11 Maryland opinions name it 3 courts 1975–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Richardson v. McGriffgreen2 sentences2022Several lawmakers indicated that the standard they sought to adopt was more restrictive than the Graham standard, which, as noted above, requires only that an officer’s use of force “fall[] within a range of conduct which is objectively ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment’” and does not consider “whether there [a]re other alternatives available.” Richardson, 361 Md. at 455 (quoting Schulz, 44 F.3d at 649 ). 2022Several lawmakers indicated that the standard they sought to adopt was more restrictive than the Graham standard, which, as noted above, requires only that an officer’s use of force “fall[] within a range of conduct which is objectively ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment’” and does not consider “whether there [a]re other alternatives available.” Richardson, 361 Md. at 455 (quoting Schulz, 44 F.3d at 649 ). | 2 | 2 |
Graham v. Connorgreen2 sentences2022Although the Graham standard also refers to “the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation,” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (emphasis added),41 the Legislature plainly intended to enact a standard more restrictive of police officers’ use of force than Graham. 2022Although the Graham standard also refers to “the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation,” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (emphasis added),41 the Legislature plainly intended to enact a standard more restrictive of police officers’ use of force than Graham. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Pagottogreen1 sentence2022For example, the objective reasonableness test has been applied to claims that an officer’s use of force violated the Maryland Constitution,2 constituted an unlawful battery or other tort,3 or rose to the level of a crime.4 In applying Graham, Maryland courts have said that the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force depends only on “the circumstances at the moment or moments directly preceding the use of . . . force.” Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Hart, 167 See, e.g., Blair, 469 Md. at 22-23 (“Whether a police officer has used 2 excessive force in violation of the Maryland Declarat | 1 | 1 |
Schulz v. Longgreen2 sentences2022Several lawmakers indicated that the standard they sought to adopt was more restrictive than the Graham standard, which, as noted above, requires only that an officer’s use of force “fall[] within a range of conduct which is objectively ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment’” and does not consider “whether there [a]re other alternatives available.” Richardson, 361 Md. at 455 (quoting Schulz, 44 F.3d at 649 ). 2022Several lawmakers indicated that the standard they sought to adopt was more restrictive than the Graham standard, which, as noted above, requires only that an officer’s use of force “fall[] within a range of conduct which is objectively ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment’” and does not consider “whether there [a]re other alternatives available.” Richardson, 361 Md. at 455 (quoting Schulz, 44 F.3d at 649 ). | 1 | 1 |
Cagle v. Stategreen1 sentence2022For example, the objective reasonableness test has been applied to claims that an officer’s use of force violated the Maryland Constitution,2 constituted an unlawful battery or other tort,3 or rose to the level of a crime.4 In applying Graham, Maryland courts have said that the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force depends only on “the circumstances at the moment or moments directly preceding the use of . . . force.” Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Hart, 167 See, e.g., Blair, 469 Md. at 22-23 (“Whether a police officer has used 2 excessive force in violation of the Maryland Declarat | 1 | 1 |
Estate of Blair v. Austingreen1 sentence2022For example, the objective reasonableness test has been applied to claims that an officer’s use of force violated the Maryland Constitution,2 constituted an unlawful battery or other tort,3 or rose to the level of a crime.4 In applying Graham, Maryland courts have said that the reasonableness of an officer’s use of force depends only on “the circumstances at the moment or moments directly preceding the use of . . . force.” Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Hart, 167 See, e.g., Blair, 469 Md. at 22-23 (“Whether a police officer has used 2 excessive force in violation of the Maryland Declarat | 1 | 1 |
Erlewine v. Happgreen2 sentences2022Gen. 33] 39 Md. 2022Gen. 33] 39 Md. | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. Stategreen2 sentences2022App. 593, 604-05, 607 (2018) (noting in a case affirming a police officer’s convictions for first-degree assault and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony or crime of violence, that when “an officer has been accused of using excessive force in the course of an arrest, evidence is relevant as to whether the officer’s actions [were] objectively reasonable” under the Graham standard); Wilson v. State, 87 Md. 2022App. 593, 604-05, 607 (2018) (noting in a case affirming a police officer’s convictions for first-degree assault and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony or crime of violence, that when “an officer has been accused of using excessive force in the course of an arrest, evidence is relevant as to whether the officer’s actions [were] objectively reasonable” under the Graham standard); Wilson v. State, 87 Md. | 1 | 1 |
Moore v. Stategreen2 sentences2022In adopting a “necessary” standard, lawmakers said that they aimed to “raise[] the standard substantially,”30 by allowing 29 “[T]he failure of a single bill in the General Assembly may be due to many reasons.” Moore v. State, 388 Md. 623, 641 (2005). 2022In adopting a “necessary” standard, lawmakers said that they aimed to “raise[] the standard substantially,”30 by allowing 29 “[T]he failure of a single bill in the General Assembly may be due to many reasons.” Moore v. State, 388 Md. 623, 641 (2005). | 1 | 1 |
Okwa v. Harpergreen2 sentences2013See, e.g., Okwa, supra, 360 Md. at 203-05 , 757 A.2d 118 ; Hines v. French, 157 Md.App. 536, 574-75 , 852 A.2d 1047 (2004) (“The standards for analyzing claims of excessive force are the same under Arti cles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Constitution as that under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”); Tavakoli-Nouri v. State, 139 Md.App. 716, 730 , 779 A.2d 992 (2001) (“Such excessive force could be a violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights....”) Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in submitting the Espinas’ Article 24 claim to the jury. 2013See, e.g., Okwa, supra, 360 Md. at 203-05 , 757 A.2d 118 ; Hines v. French, 157 Md.App. 536, 574-75 , 852 A.2d 1047 (2004) (“The standards for analyzing claims of excessive force are the same under Arti cles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Constitution as that under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”); Tavakoli-Nouri v. State, 139 Md.App. 716, 730 , 779 A.2d 992 (2001) (“Such excessive force could be a violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights....”) Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in submitting the Espinas’ Article 24 claim to the jury. | 1 | 1 |
Hines v. Frenchgreen2 sentences2013See, e.g., Okwa, supra, 360 Md. at 203-05 , 757 A.2d 118 ; Hines v. French, 157 Md.App. 536, 574-75 , 852 A.2d 1047 (2004) (“The standards for analyzing claims of excessive force are the same under Arti cles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Constitution as that under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”); Tavakoli-Nouri v. State, 139 Md.App. 716, 730 , 779 A.2d 992 (2001) (“Such excessive force could be a violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights....”) Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in submitting the Espinas’ Article 24 claim to the jury. 2013See, e.g., Okwa, supra, 360 Md. at 203-05 , 757 A.2d 118 ; Hines v. French, 157 Md.App. 536, 574-75 , 852 A.2d 1047 (2004) (“The standards for analyzing claims of excessive force are the same under Arti cles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Constitution as that under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”); Tavakoli-Nouri v. State, 139 Md.App. 716, 730 , 779 A.2d 992 (2001) (“Such excessive force could be a violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights....”) Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in submitting the Espinas’ Article 24 claim to the jury. | 1 | 1 |
Tavakoli-Nouri v. Stategreen2 sentences2013See, e.g., Okwa, supra, 360 Md. at 203-05 , 757 A.2d 118 ; Hines v. French, 157 Md.App. 536, 574-75 , 852 A.2d 1047 (2004) (“The standards for analyzing claims of excessive force are the same under Arti cles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Constitution as that under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”); Tavakoli-Nouri v. State, 139 Md.App. 716, 730 , 779 A.2d 992 (2001) (“Such excessive force could be a violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights....”) Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in submitting the Espinas’ Article 24 claim to the jury. 2013See, e.g., Okwa, supra, 360 Md. at 203-05 , 757 A.2d 118 ; Hines v. French, 157 Md.App. 536, 574-75 , 852 A.2d 1047 (2004) (“The standards for analyzing claims of excessive force are the same under Arti cles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Constitution as that under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”); Tavakoli-Nouri v. State, 139 Md.App. 716, 730 , 779 A.2d 992 (2001) (“Such excessive force could be a violation of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights....”) Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in submitting the Espinas’ Article 24 claim to the jury. | 1 | 1 |
cluster 733408green2 sentences2001The Graham standard denies judges and hearing panelists the luxury of armchair analysis: “I should have thought that the Court in [Tennessee v. ]Garner[, 471 U.S. 1 , 105 S.Ct. 1694 , 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) ] /Graham made one thing clear—that those in robes should not strip those in uniform even of the right to self-protection.” Elliott v. Leavitt, 105 F.3d 174, 178 (4th Cir.1997) (reversing officer’s police excessive force conviction in case involving intoxicated and violent complaining witness). 2001The Graham standard denies judges and hearing panelists the luxury of armchair analysis: “I should have thought that the Court in [Tennessee v. ]Garner[, 471 U.S. 1 , 105 S.Ct. 1694 , 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) ] /Graham made one thing clear—that those in robes should not strip those in uniform even of the right to self-protection.” Elliott v. Leavitt, 105 F.3d 174, 178 (4th Cir.1997) (reversing officer’s police excessive force conviction in case involving intoxicated and violent complaining witness). | 1 | 1 |
Eisenberg, Admin. v. Air Cond., Inc.green2 sentences1975Accord Eisenberg v. Air Cond., Inc., 225 Md. 324, 337 , 170 A. 2d 743, 748-9 (1961). *430 Here, the transaction on which Lawrence relied for recoupment arose out of the same transaction, which formed the basis for Graham’s claim. 1975Accord Eisenberg v. Air Cond., Inc., 225 Md. 324, 337 , 170 A. 2d 743, 748-9 (1961). *430 Here, the transaction on which Lawrence relied for recoupment arose out of the same transaction, which formed the basis for Graham’s claim. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Baltimore Gas and Electric Company v. BALTIMORE STEAM COMPANY
green
2 sentences2008See, e.g., Richardson v. McGriff, 361 Md. 437, 485-86 , 762 A.2d 48 (2000); Shoemaker v. Smith, 353 Md. 143, 160-61 , 725 A.2d 549 (1999). 2008See, e.g., Richardson v. McGriff, 361 Md. 437, 485-86 , 762 A.2d 48 (2000); Shoemaker v. Smith, 353 Md. 143, 160-61 , 725 A.2d 549 (1999). | 2 | 1999–2008 |
Shoemaker v. Smith
green
2 sentences2008See, e.g., Richardson v. McGriff, 361 Md. 437, 485-86 , 762 A.2d 48 (2000); Shoemaker v. Smith, 353 Md. 143, 160-61 , 725 A.2d 549 (1999). 2008See, e.g., Richardson v. McGriff, 361 Md. 437, 485-86 , 762 A.2d 48 (2000); Shoemaker v. Smith, 353 Md. 143, 160-61 , 725 A.2d 549 (1999). | 2 | 1999–2008 |
Randall v. Peaco
green
2 sentences2022As already noted, the Graham standard does not make this conception of necessity “central or mandatory,” Harmon, supra, at 1172, as “the reasonableness of a police officer’s use of . . . force” under that standard “is not measured by what other measures the officer could have employed,” Randall, 175 Md. 2022As already noted, the Graham standard does not make this conception of necessity “central or mandatory,” Harmon, supra, at 1172, as “the reasonableness of a police officer’s use of . . . force” under that standard “is not measured by what other measures the officer could have employed,” Randall, 175 Md. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex
green
2 sentences2019Holly emphasizes the Greenholtz Court's observation that "[i]f parole determinations are encumbered by procedures that states regard as burdensome and unwarranted, they may abandon or curtail parole." Id. at 13 , 99 S.Ct. 2100 . 2019Holly emphasizes the Greenholtz Court's observation that "[i]f parole determinations are encumbered by procedures that states regard as burdensome and unwarranted, they may abandon or curtail parole." Id. at 13 , 99 S.Ct. 2100 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Lehmkuhl
green
2 sentences2017A division of the Colorado intermediate appellate court also addressed a Graham challenge to multiple term-of-years sentences in People v. Lehmkuhl, 369 P.3d 635 (Colo. App. 2013). 2017A division of the Colorado intermediate appellate court also addressed a Graham challenge to multiple term-of-years sentences in People v. Lehmkuhl, 369 P.3d 635 (Colo. App. 2013). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Espina v. Prince George's County
green
2 sentences2014Rather, an Article 24 claim is viable if a claimant can prove excessive force under the Graham test.... 215 Md.App. at 653-54 , 82 A.3d 1240 (emphasis supplied). 2014Rather, an Article 24 claim is viable if a claimant can prove excessive force under the Graham test.... 215 Md.App. at 653-54 , 82 A.3d 1240 (emphasis supplied). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Murray International Freight Corp. v. Graham
green
2 sentences2010This Court held that the determination of whether Graham was an employee was not essential to the resolution of Graham's claim for compensation and, more importantly for present purposes, "Murray International could not have appealed from that `judgment.'" 315 Md. at 550, 555 A.2d at 505 . 2010This Court held that the determination of whether Graham was an employee was not essential to the resolution of Graham’s claim for compensation and, more importantly for present purposes, “Murray International could not have appealed from that ‘judgment.’ ” 315 Md. at 550, 555 A.2d at 505 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Tennessee v. Garner
green
2 sentences2001The Graham standard denies judges and hearing panelists the luxury of armchair analysis: “I should have thought that the Court in [Tennessee v. ]Garner[, 471 U.S. 1 , 105 S.Ct. 1694 , 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) ] /Graham made one thing clear—that those in robes should not strip those in uniform even of the right to self-protection.” Elliott v. Leavitt, 105 F.3d 174, 178 (4th Cir.1997) (reversing officer’s police excessive force conviction in case involving intoxicated and violent complaining witness). 2001The Graham standard denies judges and hearing panelists the luxury of armchair analysis: “I should have thought that the Court in [Tennessee v. ]Garner[, 471 U.S. 1 , 105 S.Ct. 1694 , 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) ] /Graham made one thing clear—that those in robes should not strip those in uniform even of the right to self-protection.” Elliott v. Leavitt, 105 F.3d 174, 178 (4th Cir.1997) (reversing officer’s police excessive force conviction in case involving intoxicated and violent complaining witness). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Deering v. Reich
green
2 sentences2000In Deering v. Reich, 183 F.3d 645 (7th Cir.1999), Reinhold Deering was fatally shot by deputy sheriff James Reich. 2000In Deering v. Reich, 183 F.3d 645 (7th Cir.1999), Reinhold Deering was fatally shot by deputy sheriff James Reich. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.