highly prejudicial error in Maine

2019Pabon, 2011 ME 100, ¶¶ 34-36 , 28 A.3d 1147 ; see also State v. Weaver, 2016 ME 12, ¶ 11 , 130 A.3d 972 (describing obvious error as occurring if the incorrect instruction “reviewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice” (quotation marks omitted)); State v. Doughty, 399 A.2d 1319, 1326 (Me. 1979) (stating that jury instructions contain obvious error when they “so taint[] the proceeding as virtually to deprive the aggrieved party of a fair trial”).

1982Our review of the error asserted on this appeal, therefore, “will be limited to whether the offending instruction ‘when reviewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.’ ” State v. Mahaney, Me., 437 A.2d 613, 618-19 (1981), quoting State v. Doughty, Me., 399 A.2d 1319, 1326 (1979).

2001See Warren, 1998 ME 136, ¶ 17 , 711 A.2d at 857 ; see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). [¶ 30] The question presented is whether the failure to submit the omitted fact to the jury for its consideration resulted in a deprivation of Burdick's substantial rights. [17] Burdick must convince us that the omission of the instruction "`when reviewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.'" Child, 1999 ME 198, ¶ 7 , 743 A.2d at 232 (quoting State v. Googins, 640 A.2d 1060, 1062 (Me. 1994)).

2001See Warren, 1998 ME 136, ¶ 17 , 711 A.2d at 857 ; see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). [¶ 30]' The question presented is whether the failure to submit ’the omitted fact to the jury for its consideration resulted in a deprivation of Burdick’s substantial rights. 17 Burdick must convince us that the omission of the instruction “ “when reviewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.’ ” Child, 1999 ME 198, ¶ 7 , 743 A.2d at 232 (quoting State v. Googins, 640 A.2d 1060, 1062 (Me.1994))

1999To vacate a judgment on the basis of obvious error, we must determine that “the offending instruction when reviewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.” Id. (quoting State v. Weidul, 628 A.2d 135, 137 (Me.1993)) (emphasis added). [¶ 8] We have broken down the burglary statute into four elements that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: “(1) entry (2) of a structure (3) with the knowledge that the entry is not licensed and (4) with the intent to commit a crime within the structure.” State v. Thibeault, 402 A.2d

1994To vacate the judgment against Googins on the basis of obvious error, we must determine that “the offending instruction “when reviewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.’ ” State v. Weidul, 628 A.2d 135, 137 (Me.1993) (quoting State v. Quint, 448 A.2d 1353, 1355 (Me.1982)).

1994To vacate the judgment against Googins on the basis of obvious error, we must determine that “the offending instruction “when reviewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.’ ” State v. Weidul, 628 A.2d 135, 137 (Me.1993) (quoting State v. Quint, 448 A.2d 1353, 1355 (Me.1982)).

1993Since no objection *137 was raised to the trial justice's language departing from the ABA standard, we review to determine "whether the offending instruction `when reviewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.'" See State v. Quint, 448 A.2d 1353, 1355 (Me.1982) ( quoting State v. Mahaney, 437 A.2d 613, 618-19 (Me.1981)).

1993Since no objection *137 was raised to the trial justice's language departing from the ABA standard, we review to determine "whether the offending instruction `when reviewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.'" See State v. Quint, 448 A.2d 1353, 1355 (Me.1982) ( quoting State v. Mahaney, 437 A.2d 613, 618-19 (Me.1981)).

1993Since no objection was raised to the trial justice’s language departing from the ABA standard, we review to determine “whether the offending instruction ‘when reviewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.’ ” See State v. Quint, 448 A.2d 1353, 1355 (Me.1982) (quoting State v. Mahaney, 437 A.2d 613, 618-19 (Me.1981)).

2025As in Baker and Villacci, the instructions given “were highly prejudicial and tended to produce a manifest injustice,” Villacci, 2018 ME 80, ¶ 20 , 187 A.3d 576 ; see Baker, 2015 ME 39, ¶ 11 , 114 A.3d 214 ; Weaver, 2016 ME 12 , ¶¶ 9 n.4, 11, 130 A.3d 972 (“[T]o vacate the judgment on the basis of obvious error we must determine that the offending instruction when reviewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.” (quotation marks 11The court’s instruction that the jury should consider all three defenses—self-defense, competing harm

2025As in Baker and Villacci, the instructions given “were highly prejudicial and tended to produce a manifest injustice,” Villacci, 2018 ME 80, ¶ 20 , 187 A.3d 576 ; see Baker, 2015 ME 39, ¶ 11 , 114 A.3d 214 ; Weaver, 2016 ME 12 , ¶¶ 9 n.4, 11, 130 A.3d 972 (“[T]o vacate the judgment on the basis of obvious error we must determine that the offending instruction when reviewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.” (quotation marks 11The court’s instruction that the jury should consider all three defenses—self-defense, competing harm

2025As in Baker and Villacci, the instructions given “were highly prejudicial and tended to produce a manifest injustice,” Villacci, 2018 ME 80, ¶ 20 , 187 A.3d 576 ; see Baker, 2015 ME 39, ¶ 11 , 114 A.3d 214 ; Weaver, 2016 ME 12 , ¶¶ 9 n.4, 11, 130 A.3d 972 (“[T]o vacate the judgment on the basis of obvious error we must determine that the offending instruction when reviewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.” (quotation marks 11The court’s instruction that the jury should consider all three defenses—self-defense, competing harm

2025As in Baker and Villacci, the instructions given “were highly prejudicial and tended to produce a manifest injustice,” Villacci, 2018 ME 80, ¶ 20 , 187 A.3d 576 ; see Baker, 2015 ME 39, ¶ 11 , 114 A.3d 214 ; Weaver, 2016 ME 12 , ¶¶ 9 n.4, 11, 130 A.3d 972 (“[T]o vacate the judgment on the basis of obvious error we must determine that the offending instruction when reviewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.” (quotation marks 11The court’s instruction that the jury should consider all three defenses—self-defense, competing harm

2016P. 30(b), 52(b). “[T]o vacate the judgment on the basis of obvious error we must determine that the offending instruction when reviewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.” State v. Ashley, 666 A.2d 103, 106-07 (Me.1995) (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 12] In Baker , which we decided about nine months after the trial in this case, we concluded that a defendant had met this high burden, based on the combined effect of two “structural flaws.” 2015 ME 39, ¶ 13 , 114 A.3d 214 .

2001See Warren, 1998 ME 136, ¶ 17 , 711 A.2d at 857 ; see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). [¶ 30] The question presented is whether the failure to submit the omitted fact to the jury for its consideration resulted in a deprivation of Burdick's substantial rights. [17] Burdick must convince us that the omission of the instruction "`when reviewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.'" Child, 1999 ME 198, ¶ 7 , 743 A.2d at 232 (quoting State v. Googins, 640 A.2d 1060, 1062 (Me. 1994)).

2001See Warren, 1998 ME 136, ¶ 17 , 711 A.2d at 857 ; see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). [¶ 30] The question presented is whether the failure to submit the omitted fact to the jury for its consideration resulted in a deprivation of Burdick's substantial rights. [17] Burdick must convince us that the omission of the instruction "`when reviewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.'" Child, 1999 ME 198, ¶ 7 , 743 A.2d at 232 (quoting State v. Googins, 640 A.2d 1060, 1062 (Me. 1994)).

2001When the claimed error is the omission of a particular instruction, we will vacate the judgment only if "the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element." Neder, 527 U.S. at 19 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 ; cf. State v. McKeough, 300 A.2d 755, 761 (Me.1973). [¶ 31] There is no evidence in the record that "could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element." Neder, 527 U.S. at 19 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 .

2001When the claimed error is the omission of a particular instruction, we will vacate the judgment only if “the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element.” Neder, 527 U.S. at 19 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 ; cf. State v. McKeough, 300 A.2d 755, 761 (Me.1973). [¶ 31] There is no evidence in the record that “could rationally lead to a contrary finding with respect to the omitted element.” Neder, 527 U.S. at 19 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 .

2001See Warren, 1998 ME 136, ¶ 17 , 711 A.2d at 857 ; see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). [¶ 30] The question presented is whether the failure to submit the omitted fact to the jury for its consideration resulted in a deprivation of Burdick's substantial rights. [17] Burdick must convince us that the omission of the instruction "`when reviewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.'" Child, 1999 ME 198, ¶ 7 , 743 A.2d at 232 (quoting State v. Googins, 640 A.2d 1060, 1062 (Me. 1994)).

2001See Warren, 1998 ME 136, ¶ 17 , 711 A.2d at 857 ; see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). [¶ 30] The question presented is whether the failure to submit the omitted fact to the jury for its consideration resulted in a deprivation of Burdick's substantial rights. [17] Burdick must convince us that the omission of the instruction "`when reviewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.'" Child, 1999 ME 198, ¶ 7 , 743 A.2d at 232 (quoting State v. Googins, 640 A.2d 1060, 1062 (Me. 1994)).

2001See Warren, 1998 ME 136, ¶ 17 , 711 A.2d at 857 ; see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). [¶ 30] The question presented is whether the failure to submit the omitted fact to the jury for its consideration resulted in a deprivation of Burdick's substantial rights. [17] Burdick must convince us that the omission of the instruction "`when reviewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.'" Child, 1999 ME 198, ¶ 7 , 743 A.2d at 232 (quoting State v. Googins, 640 A.2d 1060, 1062 (Me. 1994)).

2001See Warren, 1998 ME 136, ¶ 17 , 711 A.2d at 857 ; see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). [¶ 30] The question presented is whether the failure to submit the omitted fact to the jury for its consideration resulted in a deprivation of Burdick's substantial rights. [17] Burdick must convince us that the omission of the instruction "`when reviewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.'" Child, 1999 ME 198, ¶ 7 , 743 A.2d at 232 (quoting State v. Googins, 640 A.2d 1060, 1062 (Me. 1994)).

1999To vacate a judgment on the basis of obvious error, we must determine that “the offending instruction when reviewed with the charge as a whole constituted highly prejudicial error tending to produce manifest injustice.” Id. (quoting State v. Weidul, 628 A.2d 135, 137 (Me.1993)) (emphasis added). [¶ 8] We have broken down the burglary statute into four elements that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: “(1) entry (2) of a structure (3) with the knowledge that the entry is not licensed and (4) with the intent to commit a crime within the structure.” State v. Thibeault, 402 A.2d

1998See Daniels, 663 A.2d at 36 . 4 IV. [¶ 13] At trial, Hunter testified, over Berry’s objection, that Berry said that he was going to purchase drugs with the stolen money.

1993We agree with Weidul that the court's instructions were erroneous in the following particulars: 1) The court's instructions failed to strike the crucial balance between the competing considerations of the desirability of a juror's reconsideration of his opinions in order to reach a verdict and the need that any verdict rendered accurately reflect honestly held beliefs, see State v. Cote, 507 A.2d 584, 586 (Me. 1986); 2) The charge repeatedly emphasized the desirability of reaching a verdict while failing to properly note the countervailing, but no less important, requirement that an individual

1993We agree with Weidul that the court's instructions were erroneous in the following particulars: 1) The court's instructions failed to strike the crucial balance between the competing considerations of the desirability of a juror's reconsideration of his opinions in order to reach a verdict and the need that any verdict rendered accurately reflect honestly held beliefs, see State v. Cote, 507 A.2d 584, 586 (Me. 1986); 2) The charge repeatedly emphasized the desirability of reaching a verdict while failing to properly note the countervailing, but no less important, requirement that an individual

1993We agree with Weidul that the court's instructions were erroneous in the following particulars: 1) The court's instructions failed to strike the crucial balance between the competing considerations of the desirability of a juror's reconsideration of his opinions in order to reach a verdict and the need that any verdict rendered accurately reflect honestly held beliefs, see State v. Cote, 507 A.2d 584, 586 (Me. 1986); 2) The charge repeatedly emphasized the desirability of reaching a verdict while failing to properly note the countervailing, but no less important, requirement that an individual

1993We agree with Weidul that the court’s instructions were erroneous in the following particulars: 1) The court’s instructions failed to strike the crucial balance between the competing considerations of the desirability of a juror’s reconsideration of his opinions in order to reach a verdict and the need that any verdict rendered accurately reflect honestly held beliefs, see State v. Cote, 507 A.2d 584, 586 (Me. 1986); 2) The charge repeatedly emphasized the desirability of reaching a verdict while failing to properly note the countervailing, but no less important, requirement that an individual

1982The instruction challenged here represents a variation of the Allen “dynamite” charge, see Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 , 17 S.Ct. 154, 157 , 41 L.Ed. 528, 530 (1886), which when properly used is intended to assure the existence of a genuine impasse as a predicate for a determination of “manifest necessity” for a mistrial if the jury cannot ultimately agree on a verdict.

1982The instruction challenged here represents a variation of the Allen “dynamite” charge, see Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 , 17 S.Ct. 154, 157 , 41 L.Ed. 528, 530 (1886), which when properly used is intended to assure the existence of a genuine impasse as a predicate for a determination of “manifest necessity” for a mistrial if the jury cannot ultimately agree on a verdict.