antisubrogation rule in New York

2018Under the antisubrogation rule, "an insurer has no right of subrogation against its own insured for a claim arising from the very risk for which the insured was covered" ( ELRAC, Inc. v Ward , 96 NY2d 58, 76 [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2012While Kitaw, as lessee of a vehicle owned by Thrifty, was also covered, pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 370 (1) (b), by the policy Reliance issued to Thrifty (see ELRAC, Inc. v Ward, 96 NY2d 58, 73-75 [2001]), the antisubrogation rule does not prevent Reliance, as Thrifty’s subrogee, from seeking to recover from Kitaw any amounts above the limits of Kitaw’s coverage under the Reliance policy that Reliance has paid in settlement of the underlying personal injury actions (see id. at 77-78 ).

2017We reject the contention of Camden and Bovis that the antisubrogation rule *1164 entitles them to dismissal of Nole’s cross claim for contribution (see generally Lodovichetti v Baez, 31 AD3d 718, 719 [2006]).

2009“Pursuant to the antisubrogation rule, ‘[a]n insurer . . . has no right of subrogation against its own insured for a claim arising from the very risk for which the insured was covered’ ” (Lodovichetti v Baez, 31 AD3d 718, 719 [2006], quoting North Star Reins.

2012The defendant also failed to demonstrate his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the alternative ground that the antisubrogation rule precluded the plaintiffs from seeking indemnification from him (see Hamilton v Khalife, 289 AD2d 444, 445-446 [2001]).

2012The defendant also failed to demonstrate his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law on the alternative ground that the antisubrogation rule precluded the plaintiffs from seeking indemnification from him (see Hamilton v Khalife, 289 AD2d 444, 445-446 [2001]).

2012Accordingly, since the defendant did not establish his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of his cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; Winegrad v New York Univ.

2012Accordingly, since the defendant did not establish his prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of his cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the amended complaint (see Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320, 324 [1986]; Winegrad v New York Univ.

2013Boston’s common-law indemnification claim against Pro-Quest should be dismissed based on the antisubrogation rule (see North Star Reins., 82 NY2d at 294 ).

2013Boston’s common-law indemnification claim against Pro-Quest should be dismissed based on the antisubrogation rule (see North Star Reins., 82 NY2d at 294 ).

2007Co. v Austin Powder Co., 68 NY2d 465, 468 [1986].) To allow the insurer’s subrogation right to extend beyond a third party and to reach its own insured would permit an insurer, in effect, “to pass the incidence of the loss . . . from itself to its own insured and thus avoid the coverage which its insured purchased.” (Id. at 471.) The rule against allowing a subrogation claim against an insured is based, in part, on the “potential for conflict of interest that is inherent in these situations.” (Id. at 472.) The antisubrogation rule does not apply where there are two distinct and separate polici

2001Co. v Austin Powder Co., 68 NY2d 465, 471 .) In circumstances more analogous to those of the instant case, the antisubrogation rule bars an insurance company from being subrogated to the indemnification claim of a property owner against a general contractor whose negligence was the sole cause of the loss where the contractor, pursuant to its contract with the owner, procured insurance coverage for the owner whether as an additional insured under the contractor’s policy or under a separate policy (North Star Reins. v Continental, 82 NY2d 281 ).

2006Supreme Court properly concluded that the antisubrogation rule bars the third-party action inasmuch as Dunlop and Nicholson & Hall were insured for the same risk under the same policies (see Hailey v New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 214 AD2d 986, 987 [1995]; see also Phoenix Ins.

1998Further, because the antisubrogation rule applies and the third-party complaint does not seek damages in excess of the coverage limits of the comprehensive general liability policy issued by Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, the court properly dismissed that part of the third-party action seeking contractual indemnification (see, Hailey v New York State Elec. & Gas Corp., 214 AD2d 986, 987 ).

2025Additionally, enforcement of the rule seeks to prohibit an insurer from passing its loss to its own insured." ( 92 NY2d 363, 373, 703 [1998], emphasis supplied.) See also Millennium Holdings LLC v. Glidden Co ., "However, the antisubrogation rule is an exception to the right of subrogation ( see Pennsylvania Gen.

2016We reasoned that, although the operator was not named on the policy, the operator qualified as an insured because the policy covered permissive users of the vehicle, and that the distinction between a named insured and a permissive user was “immaterial for *416 purposes of application of the antisubrogation rule” ( 92 NY2d at 375 ).

2025Corp ., 216 AD2d 538 [2nd Dept. 1995].) Furthermore, as the policy did not require the defendant to defend the plaintiff in any litigation action between the plaintiff and a third party, the other public policy ground of the antisubrogation rule is not implicated. ("The two primary purposes of the antisubrogation rule are to avoid "a conflict of interest that would undercut the insurer's incentive to provide an insured with a vigorous defense" and "to prohibit an insurer from passing its loss to its own insured" ( id .)." ( Millennium Holdings LLC v. Glidden Co ., 27 NY3d 406, 415 [2016].) The

2023"The essential element of the antisubrogation rule is that the party to which the insurer seeks to subrogate is covered by the relevant insurance policy" [*2]( Millennium Holdings LLC v Glidden Co. , 27 NY3d 406, 416 ).

2012Co. v City of New York, 293 AD2d 568, 570 [2002]) and that consequently, the plaintiff, by prosecuting the action, in effect, on behalf of Lloyd’s, was not making a claim against one of Lloyd’s insureds.

2008Co. v City of New York, 293 AD2d at 570 ).

2011Furthermore, although Burns is correct that the assertion with respect to the antisubrogation rule is not preserved for our review, West Valley may raise that assertion for the first time on appeal because it involves “ ‘[a] question of law appearing on the face of the record . . . [that] could not have been avoided by [Burns] if brought to [its] attention in a timely manner’ ” (Art Capital Partners, LP v Tyco Acquisition Corp. XVIII, 71 AD3d 1404, 1405 , quoting Oram v Capone, 206 AD2d 839, 840 ).

2011Furthermore, although Burns is correct that the assertion with respect to the antisubrogation rule is not preserved for our review, West Valley may raise that assertion for the first time on appeal because it involves “ ‘[a] question of law appearing on the face of the record . . . [that] could not have been avoided by [Burns] if brought to [its] attention in a timely manner’ ” (Art Capital Partners, LP v Tyco Acquisition Corp. XVIII, 71 AD3d 1404, 1405 [2010], quoting Oram v Capone, 206 AD2d 839, 840 [1994]).

2011Furthermore, although Burns is correct that the assertion with respect to the antisubrogation rule is not preserved for our review, West Valley may raise that assertion for the first time on appeal because it involves “ ‘[a] question of law appearing on the face of the record . . . [that] could not have been avoided by [Burns] if brought to [its] attention in a timely manner’ ” (Art Capital Partners, LP v Tyco Acquisition Corp. XVIII, 71 AD3d 1404, 1405 , quoting Oram v Capone, 206 AD2d 839, 840 ).

2011Furthermore, although Burns is correct that the assertion with respect to the antisubrogation rule is not preserved for our review, West Valley may raise that assertion for the first time on appeal because it involves “ ‘[a] question of law appearing on the face of the record . . . [that] could not have been avoided by [Burns] if brought to [its] attention in a timely manner’ ” (Art Capital Partners, LP v Tyco Acquisition Corp. XVIII, 71 AD3d 1404, 1405 [2010], quoting Oram v Capone, 206 AD2d 839, 840 [1994]).

2011The antisubrogation rule bars Klewin’s third-party action inasmuch as Mader and Klewin were insured under the same primary and excess policies (see generally ELRAC, Inc. v Ward, 96 NY2d 58, 76 , rearg denied 96 NY2d 855 ), except to the extent that Klewin seeks indemnification for amounts in excess of the coverage afforded by the policies at issue (see Bruno v Price Enters., 299 AD2d 846, 848 ).

2011The antisubrogation rule bars Klewin’s third-party action inasmuch as Mader and Klewin were insured under the same primary and excess policies (see generally ELRAC, Inc. v Ward, 96 NY2d 58, 76 [2001], rearg denied 96 NY2d 855 [2001]), except to the extent that Klewin seeks indemnification for amounts in excess of the coverage afforded by the policies at issue (see Bruno v Price Enters., 299 AD2d 846, 848 [2002]).

2006The antisubrogation rule applies only to the policy limits of the comprehensive general liability policy at issue, and claims for contribution and/or indemnification beyond the limits of a common insurance policy are not barred (see ELRAC, Inc. v Ward, 96 NY2d 58, 78 [2001]; Blanco v CVS Corp., 18 AD3d 685 [2005]; Dunn v Hurtt, 4 AD3d 884 [2004]; Curran v City of New York, 234 AD2d 254 [1996]).

2001Co., supra, 82 NY2d, at 296 [antisubrogation rule did not apply where exclusions rendered policy inapplicable to the loss]; Curran v City of New York, 234 AD2d 254, 255 [holding that the antisubrogation rule applied only up to the policy limits of a liability policy]).

2005Realty Corp., 228 AD2d 174, 174 [1996]).

2002Realty Corp., 228 AD2d 174, 174 ; see, Billion v Parade Mgt.

2003Recovery is warranted for the reasons stated in this Court’s previous decision, rejecting application of the antisubrogation rule to bar Wausau’s claim for reimbursement ( 241 AD2d 166, 172 [1998]): “The court’s order prevents Wausau from recovering from American the payment Wausau has made on behalf of Turner/450 for injury sustained by an American employee.

2001Co., 241 AD2d 166, 171 ; National Union Fire Ins.

2026This doctrine "provides that an insurance company cannot recover from its own insured for the very risk for which the insured was covered" ( Storms v Dominican Coll. of Blauvelt , 308 AD2d 575, 577 ; see Homeland Ins.

2026This doctrine "provides that an insurance company cannot recover from its own insured for the very risk for which the insured was covered" ( Storms v Dominican Coll. of Blauvelt , 308 AD2d 575, 577; see Homeland Ins.

2019ACT failed to show that Breeze's reliance on the same subcontract that ACT relies on has "hindered [ACT] in the preparation of [its] case" or "prevented [it] from taking some measure in support of [its] position" ( see Jacobson v McNeil Consumer & Specialty Pharms. , 68 AD3d 652, 655 [1st Dept 2009] [internal quotation marks omitted]).