11 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1978–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Claygreen2 sentences2015See e.g., State v. Clay, 300 Kan. 401, 409 , 329 P.3d 484 (2014) (“Based on Todd, we conclude Clay was not legally entitled to either an unintentional second-degree murder instruction or an involuntary manslaughter instruction as a lesser included offense of felony murder.”). 2015See e.g., State v. Clay, 300 Kan. 401, 409 , 329 P.3d 484 (2014) (“Based on Todd, we conclude Clay was not legally entitled to either an unintentional second-degree murder instruction or an involuntary manslaughter instruction as a lesser included offense of felony murder.”). | 1 | 1 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen1 sentence2014Turning first to the State’s argument, the State is correct that generally“[i]t is within the province of a lawyer to decide what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination, and other strategic and tactical decisions.” Thompson v. State, 293 Kan. 704, 716 , 270 P.3d 1089 (2011) (citing State v. Ward, 227 Kan. 663 , Syl. ¶ 1, 608 P.2d 1351 [1980]); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91 (“[Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Farleygreen2 sentences1981See also State v. Farley, 225 Kan. 127 , 587 P.2d 337 (1978).” These comments were inspired by the fact that at the first trial the involuntary manslaughter instruction required the jury to find only an unintentional killing and “That it was done while in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony, to wit: discharging a gun within the city limits.” The defendant argued at that time, in substance, that self-defense would justify the violation of the city ordinance against shooting firearms, but that if her self-defense involved excessive force she might be guilty of involuntary 1981See also State v. Farley, 225 Kan. 127 , 587 P.2d 337 (1978).” These comments were inspired by the fact that at the first trial the involuntary manslaughter instruction required the jury to find only an unintentional killing and “That it was done while in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony, to wit: discharging a gun within the city limits.” The defendant argued at that time, in substance, that self-defense would justify the violation of the city ordinance against shooting firearms, but that if her self-defense involved excessive force she might be guilty of involuntary | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Childers
green
2 sentences1999He bases his arguments upon State v. Gregory, 218 Kan. 180 , 542 P.2d 1051 (1975), and State v. Clark, 218 Kan. 18 , 542 P.2d 291 (1975); as well as State v. Seelke, 221 Kan. 672 , 561 P.2d 869 (1977); State v. Childers, 217 Kan. 410 , 536 P.2d 1349 (1973); State v. Mitchell, 23 Kan. 1999He bases his arguments upon State v. Gregory, 218 Kan. 180 , 542 P.2d 1051 (1975), and State v. Clark, 218 Kan. 18 , 542 P.2d 291 (1975); as well as State v. Seelke, 221 Kan. 672 , 561 P.2d 869 (1977); State v. Childers, 217 Kan. 410 , 536 P.2d 1349 (1973); State v. Mitchell, 23 Kan. | 2 | 1979–1999 |
State v. Seelke
green
2 sentences1981State v. Seelke, 221 Kan. 672, 680 , 561 P.2d 869 (1977), teaches that under such circumstances the trial judge would have committed reversible error had he not given the involuntary manslaughter instruction. 1981State v. Seelke, 221 Kan. 672, 680 , 561 P.2d 869 (1977), teaches that under such circumstances the trial judge would have committed reversible error had he not given the involuntary manslaughter instruction. | 2 | 1981–1999 |
State v. Gunby
green
2 sentences2015Our Supreme Court addressed a similar argument raised in the context of juiy instruction error in State v. Roberson, 272 Kan. 1143, 1154 , 38 P.3d 715 , cert. denied 537 U.S. 829 (2002), disapproved on other grounds by State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39 , 144 P.3d 647 (2006). 2015Our Supreme Court addressed a similar argument raised in the context of juiy instruction error in State v. Roberson, 272 Kan. 1143, 1154 , 38 P.3d 715 , cert. denied 537 U.S. 829 (2002), disapproved on other grounds by State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39 , 144 P.3d 647 (2006). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Rasten v. Bournewood Hospital
green
1 sentence2015Our Supreme Court addressed a similar argument raised in the context of juiy instruction error in State v. Roberson, 272 Kan. 1143, 1154 , 38 P.3d 715 , cert. denied 537 U.S. 829 (2002), disapproved on other grounds by State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39 , 144 P.3d 647 (2006). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Roberson
green
2 sentences2015Our Supreme Court addressed a similar argument raised in the context of juiy instruction error in State v. Roberson, 272 Kan. 1143, 1154 , 38 P.3d 715 , cert. denied 537 U.S. 829 (2002), disapproved on other grounds by State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39 , 144 P.3d 647 (2006). 2015Our Supreme Court addressed a similar argument raised in the context of juiy instruction error in State v. Roberson, 272 Kan. 1143, 1154 , 38 P.3d 715 , cert. denied 537 U.S. 829 (2002), disapproved on other grounds by State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39 , 144 P.3d 647 (2006). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Thompson v. State
green
2 sentences2014Turning first to the State’s argument, the State is correct that generally“[i]t is within the province of a lawyer to decide what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination, and other strategic and tactical decisions.” Thompson v. State, 293 Kan. 704, 716 , 270 P.3d 1089 (2011) (citing State v. Ward, 227 Kan. 663 , Syl. ¶ 1, 608 P.2d 1351 [1980]); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91 (“[Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.”). 2014Turning first to the State’s argument, the State is correct that generally“[i]t is within the province of a lawyer to decide what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination, and other strategic and tactical decisions.” Thompson v. State, 293 Kan. 704, 716 , 270 P.3d 1089 (2011) (citing State v. Ward, 227 Kan. 663 , Syl. ¶ 1, 608 P.2d 1351 [1980]); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91 (“[Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.”). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Ward
green
2 sentences2014Turning first to the State’s argument, the State is correct that generally“[i]t is within the province of a lawyer to decide what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination, and other strategic and tactical decisions.” Thompson v. State, 293 Kan. 704, 716 , 270 P.3d 1089 (2011) (citing State v. Ward, 227 Kan. 663 , Syl. ¶ 1, 608 P.2d 1351 [1980]); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91 (“[Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.”). 2014Turning first to the State’s argument, the State is correct that generally“[i]t is within the province of a lawyer to decide what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination, and other strategic and tactical decisions.” Thompson v. State, 293 Kan. 704, 716 , 270 P.3d 1089 (2011) (citing State v. Ward, 227 Kan. 663 , Syl. ¶ 1, 608 P.2d 1351 [1980]); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91 (“[Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.”). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Jackson
green
2 sentences2001The State counters with State v. Jackson, 262 Kan. 119 , 936 P.2d 761 (1997). 2001The State counters with State v. Jackson, 262 Kan. 119 , 936 P.2d 761 (1997). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Dixon
green
1 sentence1999He claimed at trial that he was upset and had simply “lost his wits” and shot his wife in the legs with no intent to cause her harm or death, and, therefore, should have been entitled to an involuntary manslaughter instruction. 248 Kan. at 785-86 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Clark
green
2 sentences1999He bases his arguments upon State v. Gregory, 218 Kan. 180 , 542 P.2d 1051 (1975), and State v. Clark, 218 Kan. 18 , 542 P.2d 291 (1975); as well as State v. Seelke, 221 Kan. 672 , 561 P.2d 869 (1977); State v. Childers, 217 Kan. 410 , 536 P.2d 1349 (1973); State v. Mitchell, 23 Kan. 1999He bases his arguments upon State v. Gregory, 218 Kan. 180 , 542 P.2d 1051 (1975), and State v. Clark, 218 Kan. 18 , 542 P.2d 291 (1975); as well as State v. Seelke, 221 Kan. 672 , 561 P.2d 869 (1977); State v. Childers, 217 Kan. 410 , 536 P.2d 1349 (1973); State v. Mitchell, 23 Kan. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Gregory
green
2 sentences1999He bases his arguments upon State v. Gregory, 218 Kan. 180 , 542 P.2d 1051 (1975), and State v. Clark, 218 Kan. 18 , 542 P.2d 291 (1975); as well as State v. Seelke, 221 Kan. 672 , 561 P.2d 869 (1977); State v. Childers, 217 Kan. 410 , 536 P.2d 1349 (1973); State v. Mitchell, 23 Kan. 1999He bases his arguments upon State v. Gregory, 218 Kan. 180 , 542 P.2d 1051 (1975), and State v. Clark, 218 Kan. 18 , 542 P.2d 291 (1975); as well as State v. Seelke, 221 Kan. 672 , 561 P.2d 869 (1977); State v. Childers, 217 Kan. 410 , 536 P.2d 1349 (1973); State v. Mitchell, 23 Kan. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Hickles
green
2 sentences1999More recently, in State v. Hickles, 261 Kan. 74 , 929 P.2d 141 (1996), this court found that a defendant’s testimony that a stabbing of a police officer “just happened” as they fought for possession of a knife was insufficient to support the giving of an involuntary manslaughter instruction. 1999More recently, in State v. Hickles, 261 Kan. 74 , 929 P.2d 141 (1996), this court found that a defendant’s testimony that a stabbing of a police officer “just happened” as they fought for possession of a knife was insufficient to support the giving of an involuntary manslaughter instruction. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
State v. Griblin
green
1 sentence1997A similar finding was made in State v. Griblin, 12 Kan. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Jordan
green
2 sentences1992State v. Jordan, 250 Kan. 180, 189 , 825 P.2d 157 (1992). 1992State v. Jordan, 250 Kan. 180, 189 , 825 P.2d 157 (1992). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
State v. Weyer
green
2 sentences1979State v. Childers, 217 Kan. 410 , 536 P.2d 1349 (1975); State v. Clark, 214 Kan. 293 , 521 P.2d 298 (1974); State v. Weyer, 210 Kan. 721 , 504 P.2d 178 (1972). 1979State v. Childers, 217 Kan. 410 , 536 P.2d 1349 (1975); State v. Clark, 214 Kan. 293 , 521 P.2d 298 (1974); State v. Weyer, 210 Kan. 721 , 504 P.2d 178 (1972). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
State v. Clark
green
2 sentences1979State v. Childers, 217 Kan. 410 , 536 P.2d 1349 (1975); State v. Clark, 214 Kan. 293 , 521 P.2d 298 (1974); State v. Weyer, 210 Kan. 721 , 504 P.2d 178 (1972). 1979State v. Childers, 217 Kan. 410 , 536 P.2d 1349 (1975); State v. Clark, 214 Kan. 293 , 521 P.2d 298 (1974); State v. Weyer, 210 Kan. 721 , 504 P.2d 178 (1972). | 1 | 1979–1979 |
State v. Branch and Bussey
green
2 sentences1978(See State v. Branch and Bussey, 223 Kan. 381, 382-383 , 573 P.2d 1041 [1978].) Thus, the trial court in refusing the involuntary manslaughter instruction had to find as a matter of law the evidence established that defendants had committed an attempted burglary and the evidence would admit of no other conclusion. *122 The attempt statute, K.S.A. 21-3301(1), provides: “An attempt is any overt act toward the perpetration of a crime done by a person who intends to commit such crime but fails in the perpetration thereof or is prevented or intercepted in executing such crime.” This court has held 1978(See State v. Branch and Bussey, 223 Kan. 381, 382-383 , 573 P.2d 1041 [1978].) Thus, the trial court in refusing the involuntary manslaughter instruction had to find as a matter of law the evidence established that defendants had committed an attempted burglary and the evidence would admit of no other conclusion. *122 The attempt statute, K.S.A. 21-3301(1), provides: “An attempt is any overt act toward the perpetration of a crime done by a person who intends to commit such crime but fails in the perpetration thereof or is prevented or intercepted in executing such crime.” This court has held | 1 | 1978–1978 |
State v. Gobin
green
2 sentences1978The overt act necessary must extend beyond mere preparations made by the accused and must approach sufficiently near to consummation of the offense to stand either as the first or some subsequent step in a direct movement toward the completed offense.” (State v. Gobin, 216 Kan. 278 , Syl. ¶ 3, 531 P.2d 16 , 76 A.L.R.3d 832 [1975].) At page 281 of the Gobin opinion the court quotes from the comments to the committee to PIK Crim. 55.01: “ ‘. . . 1978The overt act necessary must extend beyond mere preparations made by the accused and must approach sufficiently near to consummation of the offense to stand either as the first or some subsequent step in a direct movement toward the completed offense.” (State v. Gobin, 216 Kan. 278 , Syl. ¶ 3, 531 P.2d 16 , 76 A.L.R.3d 832 [1975].) At page 281 of the Gobin opinion the court quotes from the comments to the committee to PIK Crim. 55.01: “ ‘. . . | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.