second assigned error in Ohio

2019Manifest Weight {¶22} In the second assigned error, Hill argues that his convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence because no investigation of David was conducted, and there was no forensic testing of his phone to determine whether someone else placed it in Rodney’s car. {¶23} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court reviews “the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost

2019Manifest Weight {¶22} In the second assigned error, Hill argues that his convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence because no investigation of David was conducted, and there was no forensic testing of his phone to determine whether someone else placed it in Rodney’s car. {¶23} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court reviews “the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost

2019Manifest Weight {¶22} In the second assigned error, Hill argues that his convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence because no investigation of David was conducted, and there was no forensic testing of his phone to determine whether someone else placed it in Rodney’s car. {¶23} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court reviews “the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost

2014Manifest Weight of the Evidence {¶34} In the second assigned error, Taylor argues his convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence. {¶35} In State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382 , 2007-Ohio-2202 , 865 N.E.2d 1264 , the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the standard of review for a criminal manifest weight challenge, as follows: The criminal manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard was explained in State v. Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380 , 1997 Ohio 52 , 678 N.E.2d 541 .

2018Cuyahoga No. 99103, 2013-Ohio-2999, ¶ 26 , quoting State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382 , 2007-Ohio-2202 , 865 N.E.2d 1264 , ¶ 24. {¶45} We do not find that the finder of fact “‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Strickland, 183 Ohio App.3d 602 , 2009-Ohio-3906 , 918 N.E.2d 170, at ¶ 23-26 , quoting Welms, 169 Ohio App.3d 600 , 2006-Ohio-6441 , 863 N.E.2d 1125 , citing Thompkins at 390 . {¶46} The second assigned error lacks merit.

2014Manifest Weight of the Evidence {¶34} In the second assigned error, Taylor argues his convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence. {¶35} In State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382 , 2007-Ohio-2202 , 865 N.E.2d 1264 , the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the standard of review for a criminal manifest weight challenge, as follows: The criminal manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard was explained in State v. Thompkins (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 380 , 1997 Ohio 52 , 678 N.E.2d 541 .

2014“When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and disagrees with the factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony.” Id. at 387 , 678 N.E.2d 541 , citing Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 , 102 S.Ct. 2211 , 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982). {¶37} As discussed in the second assigned error, the state presented sufficient evidence to sustain all of Ellis’s convictions, except that for aggravated riot.

2014“When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a ‘thirteenth juror’ and disagrees with the factfinder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony.” Id. at 387 , 678 N.E.2d 541 , citing Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 , 102 S.Ct. 2211 , 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982). {¶37} As discussed in the second assigned error, the state presented sufficient evidence to sustain all of Ellis’s convictions, except that for aggravated riot.

2019Manifest Weight {¶22} In the second assigned error, Hill argues that his convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence because no investigation of David was conducted, and there was no forensic testing of his phone to determine whether someone else placed it in Rodney’s car. {¶23} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court reviews “the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost

2019Manifest Weight {¶22} In the second assigned error, Hill argues that his convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence because no investigation of David was conducted, and there was no forensic testing of his phone to determine whether someone else placed it in Rodney’s car. {¶23} In determining whether a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence, a reviewing court reviews “the entire record, weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost

2020Scope of the Search In the second assigned error, Taylor argues that the officers’ search exceeded the scope of the probable cause in this case. “‘[U]nder the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, the police may search a motor vehicle without a warrant if they have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband.’” Alim, 2017-Ohio-8868 , 100 N.E.3d 1119, at ¶ 27 , quoting State v. Battle, 10th Dist.

2020Scope of the Search In the second assigned error, Taylor argues that the officers’ search exceeded the scope of the probable cause in this case. “‘[U]nder the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, the police may search a motor vehicle without a warrant if they have probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband.’” Alim, 2017-Ohio-8868 , 100 N.E.3d 1119, at ¶ 27 , quoting State v. Battle, 10th Dist.

2019App 456, 685 P.2d 1026 (1984). {¶30} In accordance with the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly concluded that laws of Ohio and Oregon provide that “(1) an insurer’s duty to defend will attach if the allegations in the underlying complaint fall under the policy coverage, and that (2) court in certain, limited circumstances may look to extrinsic evidence outside of the complaint.” {¶31} The second assigned error lacks merit.

2018App. 456 , 685 P.2d 1026 (1984). {¶22} In accordance with the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly concluded that laws of Ohio and Oregon provide that "(1) an insurer's duty to defend will attach if the allegations in the underlying complaint fall under the policy coverage, and that (2) the court in certain, limited circumstances may look to extrinsic evidence outside of the complaint." {¶23} The second assigned error lacks merit.

2018Manifest Weight {¶ 35} In the second assigned error, appellants argue that the order granting the CSPO is against the manifest weight of the evidence. {¶ 36} Under a manifest weight challenge, appellate courts are charged with "weigh[ing] the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[ing] the credibility of witnesses and determin[ing] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [finder of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be reversed and a new trial ordered." Vega at ¶ 9 , citing Eastley v. Volkman , 132 Ohio S

2018Manifest Weight {¶ 35} In the second assigned error, appellants argue that the order granting the CSPO is against the manifest weight of the evidence. {¶ 36} Under a manifest weight challenge, appellate courts are charged with "weigh[ing] the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider[ing] the credibility of witnesses and determin[ing] whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [finder of fact] clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be reversed and a new trial ordered." Vega at ¶ 9 , citing Eastley v. Volkman , 132 Ohio S

2017Because we find the issues interrelate, we address them together. {¶ 13} In evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the test is “whether the accused, under all the circumstances, * * * had a fair trial and substantial justice was done.” State v. Hester, 45 Ohio St.2d 71 , 341 N.E.2d 304 (1976), paragraph four of the syllabus; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

2017Because we find the issues interrelate, we address them together. {¶ 13} In evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the test is “whether the accused, under all the circumstances, * * * had a fair trial and substantial justice was done.” State v. Hester, 45 Ohio St.2d 71 , 341 N.E.2d 304 (1976), paragraph four of the syllabus; see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).

2026Standard of Review Whether to “admit or exclude evidence lies within the trial court’s discretion.” Cleveland v. Myles, 2022-Ohio-4504, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173 (1987), paragraph two of the syllabus.

2025Because the trial court’s judgment [Cite as Middleton v. Clarky's Closeouts, 2025-Ohio-1414 .] did not turn on whether Mrs. Middleton was warned of the hole prior to her fall, the Middletons’ second assigned error lacks merit. {¶19} With respect to the Middletons’ first assigned error, we note that the deposition transcripts provide a limited description of the premises and the location of the hole and surrounding area.

2021Buddenberg v. Weisdack, 161 Ohio St.3d 160 , 2020-Ohio-3832 , 161 N.E.3d 603, ¶ 6-14 .

2021Buddenberg v. Weisdack, 161 Ohio St.3d 160 , 2020-Ohio-3832 , 161 N.E.3d 603, ¶ 6-14 .

2018Brown No. CA97-02-007, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 1078 , *12 (Mar. 23, 1998), citing Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 394 , 52 S.Ct. 189 , 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932), and United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 279 , 64 S.Ct. 134 , 88 L.Ed. 48 (1943). {¶26} The second assigned error lacks merit.

2018Brown No. CA97-02-007, 1998 Ohio App. LEXIS 1078 , *12 (Mar. 23, 1998), citing Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 394 , 52 S.Ct. 189 , 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932), and United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 279 , 64 S.Ct. 134 , 88 L.Ed. 48 (1943). {¶26} The second assigned error lacks merit.

2018Cuyahoga No. 99103, 2013-Ohio-2999, ¶ 26 , quoting State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382 , 2007-Ohio-2202 , 865 N.E.2d 1264 , ¶ 24. {¶45} We do not find that the finder of fact “‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Strickland, 183 Ohio App.3d 602 , 2009-Ohio-3906 , 918 N.E.2d 170, at ¶ 23-26 , quoting Welms, 169 Ohio App.3d 600 , 2006-Ohio-6441 , 863 N.E.2d 1125 , citing Thompkins at 390 . {¶46} The second assigned error lacks merit.

2018Cuyahoga No. 99103, 2013-Ohio-2999, ¶ 26 , quoting State v. Wilson, 113 Ohio St.3d 382 , 2007-Ohio-2202 , 865 N.E.2d 1264 , ¶ 24. {¶45} We do not find that the finder of fact “‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Strickland, 183 Ohio App.3d 602 , 2009-Ohio-3906 , 918 N.E.2d 170, at ¶ 23-26 , quoting Welms, 169 Ohio App.3d 600 , 2006-Ohio-6441 , 863 N.E.2d 1125 , citing Thompkins at 390 . {¶46} The second assigned error lacks merit.

2018Therefore, we dispose of the second assigned error and only address the third. {¶ 52} "Under the tenets of due process, an ordinance is unconstitutionally vague under a void-for-vagueness analysis when it does not clearly define what acts are prohibited under it." Viviano v. City of Sandusky , 2013-Ohio-2813 , 991 N.E.2d 1263 , ¶ 13 (6th Dist.), citing Grayned v. City of Rockford , 408 U.S. 104 , 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) ; State v. Tanner , 15 Ohio St.3d 1 , 472 N.E.2d 689 (1984) ; Norwood v. Horney , 110 Ohio St.3d 353 , 2006-Ohio-3799 , 853 N.E.2d 1115 . {¶ 53} A law is vague in

2018Therefore, we dispose of the second assigned error and only address the third. {¶ 52} "Under the tenets of due process, an ordinance is unconstitutionally vague under a void-for-vagueness analysis when it does not clearly define what acts are prohibited under it." Viviano v. City of Sandusky , 2013-Ohio-2813 , 991 N.E.2d 1263 , ¶ 13 (6th Dist.), citing Grayned v. City of Rockford , 408 U.S. 104 , 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) ; State v. Tanner , 15 Ohio St.3d 1 , 472 N.E.2d 689 (1984) ; Norwood v. Horney , 110 Ohio St.3d 353 , 2006-Ohio-3799 , 853 N.E.2d 1115 . {¶ 53} A law is vague in

2018In opposition, the state argues that the trial court questioned the jurors about this issue and did not err. {¶ 35} "In cases involving outside influences on jurors, trial courts are granted broad discretion in * * * determining whether to declare a mistrial." State v. Herring , 94 Ohio St.3d 246 , 259, 762 N.E.2d 940 (2002), quoting State v. Phillips , 74 Ohio St.3d 72 , 89, 656 N.E.2d 643 (1995). {¶ 36} The complaining party must show actual prejudice, i.e., he must show that the communication biased one or more jurors.

2018In opposition, the state argues that the trial court questioned the jurors about this issue and did not err. {¶ 35} "In cases involving outside influences on jurors, trial courts are granted broad discretion in * * * determining whether to declare a mistrial." State v. Herring , 94 Ohio St.3d 246 , 259, 762 N.E.2d 940 (2002), quoting State v. Phillips , 74 Ohio St.3d 72 , 89, 656 N.E.2d 643 (1995). {¶ 36} The complaining party must show actual prejudice, i.e., he must show that the communication biased one or more jurors.

2018Therefore, we dispose of the second assigned error and only address the third. {¶ 52} "Under the tenets of due process, an ordinance is unconstitutionally vague under a void-for-vagueness analysis when it does not clearly define what acts are prohibited under it." Viviano v. City of Sandusky , 2013-Ohio-2813 , 991 N.E.2d 1263 , ¶ 13 (6th Dist.), citing Grayned v. City of Rockford , 408 U.S. 104 , 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) ; State v. Tanner , 15 Ohio St.3d 1 , 472 N.E.2d 689 (1984) ; Norwood v. Horney , 110 Ohio St.3d 353 , 2006-Ohio-3799 , 853 N.E.2d 1115 . {¶ 53} A law is vague in

2018Therefore, we dispose of the second assigned error and only address the third. {¶ 52} "Under the tenets of due process, an ordinance is unconstitutionally vague under a void-for-vagueness analysis when it does not clearly define what acts are prohibited under it." Viviano v. City of Sandusky , 2013-Ohio-2813 , 991 N.E.2d 1263 , ¶ 13 (6th Dist.), citing Grayned v. City of Rockford , 408 U.S. 104 , 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) ; State v. Tanner , 15 Ohio St.3d 1 , 472 N.E.2d 689 (1984) ; Norwood v. Horney , 110 Ohio St.3d 353 , 2006-Ohio-3799 , 853 N.E.2d 1115 . {¶ 53} A law is vague in