emergency response immunity in Iowa

2020Mfg., Co. v. City of Des Moines, 586 N.W.2d 340, 350 (Iowa 1998) (finding a material issue of fact whether the emergency response immunity applied).

2018See Keystone, 586 N.W.2d at 346 .

2015Soc’y v. Iowa Bd. of Nursing, 831 N.W.2d 826, 841 (Iowa 2013) (“If the legislature had intended to give another agency or organization the power to determine recognition by the medical profession, it would have said so.... ”).

2015Soc’y v. Iowa Bd. of Nursing, 831 N.W.2d 826, 841 (Iowa 2013) (“If the legislature had intended to give another agency or organization the power to determine recognition by the medical profession, it would have said so . . . .”).

2015See Hook v. Trevino, 839 N.W.2d 434, 443-44 (Iowa 2013) (“If the legislature had intended volunteer immunity to apply' to the state, it presumably would have said so expressly, as it did for the emergency response immunity in the Municipal Tort Claims Act.”); Iowa Med.

2015See Hook v. Trevino, 839 N.W.2d 434 , 443–44 (Iowa 2013) (“If the legislature had intended volunteer immunity to apply to the state, it presumably would have said so expressly, as it did for the emergency response immunity in the Municipal Tort Claims Act.”); Iowa Med.

2025Servs., 924 N.W.2d 853, 863 (Iowa 2019). 13 Turning to the statutory defense, the defendants argue that the district court erred by failing to dismiss this action based on the emergency response immunity codified in section 670.4(1)(k) of the IMTCA.1 The Mormanns argue that the emergency response immunity is defeated when, as here, the jury finds that the police officer was reckless in continuing his pursuit under Iowa Code section 321.231(5) (2021).

2025Id. at 683; see also Iowa Code § 4.7 (requiring us to construe the provisions of specific statutes as exceptions to those of general statutes).

2025Hoffert, 578 N.W.2d at 684–85 (explaining that “it is the manner of driving” that triggers section 321.231 liability and that “the level of culpability to retain the statutorily granted immunity is negligence”).

2020A municipality does not have a right to a pretrial evidentiary hearing on immunity.6 6Wilson quotes from Nelson v. Lindaman, 867 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2015).

2018The county relies on Kershner v. City of Burlington, 618 N.W.2d 340 (Iowa 2000).

2018See id. at 341-42 .

2017While the court in that case did not “discount the potential hazards that could arise”- from traffic violations, the court reasoned that “[i]f routine traffic violations ... are deemed emergencies, there is little doubt that the emergency response exception would swallow the rule.” Stych, 655 F.Supp.2d at 936, 938 .

2013Id. at 890-92 .

2013Trevino seizes on language in which we denied the county’s cross-appeal, stating the summary judgments in favor of the county employees, hospital, and ambulance service “necessarily justified dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims against defendant Howard County, either on governmental immunity or vicarious liability grounds.” Id. at 892 (emphasis added) (citing Iowa Code § 670.4 (11) (1995) and Biddle v. Sartori Mem’l Hosp., 518 N.W.2d 795, 799 (Iowa 1994) (holding settlement with doctor extinguished further claims against defendant hospital based on vicarious-liability theory)). 3 The italicized la

2013Trevino seizes on language in which we denied the county’s cross-appeal, stating the summary judgments in favor of the county employees, hospital, and ambulance service “necessarily justified dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims against defendant Howard County, either on governmental immunity or vicarious liability grounds.” Id. at 892 (emphasis added) (citing Iowa Code § 670.4 (11) (1995) and Biddle v. Sartori Mem’l Hosp., 518 N.W.2d 795, 799 (Iowa 1994) (holding settlement with doctor extinguished further claims against defendant hospital based on vicarious-liability theory)). 3 The italicized la

2013Id. at 892-93 .

2004See McAlexander v. Siskiyou Joint Cmty. Coll, 222 Cal.App.3d 768 , 272 Cal.Rptr. 70, 73 (1990) (refusing to read into immunity statute for liability resulting from emergency medical. training a limitation restricting immunity.to suits brought by third persons).

2004See McAlexander v. Siskiyou Joint Cmty. Coll, 222 Cal.App.3d 768 , 272 Cal.Rptr. 70, 73 (1990) (refusing to read into immunity statute for liability resulting from emergency medical. training a limitation restricting immunity.to suits brought by third persons).

2004See Fried v. Archer, 139 Md.App. 229 , 775 A.2d 430, 449 (2001) (holding fact that negligence claim rests on a special duty does not prevent the extinguishment of that claim when immunity has been granted for such negligence).

2004See Fried v. Archer, 139 Md.App. 229 , 775 A.2d 430, 449 (2001) (holding fact that negligence claim rests on a special duty does not prevent the extinguishment of that claim when immunity has been granted for such negligence).

1998Cf. Odello Bros. v. County of Monterey, 63 Cal.App.4th 778, 791 , 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 911 (Cal.App.1998) (county not immune from inverse condemnation elaim under emergency exception because although county was responding to flood when it intentionally breached a levee, the emergency was due to inadequacy of another levee, of which city had knowledge, but took no action to repair).

1998Cf. Odello Bros. v. County of Monterey, 63 Cal.App.4th 778, 791 , 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 903, 911 (Cal.App.1998) (county not immune from inverse condemnation elaim under emergency exception because although county was responding to flood when it intentionally breached a levee, the emergency was due to inadequacy of another levee, of which city had knowledge, but took no action to repair).