Graham standard in Maryland

2022This suggests a legislative intent to depart from the Graham standard, which, as noted above, focuses only on “the circumstances at the moment or moments directly proceeding the use of . . . force,” Hart, 167 Md. App. at 118, without considering the officer’s actions leading up to that moment, Richardson, 361 Md. at 456-57 .

2022This suggests a legislative intent to depart from the Graham standard, which, as noted above, focuses only on “the circumstances at the moment or moments directly proceeding the use of . . . force,” Hart, 167 Md. App. at 118, without considering the officer’s actions leading up to that moment, Richardson, 361 Md. at 456-57 .

2022Although the Graham standard also refers to “the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation,” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (emphasis added),41 the Legislature plainly intended to enact a standard more restrictive of police officers’ use of force than Graham.

2022Although the Graham standard also refers to “the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation,” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (emphasis added),41 the Legislature plainly intended to enact a standard more restrictive of police officers’ use of force than Graham.

2022For example, the objective reasonableness test has been applied to claims that an officer’s use of force violated the Maryland Constitution,2 constituted an unlawful battery or other tort,3 or rose to the level of a crime.4 In applying Graham, Maryland courts have said that the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force depends only on “the circumstances at the moment or moments directly preceding the use of . . . force.” Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Hart, 167 See, e.g., Blair, 469 Md. at 22-23 (“Whether a police officer has used 2 excessive force in violation of the Maryland Declarat

2022Because we must construe “necessary and proportional” in the context of the statute as a whole, see, e.g., Spangler v. McQuitty, 449 Md. 33, 49 (2016), these neighboring provisions indicate that the propriety of a particular use of force will depend not only on the circumstances at the moment the officer uses force but, rather, the circumstances surrounding the entire encounter between the officer and the person against whom the officer uses force.

2022Because we must construe “necessary and proportional” in the context of the statute as a whole, see, e.g., Spangler v. McQuitty, 449 Md. 33, 49 (2016), these neighboring provisions indicate that the propriety of a particular use of force will depend not only on the circumstances at the moment the officer uses force but, rather, the circumstances surrounding the entire encounter between the officer and the person against whom the officer uses force.

2022Several lawmakers indicated that the standard they sought to adopt was more restrictive than the Graham standard, which, as noted above, requires only that an officer’s use of force “fall[] within a range of conduct which is objectively ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment’” and does not consider “whether there [a]re other alternatives available.” Richardson, 361 Md. at 455 (quoting Schulz, 44 F.3d at 649 ).

2022Several lawmakers indicated that the standard they sought to adopt was more restrictive than the Graham standard, which, as noted above, requires only that an officer’s use of force “fall[] within a range of conduct which is objectively ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment’” and does not consider “whether there [a]re other alternatives available.” Richardson, 361 Md. at 455 (quoting Schulz, 44 F.3d at 649 ).

2022For example, the objective reasonableness test has been applied to claims that an officer’s use of force violated the Maryland Constitution,2 constituted an unlawful battery or other tort,3 or rose to the level of a crime.4 In applying Graham, Maryland courts have said that the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force depends only on “the circumstances at the moment or moments directly preceding the use of . . . force.” Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Hart, 167 See, e.g., Blair, 469 Md. at 22-23 (“Whether a police officer has used 2 excessive force in violation of the Maryland Declarat

2022Servs., 175 Md. App. 384, 409 (2007). 20 See also 85 Opinions of the Attorney General at 114-15, 117-18 (interpreting the phrase “reasonable and necessary force” to essentially mean the same thing as “objectively reasonable” force under the Supreme Court’s Graham standard).

2022“Maryland courts have repeatedly relied upon Graham for a framework to analyze whether challenged law enforcement action constituted excessive force.” 84 Opinions of the Attorney General at 115; see also French v. Hines, 182 Md. App. 201, 262 (2008) (“[T]he Graham standard is applied consistently in Maryland courts.”).

2022In adopting a “necessary” standard, lawmakers said that they aimed to “raise[] the standard substantially,”30 by allowing 29 “[T]he failure of a single bill in the General Assembly may be due to many reasons.” Moore v. State, 388 Md. 623, 641 (2005).

2022In adopting a “necessary” standard, lawmakers said that they aimed to “raise[] the standard substantially,”30 by allowing 29 “[T]he failure of a single bill in the General Assembly may be due to many reasons.” Moore v. State, 388 Md. 623, 641 (2005).

2022For example, the objective reasonableness test has been applied to claims that an officer’s use of force violated the Maryland Constitution,2 constituted an unlawful battery or other tort,3 or rose to the level of a crime.4 In applying Graham, Maryland courts have said that the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force depends only on “the circumstances at the moment or moments directly preceding the use of . . . force.” Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Hart, 167 See, e.g., Blair, 469 Md. at 22-23 (“Whether a police officer has used 2 excessive force in violation of the Maryland Declarat

2022Gen. 33] 39 Md. App. 106, 118 (citing Richardson, 361 Md. at 458 ), aff’d, 395 Md. 394 (2006).

2022Gen. 33] 39 Md. App. 106, 118 (citing Richardson, 361 Md. at 458 ), aff’d, 395 Md. 394 (2006).

2022For example, the objective reasonableness test has been applied to claims that an officer’s use of force violated the Maryland Constitution,2 constituted an unlawful battery or other tort,3 or rose to the level of a crime.4 In applying Graham, Maryland courts have said that the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force depends only on “the circumstances at the moment or moments directly preceding the use of . . . force.” Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Hart, 167 See, e.g., Blair, 469 Md. at 22-23 (“Whether a police officer has used 2 excessive force in violation of the Maryland Declarat

2017It concluded that “the Graham rule applies to aggregate sentences that are the functional equivalent of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole.” Id. at 457.

2017It concluded that “the Graham rule applies to aggregate sentences that are the functional equivalent of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole.” Id. at 457.

2013See, e.g., Okwa, supra, 360 Md. at 203-05 , 757 A.2d 118 ; Hines v. French, 157 Md.App. 536, 574-75 , 852 A.2d 1047 (2004) (“The standards for analyzing claims of excessive force are the same under Arti cles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Constitution as that under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”); Tavakoli-Nouri v. State, 139 Md.App. 716, 730 , 779 A.2d 992 (2001) (“Such excessive force could be a violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights....”) Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in submitting the Espinas’ Article 24 claim to the jury.

2013See, e.g., Okwa, supra, 360 Md. at 203-05 , 757 A.2d 118 ; Hines v. French, 157 Md.App. 536, 574-75 , 852 A.2d 1047 (2004) (“The standards for analyzing claims of excessive force are the same under Arti cles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Constitution as that under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”); Tavakoli-Nouri v. State, 139 Md.App. 716, 730 , 779 A.2d 992 (2001) (“Such excessive force could be a violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights....”) Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in submitting the Espinas’ Article 24 claim to the jury.

2013See, e.g., Okwa, supra, 360 Md. at 203-05 , 757 A.2d 118 ; Hines v. French, 157 Md.App. 536, 574-75 , 852 A.2d 1047 (2004) (“The standards for analyzing claims of excessive force are the same under Arti cles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Constitution as that under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”); Tavakoli-Nouri v. State, 139 Md.App. 716, 730 , 779 A.2d 992 (2001) (“Such excessive force could be a violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights....”) Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in submitting the Espinas’ Article 24 claim to the jury.

2013See, e.g., Okwa, supra, 360 Md. at 203-05 , 757 A.2d 118 ; Hines v. French, 157 Md.App. 536, 574-75 , 852 A.2d 1047 (2004) (“The standards for analyzing claims of excessive force are the same under Arti cles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Constitution as that under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”); Tavakoli-Nouri v. State, 139 Md.App. 716, 730 , 779 A.2d 992 (2001) (“Such excessive force could be a violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights....”) Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in submitting the Espinas’ Article 24 claim to the jury.

2013See, e.g., Okwa, supra, 360 Md. at 203-05 , 757 A.2d 118 ; Hines v. French, 157 Md.App. 536, 574-75 , 852 A.2d 1047 (2004) (“The standards for analyzing claims of excessive force are the same under Arti cles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Constitution as that under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”); Tavakoli-Nouri v. State, 139 Md.App. 716, 730 , 779 A.2d 992 (2001) (“Such excessive force could be a violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights....”) Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in submitting the Espinas’ Article 24 claim to the jury.

2013See, e.g., Okwa, supra, 360 Md. at 203-05 , 757 A.2d 118 ; Hines v. French, 157 Md.App. 536, 574-75 , 852 A.2d 1047 (2004) (“The standards for analyzing claims of excessive force are the same under Arti cles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Constitution as that under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”); Tavakoli-Nouri v. State, 139 Md.App. 716, 730 , 779 A.2d 992 (2001) (“Such excessive force could be a violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights....”) Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in submitting the Espinas’ Article 24 claim to the jury.

2001The Graham standard denies judges and hearing panelists the luxury of armchair analysis: “I should have thought that the Court in [Tennessee v. ]Garner[, 471 U.S. 1 , 105 S.Ct. 1694 , 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) ] /Graham made one thing clear—that those in robes should not strip those in uniform even of the right to self-protection.” Elliott v. Leavitt, 105 F.3d 174, 178 (4th Cir.1997) (reversing officer’s police excessive force conviction in case involving intoxicated and violent complaining witness).

2001The Graham standard denies judges and hearing panelists the luxury of armchair analysis: “I should have thought that the Court in [Tennessee v. ]Garner[, 471 U.S. 1 , 105 S.Ct. 1694 , 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) ] /Graham made one thing clear—that those in robes should not strip those in uniform even of the right to self-protection.” Elliott v. Leavitt, 105 F.3d 174, 178 (4th Cir.1997) (reversing officer’s police excessive force conviction in case involving intoxicated and violent complaining witness).

1999See Branch , 123 Md. App. at 348-49 (discussing defendants' entitlement to immunity under the Graham standard).

1999See Branch , 123 Md. App. at 348-49 (discussing defendants' entitlement to immunity under the Graham standard).

1975Accord Eisenberg v. Air Cond., Inc., 225 Md. 324, 337 , 170 A. 2d 743, 748-9 (1961). *430 Here, the transaction on which Lawrence relied for recoupment arose out of the same transaction, which formed the basis for Graham’s claim.

1975Accord Eisenberg v. Air Cond., Inc., 225 Md. 324, 337 , 170 A. 2d 743, 748-9 (1961). *430 Here, the transaction on which Lawrence relied for recoupment arose out of the same transaction, which formed the basis for Graham’s claim.