Currencygreen2 sentences2009App. 697 , 855 P.2d 330 (1993), for the proposition that the personal representative of an estate may assert the innocent owner defense on behalf of the estate, rather than on behalf of the decedent property owner. 2009This court held that the successor personal representative was entitled to rely upon the innocent owner defense because he “had an interest in the cashier’s check [the proceeds] to the extent that those funds were needed to satisfy the legitimate claims of creditors and the expenses of administration.” Cashier’s Check, 70 Wn. | 2 | 3 |
Tellevik v. Real Property Known as 31641green2 sentences2007In Tellevik v. Real Property Known as 31641 West Rutherford Street, 120 Wn.2d 68 , 838 P.2d 111 (1992), our Supreme Court defined “consent,” in the context of the innocent owner exception to the real property forfeiture provision of RCW 69.50.505, as “ ‘the failure to take all reasonable steps to prevent illicit use of premises once one acquires knowledge of that use.’ ” 120 Wn.2d at 88 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. 141st St. 2007In Tellevik v. Real Property Known as 31641 West Rutherford Street, 120 Wn.2d 68 , 838 P.2d 111 (1992), our Supreme Court defined “consent,” in the context of the innocent owner exception to the real property forfeiture provision of RCW 69.50.505, as “ ‘the failure to take all reasonable steps to prevent illicit use of premises once one acquires knowledge of that use.’ ” 120 Wn.2d at 88 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. 141st St. | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Property Identified as 1813 15th Street N.W.green1 sentence2009Corp., 911 F.2d at 877 ("there was substantial evidence from which the jury could have concluded that [claimant] was aware of the drug trafficking"); 1813 15th St., N.W., 956 F.Supp. at 1036 ("Faced with overwhelming evidence to the contrary, a claimant cannot rely upon mere denials to prove an absence of actual knowledge, but rather must come forward with something more substantial."); United States v. Four Million, Two Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand, 762 F.2d 895, 906 (11th Cir.1985) ("the district court properly applied the `actual knowledge' standard, and found sufficient evidence to support | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Four Million, Two Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand, Etc., United States of America v. Three Million, Six Hundred Eighty-Six Thousand, Etc.green1 sentence2009Corp., 911 F.2d at 877 ("there was substantial evidence from which the jury could have concluded that [claimant] was aware of the drug trafficking"); 1813 15th St., N.W., 956 F.Supp. at 1036 ("Faced with overwhelming evidence to the contrary, a claimant cannot rely upon mere denials to prove an absence of actual knowledge, but rather must come forward with something more substantial."); United States v. Four Million, Two Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand, 762 F.2d 895, 906 (11th Cir.1985) ("the district court properly applied the `actual knowledge' standard, and found sufficient evidence to support | 1 | 1 |
United States v. 8848 South Commercial St., Chicago, Ill.green1 sentence2009Corp., 911 F.2d at 877 ("there was substantial evidence from which the jury could have concluded that [claimant] was aware of the drug trafficking"); 1813 15th St., N.W., 956 F.Supp. at 1036 ("Faced with overwhelming evidence to the contrary, a claimant cannot rely upon mere denials to prove an absence of actual knowledge, but rather must come forward with something more substantial."); United States v. Four Million, Two Hundred Fifty-Five Thousand, 762 F.2d 895, 906 (11th Cir.1985) ("the district court properly applied the `actual knowledge' standard, and found sufficient evidence to support | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Parcel of Rumson, NJ, Land
green
2 sentences1998City of Bellevue, 70 Wash.App. at 705 , 855 P.2d 330 ("`[E]quitable doctrines may foreclose the assertion of an innocent owner defense by a party with guilty knowledge of the tainted character of the property.'") (quoting 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S. at 130 , 113 S.Ct. 1126 ). 1998App. at 705 (“ ‘[E] quit able doctrines may foreclose the assertion of an innocent owner defense by a party with guilty knowledge of the tainted character of the property.’ ”) (quoting 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S. at 130 ). | 5 | 1993–2009 |
State v. Brown
green
2 sentences2009Brown, 92 Wn. 2009Brown, 92 Wash.App. at 596 , 965 P.2d 1102 . ¶ 24 Regardless of the soundness of Brown's application of Cashier's Check, Brown does not help the beneficiaries here. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Guillen v. Contreras
neutral
2 sentences2009App. 326 , 195 P.3d 90 (2008), claiming that it stands for the proposition that courts routinely apply the innocent owner defense when property is transferred by will after the commencement of a forfeiture action. 2009First, the beneficiaries cite to Guillen v. Contreras, 147 Wash.App. 326 , 195 P.3d 90 (2008), claiming that it stands for the proposition that courts routinely apply the innocent owner defense when property is transferred by will after the commencement of a forfeiture action. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Guillen v. Contreras
green
2 sentences2009While it is true that the superior court in that case appeared to rule in a family’s favor on that basis with respect to an item of personal property, Guillen, 147 Wn. 2009First, the beneficiaries cite to Guillen v. Contreras, 147 Wash.App. 326 , 195 P.3d 90 (2008), claiming that it stands for the proposition that courts routinely apply the innocent owner defense when property is transferred by will after the commencement of a forfeiture action. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
Jones v. Takaki
green
2 sentences2007For example, in Jones v. Takaki, 38 F.3d 321 (7th Cir.1994), owners presented an innocent-owner defense to property forfeiture and also argued unconstitutional delay in bringing forfeiture proceedings. 2007For example, in Jones v. Takaki, 38 F.3d 321 (7th Cir. 1994), owners presented an innocent-owner defense to property forfeiture and also argued unconstitutional delay in bringing forfeiture proceedings. | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Escamilla v. Tri-City Metro Drug Task Force
green
2 sentences2007In Escamilla v. Tri-City Metro Drug Task Force, 100 Wash.App. 742, 753-54 , 999 P.2d 625 (2000), Division Three of this court held that the claimant in that case was not entitled to benefit from the innocent owner exception to the illegal proceeds forfeiture provision of RCW 69.50.505 when the claimant either knew or "should have known" that the proceeds in question were drug-related. 2007App. 742, 753-54 , 999 P.2d 625 (2000), Division Three of this court held that the claimant in that case was not entitled to benefit from the innocent owner exception to the illegal proceeds forfeiture provision of RCW 69.50.505 when the claimant either knew or “should have known” that the proceeds in question were drug-related. | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Department of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C.
green
2 sentences2007Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wash.2d 1, 9 , 43 P.3d 4 (2002). 2007Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9 , 43 P.3d 4 (2002). | 2 | 2007–2007 |
State, Dept. of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn
green
2 sentences2007Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wash.2d 1, 9 , 43 P.3d 4 (2002). 2007Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9 , 43 P.3d 4 (2002). | 2 | 2007–2007 |
In Re 1980 Porsche
neutral
2 sentences1998The Porsche court cited a Georgia case stating that "`[t]he state in a forfeiture proceeding is not in the position of a creditor or lienholder, but its interest is only to prevent a guilty party from further misusing the *1109 property.'" 54 Wash.App. at 501 , 774 P.2d 528 (quoting State v. Sewell, 155 Ga.App. 734 (2), 735, 272 S.E.2d 514 (1980)). 1998The Porsche court cited a Georgia case stating that “ ‘[t]he state in a forfeiture proceeding is not in the position of a creditor or lienholder, but its interest is only to prevent a guilty party from further misusing the property.’ ” 54 Wn. | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Gammel v. Diethelm
green
2 sentences1998UNILATERAL MISTAKE The Browns, citing Gammel v. Diethelm, 59 Wn.2d 504 , 368 P.2d 718 (1962), argue that neither they nor their former counsel knew about the applicability of the innocent owner defense and the corresponding case law that protected them from the Government’s threatened forfeiture. 1998UNILATERAL MISTAKE The Browns, citing Gammel v. Diethelm, 59 Wn.2d 504 , 368 P.2d 718 (1962), argue that neither they nor their former counsel knew about the applicability of the innocent owner defense and the corresponding case law that protected them from the Government’s threatened forfeiture. | 2 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Brown
green
1 sentence2009Brown, 92 Wash.App. at 596 , 965 P.2d 1102 . ¶ 24 Regardless of the soundness of Brown's application of Cashier's Check, Brown does not help the beneficiaries here. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Lively
green
1 sentence2007State v. Lively, 130 Wn.2d 1, 17 , 921 P.2d 1035 (1996) (entrapment defense); State v. Matthews, 132 Wn. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Lively
green
1 sentence2007State v. Lively, 130 Wn.2d 1, 17 , 921 P.2d 1035 (1996) (entrapment defense); State v. Matthews, 132 Wn. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Escamilla v. Tri-City Metro Drug Task Force
green
2 sentences2007In Escamilla v. Tri-City Metro Drug Task Force, 100 Wash.App. 742, 753-54 , 999 P.2d 625 (2000), Division Three of this court held that the claimant in that case was not entitled to benefit from the innocent owner exception to the illegal proceeds forfeiture provision of RCW 69.50.505 when the claimant either knew or "should have known" that the proceeds in question were drug-related. 2007In Escamilla v. Tri-City Metro Drug Task Force, 100 Wash.App. 742, 753-54 , 999 P.2d 625 (2000), Division Three of this court held that the claimant in that case was not entitled to benefit from the innocent owner exception to the illegal proceeds forfeiture provision of RCW 69.50.505 when the claimant either knew or "should have known" that the proceeds in question were drug-related. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Matthews
green
1 sentence2007State v. Lively, 130 Wn.2d 1, 17 , 921 P.2d 1035 (1996) (entrapment defense); State v. Matthews, 132 Wn. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State of Georgia v. Sewell
green
2 sentences1998The Porsche court cited a Georgia case stating that "`[t]he state in a forfeiture proceeding is not in the position of a creditor or lienholder, but its interest is only to prevent a guilty party from further misusing the *1109 property.'" 54 Wash.App. at 501 , 774 P.2d 528 (quoting State v. Sewell, 155 Ga.App. 734 (2), 735, 272 S.E.2d 514 (1980)). 1998The Porsche court cited a Georgia case stating that "`[t]he state in a forfeiture proceeding is not in the position of a creditor or lienholder, but its interest is only to prevent a guilty party from further misusing the *1109 property.'" 54 Wash.App. at 501 , 774 P.2d 528 (quoting State v. Sewell, 155 Ga.App. 734 (2), 735, 272 S.E.2d 514 (1980)). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
United States v. 5.935 Acres of Land, Tax Map Key (3)2-8-017-43
green
1 sentence1992The court then declined to adopt the interpretation of the innocent owner defense expressed in Lot 111-B and adopted the position of the Second and Third Circuits: a forfeiture under 21 U.S.C. § 881 (a)(7) fails if the claimant can prove either that he had no knowledge of the illegal activity or that he did not consent to it. 5.935 Acres of Land, 752 F. Supp. at 362 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.