80 Ohio opinions name it 4 courts 1987–2025 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hamilton v. Ohio Savings Bankgreen2 sentences2018Hamilton , 82 Ohio St.3d at 71 -72 , 694 N.E.2d 442 . *649 {¶ 17} This court has explained that the identifiable class requirement is not to be confused with the predominance requirement set forth in Civ.R. 23(B)(3). 2018Hamilton , 82 Ohio St.3d at 71 -72 , 694 N.E.2d 442 . *649 {¶ 17} This court has explained that the identifiable class requirement is not to be confused with the predominance requirement set forth in Civ.R. 23(B)(3). | 2 | 8 |
In re Live Concert Antitrust Litigationgreen2 sentences2022See In re Live Antitrust Litigation, 247 F.R.D. 98 (C.D. 2015See In re Live Antitrust Litigation, 247 F.R.D. 98 (C.D.Cal.2007) (recognizing the distinction between demonstrating the fact of damages and the amount of damages, and determining that while the latter does not preclude class certification, the former does.); Catlin v. Washington Energy Co., 791 F.2d 1343 , 1350 (9th Cir.1986) (“[T]he requirement that plaintiff prove ‘both the fact of damage and the amount of damage * * * are two separate proofs’ ”). | 2 | 2 |
Schmidt v. Avco Corp.green2 sentences2019“To meet the predominance requirement, a plaintiff must establish that issues subject to generalized proof and applicable to the class as a whole predominate over those issues that are subject to only individualized proof.” (Citation omitted.) Id. at ¶ 30; Schmidt v. Avco Corp., 15 Ohio St.3d 310, 313 , 473 N.E.2d 822 (1984) (“in determining whether common questions of law or fact predominate over individual issues, it is not sufficient that common questions merely exist; rather, the common questions must represent a significant aspect of the case and they must be able to be resolved for all m 2019“To meet the predominance requirement, a plaintiff must establish that issues subject to generalized proof and applicable to the class as a whole predominate over those issues that are subject to only individualized proof.” (Citation omitted.) Id. at ¶ 30; Schmidt v. Avco Corp., 15 Ohio St.3d 310, 313 , 473 N.E.2d 822 (1984) (“in determining whether common questions of law or fact predominate over individual issues, it is not sufficient that common questions merely exist; rather, the common questions must represent a significant aspect of the case and they must be able to be resolved for all m | 1 | 25 |
Cope v. Metropolitan Life Insurancegreen2 sentences2016Reviewing the merits of the class, the court reiterated that “[i]t is now well established that ‘a claim will meet the predominance requirement when there exists generalized evidence which proves or disproves an element on a simultaneous, class-wide basis, since such proof obviates the need to examine each class member’s individual position.’” Id. at 429-430 , citing Lockwood Motors, Inc. v. Gen. 2015Co., 82 Ohio St.3d 426, 429-430 , 696 N.E.2d 1001 (1998) (“It is now well established that ‘a claim will meet the predominance requirement when there exists generalized evidence which proves or disproves an element on a simultaneous, class-wide basis, since such proof obviates the need to examine each class member’s individual position.’ Lockwood Motors, Inc. v. Gen. | 1 | 21 |
Lockwood Motors, Inc. v. General Motors Corp.green2 sentences2016Motors Corp., 162 F.R.D. 569, 580 (D.Minn.1995). {¶26} In certifying the class in that case, the Ohio Supreme Court reasoned that “a wide variety of claims may be established by common proof in cases involving similar form documents or the use of standardized procedures and practices.” Id. at 430. 2015Motors Corp. (D.Minn.1995), 162 F.R.D. 569 , 580”). {¶ 52} This court also granted jurisdiction over Ganley’s second proposition of law: “In a class action brought under the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act, R.C. 1345.09(B) requires the consumers to have sustained actual damages as a result of the challenged conduct.” I can readily agree with this proposition, as it correctly states Ohio law. | 1 | 17 |
Marks v. C.P. Chemical Co.green2 sentences2023Accordingly, “ ‘ “[t]o meet the predominance requirement, a plaintiff must establish that issues subject to generalized proof and applicable to the class as a whole predominate over those issues that are subject to only individualized proof.” ’ ” Id., quoting Young v. Nationwide Mut. 2022Co., Inc., 31 Ohio St.3d 200, 204 (1987). {¶29} In support of its position that the trial court failed to adequately analyze the predominance requirement set forth in Civ.R. 23(B), KNR argues that the trial court failed to address how it would be possible to determine KNR’s responsibility for the charges that Dr. Ghoubrial imposed on his patients by evidence common to all class members in a single adjudication. | 1 | 6 |
Baughman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurancegreen2 sentences2024"To meet the predominance requirement, a plaintiff must establish that issues subject to generalized proof and applicable to the class as a whole predominate over those issues that are subject to only individualized proof." Cullen, 2013-Ohio-4733 at ¶ 30 . "[A] claim will meet the predominance requirement when there exists generalized evidence which proves or disproves an element on a simultaneous, class-wide basis, since such proof obviates the need to examine each class member's individual position." Baughman, 88 Ohio St.3d at 489 . {¶ 45} The trial court did not err by finding that the pred 2007The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that the predominance requirement is met "when there exists generalized evidence which proves or disproves an element on a simultaneous, class-wide basis, since such proof obviates the need to examine each class member's individual position." Baughman , 88 Ohio St.3d at 489 (Citations *Page 6 omitted). | 1 | 4 |
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsorgreen2 sentences2022And therefore "a key purpose of the predominance requirement is to test whether the proposed class is sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation." Felix at ¶ 35, citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997). {¶ 21} For common questions of law or fact to predominate, it is not sufficient that such questions merely exist; rather, they must also represent a significant aspect of the case and they must be capable of resolution for all members in a single adjudication. 2021A "key purpose" of the predominance requirement "is to test whether the proposed class is sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation." Felix, at ¶ 35, citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997). " 'For common questions of law or fact to predominate it is not sufficient that such questions merely exist; rather, they must represent a significant aspect of the case.' " Cullen, at ¶ 30, quoting Marks at 204 . | 1 | 4 |
Warner v. Waste Management, Inc.green2 sentences2013The rule permits numerous individuals “who have small claims that might not be worth litigating in individual actions to combine their resources and bring an action to vindicate their collective rights.” Id., quoting 7A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure, Section 1777, at 518 (2d Ed.1986). 10 {¶18} In challenging the predominance requirement of Civ.R. 23(B)(3), First Ohio and the Sureties argue that individual questions would dominate the class action against them because each class member would have to prove an actual injury resulted from any deficiency in their disclosure 2007In the court's determination of both predominance and superiority, "the key should be whether the efficiency and economy of common adjudication outweigh the difficulties and complexity of individual treatment of class members' claims." Warner , 36 Ohio St.3d at 96 (Internal citations omitted). {¶ 13} In this case, there are general allegations that Appellants orally misrepresented to Appellees the characteristics of the stock Appellants were selling, and that Appellants withheld certain information from Appellees that would have made a difference to Appellees in their decisions regarding purch | 1 | 4 |
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukesgreen2 sentences2014Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 588 (9th Cir.2012), quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 1 __, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2548, 2551 , 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011). 2014Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 588 (9th Cir.2012), quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 1 __, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2548, 2551 , 180 L.Ed.2d 374 (2011). | 1 | 3 |
Comcast Corp. v. Behrendgreen2 sentences2017Gale Dep. p. 69. [Ameritech] relies principally on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in [Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S.Ct. 1426 , 185 L.Ed.2d 515 (2013)]. [Ameritech] argues that Comcast stands for the proposition that [Intermessage] must provide damages model susceptible to measurement across the entire class in order to satisfy the predominance requirement. 2017Gale Dep. p. 69. [Ameritech] relies principally on the United States Supreme Court’s decision in [Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S.Ct. 1426 , 185 L.Ed.2d 515 (2013)]. [Ameritech] argues that Comcast stands for the proposition that [Intermessage] must provide damages model susceptible to measurement across the entire class in order to satisfy the predominance requirement. | 1 | 2 |
cluster 330740green2 sentences2022LEXIS 196 , at *55-56 (Jan. 3, 2012): When evaluating damages in the predominance inquiry, "[t]he amount of damages is invariably an individual question and does not defeat class action treatment." Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 , 905 (9th cir.1975) (emphasis added); see also Negrete v. Allianz Life Ins. 2015As one federal trial court recently explained, When evaluating damages in the predominance inquiry, “[t]he amount of damages is invariably an individual question and does not defeat class action treatment.” Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 , 905 (9th Cir.1975) (emphasis added); see also Negrete v. Allianz Life Ins. | 1 | 2 |
Wilson v. Brush Wellman, Inc.green2 sentences2004We have held, however, that to establish commonality predominance for purposes of Civ.R. 23(B)(3), “it is not sufficient that common questions merely exist; rather, the” common questions must represent a significant aspect of the case and they must be able to be resolved for all members of the class in a single adjudication.” Schmidt v. Avco Corp. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 310, 313 , 15 OBR 439, 473 N.E.2d 822 . {¶ 20} Indeed, in Wilson v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 103 Ohio St.3d 538 , 2004-Ohio-5847 , 817 N.E.2d 59 , we upheld the trial court’s determination that the proposed class met the commonality 2004We have held, however, that to establish commonality predominance for purposes of Civ.R. 23(B)(3), “it is not sufficient that common questions merely exist; rather, the” common questions must represent a significant aspect of the case and they must be able to be resolved for all members of the class in a single adjudication.” Schmidt v. Avco Corp. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 310, 313 , 15 OBR 439, 473 N.E.2d 822 . {¶ 20} Indeed, in Wilson v. Brush Wellman, Inc., 103 Ohio St.3d 538 , 2004-Ohio-5847 , 817 N.E.2d 59 , we upheld the trial court’s determination that the proposed class met the commonality | 1 | 2 |
Winrod v. Loraingreen1 sentence2025See, e.g., Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 161, fn. 4 (3d Cir. 2015); Winrod v. Lorain, 2020-Ohio-157, ¶ 4 (9th Dist.). | 1 | 1 |
LaMarcus Ealy v. Pinkerton Government Servicesgreen1 sentence2025Servs., Inc., 514 Fed.Appx. 299, 308 (4th Cir. 2013). {¶ 78} “‘For common questions of law or fact to predominate, it is not sufficient that such questions merely exist; rather, they must present a significant aspect of the case. | 1 | 1 |
William Hayes v. WalMart Stores Incgreen1 sentence2025As the Third Circuit cautioned in Byrd when distinguishing the ascertainability and predominance inquiries: “ ‘ “[T]he ascertainability requirement focuses on whether individuals fitting the class definition may be identified without resort to mini-trials, whereas the predominance requirement focuses on whether essential elements of the class’s claims can be proven at trial with common, as opposed to individualized, evidence.” ’ ” Byrd at 164, quoting Grandalski v. Quest Diagnostics Inc., 767 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 2014), quoting Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 359 (3d Cir. 2013) | 1 | 1 |
Richard Grandalski v. Quest Diagnostics Incgreen1 sentence2025As the Third Circuit cautioned in Byrd when distinguishing the ascertainability and predominance inquiries: “ ‘ “[T]he ascertainability requirement focuses on whether individuals fitting the class definition may be identified without resort to mini-trials, whereas the predominance requirement focuses on whether essential elements of the class’s claims can be proven at trial with common, as opposed to individualized, evidence.” ’ ” Byrd at 164, quoting Grandalski v. Quest Diagnostics Inc., 767 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 2014), quoting Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 359 (3d Cir. 2013) | 1 | 1 |
Crystal Byrd v. Aaron's Incgreen2 sentences2025See, e.g., Byrd v. Aaron’s Inc., 784 F.3d 154, 161, fn. 4 (3d Cir. 2015); Winrod v. Lorain, 2020-Ohio-157, ¶ 4 (9th Dist.). 2025As the Third Circuit cautioned in Byrd when distinguishing the ascertainability and predominance inquiries: “ ‘ “[T]he ascertainability requirement focuses on whether individuals fitting the class definition may be identified without resort to mini-trials, whereas the predominance requirement focuses on whether essential elements of the class’s claims can be proven at trial with common, as opposed to individualized, evidence.” ’ ” Byrd at 164, quoting Grandalski v. Quest Diagnostics Inc., 767 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir. 2014), quoting Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d 349, 359 (3d Cir. 2013) | 1 | 1 |
| Susan Hicks v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Martino v. McDonald's System, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Beattie v. CenturyTel, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Rule v. Fort Dodge Animal Health, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Mazza v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Felix v. Ganley Chevrolet, Inc. (Slip Opinion)
green
2 sentences2024"The inquiry into whether there is damage-in-fact is distinct from the inquiry into actual damages[.]" Felix v. Ganley Chevrolet, Inc., 2015-Ohio-3430, ¶ 34 . "'When evaluating damages in the predominance inquiry, '[t]he amount of damages is invariably an individual question and does not defeat class action treatment.''" Id., quoting Gonzales v. Comcast Corp., 2012 U.S. Dist. 2024"The inquiry into whether there is damage-in-fact is distinct from the inquiry into actual damages[.]" Felix v. Ganley Chevrolet, Inc., 2015-Ohio-3430, ¶ 34 . "'When evaluating damages in the predominance inquiry, '[t]he amount of damages is invariably an individual question and does not defeat class action treatment.''" Id., quoting Gonzales v. Comcast Corp., 2012 U.S. Dist. | 7 | 2016–2024 |
Vasquez v. Superior Court
red
2 sentences2011Individual actions by each of the defrauded consumers are often impracticable because the amount of individual recovery would be insufficient to justify bringing a separate action; thus an unscrupulous seller retains the benefits of its wrongful conduct.’” Id. at 429, quoting Vasquez v. Superior Court of San Joaquin Cty. (1971), 4 Cal.3d 800, 808 , 94 Cal.Rptr. 796 , 484 P.2d 964 . {¶ 41} The high court went on to elucidate that “[i]t is now well established that ‘a claim will meet the predominance requirement when there exists generalized evidence which proves or disproves an element on a sim 2011Individual actions by each of the defrauded consumers are often impracticable because the amount of individual recovery would be insufficient to justify bringing a separate action; thus an unscrupulous seller retains the benefits of its wrongful conduct.’” Id. at 429, quoting Vasquez v. Superior Court of San Joaquin Cty. (1971), 4 Cal.3d 800, 808 , 94 Cal.Rptr. 796 , 484 P.2d 964 . {¶ 41} The high court went on to elucidate that “[i]t is now well established that ‘a claim will meet the predominance requirement when there exists generalized evidence which proves or disproves an element on a sim | 5 | 2001–2011 |
Cullen v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
green
2 sentences2024"To meet the predominance requirement, a plaintiff must establish that issues subject to generalized proof and applicable to the class as a whole predominate over those issues that are subject to only individualized proof." Cullen, 2013-Ohio-4733 at ¶ 30 . "[A] claim will meet the predominance requirement when there exists generalized evidence which proves or disproves an element on a simultaneous, class-wide basis, since such proof obviates the need to examine each class member's individual position." Baughman, 88 Ohio St.3d at 489 . {¶ 45} The trial court did not err by finding that the pred 2019Civil Rule 23(B)(3) (“questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members”) {¶31} The predominance inquiry under Civil Rule 23(B)(3) “requires a court to balance questions common among class members with any dissimilarities between them, and if the court is satisfied that common questions predominate, it then should ‘consider whether any alternative methods exist for resolving the controversy and whether the class action method is in fact superior.’” (Citation omitted.) Cullen, 137 11 Ohio St.3d 373 , 2013-Ohio-4733 , 999 N.E.2d 614 | 4 | 2016–2024 |
Hoang v. Etrade Group, Inc.
green
2 sentences2011Here, appellant contends that the predominance requirement cannot be met where individualized inquiry into each EWU appraisal is inescapable based on the nature of Agrawal’s claim. 1. {¶ 28} Initially, appellant argues that establishing liability would require a fact-specific inquiry into the details of every individual lease-end inspection in order to determine whether the dealer, in fact, applied the “clean” standard during the lease-end appraisal. {¶ 29} Ford Credit’s argument relies on Young v. FirstMerit Bank, N.A., Cuyahoga App. No. 94913, 2011-Ohio-614 ; Linn v. Roto-Rooter, Inc., Cuyah 2011Here, appellant contends that the predominance requirement cannot be met where individualized inquiry into each EWU appraisal is inescapable based on the nature of Agrawal’s claim. 1. {¶ 28} Initially, appellant argues that establishing liability would require a fact-specific inquiry into the details of every individual lease-end inspection in order to determine whether the dealer, in fact, applied the “clean” standard during the lease-end appraisal. {¶ 29} Ford Credit’s argument relies on Young v. FirstMerit Bank, N.A., Cuyahoga App. No. 94913, 2011-Ohio-614 ; Linn v. Roto-Rooter, Inc., Cuyah | 4 | 2007–2019 |
Shaver v. Standard Oil Co.
green
2 sentences2006Co. (1990), 68 Ohio App.3d 783 , 798 . {¶ 27} In finding that the predominance requirement was met, the trial court stated: * * * The court finds that it is evident that questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate[.] * * * The court is convinced that plaintiffs are correct in their assertion that the common questions of law and fact regarding the claims of negligence and unconstitutional taking of property can be resolved with "one body of evidence, that regarding [defendants] conduct toward PPC." Moreover * * * the defenses asserted to be unique to particular plain 2005Co. (1990), 68 Ohio App.3d 783 , 798 . {¶ 27} In finding that the predominance requirement was met, the trial court stated: * * * The court finds that it is evident that questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate[.] * * * The court is convinced that plaintiffs are correct in their assertion that the common questions of law and fact regarding the claims of negligence and unconstitutional taking of property can be resolved with "one body of evidence, that regarding [defendants] conduct toward PPC." Moreover * * * the defenses asserted to be unique to particular plain | 4 | 2000–2006 |
George v. Ohio Department of Human Services
green
2 sentences2021"A court may examine the underlying claims only for the No. 20AP-217 7 purpose of determining whether common questions exist and predominate and not for the purpose of determining the validity of such claims." Id. {¶ 19} In the instant matter, in finding that the predominance requirement of Civ.R.23(B)(3) was met, the trial court stated: [t]he common question of law affecting every class member is whether [ODPS] was authorized to collect the $1.50 lamination fee. 2006Thus, in determining whether common questions of law or fact predominate over individual issues, "it is not sufficient that common questions merely exist; rather, the common questions must represent a significant aspect of the case and they must be able to be resolved for all members of the class in a single adjudication." Schmidt v. Avco Corp. (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 310 , 313 . {¶ 26} A trial court must also be mindful that "[q]uestions going to the merits of the action are not determined at the class certification stage." George v. Ohio Dept. of Human Serv. (2001), 145 Ohio App.3d 681 , 687 . | 3 | 2005–2021 |
Ojalvo v. Board of Trustees
green
2 sentences2002Ojalvo v. Bd. of Trustees of Ohio State Univ. (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 230, 235 ,12 OBR 313, 466 N.E.2d 875 . {¶ 32} When considering the predominance requirement, the Supreme Court has found that it will be satisfied “ ‘when there exists generalized evidence which proves or disproves an element on a simultaneous, class-wide basis, since such proof obviates the need to examine each class member’s individual position.’ ” Baughman, 88 Ohio St.3d at 489 , 727 N.E.2d 1265 , quoting Lockwood Motors, Inc. v. Gen. 2002Ojalvo v. Bd. of Trustees of Ohio State Univ. (1984), 12 Ohio St.3d 230, 235 ,12 OBR 313, 466 N.E.2d 875 . {¶ 32} When considering the predominance requirement, the Supreme Court has found that it will be satisfied “ ‘when there exists generalized evidence which proves or disproves an element on a simultaneous, class-wide basis, since such proof obviates the need to examine each class member’s individual position.’ ” Baughman, 88 Ohio St.3d at 489 , 727 N.E.2d 1265 , quoting Lockwood Motors, Inc. v. Gen. | 3 | 2002–2018 |
Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc.
green
2 sentences2022Lucas No. L- 01-1473, 2002-Ohio-5499 , ¶ 35, citing Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc. (C.A.11, 1997), 130 F.3d 999 , 1005. -15- Case No. 5-21-04 {¶28} On January 19, 2021, the trial court filed its “Decision on Remand” readdressing Colvin’s motion for class certification in light of this Court’s determination in Colvin I. 2002Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc. (C.A.11, 1997), 130 F.3d 999 , 1005 . "`[T]he issues in the class action that are subject to generalized proof, and thus applicable to the class as a whole, must predominate over those issues that are subject only to individualized proof.'" Id., quoting Kerr v. City of West Palm Beach (C.A.11, 1989), 875 F.2d 1546 , 1557-58 . | 2 | 2002–2022 |
Negrete v. Allianz Life Insurance Co. of North America
green
2 sentences2022Co. of North America, 238 F.R.D. 482 (C.D. 2015Co. of North America, 238 F.R.D. 482 (C.D.Cal. 2002 [sic, 2006]). | 2 | 2015–2022 |
Planned Parenthood Asss'n v. Project Jericho
green
2 sentences2018"The focus at this stage is on how the class is defined. 'The test is whether the means is specified at the time of certification to determine whether a particular individual is a member of the class.' " Hamilton at id. , quoting Planned Parenthood Assn. of Cincinnati, Inc. v. Project Jericho , 52 Ohio St.3d 56 , 63, 556 N.E.2d 157 (1990). {¶ 18} In his motion for class certification, Bowen sought to certify a class as defined as follows: "all persons who purchased automobile insurance from Farmers and paid premiums identified as paying for UM coverage on more than one vehicle in the household 2018"The focus at this stage is on how the class is defined. 'The test is whether the means is specified at the time of certification to determine whether a particular individual is a member of the class.' " Hamilton at id. , quoting Planned Parenthood Assn. of Cincinnati, Inc. v. Project Jericho , 52 Ohio St.3d 56 , 63, 556 N.E.2d 157 (1990). {¶ 18} In his motion for class certification, Bowen sought to certify a class as defined as follows: "all persons who purchased automobile insurance from Farmers and paid premiums identified as paying for UM coverage on more than one vehicle in the household | 2 | 2007–2018 |
Bernard v. First National Bank of Oregon
green
2 sentences1998Id. at 162, 550 P.2d at 1214 . 1998Id. at 162, 550 P.2d at 1214 . | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Cross v. Univ. of Toledo
green
1 sentence2025Id. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
| Repede v. Nunes, Unpublished Decision (8-10-2006) neutral | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Vinci v. American Can Co. green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Agrawal green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Lynch v. Dial Finance Co. of Ohio No. 1 green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Schmidt v. Avco Corp. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Catlin v. Washington Energy Company green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Stammco, L.L.C. v. United Tel. Co. of Ohio green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Sykes v. United States red | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Miller v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., E-07-047 (9-19-2008) neutral | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Amato v. General Motors Corp. green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Searles v. Germain Ford of Columbus, L.L.C., 08ap-728 (3-24-2009) green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Linn v. Roto-Rooter, Inc., Unpublished Decision (5-20-2004) green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| cluster 794047 green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Estate of Reed v. Hadley green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Cope v. Metro. Life Ins. Co. neutral | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Brown v. Lyons green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Dorna F. Kerr v. City of West Palm Beach green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| In re Tetracycline Cases green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.