exclusivity provisions bar in Illinois

1999Because injuries intentionally inflicted by a co[ ] worker are accidental from the employer’s point of view, the employer has a right to consider that the injured employee’s sole remedy against the employer will be under the workers’ compensation statute. *** The exclusivity provisions will not bar a common law cause of action against an employer, however, for injuries which the employer or its alter ego intentionally inflicts upon the employee or which were commanded or expressly authorized by the employer. [Citations.] The rationale advanced in support of this rule is that the employer shoul

1993Although noting that injuries inflicted intentionally upon an employee by a coemployee are "accidental" within the meaning of the Act, since such injuries are unexpected and unforeseeable from the injured employee's point of view, the court also noted that the exclusivity provisions will not bar a common law cause of action against an employer for injuries which the employer or its alter ego intentionally inflicts upon an employee or which were commanded or expressly authorized by the employer, adopting the rationale of the court in Jablonski v. Multack . ( Meerbrey, 139 Ill.2d at 464 , 151 Il

2015In Moushon v. National Garages, Inc., 9 Ill. 2d 407 (1956), and Duley v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 44 Ill. 2d 15 (1969), however, this court had some opportunity to consider the interplay between certain provisions under the Workers’ Compensation Act that limit the employer’s liability and the exclusive remedy provisions. ¶ 27 In Moushon, an employee was injured while operating equipment at his workplace.

2015In Moushon v. National Garages, Inc., 9 Ill. 2d 407 (1956), and Duley v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 44 Ill. 2d 15 (1969), however, this court had some opportunity to consider the interplay between certain provisions under the Workers’ Compensation Act that limit the employer’s liability and the exclusive remedy provisions. ¶ 27 In Moushon, an employee was injured while operating equipment at his workplace.

2015In Moushon v. National Garages, Inc., 9 Ill. 2d 407 (1956), and Duley v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 44 Ill. 2d 15 (1969), however, this court had some opportunity to consider the interplay between certain provisions under the Workers’ Compensation Act that limit the employer’s liability and the exclusive remedy provisions. ¶ 27 In Moushon, an employee was injured while operating equipment at his workplace.

2015In Moushon v. National Garages, Inc., 9 Ill. 2d 407 (1956), and Duley v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 44 Ill. 2d 15 (1969), however, this court had some opportunity to consider the interplay between certain provisions under the Workers’ Compensation Act that limit the employer’s liability and the exclusive remedy provisions. ¶ 27 In Moushon, an employee was injured while operating equipment at his workplace.

2014Fox v. Gauto, 2013 IL App (5th) 110327, ¶ 13 , 995 N.E.2d 1026 . ¶ 12 Both of the certified questions concern whether the Act's exclusivity provisions bar an injured employee from recovering damages for lost wages in a retaliatory discharge lawsuit when the employee is injured in a work-related accident and is unable to work as a result of the workers' compensation carrier's delay in approving medical treatment.

2014Fox v. Gauto, 2013 IL App (5th) 110327, ¶ 13 , 995 N.E.2d 1026 . ¶ 12 Both of the certified questions concern whether the Act’s exclusivity provisions bar an injured employee from recovering damages for lost wages in a retaliatory discharge lawsuit when the employee is injured in a work-related accident and is unable to work as a result of the workers’ compensation carrier’s delay in approving medical treatment.

2014In answering both certified questions, we hold that the employee's damages for lost wages fall within the exclusivity provisions of the Act. ¶ 13 The Act "was enacted to abrogate the system of common law rights and liabilities which previously governed an injured employee's ability to recover against his employer." Ocasek v. Krass, 153 Ill.

2014In answering both certified questions, we hold that the employee’s damages for lost wages fall within the exclusivity provisions of the Act. ¶ 13 The Act “was enacted to abrogate the system of common law rights and liabilities which previously governed an injured employee’s ability to recover against his employer.” Ocasek v. Krass, 153 Ill.

2022“Our primary objective when construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.” Eighner v. Tiernan, 2021 IL 126101, ¶ 19 .

2022The [a]ppellate [c]ourt may thereupon in its discretion allow an appeal from the order.” “By definition, certified questions are questions of law subject to de novo review.” Rozsavolgyi v. City of Aurora, 2017 IL 121048, ¶ 21 . ¶ 17 The certified question in this case asks us to construe the language of the Compensation Act and the Privacy Act to determine whether the Compensation Act’s exclusivity provisions bar an employee’s claim filed in the circuit court for statutory damages under the Privacy Act.

1990Jablonski v. Multack (1978), 63 Ill.