81 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1991–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Swafford v. Stategreen2 sentences2023The State does not challenge the Court of Appeals’ reversal of Defendant’s conviction for possession of burglary tools. 2 We note that Defendant was charged with, and subsequently convicted of burglary, not aggravated burglary as set out in the Court of Appeals’ opinion. 3 1 the Court of Appeals first correctly recognized that this case involved a double 2 jeopardy, multiple description issue and applied the two-part Swafford test, which 3 examines “‘(1) whether the conduct is unitary, and, if so, (2) whether the Legislature 4 intended to punish the offenses separately.’” Id. ¶¶ 5-6 (quoting S 2023The State does not challenge the Court of Appeals’ reversal of Defendant’s conviction for possession of burglary tools. 2 We note that Defendant was charged with, and subsequently convicted of burglary, not aggravated burglary as set out in the Court of Appeals’ opinion. 3 1 the Court of Appeals first correctly recognized that this case involved a double 2 jeopardy, multiple description issue and applied the two-part Swafford test, which 3 examines “‘(1) whether the conduct is unitary, and, if so, (2) whether the Legislature 4 intended to punish the offenses separately.’” Id. ¶¶ 5-6 (quoting S | 13 | 36 |
Blockburger v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2023The State does not challenge the Court of Appeals’ reversal of Defendant’s conviction for possession of burglary tools. 2 We note that Defendant was charged with, and subsequently convicted of burglary, not aggravated burglary as set out in the Court of Appeals’ opinion. 3 1 the Court of Appeals first correctly recognized that this case involved a double 2 jeopardy, multiple description issue and applied the two-part Swafford test, which 3 examines “‘(1) whether the conduct is unitary, and, if so, (2) whether the Legislature 4 intended to punish the offenses separately.’” Id. ¶¶ 5-6 (quoting S 2023The State does not challenge the Court of Appeals’ reversal of Defendant’s conviction for possession of burglary tools. 2 We note that Defendant was charged with, and subsequently convicted of burglary, not aggravated burglary as set out in the Court of Appeals’ opinion. 3 1 the Court of Appeals first correctly recognized that this case involved a double 2 jeopardy, multiple description issue and applied the two-part Swafford test, which 3 examines “‘(1) whether the conduct is unitary, and, if so, (2) whether the Legislature 4 intended to punish the offenses separately.’” Id. ¶¶ 5-6 (quoting S | 12 | 20 |
State v. Francogreen2 sentences2026We 7 also consider, “whether the facts presented at trial establish that the jury reasonably 8 could have inferred independent factual bases for the charged offenses.” State v. 9 Franco, 2005-NMSC-013, ¶ 7 , 137 N.M. 447 , 112 P.3d 1104 (internal quotation 10 marks and citation omitted). 11 {16} When analyzing legislative intent under part two of the Swafford test, we first 12 determine “whether the Legislature intended to permit multiple punishments” under 13 each statute. 2026We 7 also consider, “whether the facts presented at trial establish that the jury reasonably 8 could have inferred independent factual bases for the charged offenses.” State v. 9 Franco, 2005-NMSC-013, ¶ 7 , 137 N.M. 447 , 112 P.3d 1104 (internal quotation 10 marks and citation omitted). 11 {16} When analyzing legislative intent under part two of the Swafford test, we first 12 determine “whether the Legislature intended to permit multiple punishments” under 13 each statute. | 7 | 11 |
State v. Silvasgreen2 sentences2019See State v. Silvas, 2015-NMSC-006, ¶ 10 , 343 P.3d 616 (“Conduct is unitary when not sufficiently separated by time or place, and the object and result or quality and nature of the acts cannot be distinguished.”). {22} We now turn to the second part of the Swafford test to determine whether the Legislature intended to make aggravated assault and aggravated battery, as charged in this case, separately punishable offenses. 2019See State v. Silvas, 2015-NMSC-006, ¶ 10 , 343 P.3d 616 (“Conduct is unitary when not sufficiently separated by time or place, and the object and result or quality and nature of the acts cannot be distinguished.”). {22} We now turn to the second part of the Swafford test to determine whether the Legislature intended to make aggravated assault and aggravated battery, as charged in this case, separately punishable offenses. | 4 | 5 |
State v. Bahneygreen2 sentences2020We, however, need not undertake a unitary conduct analysis here because Defendant “cannot carry the burden imposed by the second prong of the Swafford test.” State v. Ramirez, 2018-NMSC-003, ¶ 42 , 409 P.3d 902 ; see also State v. Bahney, 2012-NMCA-039, ¶ 21 , 274 P.3d 134 (stating that it is permissible to presume unitary conduct because “our case law separately makes it clear that analysis pursuant to either prong can be dispositive of a Swafford-governed double jeopardy challenge”). {18} “The sole limitation on multiple punishments is legislative intent[.]” State v. Franco, 2005-NMSC-013, ¶ 2020We, however, need not undertake a unitary conduct analysis here because Defendant “cannot carry the burden imposed by the second prong of the Swafford test.” State v. Ramirez, 2018-NMSC-003, ¶ 42 , 409 P.3d 902 ; see also State v. Bahney, 2012-NMCA-039, ¶ 21 , 274 P.3d 134 (stating that it is permissible to presume unitary conduct because “our case law separately makes it clear that analysis pursuant to either prong can be dispositive of a Swafford-governed double jeopardy challenge”). {18} “The sole limitation on multiple punishments is legislative intent[.]” State v. Franco, 2005-NMSC-013, ¶ | 4 | 4 |
State v. Saizred2 sentences2016See State v. Saiz, 2008-NMSC-048, ¶ 35 , 144 N.M. 663 , 6 191 P.3d 521 , abrogated on other grounds by State v. Bellanger, 2009-NMSC-025 , 7 ¶ 36 n.1, 146 N.M. 351 , 210 P.3d 783 . 8 Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 9 {23} Defendant claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial 10 counsel failed to: (1) investigate potential defenses, (2) secure witnesses, (3) preserve 11 issues, and (4) strike a juror who knew Defendant for possible bias. 2016See State v. Saiz, 2008-NMSC-048, ¶ 35 , 144 N.M. 663 , 6 191 P.3d 521 , abrogated on other grounds by State v. Bellanger, 2009-NMSC-025 , 7 ¶ 36 n.1, 146 N.M. 351 , 210 P.3d 783 . 8 Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 9 {23} Defendant claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial 10 counsel failed to: (1) investigate potential defenses, (2) secure witnesses, (3) preserve 11 issues, and (4) strike a juror who knew Defendant for possible bias. | 4 | 4 |
State v. Begayegreen2 sentences2023The State does not challenge the Court of Appeals’ reversal of Defendant’s conviction for possession of burglary tools. 2 We note that Defendant was charged with, and subsequently convicted of burglary, not aggravated burglary as set out in the Court of Appeals’ opinion. 3 1 the Court of Appeals first correctly recognized that this case involved a double 2 jeopardy, multiple description issue and applied the two-part Swafford test, which 3 examines “‘(1) whether the conduct is unitary, and, if so, (2) whether the Legislature 4 intended to punish the offenses separately.’” Id. ¶¶ 5-6 (quoting S 2023The State does not challenge the Court of Appeals’ reversal of Defendant’s conviction for possession of burglary tools. 2 We note that Defendant was charged with, and subsequently convicted of burglary, not aggravated burglary as set out in the Court of Appeals’ opinion. 3 1 the Court of Appeals first correctly recognized that this case involved a double 2 jeopardy, multiple description issue and applied the two-part Swafford test, which 3 examines “‘(1) whether the conduct is unitary, and, if so, (2) whether the Legislature 4 intended to punish the offenses separately.’” Id. ¶¶ 5-6 (quoting S | 3 | 3 |
State v. Belangergreen2 sentences2016See State v. Saiz, 2008-NMSC-048, ¶ 35 , 144 N.M. 663 , 6 191 P.3d 521 , abrogated on other grounds by State v. Bellanger, 2009-NMSC-025 , 7 ¶ 36 n.1, 146 N.M. 351 , 210 P.3d 783 . 8 Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 9 {23} Defendant claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial 10 counsel failed to: (1) investigate potential defenses, (2) secure witnesses, (3) preserve 11 issues, and (4) strike a juror who knew Defendant for possible bias. 2016See State v. Saiz, 2008-NMSC-048, ¶ 35 , 144 N.M. 663 , 6 191 P.3d 521 , abrogated on other grounds by State v. Bellanger, 2009-NMSC-025 , 7 ¶ 36 n.1, 146 N.M. 351 , 210 P.3d 783 . 8 Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 9 {23} Defendant claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial 10 counsel failed to: (1) investigate potential defenses, (2) secure witnesses, (3) preserve 11 issues, and (4) strike a juror who knew Defendant for possible bias. | 3 | 3 |
State v. Contrerasgreen2 sentences2007Contreras and Application of the Block-burger Test to Felony murder Cases {16} This Court has already determined the outcome of the second part of the Swafford test as applied to felony murder cases based on unitary conduct: In Contreras, we held that when the conduct is unitary, the defendant cannot be convicted of both felony murder and the underlying predicate felony. 120 N.M. at 491 , 903 P.2d at 233 . 2007Contreras and Application of the Block-burger Test to Felony murder Cases {16} This Court has already determined the outcome of the second part of the Swafford test as applied to felony murder cases based on unitary conduct: In Contreras, we held that when the conduct is unitary, the defendant cannot be convicted of both felony murder and the underlying predicate felony. 120 N.M. at 491 , 903 P.2d at 233 . | 3 | 3 |
State v. Francogreen2 sentences2026We 7 also consider, “whether the facts presented at trial establish that the jury reasonably 8 could have inferred independent factual bases for the charged offenses.” State v. 9 Franco, 2005-NMSC-013, ¶ 7 , 137 N.M. 447 , 112 P.3d 1104 (internal quotation 10 marks and citation omitted). 11 {16} When analyzing legislative intent under part two of the Swafford test, we first 12 determine “whether the Legislature intended to permit multiple punishments” under 13 each statute. 2026We 7 also consider, “whether the facts presented at trial establish that the jury reasonably 8 could have inferred independent factual bases for the charged offenses.” State v. 9 Franco, 2005-NMSC-013, ¶ 7 , 137 N.M. 447 , 112 P.3d 1104 (internal quotation 10 marks and citation omitted). 11 {16} When analyzing legislative intent under part two of the Swafford test, we first 12 determine “whether the Legislature intended to permit multiple punishments” under 13 each statute. | 2 | 10 |
State v. Allengreen2 sentences2014See Allen, 2000-NMSC-002, ¶ 70 (“[I]f there was a basis for the jury to find factually distinct bases for kidnapping [and] attempted CSP,... then the conduct is considered non-unitary.”). {11} Because we conclude that Defendant’s conduct was not unitary, we do not proceed to the second part of the Swafford analysis. 2014See Allen, 2000-NMSC-002, ¶ 70 (“[I]f there was a basis for the jury to find factually distinct bases for kidnapping [and] attempted CSP,... then the conduct is considered non-unitary.”). {11} Because we conclude that Defendant’s conduct was not unitary, we do not proceed to the second part of the Swafford analysis. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Fuentesgreen2 sentences2009See id. at 15 , 810 P.2d at 1235 (“Where one statutory provision incorporates many of the elements of a base statute, and extracts a greater penalty than the base statute, it may be inferred that the [LJegislature did not intend punishment under both statutes.”); State v. Fuentes, 119 N.M. 104, 108-09 , 888 P.2d 986, 990-91 (Ct.App.1994) (clarifying Swafford’s analysis regarding the quantum of punishment in considering legislative intent by indicating that where different punishments exist between that in the base statute and that in a statute that increases the penalty for “aggravating conduc 2009See id. at 15 , 810 P.2d at 1235 (“Where one statutory provision incorporates many of the elements of a base statute, and extracts a greater penalty than the base statute, it may be inferred that the [LJegislature did not intend punishment under both statutes.”); State v. Fuentes, 119 N.M. 104, 108-09 , 888 P.2d 986, 990-91 (Ct.App.1994) (clarifying Swafford’s analysis regarding the quantum of punishment in considering legislative intent by indicating that where different punishments exist between that in the base statute and that in a statute that increases the penalty for “aggravating conduc | 2 | 2 |
State v. Swickgreen2 sentences2015The jury need not have 13 determined during which encounter penetration occurred to conclude that CSP occurred. 14 The remaining encounter, which was not the basis for the CSP conviction, remains and is 15 sufficient to stand as the basis for the CSC conviction. 16 {25} Having determined Defendant’s conduct was not unitary, we need not reach the 17 second step in the Swafford analysis, and we conclude that there was no double 18 jeopardy violation. 1991-NMSC-043 , ¶ 28 (stating that a finding that the defendant’s 19 conduct was not unitary ends the inquiry); Swick, 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 11 . 2015The jury need not have 13 determined during which encounter penetration occurred to conclude that CSP occurred. 14 The remaining encounter, which was not the basis for the CSP conviction, remains and is 15 sufficient to stand as the basis for the CSC conviction. 16 {25} Having determined Defendant’s conduct was not unitary, we need not reach the 17 second step in the Swafford analysis, and we conclude that there was no double 18 jeopardy violation. 1991-NMSC-043 , ¶ 28 (stating that a finding that the defendant’s 19 conduct was not unitary ends the inquiry); Swick, 2012-NMSC-018, ¶ 11 . | 1 | 4 |
State v. Ramirezgreen2 sentences2020We, however, need not undertake a unitary conduct analysis here because Defendant “cannot carry the burden imposed by the second prong of the Swafford test.” State v. Ramirez, 2018-NMSC-003, ¶ 42 , 409 P.3d 902 ; see also State v. Bahney, 2012-NMCA-039, ¶ 21 , 274 P.3d 134 (stating that it is permissible to presume unitary conduct because “our case law separately makes it clear that analysis pursuant to either prong can be dispositive of a Swafford-governed double jeopardy challenge”). {18} “The sole limitation on multiple punishments is legislative intent[.]” State v. Franco, 2005-NMSC-013, ¶ 2020We, however, need not undertake a unitary conduct analysis here because Defendant “cannot carry the burden imposed by the second prong of the Swafford test.” State v. Ramirez, 2018-NMSC-003, ¶ 42 , 409 P.3d 902 ; see also State v. Bahney, 2012-NMCA-039, ¶ 21 , 274 P.3d 134 (stating that it is permissible to presume unitary conduct because “our case law separately makes it clear that analysis pursuant to either prong can be dispositive of a Swafford-governed double jeopardy challenge”). {18} “The sole limitation on multiple punishments is legislative intent[.]” State v. Franco, 2005-NMSC-013, ¶ | 1 | 4 |
State v. Fostergreen2 sentences2024Id. {10} Turning to the first prong, when considering whether conduct is unitary, our Supreme Court held in Foster that “we must presume that a conviction under a general verdict requires reversal if the jury is instructed on an alternative basis for the conviction that would result in double jeopardy, and the record does not disclose whether the jury relied on this legally inadequate alternative.” 1999-NMSC-007, ¶ 28 . 2024Id. {10} Turning to the first prong, when considering whether conduct is unitary, our Supreme Court held in Foster that “we must presume that a conviction under a general verdict requires reversal if the jury is instructed on an alternative basis for the conviction that would result in double jeopardy, and the record does not disclose whether the jury relied on this legally inadequate alternative.” 1999-NMSC-007, ¶ 28 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Caldwellgreen2 sentences2019“When applying the Blockburger test to offenses that may be charged in alternate ways, we look only to the elements of the statute as charged to the jury and disregard the inapplicable statutory elements.” State v. Caldwell, 2008-NMCA-049, ¶ 13 , 143 N.M. 792 , 182 P.3d 775 (omission, alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). {21} With respect to the first part of the Swafford test, we fail to see “sufficient indicia of distinctness” between the conduct underlying Defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault and aggravated battery. 2019“When applying the Blockburger test to offenses that may be charged in alternate ways, we look only to the elements of the statute as charged to the jury and disregard the inapplicable statutory elements.” State v. Caldwell, 2008-NMCA-049, ¶ 13 , 143 N.M. 792 , 182 P.3d 775 (omission, alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). {21} With respect to the first part of the Swafford test, we fail to see “sufficient indicia of distinctness” between the conduct underlying Defendant’s convictions for aggravated assault and aggravated battery. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Reedgreen2 sentences2023See State v. Reed, 2022-NMCA-025, ¶ 8 , 510 P.3d 1261 . 2023See State v. Reed, 2022-NMCA-025, ¶ 8 , 510 P.3d 1261 . | 1 | 1 |
| Kersey v. Hatchgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hornbeckgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Vick v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Martinezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Moragreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Meadorsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Charltongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Elmquistgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Armendariz
green
2 sentences2012Armendariz, 2006-NMSC-036, ¶ 20 . 3 In double-description cases, we apply the Swafford test, first determining 4 whether the conduct underlying the offenses charged is unitary. 2012Armendariz, 2006-NMSC-036, ¶ 20 . 3 In double-description cases, we apply the Swafford test, first determining 4 whether the conduct underlying the offenses charged is unitary. | 6 | 2007–2012 |
State v. Gonzales
green
2 sentences2023The State does not challenge the Court of Appeals’ reversal of Defendant’s conviction for possession of burglary tools. 2 We note that Defendant was charged with, and subsequently convicted of burglary, not aggravated burglary as set out in the Court of Appeals’ opinion. 3 1 the Court of Appeals first correctly recognized that this case involved a double 2 jeopardy, multiple description issue and applied the two-part Swafford test, which 3 examines “‘(1) whether the conduct is unitary, and, if so, (2) whether the Legislature 4 intended to punish the offenses separately.’” Id. ¶¶ 5-6 (quoting S 2023The State does not challenge the Court of Appeals’ reversal of Defendant’s conviction for possession of burglary tools. 2 We note that Defendant was charged with, and subsequently convicted of burglary, not aggravated burglary as set out in the Court of Appeals’ opinion. 3 1 the Court of Appeals first correctly recognized that this case involved a double 2 jeopardy, multiple description issue and applied the two-part Swafford test, which 3 examines “‘(1) whether the conduct is unitary, and, if so, (2) whether the Legislature 4 intended to punish the offenses separately.’” Id. ¶¶ 5-6 (quoting S | 3 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Comitz
green
2 sentences2023While this Court is not bound by the State’s apparent 18 concession, State v. Comitz, 2019-NMSC-011, ¶ 25 , 443 P.3d 1130 , we agree with 19 the State that Defendant’s convictions for nonresidential burglary and breaking and 13 1 entering both arose out of the unitary conduct of Defendant entering Ram Signs by 2 breaking the window. 2023While this Court is not bound by the State’s apparent 18 concession, State v. Comitz, 2019-NMSC-011, ¶ 25 , 443 P.3d 1130 , we agree with 19 the State that Defendant’s convictions for nonresidential burglary and breaking and 13 1 entering both arose out of the unitary conduct of Defendant entering Ram Signs by 2 breaking the window. | 3 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Comitz
green
2 sentences2023While this Court is not bound by the State’s apparent 18 concession, State v. Comitz, 2019-NMSC-011, ¶ 25 , 443 P.3d 1130 , we agree with 19 the State that Defendant’s convictions for nonresidential burglary and breaking and 13 1 entering both arose out of the unitary conduct of Defendant entering Ram Signs by 2 breaking the window. 2023While this Court is not bound by the State’s apparent 18 concession, State v. Comitz, 2019-NMSC-011, ¶ 25 , 443 P.3d 1130 , we agree with 19 the State that Defendant’s convictions for nonresidential burglary and breaking and 13 1 entering both arose out of the unitary conduct of Defendant entering Ram Signs by 2 breaking the window. | 3 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Andazola
green
2 sentences2007If the conduct is unitary, the second prong of the Swafford test requires us to determine “whether the legislature intended multiple punishments for the unitary conduct.” State v. Andazola, 2003-NMCA-146, ¶ 15 , 134 N.M. 710 , 82 P.3d 77 . {21} In analyzing whether a defendant’s conduct is unitary, we look to whether defendant’s acts have “sufficient indicia of distinctness.” Id. 2007If the conduct is unitary, the second prong of the Swafford test requires us to determine “whether the legislature intended multiple punishments for the unitary conduct.” State v. Andazola, 2003-NMCA-146, ¶ 15 , 134 N.M. 710 , 82 P.3d 77 . {21} In analyzing whether a defendant’s conduct is unitary, we look to whether defendant’s acts have “sufficient indicia of distinctness.” Id. | 3 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Branch
green
2 sentences2020“When, as here, the statutes themselves do not expressly provide for multiple punishments, we begin by applying the rule of statutory construction from Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 . . . (1932), to determine whether each provision requires proof of a fact that the other does not.” State v. Branch, 2018-NMCA-031 , ¶ 24, 417 P.3d 1141 . 2020“When, as here, the statutes themselves do not expressly provide for multiple punishments, we begin by applying the rule of statutory construction from Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 . . . (1932), to determine whether each provision requires proof of a fact that the other does not.” State v. Branch, 2018-NMCA-031 , ¶ 24, 417 P.3d 1141 . | 2 | 2019–2020 |
State v. Gutierrez
green
2 sentences2018Thus, we turn to the 16 second part of the Swafford test and focus “on the statutes at issue to determine 17 whether the [L]egislature intended to create separately punishable offenses.” Id. 18 {9} Our Supreme Court has described legislative intent as “the touchstone of our 19 inquiry” because in this context “[i]t is well established that the Double Jeopardy 5 1 Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater 2 punishment than the [L]egislature intended.” Gutierrez, 2011-NMSC-024 , ¶ 50 3 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 2018Thus, we turn to the 16 second part of the Swafford test and focus “on the statutes at issue to determine 17 whether the [L]egislature intended to create separately punishable offenses.” Id. 18 {9} Our Supreme Court has described legislative intent as “the touchstone of our 19 inquiry” because in this context “[i]t is well established that the Double Jeopardy 5 1 Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater 2 punishment than the [L]egislature intended.” Gutierrez, 2011-NMSC-024 , ¶ 50 3 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). | 2 | 2017–2018 |
State v. Contreras
green
2 sentences2011If the conduct is unitary, the second prong of the Swafford test 15 requires us to determine whether the [L]egislature intended multiple 16 punishments for the unitary conduct. 17 State v. Contreras, 2007-NMCA-045, ¶ 20 , 141 N.M. 434 , 156 P.3d 725 (internal 18 quotation marks and citations omitted). 19 Turning to the first prong of our analysis, whether the conduct was unitary, 20 “[t]he proper analytical framework is whether the facts presented at trial establish that 21 the jury reasonably could have inferred independent factual bases for the charged 22 offenses.” State v. Franco, 2005-NMS 2011If the conduct is unitary, the second prong of the Swafford test 15 requires us to determine whether the [L]egislature intended multiple 16 punishments for the unitary conduct. 17 State v. Contreras, 2007-NMCA-045, ¶ 20 , 141 N.M. 434 , 156 P.3d 725 (internal 18 quotation marks and citations omitted). 19 Turning to the first prong of our analysis, whether the conduct was unitary, 20 “[t]he proper analytical framework is whether the facts presented at trial establish that 21 the jury reasonably could have inferred independent factual bases for the charged 22 offenses.” State v. Franco, 2005-NMS | 2 | 2007–2011 |
State v. Contreras
green
2 sentences2011If the conduct is unitary, the second prong of the Swafford test 15 requires us to determine whether the [L]egislature intended multiple 16 punishments for the unitary conduct. 17 State v. Contreras, 2007-NMCA-045, ¶ 20 , 141 N.M. 434 , 156 P.3d 725 (internal 18 quotation marks and citations omitted). 19 Turning to the first prong of our analysis, whether the conduct was unitary, 20 “[t]he proper analytical framework is whether the facts presented at trial establish that 21 the jury reasonably could have inferred independent factual bases for the charged 22 offenses.” State v. Franco, 2005-NMS 2011If the conduct is unitary, the second prong of the Swafford test 15 requires us to determine whether the [L]egislature intended multiple 16 punishments for the unitary conduct. 17 State v. Contreras, 2007-NMCA-045, ¶ 20 , 141 N.M. 434 , 156 P.3d 725 (internal 18 quotation marks and citations omitted). 19 Turning to the first prong of our analysis, whether the conduct was unitary, 20 “[t]he proper analytical framework is whether the facts presented at trial establish that 21 the jury reasonably could have inferred independent factual bases for the charged 22 offenses.” State v. Franco, 2005-NMS | 2 | 2007–2011 |
State v. Cooper
green
2 sentences2006As recognized in State v. Cooper, 1997-NMSC-058, ¶ 59 , 124 N.M. 277 , 949 P.2d 660 , “unitary conduct” is more easily defined by what it is not. 2006As recognized in State v. Cooper, 1997-NMSC-058, ¶ 59 , 124 N.M. 277 , 949 P.2d 660 , “unitary conduct” is more easily defined by what it is not. | 2 | 1998–2006 |
State v. Crain
green
2 sentences2005Under these circumstances, we believe that the legislature likely intended CSP III and false imprisonment to be separately punished by four and one-half years of imprisonment in appropriate cases within the prosecutor’s discretion. {32} Defendant argues, however, that the Swafford analysis is not correctly applied to his offenses in the above manner because this Court has already decided, in State v. Crain, 1997-NMCA-101, ¶¶ 15-22 , 124 N.M. 84 , 946 P.2d 1095 , that the legislature did not intend separate punishment for every offense of restraint that is necessarily included as a factual matt 2005Under these circumstances, we believe that the legislature likely intended CSP III and false imprisonment to be separately punished by four and one-half years of imprisonment in appropriate cases within the prosecutor’s discretion. {32} Defendant argues, however, that the Swafford analysis is not correctly applied to his offenses in the above manner because this Court has already decided, in State v. Crain, 1997-NMCA-101, ¶¶ 15-22 , 124 N.M. 84 , 946 P.2d 1095 , that the legislature did not intend separate punishment for every offense of restraint that is necessarily included as a factual matt | 2 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Cowden
green
2 sentences2005It is reasonable to conclude that the Legislature narrowly tailored Section 30-3-14(A) toward prohibiting violent conduct between domestic partners and other household members. {9} Moreover, assault with intent to commit a felony is proscribed because it “put[s] persons in fear”; whereas actual penetration “actually injure[s] persons.” Cf. State v. Cowden, 1996-NMCA-051 , ¶ 12, 121 N.M. 703 , 917 P.2d 972 (contrasting the social evils relating to harm from assault and harm from battery). 2005It is reasonable to conclude that the Legislature narrowly tailored Section 30-3-14(A) toward prohibiting violent conduct between domestic partners and other household members. {9} Moreover, assault with intent to commit a felony is proscribed because it “put[s] persons in fear”; whereas actual penetration “actually injure[s] persons.” Cf. State v. Cowden, 1996-NMCA-051 , ¶ 12, 121 N.M. 703 , 917 P.2d 972 (contrasting the social evils relating to harm from assault and harm from battery). | 2 | 2005–2005 |
State v. Porter
green
2 sentences2026State v. Porter, 2020-NMSC-020, ¶ 15 , 476 P.3d 1201 . 2026State v. Porter, 2020-NMSC-020, ¶ 15 , 476 P.3d 1201 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| State v. Lucero green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Carrasco green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Montoya green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Dowling green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. LeFebre green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Rodriguez green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Cordova green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| State v. McGruder green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| State v. Livernois green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| State v. Gonzales red | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Missouri v. Hunter green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Whalen v. United States green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.