accomplice liability instruction in Delaware

2026Coleman has failed to show that either his trial counsel or 7 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 8 Id. at 689 . 9 Id. at 694 . 6 appellate counsel were ineffective with respect to the accomplice liability instruction. (8) The jury instructions for the first trial on the drug charges included an instruction on accomplice liability.

2026Coleman has failed to show that either his trial counsel or 7 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 8 Id. at 689 . 9 Id. at 694 . 6 appellate counsel were ineffective with respect to the accomplice liability instruction. (8) The jury instructions for the first trial on the drug charges included an instruction on accomplice liability.

2026This appeal followed. (5) We review the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for postconviction relief for abuse of discretion.3 We review constitutional claims, including claims of ineffective assistance, de novo. 4 The Court considers the procedural requirements of Rule 61 before addressing any substantive issues, 5 but most claims of ineffective assistance raised in a timely postconviction motion are not procedurally barred. 6 On appeal, Coleman argues that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective in their handling of the accomplice-liability instruction and that his trial counsel wa

2026This appeal followed. (5) We review the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for postconviction relief for abuse of discretion.3 We review constitutional claims, including claims of ineffective assistance, de novo. 4 The Court considers the procedural requirements of Rule 61 before addressing any substantive issues, 5 but most claims of ineffective assistance raised in a timely postconviction motion are not procedurally barred. 6 On appeal, Coleman argues that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective in their handling of the accomplice-liability instruction and that his trial counsel wa

2026This appeal followed. (5) We review the Superior Court’s denial of a motion for postconviction relief for abuse of discretion.3 We review constitutional claims, including claims of ineffective assistance, de novo. 4 The Court considers the procedural requirements of Rule 61 before addressing any substantive issues, 5 but most claims of ineffective assistance raised in a timely postconviction motion are not procedurally barred. 6 On appeal, Coleman argues that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective in their handling of the accomplice-liability instruction and that his trial counsel wa

2023And the accomplice liability instruction further allowed the jury to consider both degrees of robbery.15 13 Allen v. State, 970 A.2d 203, 213 (Del. 2009) (emphasis added). 14 Id. 15 The jury instructions that the Court provided for Accomplice Liability read, in part, as follows: For the defendant to be liable as an accomplice, you must be unanimously satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that, either before the crime took place or at the scene of the crime, the defendant either participated in the planning or commission of the crime or actively encouraged the other person to commit the crime.

2023And the accomplice liability instruction further allowed the jury to consider both degrees of robbery.15 13 Allen v. State, 970 A.2d 203, 213 (Del. 2009) (emphasis added). 14 Id. 15 The jury instructions that the Court provided for Accomplice Liability read, in part, as follows: For the defendant to be liable as an accomplice, you must be unanimously satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that, either before the crime took place or at the scene of the crime, the defendant either participated in the planning or commission of the crime or actively encouraged the other person to commit the crime.

2022This is particularly problematic, according 44 Starling v. State, 130 A.3d 316, 325 (Del. 2015) (citing Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 820 (Del. 2013)). 45 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 46 Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160 , 174 (Del. 2020). 20 to Ray, because when the prosecutor asked the court, albeit after the parties’ closing argument, to give a standard accomplice-liability instruction,47 the court refused, finding that accomplice liability “wasn’t argued, wasn’t presented, [and] there is no record evidence of it . . . .”48 What is more, although the Court did not give an accomp

2022This is particularly problematic, according 44 Starling v. State, 130 A.3d 316, 325 (Del. 2015) (citing Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 820 (Del. 2013)). 45 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 46 Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160 , 174 (Del. 2020). 20 to Ray, because when the prosecutor asked the court, albeit after the parties’ closing argument, to give a standard accomplice-liability instruction,47 the court refused, finding that accomplice liability “wasn’t argued, wasn’t presented, [and] there is no record evidence of it . . . .”48 What is more, although the Court did not give an accomp

2020We said that, “as a result 111 White correctly cites to Manlove v. State, 901 A.2d 1284, 1288 (Del. 2006) for our explanation of the distinction: “A conspiracy requires an agreement between co-conspirators, but the object of the conspiracy need not be accomplished.

2019An accomplice liability instruction is warranted when the State has provided “sufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude” that the defendant was an accomplice in the crime.12 The evidence discussed above supports 11 App. to Opening Br. at A156 (Trial Tr., at A150). 12 Ayers v. State, 844 A.2d 304, 308 (Del. 2004). 5 Cosby’s convictions for robbery and criminal mischief, through accomplice liability, beyond a reasonable doubt.

2016The jury instructions in the two cases were largely identical, 5 the prayer conference at the second trial mostly involved modifying the instructions to be consistent with the remaining drug dealing charge, and the prosecutor conducted his closing argument as if he was fully aware of what would be in the jury instructions.6 Lolley has failed to show that he had any reason to believe the accomplice liability instruction would not be given in the second trial. 4 DeAngelis v. Harrison, 628 A.2d 77, 80 (Del. 1993). 5 The jury instructions in the two cases were largely identical to the extent they

2002See Probst v. State, 547 A.2d 114, 122 (Del.1988) (holding general unanimity instruction is sufficient in routine case).

2001Again, in Chance v. State, Del.Supr., 685 A.2d 351, 360 (1996) this Court ruled that the omission of an accomplice liability instruction which *1062 "should have" been included in the jury charge, but the absence of which was not raised at trial, was not plain error.

2001Again, in Chance v. State, Del.Supr., 685 A.2d 351, 360 (1996) this Court ruled that the omission of an accomplice liability instruction which “should have” been included in the jury charge, but the absence of which was not raised at trial, was not plain error.

1989See also Lovett v. State, Del.Supr. 516 A.2d 455, 468 (1986) cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1018 , 107 S.Ct. 1898 , 95 L.Ed.2d 504 (1987) (holding that evidence presented at trial clearly justified the trial court’s accomplice liability instruction and did not cause defendant prejudice or unfair surprise, even though details of accomplice liability were not disclosed in bill of particulars).

1989See also Lovett v. State, Del.Supr. 516 A.2d 455, 468 (1986) cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1018 , 107 S.Ct. 1898 , 95 L.Ed.2d 504 (1987) (holding that evidence presented at trial clearly justified the trial court’s accomplice liability instruction and did not cause defendant prejudice or unfair surprise, even though details of accomplice liability were not disclosed in bill of particulars).

1989See also Lovett v. State, Del.Supr. 516 A.2d 455, 468 (1986) cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1018 , 107 S.Ct. 1898 , 95 L.Ed.2d 504 (1987) (holding that evidence presented at trial clearly justified the trial court’s accomplice liability instruction and did not cause defendant prejudice or unfair surprise, even though details of accomplice liability were not disclosed in bill of particulars).

1989See also Lovett v. State, Del.Supr. 516 A.2d 455, 468 (1986) cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1018 , 107 S.Ct. 1898 , 95 L.Ed.2d 504 (1987) (holding that evidence presented at trial clearly justified the trial court’s accomplice liability instruction and did not cause defendant prejudice or unfair surprise, even though details of accomplice liability were not disclosed in bill of particulars).