83 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 2014–2026 27 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Kinggreen2 sentences2026Further, so long as the trial court considers the Parker and Electroplating factors, weighs them against each other, and places its findings on the record, we will presume that its decision is reasonable and will “uphold the grant or denial [of diversion] so long as there is any substantial evidence to support the trial court’s decision.” King, 432 S.W.3d at 326-27 . 2025“Substantial evidence” is “[e]vidence that a reasonable mind could accept as adequate to support a conclusion; evidence beyond a scintilla.” Black’s Law Dictionary 640 (12th ed. 2024). -7- While the trial court is “not required to recite all of the Parker and Electroplating factors when justifying its decision on the record in order to obtain the presumption of reasonableness[,]” the record should reflect that the court “considered the Parker and Electroplating factors in rendering its decision and that it identified the specific factors applicable to the case before it.” King, 432 S.W.3d at 3 | 12 | 69 |
State v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2022App. June 2, 2014) (quoting State v. Washington, 866 S.W.2d 950, 951 (Tenn. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 2021App. June 2, 2014) (quoting State v. Washington, 866 S.W.2d 950, 951 (Tenn. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). | 4 | 4 |
State v. Neeleygreen2 sentences2016“The truthfulness of a defendant, or lack thereof, is a permissible factor for a trial judge to consider in ruling on a petition for suspended sentence.” State v. Neeley, 678 S.W.2d 48, 49 (Tenn. 1984). -6- On review of a decision to grant or deny judicial diversion, this court will apply a presumption of reasonableness if the record reflects that the trial court considered the Parker and Electroplating factors, specifically identified the relevant factors, and placed on the record the reasons for granting or denying judicial diversion, provided any substantial evidence exists to support the c 2016“The truthfulness of a defendant, or lack thereof, is a permissible factor for a trial judge to consider in ruling on a petition for suspended sentence.” State v. Neeley, 678 S.W.2d 48, 49 (Tenn. 1984) On review of a decision to grant or deny judicial diversion, this court will apply a presumption of reasonableness if the record reflects that the trial court considered the Parker and Electroplating factors, specifically identified the relevant factors, and placed on the record the reasons for granting or denying judicial diversion, provided any substantial evidence exists to support the court‟ | 4 | 4 |
State of Tennessee v. Susan Renee Bisegreen2 sentences2019The trial court need not provide a recitation of all the applicable “factors when justifying its decision on the record in order to obtain the presumption of reasonableness,” but “the record should reflect that the trial court considered the Parker and Electroplating factors in rendering its decision and that it identified the specific factors applicable to the case before it.” King, 432 S.W.3d at 327 . -19- Although judicial diversion is not a sentence, our supreme court has determined that the standard of review first expressed in State v. Bise, applies to “appellate review for a trial court 2016A trial court‟s decision regarding the grant or denial of judicial diversion is reviewed under the State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682 (Tenn. 2012), presumption of reasonableness standard so long as there is evidence the trial court considered and identified the relevant Electroplating factors in rendering its decision: Under the Bise standard of review, when a trial court considers the Parker and Electroplating factors, specifically identifies the relevant factors, and places on the record its reasons for granting or denying judicial diversion, the appellate court must apply a presumption of reason | 3 | 4 |
State v. Hoopergreen2 sentences2019App. 1993)(in a denial of judicial diversion, the trial court must make “more than an abstract statement in the record that [the trial court] has considered [the Parker and Electroplating factors]”), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1, 9-10 (Tenn. 2000). 2018App. 1993) (quoting State v. Herron, 767 S.W. 2d 151, 156 (Tenn. 1989) (concluding that in a denial of judicial diversion, the trial court must make “more than an abstract statement in the record that [the trial court] has considered [the Parker and Electroplating factors]”), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1, 9-10 (Tenn. 2000). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Dycusgreen2 sentences2017State v. Dycus, 456 S.W.3d 918, 930 (Tenn. 2015). “[E]ven though an abuse of discretion standard of review is appropriate for a trial court’s judicial diversion decision, the trial court must consider and discuss each of the Parker and Electroplating factors on the record before the appellate court can determine whether ‘any substantial evidence’ exists to support the decision.” -5- King, 432 S.W.3d at 327 . 2017State v. Dycus, 456 S.W.3d 918, 930 (Tenn. 2015). ―[E]ven though an abuse of discretion standard of review is appropriate for a trial court‘s judicial diversion decision, the trial court must consider and discuss each of the Parker and Electroplating factors on the record before the appellate court can determine whether ‗any substantial evidence‘ exists to support the decision.‖ King, 432 S.W.3d at 327 . | 3 | 3 |
State v. Electroplating, Inc.green2 sentences2025Id. at 327 . -8- Because the trial court in the Defendant’s case did not properly identify the Parker and Electroplating factors, weigh these factors, or make sufficient findings as to why it was denying judicial diversion, the presumption of reasonableness does not apply to the trial court’s decision, and the abuse of discretion is not appropriate. 2025Under the Bise standard of review, when the trial court “considers the Parker and Electroplating factors, specifically identifies the relevant factors, and places on the record its reasons for granting or denying judicial diversion,” this court “must apply a presumption of reasonableness and uphold the grant or denial so long as there is any substantial evidence to support the trial court’s decision.” Id. at 327 . | 2 | 19 |
State v. Herrongreen2 sentences2018App. 1993) (quoting State v. Herron, 767 S.W. 2d 151, 156 (Tenn. 1989) (concluding that in a denial of judicial diversion, the trial court must make “more than an abstract statement in the record that [the trial court] has considered [the Parker and Electroplating factors]”), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1, 9-10 (Tenn. 2000). 2016App. 1993) (quoting State v. Herron, 767 S.W. 2d 151, 156 (Tenn. 1989)) (concluding that in a denial of judicial diversion, the trial court must make “more than an abstract statement in the record that [the trial court] has considered [the Parker and Electroplating factors]”), overruled on other grounds by State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1, 9-10 (Tenn. 2000). | 2 | 2 |
State of Tennessee v. James Allen Pollardgreen2 sentences2025However, if the trial court “fails to consider and weigh” the Parker and Electroplating factors, “the presumption of reasonableness does not apply and the abuse of discretion standard, which merely looks for ‘any substantial evidence’ to support the trial court’s decision, is not appropriate.” Id. (citing State v. Pollard, 432 S.W.3d 851, 863-64 (Tenn. 2013)). 2025However, if the trial court “fails to consider and weigh” the Parker and Electroplating factors, “the presumption of reasonableness does not apply[,] and the abuse of discretion standard, which merely looks for ‘any substantial evidence’ to support the trial court's decision, is not appropriate.” Id. (citing State v. Pollard, 432 S.W.3d 851 , 863- 64 (Tenn. 2013)). | 1 | 2 |
State of Tennessee v. Fred Chad Clark, IIgreen1 sentence2026“Substantial evidence” is “[e]vidence that a reasonable mind could accept as adequate to support a conclusion; evidence beyond a scintilla.” Evidence, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (“substantial evidence” defined within); see State v. Clark, 452 S.W.3d 268, 280 (Tenn. 2014) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary). | 1 | 1 |
State of Tennessee v. Christine Caudlegreen2 sentences2017The trial court must balance the Parker and Electroplating factors against 3 “When a record does not include a transcript of the hearing on a guilty plea, [this Court] should determine on a case-by-case basis whether the record is sufficient for a meaningful review under the standard adopted in Bise.” State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273, 279 (Tenn. 2012). 2017If this Court determines that the record is sufficient for meaningful review, this Court “may review the merits of the sentencing decision with a presumption that the missing transcript would support the ruling of the trial court.” Id. -6- one another and explain its ruling on the record. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Parker
green
2 sentences2019Id. (quoting Parker, 932 S.W.2d at 958 ). 2016App. 1998) (citing Parker, 932 S.W.2d at 958 ); see also King, 432 S.W.3d at 326 (reaffirming that the Electroplating requirements “are essential considerations for judicial diversion”). -5- A trial court is “not required to recite all of the Parker and Electroplating factors when justifying its decision on the record in order to obtain the presumption of reasonableness.” King, 432 S.W.3d at 327 . | 3 | 2016–2019 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.