third affirmative defense in Illinois

2016“Conclusory allegations are insufficient.” Id. ¶ 35 Here, the allegations in the amended third affirmative defense were conclusory and thus properly stricken.

2016“Conclusory allegations are insufficient.” Id. ¶ 35 Here, the allegations in the amended third affirmative defense were conclusory and thus properly stricken.

2014These factors are: (1) whether the proposed amendment would cure the defective pleading; (2) whether other parties would sustain prejudice or surprise by virtue of the proposed amendment; (3) whether the proposed amendment is timely; and (4) whether previous 10 opportunities to amend the pleading could be identified. [Citation.]" Loyola Academy, 146 Ill. 2d at 273 . ¶ 30 Defendants argue that all four of the above factors are met.

2014These factors are: (1) whether the proposed amendment would cure the defective pleading; (2) whether other parties would sustain prejudice or surprise by virtue of the proposed amendment; (3) whether the proposed amendment is timely; and (4) whether previous 10 opportunities to amend the pleading could be identified. [Citation.]" Loyola Academy, 146 Ill. 2d at 273 . ¶ 30 Defendants argue that all four of the above factors are met.

2016Plaintiff argued that the amended affirmative defenses were not well pleaded, containing conclusory allegations insufficient to support fraud in the inducement or -3- 2015 IL App (2d) 140331 equitable estoppel.

2015Plaintiff argued that the amended affirmative defenses were not well pleaded, containing conclusory allegations insufficient to support fraud in the inducement or -3- 2015 IL App (2d) 140331 equitable estoppel.

2021Defendant contends that counsel was ineffective for not asserting a third affirmative defense—namely, the defense of dwelling. ¶ 49 The affirmative defenses of self-defense and defense of others provide that a person is justified in the use of deadly force only if he reasonably believes that deadly force is necessary “to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or another, or the commission of a forcible felony.” 720 ILCS 5/7-1(a) (West 2016). ¶ 50 The affirmative defense of dwelling provides that a person is justified in the use of deadly force only if: (1) someone unlawfully en

1995(Kohlmeier v. Shelter Insurance Co. (1988), 170 Ill.

1994Our courts describe acquiescence as an element in consideration of the defense of abandonment, e.g.: "The doctrine of acquiescence which will make unenforceable an otherwise valid plan of restriction is *** [based] upon the proposition that tolerated violations of the restriction will, over the course of time, defeat the object of the restriction.” (Wallace v. Hoffman (1949), 336 Ill.

1993App. 3d 1019 , 551 N.E.2d 1122 (no abuse of discretion to deny the defendants’ request to file a third affirmative defense).

1979Equitable estoppel has been defined as “ ° 0 the effect of the voluntary conduct of a party whereby he [or she] is absolutely precluded from asserting rights which might otherwise have existed as against another person who has, in good faith, relied upon such conduct and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse, and who on his part acquires some corresponding rights.’ ” (Atwater v. Atwater (1974), 18 Ill.