11 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1961–1981 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jacobellis v. Ohiogreen2 sentences1971The Roth Test The standard we are to apply was recited initially in Roth v. United States and Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 , reiterated in Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra , elaborated in Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 , adjusted in Mishkin v. New York, supra , and summarized in A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General (the Fanny Hill decision), 383 U.S. 413 . 1971The Roth Test The standard we are to apply was recited initially in Roth v. United States and Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 , reiterated in Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra , elaborated in Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 , adjusted in Mishkin v. New York, supra , and summarized in A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General (the Fanny Hill decision), 383 U.S. 413 . | 1 | 4 |
Roth v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1971The Roth Test The standard we are to apply was recited initially in Roth v. United States and Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 , reiterated in Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra , elaborated in Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 , adjusted in Mishkin v. New York, supra , and summarized in A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General (the Fanny Hill decision), 383 U.S. 413 . 1971The Roth Test The standard we are to apply was recited initially in Roth v. United States and Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 , reiterated in Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra , elaborated in Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 , adjusted in Mishkin v. New York, supra , and summarized in A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General (the Fanny Hill decision), 383 U.S. 413 . | 1 | 4 |
Dunn v. Maryland State Board of Censorsgreen2 sentences1974Thus, Judge Hammond said for the Court in Dunn ( 240 Md. at 254 ): “We hold that the right and power of the Board to ban films as ‘obscene’ or as tending ‘to debase or corrupt morals’ under Sec. 6 of Art. 66A extends only to motion pictures which are obscene under the Roth test referred to and paraphrased in Trans-Lux and in this opinion. 1974Thus, Judge Hammond said for the Court in Dunn ( 240 Md. at 254 ): “We hold that the right and power of the Board to ban films as ‘obscene’ or as tending ‘to debase or corrupt morals’ under Sec. 6 of Art. 66A extends only to motion pictures which are obscene under the Roth test referred to and paraphrased in Trans-Lux and in this opinion. | 1 | 2 |
Hewitt v. Maryland State Board of Censorsgreen2 sentences1969Certainly in a prosecution which, as here, does not necessarily imply suppression of the. materials involved, the fact that they originate or are used as a subject of pandering is relevant to the application of the Roth test.” ( 383 U. S. at 470 , 86 S. Ct. at 947 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 38 ) We cited and followed Ginzburg in Sanza v. Maryland State Board of Censors, 245 Md. 319 , 226 A. 2d 317 (1967) and recently in Hewitt v. Maryland State Board of Censors, 254 M!d. 179, 193-95, 254 A. 2d 203, 210-211 (1969), involving the motion picture “Odd Tastes.” The pandering of sex in the present case is not 1969Certainly in a prosecution which, as here, does not necessarily imply suppression of the. materials involved, the fact that they originate or are used as a subject of pandering is relevant to the application of the Roth test.” ( 383 U. S. at 470 , 86 S. Ct. at 947 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 38 ) We cited and followed Ginzburg in Sanza v. Maryland State Board of Censors, 245 Md. 319 , 226 A. 2d 317 (1967) and recently in Hewitt v. Maryland State Board of Censors, 254 M!d. 179, 193-95, 254 A. 2d 203, 210-211 (1969), involving the motion picture “Odd Tastes.” The pandering of sex in the present case is not | 1 | 2 |
Al Harlib, Evelyn Diamond, Intervening v. James T. Lynn, Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Developmentgreen2 sentences1976In two of these cases, the courts have taken the position that the tenants’ interest in not having their rent increased does not amount to a “property” right for procedural due process purposes, Harlib v. Lynn, supra, 511 F. 2d at 55 (“The statutes creating the . . . [subsidized] housing program do not confer upon tenants such an ‘entitlement’ to low rental rates that would invoke *295 procedural due process requirements.”); People’s Rights Organization v. Bethlehem Associates, supra, 856 F. Supp. at 418 (“... we entertain a substantial doubt that a tenant in a federally assisted housing proje 1976In two of these cases, the courts have taken the position that the tenants’ interest in not having their rent increased does not amount to a “property” right for procedural due process purposes, Harlib v. Lynn, supra, 511 F. 2d at 55 (“The statutes creating the . . . [subsidized] housing program do not confer upon tenants such an ‘entitlement’ to low rental rates that would invoke *295 procedural due process requirements.”); People’s Rights Organization v. Bethlehem Associates, supra, 856 F. Supp. at 418 (“... we entertain a substantial doubt that a tenant in a federally assisted housing proje | 1 | 1 |
Stanley v. Georgiagreen2 sentences1969I might add that, as we observed in the Hewitt case, supra ( 254 Md. at 195 , 254 A. 2d at 211 ), Mr. Justice Marshall in the recent case of Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 568 , 89 S. Ct. 1243, 1249-50 , 22 L.Ed.2d 542, 551 (decided April 7, 1969), seems to equate the cases subsequent to the decision in Roth as continuing the Roth test as he stated, for the Supreme Court: “Roth and the cases following that decision are not impaired by today’s holding. 1969I might add that, as we observed in the Hewitt case, supra ( 254 Md. at 195 , 254 A. 2d at 211 ), Mr. Justice Marshall in the recent case of Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 568 , 89 S. Ct. 1243, 1249-50 , 22 L.Ed.2d 542, 551 (decided April 7, 1969), seems to equate the cases subsequent to the decision in Roth as continuing the Roth test as he stated, for the Supreme Court: “Roth and the cases following that decision are not impaired by today’s holding. | 1 | 1 |
Levine v. Morelandgreen2 sentences1965In Levine v. Moreland, 229 Md. 231, 236 , which also dealt with “Tropic of Cancer,” we said that since “* * * the issue of obscenity was clearly a disputed question of fact, we agree with the appellants that the lower court should not have decided it on the motion for summary judgment.” (The trial judge had ruled that after reading the book he was capable of deciding the critical questions under the Roth rule without the aid of other evidence.) We reiterated the rule that the allegedly obscene material “* * * must in every case be perused and examined with care by the trier of facts * * *,” bu 1965In Levine v. Moreland, 229 Md. 231, 236 , which also dealt with “Tropic of Cancer,” we said that since “* * * the issue of obscenity was clearly a disputed question of fact, we agree with the appellants that the lower court should not have decided it on the motion for summary judgment.” (The trial judge had ruled that after reading the book he was capable of deciding the critical questions under the Roth rule without the aid of other evidence.) We reiterated the rule that the allegedly obscene material “* * * must in every case be perused and examined with care by the trier of facts * * *,” bu | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Monfred v. Maryland
green
2 sentences1981In Monfred v. State, 226 Md. 312 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 953 (1962), the Court of Appeals adopted and engrafted into the Maryland obscenity statute the Roth test — at least, it said (p. 323), "until the Supreme Court specifically speaks further in this uncertain area.” See also Yudkin v. State, 229 *157 Md. 223 (1962), and Levin v. State, 1 Md. 1981In Monfred v. State, 226 Md. 312 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 953 (1962), the Court of Appeals adopted and engrafted into the Maryland obscenity statute the Roth test — at least, it said (p. 323), "until the Supreme Court specifically speaks further in this uncertain area.” See also Yudkin v. State, 229 *157 Md. 223 (1962), and Levin v. State, 1 Md. | 2 | 1962–1981 |
Monfred v. State
green
2 sentences1981In Monfred v. State, 226 Md. 312 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 953 (1962), the Court of Appeals adopted and engrafted into the Maryland obscenity statute the Roth test — at least, it said (p. 323), "until the Supreme Court specifically speaks further in this uncertain area.” See also Yudkin v. State, 229 *157 Md. 223 (1962), and Levin v. State, 1 Md. 1981In Monfred v. State, 226 Md. 312 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 953 (1962), the Court of Appeals adopted and engrafted into the Maryland obscenity statute the Roth test — at least, it said (p. 323), "until the Supreme Court specifically speaks further in this uncertain area.” See also Yudkin v. State, 229 *157 Md. 223 (1962), and Levin v. State, 1 Md. | 2 | 1962–1981 |
Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University
green
2 sentences1965The cases of Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1512 , and Roth and Jacobellis, following Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 , 92 L.Ed. 840 , and Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 , 96 L.Ed. 1098 , make it manifest that only material which is obscene under the Roth test can be censored or suppressed by a state, and that a state may not effectively substitute its definition of what is obscene for the Roth definition. 1965The cases of Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1512 , and Roth and Jacobellis, following Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 , 92 L.Ed. 840 , and Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 , 96 L.Ed. 1098 , make it manifest that only material which is obscene under the Roth test can be censored or suppressed by a state, and that a state may not effectively substitute its definition of what is obscene for the Roth definition. | 2 | 1965–1974 |
Winters v. New York
green
2 sentences1965The cases of Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1512 , and Roth and Jacobellis, following Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 , 92 L.Ed. 840 , and Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 , 96 L.Ed. 1098 , make it manifest that only material which is obscene under the Roth test can be censored or suppressed by a state, and that a state may not effectively substitute its definition of what is obscene for the Roth definition. 1965The cases of Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1512 , and Roth and Jacobellis, following Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 , 92 L.Ed. 840 , and Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 , 96 L.Ed. 1098 , make it manifest that only material which is obscene under the Roth test can be censored or suppressed by a state, and that a state may not effectively substitute its definition of what is obscene for the Roth definition. | 2 | 1965–1974 |
Sanza v. Maryland State Board of Censors
green
2 sentences1969Certainly in a prosecution which, as here, does not necessarily imply suppression of the. materials involved, the fact that they originate or are used as a subject of pandering is relevant to the application of the Roth test.” ( 383 U. S. at 470 , 86 S. Ct. at 947 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 38 ) We cited and followed Ginzburg in Sanza v. Maryland State Board of Censors, 245 Md. 319 , 226 A. 2d 317 (1967) and recently in Hewitt v. Maryland State Board of Censors, 254 M!d. 179, 193-95, 254 A. 2d 203, 210-211 (1969), involving the motion picture “Odd Tastes.” The pandering of sex in the present case is not 1969Certainly in a prosecution which, as here, does not necessarily imply suppression of the. materials involved, the fact that they originate or are used as a subject of pandering is relevant to the application of the Roth test.” ( 383 U. S. at 470 , 86 S. Ct. at 947 , 16 L.Ed.2d at 38 ) We cited and followed Ginzburg in Sanza v. Maryland State Board of Censors, 245 Md. 319 , 226 A. 2d 317 (1967) and recently in Hewitt v. Maryland State Board of Censors, 254 M!d. 179, 193-95, 254 A. 2d 203, 210-211 (1969), involving the motion picture “Odd Tastes.” The pandering of sex in the present case is not | 2 | 1969–1974 |
Trans-Lux Distributing Corp. v. Maryland State Board
green
2 sentences1973Upon finding that decisions of the Supreme Court made it “manifest that only material which is obscene under the Roth test can be censored or suppressed by a state, and that a state may not effectively substitute its definition of what is obscene for the Roth definition,” the Court held “that the right and power of the Board to ban films [and views] 10 as ‘obscene’ or as tending ‘to debase or corrupt morals’ under Sec. 6 of Art. 66A extend only to motion pictures [or views] which are obscene under the Roth test referred to and paraphrased in Trans-Lux [Distributing Corp. v. Board of Censors, 2 1973Upon finding that decisions of the Supreme Court made it “manifest that only material which is obscene under the Roth test can be censored or suppressed by a state, and that a state may not effectively substitute its definition of what is obscene for the Roth definition,” the Court held “that the right and power of the Board to ban films [and views] 10 as ‘obscene’ or as tending ‘to debase or corrupt morals’ under Sec. 6 of Art. 66A extend only to motion pictures [or views] which are obscene under the Roth test referred to and paraphrased in Trans-Lux [Distributing Corp. v. Board of Censors, 2 | 2 | 1973–1974 |
A Book Named \John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure\" v. Attorney General of Massachusetts"
green
2 sentences1971The Roth Test The standard we are to apply was recited initially in Roth v. United States and Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 , reiterated in Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra , elaborated in Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 , adjusted in Mishkin v. New York, supra , and summarized in A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General (the Fanny Hill decision), 383 U.S. 413 . 1971The Roth Test The standard we are to apply was recited initially in Roth v. United States and Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 , reiterated in Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra , elaborated in Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 , adjusted in Mishkin v. New York, supra , and summarized in A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General (the Fanny Hill decision), 383 U.S. 413 . | 2 | 1969–1971 |
Mishkin v. New York
green
2 sentences1971The Roth Test The standard we are to apply was recited initially in Roth v. United States and Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 , reiterated in Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra , elaborated in Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 , adjusted in Mishkin v. New York, supra , and summarized in A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General (the Fanny Hill decision), 383 U.S. 413 . 1971The Roth Test The standard we are to apply was recited initially in Roth v. United States and Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 , reiterated in Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra , elaborated in Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 , adjusted in Mishkin v. New York, supra , and summarized in A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General (the Fanny Hill decision), 383 U.S. 413 . | 2 | 1969–1971 |
Ginzburg v. United States
green
2 sentences1971The Roth Test The standard we are to apply was recited initially in Roth v. United States and Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 , reiterated in Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra , elaborated in Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 , adjusted in Mishkin v. New York, supra , and summarized in A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General (the Fanny Hill decision), 383 U.S. 413 . 1971The Roth Test The standard we are to apply was recited initially in Roth v. United States and Alberts v. California, 354 U.S. 476 , reiterated in Jacobellis v. Ohio, supra , elaborated in Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 , adjusted in Mishkin v. New York, supra , and summarized in A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General (the Fanny Hill decision), 383 U.S. 413 . | 2 | 1969–1971 |
Levin v. State
green
2 sentences1981In Monfred v. State, 226 Md. 312 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 953 (1962), the Court of Appeals adopted and engrafted into the Maryland obscenity statute the Roth test — at least, it said (p. 323), "until the Supreme Court specifically speaks further in this uncertain area.” See also Yudkin v. State, 229 *157 Md. 223 (1962), and Levin v. State, 1 Md. 1981In Monfred v. State, 226 Md. 312 (1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 953 (1962), the Court of Appeals adopted and engrafted into the Maryland obscenity statute the Roth test — at least, it said (p. 323), "until the Supreme Court specifically speaks further in this uncertain area.” See also Yudkin v. State, 229 *157 Md. 223 (1962), and Levin v. State, 1 Md. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Levin v. Maryland
green
2 sentences1981App. 139 (1967), cert. denied, 247 Md. 740 , cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 . 1981App. 139 (1967), cert. denied, 247 Md. 740 , cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 . | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Hewitt v. Maryland State Board of Censors
green
2 sentences1973See Sanza v. Maryland Board of Censors, supra; Hewitt v. Maryland Board of Censors, 254 Md. 179 ; Wagonheim v. Maryland Board of Censors, 255 Md. 297 ; Hewitt v. Maryland Board of Censors, 256 Md. 358 ; Village Books v. State’s Attorney, 263 Md. 76 , cert. granted by the Supreme *314 Court of the United States; judgment vacated 25 June 1973 and cause remanded for further consideration in light of Miller, et al.; judgment reinstated and reaffirmed by order of Court of Appeals of 10 October 1973. 1973See Sanza v. Maryland Board of Censors, supra; Hewitt v. Maryland Board of Censors, 254 Md. 179 ; Wagonheim v. Maryland Board of Censors, 255 Md. 297 ; Hewitt v. Maryland Board of Censors, 256 Md. 358 ; Village Books v. State’s Attorney, 263 Md. 76 , cert. granted by the Supreme *314 Court of the United States; judgment vacated 25 June 1973 and cause remanded for further consideration in light of Miller, et al.; judgment reinstated and reaffirmed by order of Court of Appeals of 10 October 1973. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Village Books, Inc. v. State's Attorney
green
2 sentences1973See Sanza v. Maryland Board of Censors, supra; Hewitt v. Maryland Board of Censors, 254 Md. 179 ; Wagonheim v. Maryland Board of Censors, 255 Md. 297 ; Hewitt v. Maryland Board of Censors, 256 Md. 358 ; Village Books v. State’s Attorney, 263 Md. 76 , cert. granted by the Supreme *314 Court of the United States; judgment vacated 25 June 1973 and cause remanded for further consideration in light of Miller, et al.; judgment reinstated and reaffirmed by order of Court of Appeals of 10 October 1973. 1973See Sanza v. Maryland Board of Censors, supra; Hewitt v. Maryland Board of Censors, 254 Md. 179 ; Wagonheim v. Maryland Board of Censors, 255 Md. 297 ; Hewitt v. Maryland Board of Censors, 256 Md. 358 ; Village Books v. State’s Attorney, 263 Md. 76 , cert. granted by the Supreme *314 Court of the United States; judgment vacated 25 June 1973 and cause remanded for further consideration in light of Miller, et al.; judgment reinstated and reaffirmed by order of Court of Appeals of 10 October 1973. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Wagonheim v. Maryland State Board of Censors
green
2 sentences1973See Sanza v. Maryland Board of Censors, supra; Hewitt v. Maryland Board of Censors, 254 Md. 179 ; Wagonheim v. Maryland Board of Censors, 255 Md. 297 ; Hewitt v. Maryland Board of Censors, 256 Md. 358 ; Village Books v. State’s Attorney, 263 Md. 76 , cert. granted by the Supreme *314 Court of the United States; judgment vacated 25 June 1973 and cause remanded for further consideration in light of Miller, et al.; judgment reinstated and reaffirmed by order of Court of Appeals of 10 October 1973. 1973See Sanza v. Maryland Board of Censors, supra; Hewitt v. Maryland Board of Censors, 254 Md. 179 ; Wagonheim v. Maryland Board of Censors, 255 Md. 297 ; Hewitt v. Maryland Board of Censors, 256 Md. 358 ; Village Books v. State’s Attorney, 263 Md. 76 , cert. granted by the Supreme *314 Court of the United States; judgment vacated 25 June 1973 and cause remanded for further consideration in light of Miller, et al.; judgment reinstated and reaffirmed by order of Court of Appeals of 10 October 1973. | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Donnenberg v. State
green
2 sentences1970It is not surprising that Mr. Justice Black observed: "No one, including this Court, can know what is and what is not constitutionally obscene * * * under this Court's rulings." [3] In any event it is the Roth test, as set out according to our understanding of it in Donnenberg v. State, 1 Md. 1970It is not surprising that Mr. Justice Black observed: "No one, including this Court, can know what is and what is not constitutionally obscene * * * under this Court's rulings." [3] In any event it is the Roth test, as set out according to our understanding of it in Donnenberg v. State, 1 Md. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Redrup v. New York
green
2 sentences1969Even in the case of Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767 , 87 S. Ct. 1414 , 18 L.Ed.2d 515 (1967) — discussed at some length by us in the recent Hewitt case, supra— the per curiam opinion of the Supreme Court was careful to state that the necessity of meeting the three point test was one held only by certain justices in Memoirs, and did not cite the three point test as the test of the Supreme Court. 1969Even in the case of Redrup v. New York, 386 U. S. 767 , 87 S. Ct. 1414 , 18 L.Ed.2d 515 (1967) — discussed at some length by us in the recent Hewitt case, supra— the per curiam opinion of the Supreme Court was careful to state that the necessity of meeting the three point test was one held only by certain justices in Memoirs, and did not cite the three point test as the test of the Supreme Court. | 1 | 1969–1969 |
No. 569
green
2 sentences1969This conclusion is indirectly of some importance in the present case because of the statement in the concurring opinion of Circuit Judge Friendly in the Second Circuit case: “If the governing rule were still what Mr. Justice Brennan stated in Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 489 , 77 S. Ct. 1304 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957), namely ‘whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest,’ I might well join Chief Judge Lumbard for affirmance.” ( 404 F. 2d at 200 ) As I have concluded that the gov 1969This conclusion is indirectly of some importance in the present case because of the statement in the concurring opinion of Circuit Judge Friendly in the Second Circuit case: “If the governing rule were still what Mr. Justice Brennan stated in Roth v. United States, 354 U. S. 476, 489 , 77 S. Ct. 1304 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957), namely ‘whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest,’ I might well join Chief Judge Lumbard for affirmance.” ( 404 F. 2d at 200 ) As I have concluded that the gov | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson
green
2 sentences1965The cases of Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1512 , and Roth and Jacobellis, following Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 , 92 L.Ed. 840 , and Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 , 96 L.Ed. 1098 , make it manifest that only material which is obscene under the Roth test can be censored or suppressed by a state, and that a state may not effectively substitute its definition of what is obscene for the Roth definition. 1965The cases of Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1512 , and Roth and Jacobellis, following Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 , 92 L.Ed. 840 , and Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 , 96 L.Ed. 1098 , make it manifest that only material which is obscene under the Roth test can be censored or suppressed by a state, and that a state may not effectively substitute its definition of what is obscene for the Roth definition. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Yudkin v. State
green
2 sentences1965In Yudkin v. State, 229 Md. 223, 227-28 , Yudkin appealed his conviction for selling an obscene book (“Tropic of Cancer”), and we reversed because expert testimony as to the status of the book under the Roth test was excluded by the trial court. 1965In Yudkin v. State, 229 Md. 223, 227-28 , Yudkin appealed his conviction for selling an obscene book ("Tropic of Cancer"), and we reversed because expert testimony as to the status of the book under the Roth test was excluded by the trial court. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Mounce v. United States
green
2 sentences1961And, in a fifth case, Mounce v. United States, 355 U. S. 180 (1957), the government having made a “confession of error” that the test used by the court of appeals was “materially different” from the Roth test, the judgment below was reversed and remanded to the district court for consideration in the light of Roth. 1961And, in a fifth case, Mounce v. United States, 355 U. S. 180 (1957), the government having made a “confession of error” that the test used by the court of appeals was “materially different” from the Roth test, the judgment below was reversed and remanded to the district court for consideration in the light of Roth. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield
green
2 sentences1961In the third reversal, Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U. S. 372 (1958), another case involving the mailing of a magazine—Sunshine & Health—a copy of the publication was also not included in the printed record, but it is a “nudist” type magazine—a representative copy of which is included in the transcript in the instant case—in which, although the nudist way of life is advocated and the pictures show the genital areas of the body, there is nothing obscene in the text of the magazine. 1961In the third reversal, Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 355 U. S. 372 (1958), another case involving the mailing of a magazine—Sunshine & Health—a copy of the publication was also not included in the printed record, but it is a “nudist” type magazine—a representative copy of which is included in the transcript in the instant case—in which, although the nudist way of life is advocated and the pictures show the genital areas of the body, there is nothing obscene in the text of the magazine. | 1 | 1961–1961 |
People v. Richmond County News, Inc.
green
2 sentences1961It may well be that the Supreme Court will in time (assuming it has not already done so) declare that only “hardcore pornography” is not protected by the constitution, as a majority of four of the Court of Appeals of New York (in two opinions—the latter concurring in the result reached in the former—each of which was concurred in by one other judge) did recently in construing the meaning of the obscenity statute of that State in People v. Richmond County News, Inc., 175 N. E. 2d 681 (N. Y. 1960), involving the sale and distribution of the magazine Gent, when, in discarding the Roth test, it ad 1961It may well be that the Supreme Court will in time (assuming it has not already done so) declare that only “hardcore pornography” is not protected by the constitution, as a majority of four of the Court of Appeals of New York (in two opinions—the latter concurring in the result reached in the former—each of which was concurred in by one other judge) did recently in construing the meaning of the obscenity statute of that State in People v. Richmond County News, Inc., 175 N. E. 2d 681 (N. Y. 1960), involving the sale and distribution of the magazine Gent, when, in discarding the Roth test, it ad | 1 | 1961–1961 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.