judge refused instruction in Mississippi

2017“The trial court enjoys considerable discretion regarding the form and substance of jury instructions.” Higgins v. State, 725 So. 2d 220, 223 (¶15) (Miss. 1998).

2017"The trial court enjoys considerable discretion regarding the form and substance of jury instructions." Higgins v. State , 725 So.2d 220 , 223 (¶ 15) (Miss. 1998).

2024When a defendant argues “that he was entitled to a lesser-included offense instruction, we conduct de novo review, as this is a question of law.” Downs, 962 So. 2d at 1258 (¶10). “[A] defendant has an absolute right to have the jury instructed on . . . lesser-included offenses if the evidence supports such an instruction, and there is reversible error in not giving the lesser-included offense instruction.” Id. at 1260 (¶22) (quotation marks omitted).

2024When a defendant argues “that he was entitled to a lesser-included offense instruction, we conduct de novo review, as this is a question of law.” Downs, 962 So. 2d at 1258 (¶10). “[A] defendant has an absolute right to have the jury instructed on . . . lesser-included offenses if the evidence supports such an instruction, and there is reversible error in not giving the lesser-included offense instruction.” Id. at 1260 (¶22) (quotation marks omitted).

2020You might be able to say that you believe [him] to be guilty, and yet, if you are not able to say on your oaths, beyond reasonable doubt, that [he] is guilty, it is your sworn duty to find the defendant “Not Guilty.” 35 The State objected to D-3 as an attempt to define reasonable doubt, and the judge refused the instruction on those grounds. ¶97. “[The Mississippi Supreme] Court has long held that a definition of reasonable doubt is not a proper instruction for the jury; reasonable doubt defines itself.” Fulgham v. State, 46 So. 3d 315, 332 (¶46) (Miss. 2010) (quotation marks omitted).

2017Cooper argues that the judge abused his discretion by refusing D-3 because it is nearly identical to the instruction that the Mississippi Supreme Court approved in Maye v. State, 49 So.3d 1124, 1131-32 (¶¶ 16-18) (Miss. 2010).

2017Cooper argues that the judge abused his discretion by refusing D-3 because it is nearly identical to the instruction that the Mississippi Supreme Court approved in Maye v. State, 49 So. 3d 1124, 1131-32 (¶¶16-18) (Miss. 2010).

2008Specifically, the instruction charged the jury to find Brooks guilty of simple assault if it was proven that Brooks "purposefully or knowingly or recklessly attempted to cause bodily injury." As it was noted by the trial court that Brooks testified he never intended to harm anyone, the trial judge refused the instruction stating that he could not "think of a scenario where this could be simple assault, since we can no longer say he recklessly attempted to cause bodily injury." [4] We agree as a "court may refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law." Heidel v. State, 587 So.2d 835,

2008Specifically, the instruction charged the jury to find Brooks guilty of simple assault if it was proven that Brooks “purposefully or knowingly or recklessly attempted to cause bodily injury.” As it was noted by the trial court that Brooks testified he never intended to harm anyone, the trial judge refused the instruction stating that he could not “think of a scenario where this could be simple assault, since we can no longer say he recklessly attempted to cause bodily injury.” 4 We agree as a “court may refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law.” Heidel v. State, 587 So.2d 835, 84

2004"It is also well established that instructions to the jury should not single out or contain comments on specific evidence." Lester v. State, 744 So.2d 757, 759 (¶ 6) (Miss.1999).

1984In so holding, the trial judge appears to be echoing the view of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit expressed in Bell v. Watkins, 692 F.2d 999, 1004-1005 (5th Cir.1982) and Jones v. Thigpen, 741 F.2d 805, 816 (5th Cir.1984).

1984In so holding, the trial judge appears to be echoing the view of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit expressed in Bell v. Watkins, 692 F.2d 999, 1004-1005 (5th Cir.1982) and Jones v. Thigpen, 741 F.2d 805, 816 (5th Cir.1984).