11 Georgia opinions name it 1 courts 1990–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Crispens Enterprise, Inc. v. Halsteadgreen2 sentences2004That subsection provides that an employer is liable for its contractor's negligence "[i]f the wrongful act is the violation of a duty imposed by express contract upon the employer." The rule is that if "a person contracts to do a certain thing, he cannot evade liability by employing another to do that which he has agreed to perform." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Crispens Enterprise v. Halstead, 209 Ga.App. 133, 134 (2), 433 S.E.2d 353 (1993). 2004That subsection provides that an employer is liable for its contractor's negligence "[i]f the wrongful act is the violation of a duty imposed by express contract upon the employer." The rule is that if "a person contracts to do a certain thing, he cannot evade liability by employing another to do that which he has agreed to perform." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Crispens Enterprise v. Halstead, 209 Ga.App. 133, 134 (2), 433 S.E.2d 353 (1993). | 2 | 2 |
Towles v. Coxgreen2 sentences1998OCGA § 51-2-5(4); Confetti Atlanta v. Gray, 202 Ga.App. 241, 244 (4), 414 S.E.2d 265 (1991). `An employer is liable for the negligence of a contractor... if the wrongful act is the violation of a duty imposed by statute.' OCGA § 51-2-5(4)." Griffin v. AAA Auto Club South, 221 Ga.App. 1, 2 (1), 470 S.E.2d 474 (1996); accord Parking Co. of America v. Sucan, 195 Ga.App. 616, 617 (1), 394 S.E.2d 411 (1990); Towles v. Cox, 181 Ga.App. 194, 196 , 351 S.E.2d 718 (1986); Gerald v. Ameron Automotive Centers, 145 Ga.App. 200, 202 (2), 243 S.E.2d 565 (1978). "[K]nowledge and conduct of [Goodman Decoratin 1998OCGA § 51-2-5(4); Confetti Atlanta v. Gray, 202 Ga.App. 241, 244 (4), 414 S.E.2d 265 (1991). `An employer is liable for the negligence of a contractor... if the wrongful act is the violation of a duty imposed by statute.' OCGA § 51-2-5(4)." Griffin v. AAA Auto Club South, 221 Ga.App. 1, 2 (1), 470 S.E.2d 474 (1996); accord Parking Co. of America v. Sucan, 195 Ga.App. 616, 617 (1), 394 S.E.2d 411 (1990); Towles v. Cox, 181 Ga.App. 194, 196 , 351 S.E.2d 718 (1986); Gerald v. Ameron Automotive Centers, 145 Ga.App. 200, 202 (2), 243 S.E.2d 565 (1978). "[K]nowledge and conduct of [Goodman Decoratin | 2 | 2 |
Confetti Atlanta, Ltd. v. Graygreen2 sentences1998OCGA § 51-2-5(4); Confetti Atlanta v. Gray, 202 Ga.App. 241, 244 (4), 414 S.E.2d 265 (1991). `An employer is liable for the negligence of a contractor... if the wrongful act is the violation of a duty imposed by statute.' OCGA § 51-2-5(4)." Griffin v. AAA Auto Club South, 221 Ga.App. 1, 2 (1), 470 S.E.2d 474 (1996); accord Parking Co. of America v. Sucan, 195 Ga.App. 616, 617 (1), 394 S.E.2d 411 (1990); Towles v. Cox, 181 Ga.App. 194, 196 , 351 S.E.2d 718 (1986); Gerald v. Ameron Automotive Centers, 145 Ga.App. 200, 202 (2), 243 S.E.2d 565 (1978). "[K]nowledge and conduct of [Goodman Decoratin 1998OCGA § 51-2-5(4); Confetti Atlanta v. Gray, 202 Ga.App. 241, 244 (4), 414 S.E.2d 265 (1991). `An employer is liable for the negligence of a contractor... if the wrongful act is the violation of a duty imposed by statute.' OCGA § 51-2-5(4)." Griffin v. AAA Auto Club South, 221 Ga.App. 1, 2 (1), 470 S.E.2d 474 (1996); accord Parking Co. of America v. Sucan, 195 Ga.App. 616, 617 (1), 394 S.E.2d 411 (1990); Towles v. Cox, 181 Ga.App. 194, 196 , 351 S.E.2d 718 (1986); Gerald v. Ameron Automotive Centers, 145 Ga.App. 200, 202 (2), 243 S.E.2d 565 (1978). "[K]nowledge and conduct of [Goodman Decoratin | 2 | 2 |
Gerald v. Ameron Automotive Centersgreen2 sentences1998OCGA § 51-2-5(4); Confetti Atlanta v. Gray, 202 Ga.App. 241, 244 (4), 414 S.E.2d 265 (1991). `An employer is liable for the negligence of a contractor... if the wrongful act is the violation of a duty imposed by statute.' OCGA § 51-2-5(4)." Griffin v. AAA Auto Club South, 221 Ga.App. 1, 2 (1), 470 S.E.2d 474 (1996); accord Parking Co. of America v. Sucan, 195 Ga.App. 616, 617 (1), 394 S.E.2d 411 (1990); Towles v. Cox, 181 Ga.App. 194, 196 , 351 S.E.2d 718 (1986); Gerald v. Ameron Automotive Centers, 145 Ga.App. 200, 202 (2), 243 S.E.2d 565 (1978). "[K]nowledge and conduct of [Goodman Decoratin 1998OCGA § 51-2-5(4); Confetti Atlanta v. Gray, 202 Ga.App. 241, 244 (4), 414 S.E.2d 265 (1991). `An employer is liable for the negligence of a contractor... if the wrongful act is the violation of a duty imposed by statute.' OCGA § 51-2-5(4)." Griffin v. AAA Auto Club South, 221 Ga.App. 1, 2 (1), 470 S.E.2d 474 (1996); accord Parking Co. of America v. Sucan, 195 Ga.App. 616, 617 (1), 394 S.E.2d 411 (1990); Towles v. Cox, 181 Ga.App. 194, 196 , 351 S.E.2d 718 (1986); Gerald v. Ameron Automotive Centers, 145 Ga.App. 200, 202 (2), 243 S.E.2d 565 (1978). "[K]nowledge and conduct of [Goodman Decoratin | 2 | 2 |
Griffin v. AAA Auto Club South, Inc.green2 sentences1998OCGA § 51-2-5(4); Confetti Atlanta v. Gray, 202 Ga.App. 241, 244 (4), 414 S.E.2d 265 (1991). `An employer is liable for the negligence of a contractor... if the wrongful act is the violation of a duty imposed by statute.' OCGA § 51-2-5(4)." Griffin v. AAA Auto Club South, 221 Ga.App. 1, 2 (1), 470 S.E.2d 474 (1996); accord Parking Co. of America v. Sucan, 195 Ga.App. 616, 617 (1), 394 S.E.2d 411 (1990); Towles v. Cox, 181 Ga.App. 194, 196 , 351 S.E.2d 718 (1986); Gerald v. Ameron Automotive Centers, 145 Ga.App. 200, 202 (2), 243 S.E.2d 565 (1978). "[K]nowledge and conduct of [Goodman Decoratin 1998OCGA § 51-2-5(4); Confetti Atlanta v. Gray, 202 Ga.App. 241, 244 (4), 414 S.E.2d 265 (1991). `An employer is liable for the negligence of a contractor... if the wrongful act is the violation of a duty imposed by statute.' OCGA § 51-2-5(4)." Griffin v. AAA Auto Club South, 221 Ga.App. 1, 2 (1), 470 S.E.2d 474 (1996); accord Parking Co. of America v. Sucan, 195 Ga.App. 616, 617 (1), 394 S.E.2d 411 (1990); Towles v. Cox, 181 Ga.App. 194, 196 , 351 S.E.2d 718 (1986); Gerald v. Ameron Automotive Centers, 145 Ga.App. 200, 202 (2), 243 S.E.2d 565 (1978). "[K]nowledge and conduct of [Goodman Decoratin | 2 | 2 |
Parking Co. of America v. Sucangreen2 sentences1998OCGA § 51-2-5(4); Confetti Atlanta v. Gray, 202 Ga.App. 241, 244 (4), 414 S.E.2d 265 (1991). `An employer is liable for the negligence of a contractor... if the wrongful act is the violation of a duty imposed by statute.' OCGA § 51-2-5(4)." Griffin v. AAA Auto Club South, 221 Ga.App. 1, 2 (1), 470 S.E.2d 474 (1996); accord Parking Co. of America v. Sucan, 195 Ga.App. 616, 617 (1), 394 S.E.2d 411 (1990); Towles v. Cox, 181 Ga.App. 194, 196 , 351 S.E.2d 718 (1986); Gerald v. Ameron Automotive Centers, 145 Ga.App. 200, 202 (2), 243 S.E.2d 565 (1978). "[K]nowledge and conduct of [Goodman Decoratin 1998OCGA § 51-2-5(4); Confetti Atlanta v. Gray, 202 Ga.App. 241, 244 (4), 414 S.E.2d 265 (1991). `An employer is liable for the negligence of a contractor... if the wrongful act is the violation of a duty imposed by statute.' OCGA § 51-2-5(4)." Griffin v. AAA Auto Club South, 221 Ga.App. 1, 2 (1), 470 S.E.2d 474 (1996); accord Parking Co. of America v. Sucan, 195 Ga.App. 616, 617 (1), 394 S.E.2d 411 (1990); Towles v. Cox, 181 Ga.App. 194, 196 , 351 S.E.2d 718 (1986); Gerald v. Ameron Automotive Centers, 145 Ga.App. 200, 202 (2), 243 S.E.2d 565 (1978). "[K]nowledge and conduct of [Goodman Decoratin | 2 | 2 |
Watkins v. First South Utility Construction, Inc.green1 sentence2023Exceptions to this general rule are codified at OCGA § 51-2-5, including, relevant to this appeal, where “the wrongful act is the violation of a duty imposed by express contract upon the employer[.]” (Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 51-2-5 (3); see also Watkins, 284 Ga. App. at 549 . | 1 | 1 |
Kidd v. Dentsply International, Inc.green2 sentences2022Under this theory of recovery, however, “the contractual duties under which the employer would be liable for the acts of the independent contractor cannot be enforced by one not a party to the contract.” Kidd v. Dentsply Intl., 278 Ga. App. 346, 350 (2) ( 629 SE2d 58 ) (2006) (citation and punctuation omitted). 2022Under this theory of recovery, however, “the contractual duties under which the employer would be liable for the acts of the independent contractor cannot be enforced by one not a party to the contract.” Kidd v. Dentsply Intl., 278 Ga. App. 346, 350 (2) ( 629 SE2d 58 ) (2006) (citation and punctuation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Benson-Jones v. Sysco Food Services of Atlanta, LLCgreen2 sentences2017“The exception applies only where the independent contractor has breached the statutory duty of the person employing the independent contractor.” Benson-Jones v. Sysco Food Svcs. of Atlanta, 287 Ga. App. 579, 583 (2) ( 651 SE2d 839 ) (2007) (citation omitted). 2017“The exception applies only where the independent contractor has breached the statutory duty of the person employing the independent contractor.” Benson-Jones v. Sysco Food Svcs. of Atlanta, 287 Ga. App. 579, 583 (2) ( 651 SE2d 839 ) (2007) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
CHRYSLER GROUP, LLC v. WALDEN Et Al.green1 sentence2017See Chrysler Group, 339 Ga. App. at 745 (7) (abuse of discretion standard for motions in limine). 11 OCGA § 51-12-33 (a) applies when an action is brought against one or more persons and the plaintiff is to some degree responsible for the injury or damages. | 1 | 1 |
Kroger Co. v. Stricklandgreen2 sentences2014For the reasons above, we agree and reverse the grant of summary judgment to Spalding on a negligence theory.7 With respect to Spalding’s liability under a premises liability theory, Smith “must plead and prove that: (1) the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard; and (2) the plaintiff, despite exercising ordinary care for his or her own personal safety, lacked knowledge of the hazard due to the defendant’s actions or to 7 See OCGA § 51-2-5 (4) (“An employer is liable for the negligence of a contractor . . . [i]f the wrongful act is the violation of a duty imposed by stat 2014For the reasons above, we agree and reverse the grant of summary judgment to Spalding on a negligence theory.7 With respect to Spalding’s liability under a premises liability theory, Smith “must plead and prove that: (1) the defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of the hazard; and (2) the plaintiff, despite exercising ordinary care for his or her own personal safety, lacked knowledge of the hazard due to the defendant’s actions or to 7 See OCGA § 51-2-5 (4) (“An employer is liable for the negligence of a contractor . . . [i]f the wrongful act is the violation of a duty imposed by stat | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Kimberly Clarkgreen2 sentences2004OCGA § 51-2-5(4)." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Johnson v. Clark, 233 Ga.App. 508, 510 , 504 S.E.2d 536 (1998). 2004OCGA § 51-2-5(4)." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Johnson v. Clark, 233 Ga.App. 508, 510 , 504 S.E.2d 536 (1998). | 1 | 1 |
Kelley v. Piggly Wiggly Southern, Inc.green2 sentences1998OCGA § 51-2-5(4); Confetti Atlanta v. Gray, 202 Ga.App. 241, 244 (4), 414 S.E.2d 265 (1991). `An employer is liable for the negligence of a contractor... if the wrongful act is the violation of a duty imposed by statute.' OCGA § 51-2-5(4)." Griffin v. AAA Auto Club South, 221 Ga.App. 1, 2 (1), 470 S.E.2d 474 (1996); accord Parking Co. of America v. Sucan, 195 Ga.App. 616, 617 (1), 394 S.E.2d 411 (1990); Towles v. Cox, 181 Ga.App. 194, 196 , 351 S.E.2d 718 (1986); Gerald v. Ameron Automotive Centers, 145 Ga.App. 200, 202 (2), 243 S.E.2d 565 (1978). "[K]nowledge and conduct of [Goodman Decoratin 1998OCGA § 51-2-5(4); Confetti Atlanta v. Gray, 202 Ga.App. 241, 244 (4), 414 S.E.2d 265 (1991). `An employer is liable for the negligence of a contractor... if the wrongful act is the violation of a duty imposed by statute.' OCGA § 51-2-5(4)." Griffin v. AAA Auto Club South, 221 Ga.App. 1, 2 (1), 470 S.E.2d 474 (1996); accord Parking Co. of America v. Sucan, 195 Ga.App. 616, 617 (1), 394 S.E.2d 411 (1990); Towles v. Cox, 181 Ga.App. 194, 196 , 351 S.E.2d 718 (1986); Gerald v. Ameron Automotive Centers, 145 Ga.App. 200, 202 (2), 243 S.E.2d 565 (1978). "[K]nowledge and conduct of [Goodman Decoratin | 1 | 1 |
Bruno’s Food Stores, Inc. v. Taylorgreen2 sentences1998OCGA § 51-2-5(4); Confetti Atlanta v. Gray, 202 Ga.App. 241, 244 (4), 414 S.E.2d 265 (1991). `An employer is liable for the negligence of a contractor... if the wrongful act is the violation of a duty imposed by statute.' OCGA § 51-2-5(4)." Griffin v. AAA Auto Club South, 221 Ga.App. 1, 2 (1), 470 S.E.2d 474 (1996); accord Parking Co. of America v. Sucan, 195 Ga.App. 616, 617 (1), 394 S.E.2d 411 (1990); Towles v. Cox, 181 Ga.App. 194, 196 , 351 S.E.2d 718 (1986); Gerald v. Ameron Automotive Centers, 145 Ga.App. 200, 202 (2), 243 S.E.2d 565 (1978). "[K]nowledge and conduct of [Goodman Decoratin 1998OCGA § 51-2-5(4); Confetti Atlanta v. Gray, 202 Ga.App. 241, 244 (4), 414 S.E.2d 265 (1991). `An employer is liable for the negligence of a contractor... if the wrongful act is the violation of a duty imposed by statute.' OCGA § 51-2-5(4)." Griffin v. AAA Auto Club South, 221 Ga.App. 1, 2 (1), 470 S.E.2d 474 (1996); accord Parking Co. of America v. Sucan, 195 Ga.App. 616, 617 (1), 394 S.E.2d 411 (1990); Towles v. Cox, 181 Ga.App. 194, 196 , 351 S.E.2d 718 (1986); Gerald v. Ameron Automotive Centers, 145 Ga.App. 200, 202 (2), 243 S.E.2d 565 (1978). "[K]nowledge and conduct of [Goodman Decoratin | 1 | 1 |
Clark v. Carla Gay Dress Co.green2 sentences1996Despite this duty to keep its premises safe, “generally an intervening criminal act by a third party insulates a proprietor from liability, but even an independent criminal act could render the proprietor liable ‘if the defendant (original wrongdoer) had reasonable grounds for apprehending that such criminal act would be committed’ or is ‘reasonably to be anticipated.’ ” Clark v. Carla Gay Dress Co., 178 Ga. App. 157, 161 ( 342 SE2d 468 ) (1986). 1996Despite this duty to keep its premises safe, “generally an intervening criminal act by a third party insulates a proprietor from liability, but even an independent criminal act could render the proprietor liable ‘if the defendant (original wrongdoer) had reasonable grounds for apprehending that such criminal act would be committed’ or is ‘reasonably to be anticipated.’ ” Clark v. Carla Gay Dress Co., 178 Ga. App. 157, 161 ( 342 SE2d 468 ) (1986). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Fields v. B & B PIPELINE CO.
green
2 sentences1990Fields v. B & B Pipeline Co., 147 Ga. App. 875 ( 250 SE2d 582 ) (1978). 1990Fields v. B & B Pipeline Co., 147 Ga. App. 875 ( 250 SE2d 582 ) (1978). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.