comparability analysis in Washington

2009See Morley, 134 Wash.2d at 606 , 952 P.2d 167 . ¶ 17 The second step of the comparability analysis requires that the trial court review the facts underlying the out-of-state conviction. *570 Morley, 134 Wash.2d at 606 , 952 P.2d 167 .

2009See Morley, 134 Wn.2d at 606 . ¶17 The second step of the comparability analysis requires that the trial court review the facts underlying the out-of-state conviction.

2007Ed. 2d 674 (1984); State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 77-78 , 917 P.2d 563 (1996); see also State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 334-35 , 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). ¶9 In order to ascertain whether Thiefault’s counsel was deficient under Strickland’s first prong, this court must conduct a comparability analysis of the Montana conviction.

2007Ed. 2d 674 (1984); State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wn.2d 61, 77-78 , 917 P.2d 563 (1996); see also State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 334-35 , 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). ¶9 In order to ascertain whether Thiefault’s counsel was deficient under Strickland’s first prong, this court must conduct a comparability analysis of the Montana conviction.

2006As long as the trial court determines that the relevant facts in a foreign court's record have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, Lavery, 154 Wash.2d at 258 , 111 P.3d 837 , the trial court must conduct a comparability analysis [12] and include a prior foreign conviction in calculating the defendant's offender score. ¶ 50 We hold that the trial court did not violate Farnsworth's sixth amendment right under Blakely by engaging in a factual comparability analysis when it calculated his offender score for sentencing. ¶ 51 A defendant's offender score determines the range that sentencing court

2006As long as the trial court determines that the relevant facts in a foreign court’s record have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, Lavery, 154 Wn.2d at 258 , the trial court must conduct a comparability analysis 12 and include a prior foreign conviction in calculating the defendant’s offender score. ¶50 We hold that the trial court did not violate Farnsworth’s Sixth Amendment right under Blakely by engaging in a factual comparability analysis when it calculated his offender score for sentencing. ¶51 A defendant’s offender score determines the range that sentencing courts may use when determ

2026Our Supreme Court has found that “[t]he focus of the comparability inquiry remains on the elements of the crimes, and not the defenses.” State v. Sublett, 176 Wn.2d 58, 89 , 292 P.3d 715 (2012) (plurality opinion).

2026Our Supreme Court has found that “[t]he focus of the comparability inquiry remains on the elements of the crimes, and not the defenses.” State v. Sublett, 176 Wn.2d 58, 89 , 292 P.3d 715 (2012) (plurality opinion).

2011Jenkins, 160 Wn.2d at 300 (“To ‘presume’ some recipients need fewer hours of care without individualized determination violates the comparability requirement.”). ¶24 DSHS essentially argues that the presumptions in WAC 388-106-0213 create valid utilization control measures necessary to ensure that DSHS pays only for care-related needs and not for developmental needs.

2011To ‘presume’ some recipients need fewer hours of care without individualized determination violates the comparability requirement.” Jenkins, 160 Wn.2d at 300 . ¶20 Our holding in Jenkins controls the resolution of this case.

2009See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 , 106 S. Ct. 2574 , 91 L.

2009See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 , 106 S. Ct. 2574 , 91 L.

2009See State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 601 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005) (rule of lenity requires interpreting ambiguous criminal statutes in manner most favorable to defendant). ¶7 Applying the comparability analysis of RCW 9.94A.030(32)(u), Failey’s 1974 robbery is most comparable to the current offense of second degree robbery.

2009See State v. Jacobs, 154 Wn.2d 596, 601 , 115 P.3d 281 (2005) (rule of lenity requires interpreting ambiguous criminal statutes in manner most favorable to defendant). ¶7 Applying the comparability analysis of RCW 9.94A.030(32)(u), Failey’s 1974 robbery is most comparable to the current offense of second degree robbery.

2008See State v. Ball, 127 Wash.App. 956 , 957 n. 1, 113 P.3d 520 (2005) (holding that Lavery is inapplicable to defendant's prior convictions because they were Washington State, not foreign, convictions), review denied, 156 Wash.2d 1018 , 132 P.3d 734 (2006).

2008See State v. Ball, 127 Wn.

2006Schott v. Olszewski, 401 F.3d 682, 688-89 (6th Cir.2005) (finding treatment was not comparable when Medicaid did not reimburse recipient for medical expenses she paid out of pocket after she was wrongfully denied coverage); White v. Beal, 555 F.2d 1146, 1151-52 (3rd Cir.1977) (finding statute was illegal when it covered eyeglasses for those suffering from eye diseases but did not cover glasses for patients when refractive error caused poor eyesight). ¶ 30 Because Medicaid's overarching purpose is to provide for an individual recipient's needs, the comparability provision requires comparable se

2006Schott v. Olszewski, 401 F.3d 682, 688-89 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding treatment was not comparable when Medicaid did not reimburse recipient for medical expenses she paid out of pocket after she was wrongfully denied coverage); White v. Beal, 555 F.2d 1146, 1151-52 (3d Cir. 1977) (finding statute was illegal when it covered eyeglasses for those suffering from eye diseases but did not cover glasses for patients when refractive error caused poor eyesight). ¶30 Because Medicaid’s overarching purpose is to provide for an individual recipient’s needs, the comparability provision requires comparable se

2020In Thiefault, the superior court conducted a comparability analysis at sentencing and found that the defendant’s federal and out-of-state convictions were comparable to their Washington counterparts. 160 Wn.2d at 413 .

2017Therefore, in a comparability analysis we may consider only those underlying facts that were "admitted, stipulated to, or proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Thiefault, 160 Wn.2d at 415 .

2007Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash.2d 61, 77-78 , 917 P.2d 563 (1996); see also State v. McFarland, 127 Wash.2d 322, 334-35 , 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). ¶ 9 In order to ascertain whether Thiefault's counsel was deficient under Strickland's first prong, this court must conduct a comparability analysis of the Montana conviction.

2007Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Hendrickson, 129 Wash.2d 61, 77-78 , 917 P.2d 563 (1996); see also State v. McFarland, 127 Wash.2d 322, 334-35 , 899 P.2d 1251 (1995). ¶ 9 In order to ascertain whether Thiefault's counsel was deficient under Strickland's first prong, this court must conduct a comparability analysis of the Montana conviction.

2019A comparability analysis covers (1) ‘legal comparability,” and (2) “factual comparability.” Arndt, 179 Wn. App. at 378-79 .

2016A comparability analysis covers (1) "legal comparability," and (2) "factual comparability." Arndt, 179 Wn.

2019Typically, in reviewing an out of state conviction, the trial court conducts a comparability analysis in which “[o]ut-of-state convictions are classified according to the comparable offense definitions and sentences provided in Washington law.” State v. Stevens, 137 Wn. App. 460, 465 , 153 P.3d 903 (2007) (citing RCW 9.94A.525(3)).

2019Typically, in reviewing an out of state conviction, the trial court conducts a comparability analysis in which “[o]ut-of-state convictions are classified according to the comparable offense definitions and sentences provided in Washington law.” State v. Stevens, 137 Wn. App. 460, 465 , 153 P.3d 903 (2007) (citing RCW 9.94A.525(3)).

2011We note that in State v. Kelley, 168 Wn.2d 72 , 226 P.3d 773 (2010) and State v. Kier, 164 Wn.2d 798 , 194 P.3d 212 (2008), our Supreme Court suggested that clear legislative intent, as gleaned from legislative history, is reviewed in conjunction with the express statutory language, part of the comparability analysis, and like express statutory language that legislative history is outcome determinative and overrides the results of the same evidence test.

2011We note that in State v. Kelley, 168 Wn.2d 72 , 226 P.3d 773 (2010) and State v. Kier, 164 Wn.2d 798 , 194 P.3d 212 (2008), our Supreme Court suggested that clear legislative intent, as gleaned from legislative history, is reviewed in conjunction with the express statutory language, part of the comparability analysis, and like express statutory language that legislative history is outcome determinative and overrides the results of the same evidence test.

2011Calle, 125 Wash.2d at 777 , 888 P.2d 155 . [10] We note that in State v. Kelley, 168 Wash.2d 72 , 226 P.3d 773 (2010) and State v. Kier, 164 Wash.2d 798 , 194 P.3d 212 (2008), our Supreme Court suggested that clear legislative intent, as gleaned from legislative history, is reviewed in conjunction with the express statutory language part of the comparability analysis, and like express statutory language that legislative history is outcome determinative and overrides the results of the same evidence test.

2011We note that in State v. Kelley, 168 Wn.2d 72 , 226 P.3d 773 (2010) and State v. Kier, 164 Wn.2d 798 , 194 P.3d 212 (2008), our Supreme Court suggested that clear legislative intent, as gleaned from legislative history, is reviewed in conjunction with the express statutory language, part of the comparability analysis, and like express statutory language that legislative history is outcome determinative and overrides the results of the same evidence test.