11 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Stone v. Williamsongreen2 sentences2010This shift is significant because a traditional medical malpractice injury creates liability for the entire injury, while a lost opportunity claim creates liability only for that portion of the increased risk of injury attributable to a defendant.8 Make no mistake: Although Justice CAVANAGH feigns that he is unaware of the significant change in the law being made in this case, the reduced burden of persuasion and the broader scope of damages permitted is the reason the new majority now applies lost opportunity causation principles to all medical malpractice claims.9 Rather than attempting to g 2010This shift is significant because a traditional medical malpractice injury creates liability for the entire injury, while a lost opportunity claim creates liability only for that portion of the increased risk of injury attributable to a defendant.8 Make no mistake: Although Justice CAVANAGH feigns that he is unaware of the significant change in the law being made in this case, the reduced burden of persuasion and the broader scope of damages permitted is the reason the new majority now applies lost opportunity causation principles to all medical malpractice claims.9 Rather than attempting to g | 3 | 5 |
Weymers v. Kheragreen2 sentences2010In accord with this analysis, this Court has stated: “The lost opportunity doctrine allows a plaintiff to recover when the defendant’s negligence possibly, i.e., [by] a probability of fifty percent or less, caused the plaintiffs injury.” Weymers v Khera, 454 Mich 639, 648 ; 563 NW2d 647 (1997) (emphasis added). 2010In accord with this analysis, this Court has stated: “The lost opportunity doctrine allows a plaintiff to recover when the defendant’s negligence possibly, i.e., [by] a probability of fifty percent or less, caused the plaintiffs injury.” Weymers v Khera, 454 Mich 639, 648 ; 563 NW2d 647 (1997) (emphasis added). | 3 | 5 |
Falcon v. Memorial Hospitalred2 sentences2010This shift is significant because a traditional medical malpractice injury creates liability for the entire injury, while a lost opportunity claim creates liability only for that portion of the increased risk of injury attributable to a defendant.8 Make no mistake: Although Justice CAVANAGH feigns that he is unaware of the significant change in the law being made in this case, the reduced burden of persuasion and the broader scope of damages permitted is the reason the new majority now applies lost opportunity causation principles to all medical malpractice claims.9 Rather than attempting to g 2009Chief Justice TAYLOR, joined by Justices CORRIGAN and YOUNG, concluded that lost-opportunity claims do not exist because the second sentence of MCL 600.2912a(2) is so incomprehensible that it is judicially unenforceable and, further, because the Legislature reinstated the traditional elements of medical malpractice when it amended the statute after the Supreme Court adopted the lost-opportunity doctrine in Falcon, supra. Stone, supra at 160-162 (TAYLOR, C.J.). | 2 | 4 |
Ykimoff v. W a Foote Memorial Hospitalgreen2 sentences2022Stone, 482 Mich at 152 (opinion by TAYLOR, C.J.); Ykimoff v W A Foote Mem Hosp, 285 Mich App 80, 99-100 ; 776 NW2d 114 (2009). 2022Stone, 482 Mich at 152 (opinion by TAYLOR, C.J.); Ykimoff v W A Foote Mem Hosp, 285 Mich App 80, 99-100 ; 776 NW2d 114 (2009). | 1 | 2 |
Vitale v. Reddygreen2 sentences2009Chief Justice TAYLOR agreed that the lost opportunity doctrine was a unique theory of recovery that was distinct from traditional medical malpractice actions: “ ‘This theory is potentially available in situations where a plaintiff cannot prove that a defendant’s actions were the cause of his injuries, but can prove that the defendant’s actions deprived him of a chance to avoid those injuries.’ ” Id. at 152 , quoting Vitale v Reddy, 150 Mich App 492, 502 ; 389 NW2d 456 (1986). 2009Chief Justice TAYLOR agreed that the lost opportunity doctrine was a unique theory of recovery that was distinct from traditional medical malpractice actions: “ ‘This theory is potentially available in situations where a plaintiff cannot prove that a defendant’s actions were the cause of his injuries, but can prove that the defendant’s actions deprived him of a chance to avoid those injuries.’ ” Id. at 152 , quoting Vitale v Reddy, 150 Mich App 492, 502 ; 389 NW2d 456 (1986). | 1 | 2 |
James v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1995Finally, we note, as did Justice Levin in Falcon, 436 Mich 469 , n 41, that other courts have recognized that the lost opportunity doctrine applies in cases not involving death. 4 See, e.g., Borgren v United States, 723 F Supp 581 (D Kan, 1989); James v United States, 483 F Supp 581, 587 (ND Cal, 1980); Harris, supra. Because we extend the lost opportunity doctrine to cases not involving death, we find that the testimony of plaintiffs expert that plaintiff would have had a thirty to forty percent chance of retaining kidney function had she been timely diagnosed and treated for Goodpasture’s Sy | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Fulton v. William Beaumont Hospital
green
2 sentences2010The concurring opinion concluded that plaintiff also failed to present sufficient evidence of proximate causation because his “preexisting medical condition” precluded him from satisfying “his burden of establishing the existence of a genuine factual dispute concerning whether defendants’ alleged professional negligence ‘more probably tha[n] not’ proximately caused his stroke.”25 We granted leave to appeal and directed the parties to brief: 22 Fulton v William Beaumont Hosp, 253 Mich App 70 ; 655 NW2d 569 (2002). 23 O’Neal v St John Hosp & Med Ctr, 477 Mich 1087 (2007). 24 O’Neal v St John Hos 2010The concurring opinion concluded that plaintiff also failed to present sufficient evidence of proximate causation because his “preexisting medical condition” precluded him from satisfying “his burden of establishing the existence of a genuine factual dispute concerning whether defendants’ alleged professional negligence ‘more probably tha[n] not’ proximately caused his stroke.” 25 We granted leave to appeal and directed the parties to brief: (1) whether the requirements set forth in the second sentence of MCL 600.2912a(2) apply in this case; (2) if not, whether the plaintiff presented sufficie | 2 | 2009–2010 |
Taylor v. Kent Radiology, PC
green
1 sentence2022Id. at 509 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Skinner v. Square D Co.
green
2 sentences2010But, unlike in Falcon, the new majority here does not recognize merely an exception to the traditional 3 1977 PA 272 . 4 Falcon v Mem Hosp, 436 Mich 443 ; 462 NW2d 44 (1990). 5 See MCL 600.2912a, as amended by 1993 PA 78 . 6 MCL 600.2912a(2). 7 Skinner v Square D Co, 445 Mich 153, 166 ; 516 NW2d 475 (1994) (citation omitted). 3 malpractice requirement of “but for” causation, it essentially eliminates the traditional rule entirely by importing that exception into all malpractice cases. 2010But this is unimportant because the new majority now only requires causation for the increased risk of injury. 32 Id. (emphasis added). 18 Simply stated, the plaintiff has not asserted, and neither Justice HATHAWAY’s opinion nor Justice CAVANAGH’s concurring opinion assert—that the alleged medical malpractice increased his chance of suffering a stroke by the more than 50 percentage points required to prove proximate causation.33 This fact irrefutably establishes that the plaintiff asserts a lost opportunity claim, not a traditional medical malpractice claim. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
O'Neal v. St. John Hosp. & Medical Center
green
1 sentence2010The concurring opinion concluded that plaintiff also failed to present sufficient evidence of proximate causation because his “preexisting medical condition” precluded him from satisfying “his burden of establishing the existence of a genuine factual dispute concerning whether defendants’ alleged professional negligence ‘more probably tha[n] not’ proximately caused his stroke.”25 We granted leave to appeal and directed the parties to brief: 22 Fulton v William Beaumont Hosp, 253 Mich App 70 ; 655 NW2d 569 (2002). 23 O’Neal v St John Hosp & Med Ctr, 477 Mich 1087 (2007). 24 O’Neal v St John Hos | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Velez v. Tuma
green
1 sentence2009See Ykimoff, 285 Mich App at 99 ; Velez, 283 Mich App at 407 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Wickens v. Oakwood Healthcare System
green
2 sentences2009Id. 60-61 . 2009Id. at 60-61 , 631 N.W.2d 686 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Pennington v. Longabaugh
green
2 sentences2009Regardless of whether a plaintiff alleges a traditional medical malpractice or a lost-opportunity claim, the plaintiff must establish: “(1) the standard of care, (2) breach of that standard of care, (3) injury, and (4) proximate causation between the alleged breach and the injury.” Pennington v Longabaugh, 271 Mich App 101, 104 ; 719 NW2d 616 (2006). 2009Regardless of whether a plaintiff alleges a traditional medical malpractice or a lost-opportunity claim, the plaintiff must establish: “(1) the standard of care, (2) breach of that standard of care, (3) injury, and (4) proximate causation between the alleged breach and the injury.” Pennington v Longabaugh, 271 Mich App 101, 104 ; 719 NW2d 616 (2006). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Wickens v. Oakwood Healthcare System
green
2 sentences2002Weymers, supra at 650 , 563 N.W.2d 647 ; Wickens, supra, 242 Mich.App. at 391 , 619 N.W.2d 7 . 2002Weymers, supra at 650 , 563 N.W.2d 647 ; Wickens, supra, 242 Mich.App. at 391 , 619 N.W.2d 7 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Weymers v. Khera
green
2 sentences1997Plaintiff appealed in the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the trial court, holding that the lost opportunity doctrine applied to physical injury less than death. 210 Mich App 231, 236-237 ; 533 NW2d 334 (1995). 1997Plaintiff appealed in the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the trial court, holding that the lost opportunity doctrine applied to physical injury less than death. 210 Mich App 231, 236-237 ; 533 NW2d 334 (1995). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Harris v. Kissling
green
1 sentence1995Finally, we note, as did Justice Levin in Falcon, 436 Mich 469 , n 41, that other courts have recognized that the lost opportunity doctrine applies in cases not involving death. 4 See, e.g., Borgren v United States, 723 F Supp 581 (D Kan, 1989); James v United States, 483 F Supp 581, 587 (ND Cal, 1980); Harris, supra. Because we extend the lost opportunity doctrine to cases not involving death, we find that the testimony of plaintiffs expert that plaintiff would have had a thirty to forty percent chance of retaining kidney function had she been timely diagnosed and treated for Goodpasture’s Sy | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Borgren v. United States
green
1 sentence1995Finally, we note, as did Justice Levin in Falcon, 436 Mich 469 , n 41, that other courts have recognized that the lost opportunity doctrine applies in cases not involving death. 4 See, e.g., Borgren v United States, 723 F Supp 581 (D Kan, 1989); James v United States, 483 F Supp 581, 587 (ND Cal, 1980); Harris, supra. Because we extend the lost opportunity doctrine to cases not involving death, we find that the testimony of plaintiffs expert that plaintiff would have had a thirty to forty percent chance of retaining kidney function had she been timely diagnosed and treated for Goodpasture’s Sy | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.