Alaska rule in Alaska

2009Instead of requiring this fact-specific balancing for every garbage search, we base our decision on the diminished expectation of privacy a person has in his or her garbage. [43] See, e.g., Sprague v. State, 590 P.2d 410, 417 (Alaska 1979) (holding that although probationers and parolees have diminished expectations of privacy, warrantless searches of their residences are only permissible under certain limited circumstances). [44] See Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40, 46 (Alaska 1976) (allowing a warrantless investigatory stop in cases "where the police officer has reasonable suspicion that immin

2009Instead of requiring this fact-specific balancing for every garbage search, we base our decision on the diminished expectation of privacy a person has in his or her garbage. [43] See, e.g., Sprague v. State, 590 P.2d 410, 417 (Alaska 1979) (holding that although probationers and parolees have diminished expectations of privacy, warrantless searches of their residences are only permissible under certain limited circumstances). [44] See Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40, 46 (Alaska 1976) (allowing a warrantless investigatory stop in cases "where the police officer has reasonable suspicion that immin

2020Minors also may invoke the Alaska Constitution’s privilege against self- incrimination at juvenile waiver hearings.30 We have interpreted Alaska’s privilege against self-incrimination to be broader than its federal counterpart.31 The privilege 28 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966) (holding that juvenile waiver hearings must “assume[] procedural regularity sufficient in the particular circumstances to satisfy the basic requirements of due process and fairness”); State v. Angel C., 715 A.2d 652, 661 (Conn. 1998) (interpreting Kent as “stand[ing] for the proposition that if a sta

2006Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774, 786-87 (Alaska 1974).

2024To be clear, this opinion does not curtail trial courts’ ability to exercise temporary jurisdiction on an emergency basis to issue ex parte protective orders where “the petition establishes probable cause that a crime involving domestic violence has occurred, it is necessary to protect the petitioner from domestic violence, and . . . the petitioner has certified to the court . . . the efforts, if any, that have been made to provide 44 See, e.g., Shah v. Shah, 875 A.2d 931 , 940 n.5, 942 (N.J. 2005); Spencer v. Spencer, 191 S.W.3d 14, 19 (Ky. App. 2006); Hemenway v. Hemenway, 992 A.2d 575, 580-

2024To be clear, this opinion does not curtail trial courts’ ability to exercise temporary jurisdiction on an emergency basis to issue ex parte protective orders where “the petition establishes probable cause that a crime involving domestic violence has occurred, it is necessary to protect the petitioner from domestic violence, and . . . the petitioner has certified to the court . . . the efforts, if any, that have been made to provide 44 See, e.g., Shah v. Shah, 875 A.2d 931 , 940 n.5, 942 (N.J. 2005); Spencer v. Spencer, 191 S.W.3d 14, 19 (Ky. App. 2006); Hemenway v. Hemenway, 992 A.2d 575, 580-

2024To be clear, this opinion does not curtail trial courts’ ability to exercise temporary jurisdiction on an emergency basis to issue ex parte protective orders where “the petition establishes probable cause that a crime involving domestic violence has occurred, it is necessary to protect the petitioner from domestic violence, and . . . the petitioner has certified to the court . . . the efforts, if any, that have been made to provide 44 See, e.g., Shah v. Shah, 875 A.2d 931 , 940 n.5, 942 (N.J. 2005); Spencer v. Spencer, 191 S.W.3d 14, 19 (Ky. App. 2006); Hemenway v. Hemenway, 992 A.2d 575, 580-

2024To be clear, this opinion does not curtail trial courts’ ability to exercise temporary jurisdiction on an emergency basis to issue ex parte protective orders where “the petition establishes probable cause that a crime involving domestic violence has occurred, it is necessary to protect the petitioner from domestic violence, and . . . the petitioner has certified to the court . . . the efforts, if any, that have been made to provide 44 See, e.g., Shah v. Shah, 875 A.2d 931 , 940 n.5, 942 (N.J. 2005); Spencer v. Spencer, 191 S.W.3d 14, 19 (Ky. App. 2006); Hemenway v. Hemenway, 992 A.2d 575, 580-

2017Under the California Constitution, “[t]he defendant in a criminal cause has the right to a speedy public trial.” Cal. Const. art. 1, § 15. 28 Scherling, 585 P.2d at 226 . 29 Op. at 14 n.47. 30 People v. White, 298 N.E.2d 659, 662 (N.Y. 1973)). 31 White, 298 N.E.2d at 662 (“It may be that [the due process] doctrine has now been incorporated in the ‘speedy trial’ guarantee of the Sixth Amendment . . . but (continued...) -41- 7200 to determine if a defendant’s rights have been abridged are the same whether the right asserted is a speedy trial right or the due process right to prompt prosecution.”

2017Under the California Constitution, “[t]he defendant in a criminal cause has the right to a speedy public trial.” Cal. Const. art. 1, § 15. 28 Scherling, 585 P.2d at 226 . 29 Op. at 14 n.47. 30 People v. White, 298 N.E.2d 659, 662 (N.Y. 1973)). 31 White, 298 N.E.2d at 662 (“It may be that [the due process] doctrine has now been incorporated in the ‘speedy trial’ guarantee of the Sixth Amendment . . . but (continued...) -41- 7200 to determine if a defendant’s rights have been abridged are the same whether the right asserted is a speedy trial right or the due process right to prompt prosecution.”

2012See, e.g., United States v. Kap-pell, 418 F.3d 550, 556-57 (6th Cir.2005); United States v. Yellow, 18 F.3d 1438, 1442 (8th Cir. 1994). .

2012See, e.g., United States v. Kappell, 418 F.3d 550, 556-57 (6th Cir.2005); United States v. Yellow, 18 F.3d 1438, 1442 (8th Cir. 1994). [18] M.B., 3 So.3d at 248. [19] 717 P.2d 394, 399 (Alaska App.1986). [20] Id. n. 3.

2012See, e.g., United States v. Kap-pell, 418 F.3d 550, 556-57 (6th Cir.2005); United States v. Yellow, 18 F.3d 1438, 1442 (8th Cir. 1994). .

2012See, e.g., United States v. Kappell, 418 F.3d 550, 556-57 (6th Cir.2005); United States v. Yellow, 18 F.3d 1438, 1442 (8th Cir. 1994). [18] M.B., 3 So.3d at 248. [19] 717 P.2d 394, 399 (Alaska App.1986). [20] Id. n. 3.

2009Alaska's standard is more protective than the federal standard because it requires that the relationship be "fair and substantial" rather than merely "rational." Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. State, 122 P.3d 781, 787 (Alaska 2005); Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n v. Apokedak, 606 P.2d 1255, 1261-62 (Alaska 1980).

1984Isakson, 550 P.2d at 363 ; Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n. v. Apokedak, 606 P.2d 1255, 1262 (Alaska 1980). 15 .

2009See Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40, 46 (Alaska 1976) (allowing a warrantless investigatory stop in cases "where the police officer has reasonable suspicion that imminent public danger exists or serious harm to persons or property has recently occurred"); see also Ebona v. State, 577 P.2d 698, 700 (Alaska 1978) (describing the "Alaska rule" as "permitting a temporary stop when the officer has a reasonable suspicion that imminent public danger exists, or serious harm to persons or property has recently occurred"). .

2009Instead of requiring this fact-specific balancing for every garbage search, we base our decision on the diminished expectation of privacy a person has in his or her garbage. [43] See, e.g., Sprague v. State, 590 P.2d 410, 417 (Alaska 1979) (holding that although probationers and parolees have diminished expectations of privacy, warrantless searches of their residences are only permissible under certain limited circumstances). [44] See Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40, 46 (Alaska 1976) (allowing a warrantless investigatory stop in cases "where the police officer has reasonable suspicion that immin

1988See, e.g., Jackson, 750 P.2d at 824 ("Although the federal and Alaska tests ... are similar, the defendant has a lesser burden of showing prejudice under the Alaska test.’’); Strehl v. State, 722 P.2d 226 , 227 n. 1 (Alaska App.1986); Resek v. State, 715 P.2d 1188, 1191 (Alaska App. 1986); Figueroa v. State, 689 P.2d 512, 513 (Alaska App.1984); Arnold v. State, 685 P.2d 1261, 1264 (Alaska App.1984); Barry v. State, 675 P.2d 1292, 1295 (Alaska App.1984); Springer v. State, 666 P.2d 431, 435 (Alaska App.1983). 8 .

1988See, e.g., Jackson, 750 P.2d at 824 ("Although the federal and Alaska tests ... are similar, the defendant has a lesser burden of showing prejudice under the Alaska test.’’); Strehl v. State, 722 P.2d 226 , 227 n. 1 (Alaska App.1986); Resek v. State, 715 P.2d 1188, 1191 (Alaska App. 1986); Figueroa v. State, 689 P.2d 512, 513 (Alaska App.1984); Arnold v. State, 685 P.2d 1261, 1264 (Alaska App.1984); Barry v. State, 675 P.2d 1292, 1295 (Alaska App.1984); Springer v. State, 666 P.2d 431, 435 (Alaska App.1983). 8 .

2020Minors also may invoke the Alaska Constitution’s privilege against self- incrimination at juvenile waiver hearings.30 We have interpreted Alaska’s privilege against self-incrimination to be broader than its federal counterpart.31 The privilege 28 See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966) (holding that juvenile waiver hearings must “assume[] procedural regularity sufficient in the particular circumstances to satisfy the basic requirements of due process and fairness”); State v. Angel C., 715 A.2d 652, 661 (Conn. 1998) (interpreting Kent as “stand[ing] for the proposition that if a sta

1992For it has long been recognized that the privilege against self-incrimination “reflects a complex of our fundamental values and aspirations.” Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. at 444 , 92 S.Ct. at 1656 .

2009Instead of requiring this fact-specific balancing for every garbage search, we base our decision on the diminished expectation of privacy a person has in his or her garbage. [43] See, e.g., Sprague v. State, 590 P.2d 410, 417 (Alaska 1979) (holding that although probationers and parolees have diminished expectations of privacy, warrantless searches of their residences are only permissible under certain limited circumstances). [44] See Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40, 46 (Alaska 1976) (allowing a warrantless investigatory stop in cases "where the police officer has reasonable suspicion that immin

2009Instead of requiring this fact-specific balancing for every garbage search, we base our decision on the diminished expectation of privacy a person has in his or her garbage. [43] See, e.g., Sprague v. State, 590 P.2d 410, 417 (Alaska 1979) (holding that although probationers and parolees have diminished expectations of privacy, warrantless searches of their residences are only permissible under certain limited circumstances). [44] See Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40, 46 (Alaska 1976) (allowing a warrantless investigatory stop in cases "where the police officer has reasonable suspicion that immin

2025An earlier version of the Alaska rule allowed the prosecution to amend an indictment or information only for the purpose of correcting errors “in form” or “in the manner of describing the offense,” or in the defendant’s name.18 This earlier version was modified in response to the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in McGahan v. State.19 In McGahan, the supreme court held that a change to an existing charging document had gone beyond a mere “error in form” and thus violated Criminal Rule 7(e), but was nevertheless non-prejudicial and harmless.20 17 See United States v. Talbot, 51 F.3d 183, 186 (9t

2025An earlier version of the Alaska rule allowed the prosecution to amend an indictment or information only for the purpose of correcting errors “in form” or “in the manner of describing the offense,” or in the defendant’s name.18 This earlier version was modified in response to the Alaska Supreme Court’s decision in McGahan v. State.19 In McGahan, the supreme court held that a change to an existing charging document had gone beyond a mere “error in form” and thus violated Criminal Rule 7(e), but was nevertheless non-prejudicial and harmless.20 17 See United States v. Talbot, 51 F.3d 183, 186 (9t

2024J.N. v. Virg-In, 258 P.3d 795, 802 (Alaska 2011) (noting Alaska’s test is “nearly identical” to federal test). 10 Lum I, 314 P.3d at 555 (alteration in original) (quoting El-Ghazzawy v. Berthiaume, 636 F.3d 452, 459-60 (8th Cir. 2011)). -3- 2033

2024P. 23(e)(1)-(5). 26 Barber v. Schmidt, 354 P.3d 158, 160 (Alaska 2015); see also Weiss v. State, 939 P.2d 380, 386-87 , 397 n.27 (Alaska 1997) (adopting federal standard of review for Rule 23(e) and approving of — but not mandating — trial court’s use of the Federal Rule’s seven-factor settlement fairness analysis; later observing that “federal authorities are instructive in interpreting” an Alaska rule modeled on its federal counterpart). 27 See, e.g., Pierce v. Pierce, 949 P.2d 498, 500 (Alaska 1997) (explaining that “[e]ven if a party has not raised a party’s misconduct as a basis to set as

2024P. 23(e)(1)-(5). 26 Barber v. Schmidt, 354 P.3d 158, 160 (Alaska 2015); see also Weiss v. State, 939 P.2d 380, 386-87 , 397 n.27 (Alaska 1997) (adopting federal standard of review for Rule 23(e) and approving of — but not mandating — trial court’s use of the Federal Rule’s seven-factor settlement fairness analysis; later observing that “federal authorities are instructive in interpreting” an Alaska rule modeled on its federal counterpart). 27 See, e.g., Pierce v. Pierce, 949 P.2d 498, 500 (Alaska 1997) (explaining that “[e]ven if a party has not raised a party’s misconduct as a basis to set as

2024P. 23(e)(1)-(5). 26 Barber v. Schmidt, 354 P.3d 158, 160 (Alaska 2015); see also Weiss v. State, 939 P.2d 380, 386-87 , 397 n.27 (Alaska 1997) (adopting federal standard of review for Rule 23(e) and approving of — but not mandating — trial court’s use of the Federal Rule’s seven-factor settlement fairness analysis; later observing that “federal authorities are instructive in interpreting” an Alaska rule modeled on its federal counterpart). 27 See, e.g., Pierce v. Pierce, 949 P.2d 498, 500 (Alaska 1997) (explaining that “[e]ven if a party has not raised a party’s misconduct as a basis to set as

2024P. 23(e)(1)-(5). 26 Barber v. Schmidt, 354 P.3d 158, 160 (Alaska 2015); see also Weiss v. State, 939 P.2d 380, 386-87 , 397 n.27 (Alaska 1997) (adopting federal standard of review for Rule 23(e) and approving of — but not mandating — trial court’s use of the Federal Rule’s seven-factor settlement fairness analysis; later observing that “federal authorities are instructive in interpreting” an Alaska rule modeled on its federal counterpart). 27 See, e.g., Pierce v. Pierce, 949 P.2d 498, 500 (Alaska 1997) (explaining that “[e]ven if a party has not raised a party’s misconduct as a basis to set as

2024J.N. v. Virg-In, 258 P.3d 795, 802 (Alaska 2011) (noting Alaska’s test is “nearly identical” to federal test). 10 Lum I, 314 P.3d at 555 (alteration in original) (quoting El-Ghazzawy v. Berthiaume, 636 F.3d 452, 459-60 (8th Cir. 2011)). -3- 2033

2024P. 23(e)(1)-(5). 26 Barber v. Schmidt, 354 P.3d 158, 160 (Alaska 2015); see also Weiss v. State, 939 P.2d 380, 386-87 , 397 n.27 (Alaska 1997) (adopting federal standard of review for Rule 23(e) and approving of — but not mandating — trial court’s use of the Federal Rule’s seven-factor settlement fairness analysis; later observing that “federal authorities are instructive in interpreting” an Alaska rule modeled on its federal counterpart). 27 See, e.g., Pierce v. Pierce, 949 P.2d 498, 500 (Alaska 1997) (explaining that “[e]ven if a party has not raised a party’s misconduct as a basis to set as

2024P. 23(e)(1)-(5). 26 Barber v. Schmidt, 354 P.3d 158, 160 (Alaska 2015); see also Weiss v. State, 939 P.2d 380, 386-87 , 397 n.27 (Alaska 1997) (adopting federal standard of review for Rule 23(e) and approving of — but not mandating — trial court’s use of the Federal Rule’s seven-factor settlement fairness analysis; later observing that “federal authorities are instructive in interpreting” an Alaska rule modeled on its federal counterpart). 27 See, e.g., Pierce v. Pierce, 949 P.2d 498, 500 (Alaska 1997) (explaining that “[e]ven if a party has not raised a party’s misconduct as a basis to set as

2024J.N. v. Virg-In, 258 P.3d 795, 802 (Alaska 2011) (noting Alaska’s test is “nearly identical” to federal test). 10 Lum I, 314 P.3d at 555 (alteration in original) (quoting El-Ghazzawy v. Berthiaume, 636 F.3d 452, 459-60 (8th Cir. 2011)). -3- 2033

2024P. 23(e)(1)-(5). 26 Barber v. Schmidt, 354 P.3d 158, 160 (Alaska 2015); see also Weiss v. State, 939 P.2d 380, 386-87 , 397 n.27 (Alaska 1997) (adopting federal standard of review for Rule 23(e) and approving of — but not mandating — trial court’s use of the Federal Rule’s seven-factor settlement fairness analysis; later observing that “federal authorities are instructive in interpreting” an Alaska rule modeled on its federal counterpart). 27 See, e.g., Pierce v. Pierce, 949 P.2d 498, 500 (Alaska 1997) (explaining that “[e]ven if a party has not raised a party’s misconduct as a basis to set as

2024P. 23(e)(1)-(5). 26 Barber v. Schmidt, 354 P.3d 158, 160 (Alaska 2015); see also Weiss v. State, 939 P.2d 380, 386-87 , 397 n.27 (Alaska 1997) (adopting federal standard of review for Rule 23(e) and approving of — but not mandating — trial court’s use of the Federal Rule’s seven-factor settlement fairness analysis; later observing that “federal authorities are instructive in interpreting” an Alaska rule modeled on its federal counterpart). 27 See, e.g., Pierce v. Pierce, 949 P.2d 498, 500 (Alaska 1997) (explaining that “[e]ven if a party has not raised a party’s misconduct as a basis to set as

2023At the end of the Commentary to Rule 106 is a “Note” explaining that the drafters of Alaska’s rule — the Alaska Supreme Court’s Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence — “voted to adopt, in lieu of the Reporter’s Comment to this rule, the commentary contained in the Advisory Committee’s note to Federal Rule 106[.]”82 In other words, the drafters of the 80 See State v. Dunlop, 721 P.2d 604, 610 (Alaska 1986) (stating that a court may depart from precedent when the court is “clearly convinced the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changed conditions, and that more

2023At the end of the Commentary to Rule 106 is a “Note” explaining that the drafters of Alaska’s rule — the Alaska Supreme Court’s Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence — “voted to adopt, in lieu of the Reporter’s Comment to this rule, the commentary contained in the Advisory Committee’s note to Federal Rule 106[.]”82 In other words, the drafters of the 80 See State v. Dunlop, 721 P.2d 604, 610 (Alaska 1986) (stating that a court may depart from precedent when the court is “clearly convinced the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changed conditions, and that more